Jesse Wall
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198727989
- eISBN:
- 9780191794285
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198727989.003.0007
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Human Rights and Immigration
This chapter aims to identify the particular structure of rights and duties that ought to apply to the use and storage of bodily material. This requires an assessment of whether the rights that arise ...
More
This chapter aims to identify the particular structure of rights and duties that ought to apply to the use and storage of bodily material. This requires an assessment of whether the rights that arise in items of bodily material are conceptually consistent with property rights. It is argued here that a right in bodily material that is in-itself is conceptually consistent with property rights and therefore such rights ought to obtain the legal structure of property rights. However, rights in bodily material that is for-itself or for-others are exclusive but non-contingent rights. In addition, insofar as these items of bodily material are self-ascribed, such rights are ambiguous. Rights in bodily material that is for-itself or for-others therefore ought to adopt a structure that is akin to the common law right to privacy. Hence, the law ought to develop a dualist approach to the legal status of bodily material.Less
This chapter aims to identify the particular structure of rights and duties that ought to apply to the use and storage of bodily material. This requires an assessment of whether the rights that arise in items of bodily material are conceptually consistent with property rights. It is argued here that a right in bodily material that is in-itself is conceptually consistent with property rights and therefore such rights ought to obtain the legal structure of property rights. However, rights in bodily material that is for-itself or for-others are exclusive but non-contingent rights. In addition, insofar as these items of bodily material are self-ascribed, such rights are ambiguous. Rights in bodily material that is for-itself or for-others therefore ought to adopt a structure that is akin to the common law right to privacy. Hence, the law ought to develop a dualist approach to the legal status of bodily material.
