Michael Riordan, Lillian Hoddeson, and Adrienne W. Kolb
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780226294797
- eISBN:
- 9780226305837
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226305837.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
Establishing the SSC Laboratory near Dallas, Texas, proved much more difficult than anticipated. As Central Design Group leaders did not participate in construction, SSC Director Roy Schwitters ...
More
Establishing the SSC Laboratory near Dallas, Texas, proved much more difficult than anticipated. As Central Design Group leaders did not participate in construction, SSC Director Roy Schwitters turned increasingly to engineers from the US military-industrial complex to fill key posts, leading to clashes with high-energy physicists. A major SSC redesign resulted in cost overruns greater than $2 billion, as the estimated cost grew from $5.9 billion to $8.25 billion. This major cost increase soured relations with DOE officials, especially Secretary James D. Watkins, who began installing trusted lieutenants into SSC leadership positions, such as Edward Siskin as General Manager; it abetted perceptions of an alien, military-industrial culture at the lab. This cost overrun provided ammunition for Congressional SSC opponents, who began accusing the DOE and physicists of project mismanagement. These claims were partly valid, for SSC managers had been laggard in establishing and validating the required computerized project-management control system.Less
Establishing the SSC Laboratory near Dallas, Texas, proved much more difficult than anticipated. As Central Design Group leaders did not participate in construction, SSC Director Roy Schwitters turned increasingly to engineers from the US military-industrial complex to fill key posts, leading to clashes with high-energy physicists. A major SSC redesign resulted in cost overruns greater than $2 billion, as the estimated cost grew from $5.9 billion to $8.25 billion. This major cost increase soured relations with DOE officials, especially Secretary James D. Watkins, who began installing trusted lieutenants into SSC leadership positions, such as Edward Siskin as General Manager; it abetted perceptions of an alien, military-industrial culture at the lab. This cost overrun provided ammunition for Congressional SSC opponents, who began accusing the DOE and physicists of project mismanagement. These claims were partly valid, for SSC managers had been laggard in establishing and validating the required computerized project-management control system.
Michael Riordan, Lillian Hoddeson, and Adrienne W. Kolb
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780226294797
- eISBN:
- 9780226305837
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226305837.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
The October 1993 termination of the Superconducting Super Collider by Congress was a stunning blow for the US high-energy physics community — and a watershed event in the history of Big Science. ...
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The October 1993 termination of the Superconducting Super Collider by Congress was a stunning blow for the US high-energy physics community — and a watershed event in the history of Big Science. Tunnel Visions follows the evolution of this multibillion-dollar basic scientific project from its origins in the Reagan Administration’s military buildup of the early 1980s to its post-Cold War demise a decade later. Obtaining support for this expensive project required physicists to make uncomfortable compromises and enter unfamiliar alliances with Department of Energy officials, Texas politicians and businessmen, and partners from the military-industrial complex. The billions of taxpayer dollars needed to build the SSC came with a level of public scrutiny few physicists had anticipated. The combination of this attention, ever-mounting SSC cost overruns, perceptions of mismanagement of the project by the physicists and DOE, and the lack of major foreign contributions were prominent factors in its termination. The book analyzes these and many other factors that contributed to the SSC’s demise, which occurred against the political backdrop of rapidly changing scientific needs as the United States transitioned from a Cold War footing in the early 1990s. Its death raises difficult questions about maintaining public support for such a large and expensive project during its lengthy construction period. Another important question is whether (and how) academic scientists and their government backers can manage such an enormous undertaking on their own. Comparisons with the successful European experience in building the Large Hadron Collider help to address these issues.Less
The October 1993 termination of the Superconducting Super Collider by Congress was a stunning blow for the US high-energy physics community — and a watershed event in the history of Big Science. Tunnel Visions follows the evolution of this multibillion-dollar basic scientific project from its origins in the Reagan Administration’s military buildup of the early 1980s to its post-Cold War demise a decade later. Obtaining support for this expensive project required physicists to make uncomfortable compromises and enter unfamiliar alliances with Department of Energy officials, Texas politicians and businessmen, and partners from the military-industrial complex. The billions of taxpayer dollars needed to build the SSC came with a level of public scrutiny few physicists had anticipated. The combination of this attention, ever-mounting SSC cost overruns, perceptions of mismanagement of the project by the physicists and DOE, and the lack of major foreign contributions were prominent factors in its termination. The book analyzes these and many other factors that contributed to the SSC’s demise, which occurred against the political backdrop of rapidly changing scientific needs as the United States transitioned from a Cold War footing in the early 1990s. Its death raises difficult questions about maintaining public support for such a large and expensive project during its lengthy construction period. Another important question is whether (and how) academic scientists and their government backers can manage such an enormous undertaking on their own. Comparisons with the successful European experience in building the Large Hadron Collider help to address these issues.
