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This chapter explores the issue of Europeanization primarily at the horizontal level of European Union (EU) policy formulation and the adaptation and Europeanization of large and small business interests in the new opportunity structures of Brussels. The movement of business and other societal interests towards the European level has long been associated with a neofunctional perspective on European integration and societal change. Business interests have always been associated with the changes in policy and polity described by the term Europeanization, begging the question of how does the study of ‘Europeanization’ add to the understanding of European business lobbying. To answer this, the first section of the chapter, ‘Europeanization and the Application to EU Public Policy’ defines what Europeanization is understand to be, and set outs a number of European policy-making process propositions to be explored empirically in the next section ‘The Europeanization of Business Interests in a Differentiated Policy Process’. This section looks at how institutional and organizational capabilities have affected representative ability over time, how firms of all sizes have developed ‘venue shopping’ strategies in a multilevel governance structure, and, finally (in resource dependency terms), how firm size affects the distinct rules and norms of interest representation with the European Commission.

This chapter attempts to tease out the implications of the individual chapters for the future of innovation and MOT in Japan, beginning with problems in the Japanese ‘knowledge-creating’ company model. The strengths of this model are also its weaknesses. In particular, Japanese companies have had difficulties in accessing external tacit knowledge and global knowledge networks. The emergence of a ‘dual innovation system’ is considered, which consists of a ‘reformed Japanese/large firm model’ and a ‘nascent network model’, both lying between closed and open innovation system model poles. Eight features of the former are identified. Policy, on the other hand, has become oriented toward promoting the latter, with limited success. Relations and tensions between the two are discussed.

This chapter develops the key argument of the book and sets the stage for the four detailed empirical case studies of company and industry level adjustment that follow. If the French economy appears neither blocked in reform, nor excessively dependent on the state, the focus on state and market as adjustment mechanisms needs to be replaced by a different focus. The chapter examines the role that large firms have played in corporate governance, labour relations, and industrial organization.

Numerous studies have explored the influence of firm size on the processes of technological innovation. Despite financial constraints and a limited knowledge base, small firms may possess a superior ability to innovate. In contrast, large firms often encounter systemic problems in transforming their extensive knowledge base to stimulate new innovations, despite the advantages of large research and development budgets, economies of scale and scope in production, and established links to customers. This chapter examines the nature of small firm advantages in building knowledge assets and organizational competence. Contrary to the assumption in economic reasoning that a large knowledge base is always an advantage, the limited knowledge base possessed by small entrepreneurial firms may be one of their key advantages. This advantage may be particularly significant when considered in the context of four other factors that are commonly observed in small firms: product development processes that more readily accommodate change and uncertainty; problem-solving heuristics that facilitate creative recombination of knowledge; close network ties between individuals that support transfers of non-codified knowledge; an internal organizational climate conducive to innovation.

Analyses the transition in the production regime in France from a state‐centred one led by public elite to a large firm‐centred regime between 1980 and 2000. It argues that large firms led institutional change by exploiting new policies in finance, labour relations, and regional development.

This chapter discusses the factors affecting the expansion of small and large firms. It covers access to capital, the continued existence of small firms, growth opportunities and economic growth. It highlights the competitive advantages of small and large firms.

Addresses the specificities of firm competencies using data on more than 400 of the largest firms in the world. It demonstrates that these firms are characterized by being increasingly ‘multitechnology’, and are both stable and differentiated, with the firms’ main products strongly influencing their technology profile and direction of localized technological search. Together with home‐country conditions, the main products are also found to play an important role for the rate of search. Any determinism is, however, modified, since when looking at levels and rates of increase in technological activities, unexplained variance suggests that there is considerable scope for managerial choice. The extensive empirical data are argued to support several challenging conclusions about large firms, such as: they are heavily constrained in their technology choices and a technology strategy cannot really be outsourced; they are immune to radical technological breakthroughs to a surprising extent; and they are less than ‘focused’ in their technology strategy.

This chapter lays out the key puzzle of the book: how did France manage a massive reorganization of its supply-side during the second half of the 1980s and 1990s, with quite beneficial economic performance as a result? Existing theories, market-based, state-based, and cultural, help us to understand part of the problem, but run up against problems. The chapter then goes on to present the key argument of the book — referring to the role of large firms in economic adjustment and industrial reorganization — and presents the structure of the book.

Analyses the development of big business in Britain, France and Germany from the 1920s to the 1950s. Companies with a share capital of £3 million or more in 1927 and £5 million or more in 1953 and a workforce of 10,000 or more for both years have been considered as large. While the number of large companies, especially in the new industries, increased everywhere, this was the period when Britain's advance, both in quantity and diversity, was most evident. German big business displayed remarkable stability given the political upheavals experienced by the country during this period. The foundations of modern big business in France were laid during these years and not, as too often assumed, in the 1960s.

This chapter looks at the salaried automobile engineer in South Korea's late industrialization with respect to two extreme typologies – the small‐ and medium‐sized firm, and the huge diversified business group. These two groups are addressed in the first two main sections of the chapter, and includes some general discussion of across‐country situations in various manufacturing industries as well as specific discussion of the Korean automobile industry. Three further sections discuss the following: Learning at the Hyundai Motor Company, Japan's influence on Korea's small‐ and medium‐sized firms, and the subcontracting network of the Hyundai Motor Company.

The reluctance to introduce competency‐destroying innovations may be understood as a product of the decision‐making biases of many large firms; some large firms tend to lose their ability and desire to engage in competency‐destroying innovative activities as they grow because of decision‐making biases associated with their size, asset base, business practices, and organizational structure. There are two key behavioural factors that influence and bias decision making in organizations: bounded rationality (and cognitive biases in general), and inconsistent risk aversion. The interaction of these behavioural aspects with the established capabilities, complementary assets, and administrative and organizational routines in firms intensifies decision‐making biases, thereby limiting radical innovation. Implications for managing innovation and change are considered.

Analyses the world of big business before 1914. Companies with a share capital of £2 million or more, and a workforce of 10,000 or more are considered as large. It emphasizes the weight of banking and heavy industry in German and French big business and points to greater diversity in Britain.

Considers the ability of large firms to survive and grow in the long term. Survival has been defined as a company's ability to remain both independent and sufficiently large to enjoy big business status. The French large firms of the pre‐1914 years were the most successful in that respect, but of the large European corporations of the 1920s, the British proved the more resilient. Interestingly, this longevity was not achieved at the expense of growth.

Compares the profits and profitability of the largest British, French and German companies. The analysis is based on net published profits. Given their larger size, British companies tended to generate higher profits than their continental counterparts throughout the twentieth century. They have proved more profitable, consistently achieving a higher return on equity.

The current challenges to industrial districts in Europe are examined, and a range of possible scenarios is outlined for dealing with the situation. The main sections of the chapter address the following: varieties of industrial flexibility; deregionalization and re‐regionalization of production led by large firms; the long‐term viability of industrial districts such as Baden–Württemberg in Germany; and the role of regional governments and policy makers in offering assistance.

Examines the more recent developments of European big business, from the 1960s to the late 1980s, which can be seen as the golden age of the industries of the second industrial revolution. The number of large as well as giant (with a workforce of 100,000 or more) companies increased significantly, and greater convergence in the size and sectoral distribution of the largest companies can be observed.