Jason Stanley
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199695362
- eISBN:
- 9780191729768
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695362.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
The thesis of this book is that knowing how to do something amounts to knowing facts. The facts are those that answer a question about how one could do it. Elaborating the conception of knowledge how ...
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The thesis of this book is that knowing how to do something amounts to knowing facts. The facts are those that answer a question about how one could do it. Elaborating the conception of knowledge how involves presenting more generally an account of what it is to know the answer to a question. The account of knowing an answer to a question, or knowledge-wh, leads to a novel defense of a Fregean view of propositions, according to which they contain ways of thinking (or modes of presentations) of objects. In explaining and defending the account of knowing how, the book lays out a conception of knowledge of facts where possession of such knowledge is not merely passive in guiding behavior. The ultimate moral of the book is that it is our ability to acquire knowledge of facts that explains our capacity for skilled engagement with the world.Less
The thesis of this book is that knowing how to do something amounts to knowing facts. The facts are those that answer a question about how one could do it. Elaborating the conception of knowledge how involves presenting more generally an account of what it is to know the answer to a question. The account of knowing an answer to a question, or knowledge-wh, leads to a novel defense of a Fregean view of propositions, according to which they contain ways of thinking (or modes of presentations) of objects. In explaining and defending the account of knowing how, the book lays out a conception of knowledge of facts where possession of such knowledge is not merely passive in guiding behavior. The ultimate moral of the book is that it is our ability to acquire knowledge of facts that explains our capacity for skilled engagement with the world.
Jason Stanley
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199695362
- eISBN:
- 9780191729768
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695362.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
Knowing how to do something is, like knowing whether or not to do something, knowing who came to the party knowing when the party is, a kind of knowing-wh. This chapter provides an introduction to ...
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Knowing how to do something is, like knowing whether or not to do something, knowing who came to the party knowing when the party is, a kind of knowing-wh. This chapter provides an introduction to some of the standard semantic theories of embedded questions by Karttunen and Groenendijk and Stokhof. It argues that marrying such theories with the correct account of quantifier domain restriction explains most of the context-dependence associated with sentences that ascribe states of knowing-wh. The resulting morals are applied to recent challenges to standard theories of knowing-wh by Jonathan Schaffer and Jonathan Ginzburg.Less
Knowing how to do something is, like knowing whether or not to do something, knowing who came to the party knowing when the party is, a kind of knowing-wh. This chapter provides an introduction to some of the standard semantic theories of embedded questions by Karttunen and Groenendijk and Stokhof. It argues that marrying such theories with the correct account of quantifier domain restriction explains most of the context-dependence associated with sentences that ascribe states of knowing-wh. The resulting morals are applied to recent challenges to standard theories of knowing-wh by Jonathan Schaffer and Jonathan Ginzburg.
Alex Grzankowski and Michael Tye
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- December 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198803461
- eISBN:
- 9780191841644
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198803461.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
In her black and white room, Mary doesn’t know what it is like to see red. Only after undergoing an experience as of something red and hence acquainting herself with red can Mary learn what it is ...
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In her black and white room, Mary doesn’t know what it is like to see red. Only after undergoing an experience as of something red and hence acquainting herself with red can Mary learn what it is like. But learning what it is like to see red requires more than simply becoming acquainted with it, one must also know an appropriate answer to the question ‘what is it like to see red?’. To be acquainted with something is to know it, but such knowledge, as we argue, is object knowledge rather than propositional knowledge. Despite this mismatch between object knowledge and knowing an answer, we believe that acquaintance is crucial to Mary’s epistemic progress. We argue that in order to know what it is like, in order for Mary to know an appropriate answer, Mary’s propositional knowledge must be appropriately related to her acquaintance with red.Less
In her black and white room, Mary doesn’t know what it is like to see red. Only after undergoing an experience as of something red and hence acquainting herself with red can Mary learn what it is like. But learning what it is like to see red requires more than simply becoming acquainted with it, one must also know an appropriate answer to the question ‘what is it like to see red?’. To be acquainted with something is to know it, but such knowledge, as we argue, is object knowledge rather than propositional knowledge. Despite this mismatch between object knowledge and knowing an answer, we believe that acquaintance is crucial to Mary’s epistemic progress. We argue that in order to know what it is like, in order for Mary to know an appropriate answer, Mary’s propositional knowledge must be appropriately related to her acquaintance with red.
