Search Results

Three Views of Human Knowledge

Ernest Sosa

in Knowing Full Well

This chapter considers a traditional account of knowledge along with its indirect realist view of perception. On a traditional approach, perceptual knowledge is a special case of “justified true ... More

This chapter considers a traditional account of knowledge along with its indirect realist view of perception. On a traditional approach, perceptual knowledge is a special case of “justified true belief plus.” Such justification is alleged to come from the evidence of our senses. The chapter also compares a radically opposed, knowledge-first account, one that claims an important advantage: it is said to make room for reasons that can establish answers to our questions, enabling us to vouch for those answers. There is, however, a further alternative to consider. While better aligned with the tradition, this further alternative, as the chapter describes, still claims the same advantage as the radical knowledge-first approach.Less

Introduction

Juan Comesaña

in Being Rational and Being Right

This chapter introduces the rest of the book. It is assumed that practical rationality requires theoretical rationality. Three views about basic empirical evidence are introduced: Psychologism, ... More

This chapter introduces the rest of the book. It is assumed that practical rationality requires theoretical rationality. Three views about basic empirical evidence are introduced: Psychologism, according to which our basic empirical evidence is constituted by our experiences; Factualism, according to which our basic empirical evidence is constituted by those propositions we know through experience; and Experientialism, according to which our basic empirical evidence is constituted by those propositions we are basically justified in believing by our experiences. The rest of the book is dedicated to developing objections to Psychologism and Factualism, and to defending Experientialism.Less

Conclusion

Juan Comesaña

in Being Rational and Being Right

The main threads of the book are brought together and summarized.

Is Knowledge a Non-Composite Mental State?

Patrick Rysiew

in Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 4

Knowledge is widely held by philosophers to be a composite, indeed ‘hybrid’ state incorporating factors that are both mental (e.g. belief) and non-mental (e.g. truth). In “Knowledge as a Mental ... More

Knowledge is widely held by philosophers to be a composite, indeed ‘hybrid’ state incorporating factors that are both mental (e.g. belief) and non-mental (e.g. truth). In “Knowledge as a Mental State,” Jennifer Nagel raises problems challenges this orthodoxy: we intuitively treat knowledge as a mental state, and prominent arguments against regarding it as such can be reasonably challenged; further, there is empirical evidence which strongly suggests that the concept of knowledge is prior to that of belief and not, as philosophical orthodoxy would have it, the other way around. (Both of these results fit nicely with Timothy Williamson’s ‘knowledge-first’ approach.) Here, it is argued that the orthodox view is compatible, not only with regarding knowledge as a mental state, but also with the empirical findings Nagel discusses, and therefore that those findings do not in fact support the view that knowledge is a non-composite state, a mental state in its own right.Less

Simple Veritism

Christopher Cowie

in Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument From Analogy

In modelling epistemic judgements on normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’—such as sports and games, etiquette, fashion, and the law—as has been done in earlier chapters it has ... More

In modelling epistemic judgements on normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’—such as sports and games, etiquette, fashion, and the law—as has been done in earlier chapters it has been assumed that the final or basic epistemic value is true belief. This chapter considers objections to this from knowledge-first and anti-consequentialist conceptions of epistemic norms. It presents reasons for scepticism about these views and claims that these alternatives are still compatible with the basic view in the book of the contrast between epistemic norms and moral norms and so with its rejection of the parity premise.Less

From the Value of Knowledge to Skills and Stereotypes: The Individual Ideal of Known Freedom

Boudewijn de Bruin

in The Business of Liberty: Freedom and Information in Ethics, Politics, and Law

This chapter develops the normative ideal of known freedom. You possess known freedom to the extent that you possess knowledge about your opportunity set—that is, about available actions, their ... More

This chapter develops the normative ideal of known freedom. You possess known freedom to the extent that you possess knowledge about your opportunity set—that is, about available actions, their consequences, and the likelihood with which they arise. I first discuss an objection to such an ideal based on Isaiah Berlin’s notion of the ‘retreat to the inner citadel’. I critically examine recent work on the value of knowledge (the ‘Meno problem’) undertaken by Timothy Williamson and John Hawthorne, as well Duncan Pritchard’s case of the ‘ravine jumper’ purportedly illustrating the value of false beliefs. Using insights on belief revision, I argue that this body of research does not affect the value of known freedom. On the basis of theoretical and empirical work on skills, I then argue for a view of skills as known freedom and show how stereotype threats as studied by psychologists negatively affect the ideal of known freedom.Less

The Epistemic Norms of Action

Mikkel Gerken

in On Folk Epistemology: How we Think and Talk about Knowledge

Chapter 6 concerns the normative relationship between action and knowledge ascriptions. Arguments are provided against a Knowledge Norm of Action (KNAC) and in favor of the Warrant-Action norm (WA). ... More

Chapter 6 concerns the normative relationship between action and knowledge ascriptions. Arguments are provided against a Knowledge Norm of Action (KNAC) and in favor of the Warrant-Action norm (WA). According to WA, S must be adequately warranted in believing that p relative to her deliberative context to meet the epistemic requirements for acting on p. WA is developed by specifying the deliberative context and by arguing that its explanatory power exceeds that of knowledge norms. A general conclusion is that the knowledge norm is an important example of a folk epistemological principle that does not pass muster as an epistemological principle. More generally, Chapter 6 introduces the debates about epistemic normativity and develops a specific epistemic norm of action.Less

The Epistemic Norms of Assertion

Mikkel Gerken

in On Folk Epistemology: How we Think and Talk about Knowledge

Chapter 7 extends the discussion of epistemic norms to the linguistic realm. Again, it is argued that a Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNAS) is inadequate and should be replaced with a ... More

Chapter 7 extends the discussion of epistemic norms to the linguistic realm. Again, it is argued that a Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNAS) is inadequate and should be replaced with a Warrant-Assertive Speech Act norm (WASA). According to WASA, S must be adequately warranted in believing that p relative to her conversational context in order to meet the epistemic requirements for asserting that p. This epistemic norm is developed and extended to assertive speech acts that carry implicatures or illocutionary forces. Particular attention is given to the development of a species of WASA that accounts for assertive speech acts having a directive force, such as a recommendation. Thus, Chapter 7 contributes to the debates concerning epistemic norms of assertions.Less

Outline of a theory of justification

Sven Rosenkranz

in Justification as Ignorance: An Essay in Epistemology

Core theses of the novel account of justification to be developed are first stated: one has propositional justification for p just in case one is in no position to know that one is in no position to ... More

Core theses of the novel account of justification to be developed are first stated: one has propositional justification for p just in case one is in no position to know that one is in no position to know p; and one has doxastic justification for p just in case one is in no position to know that one does not know p. Unlike other theories that conceive of justification in terms of the metaphysical possibility of knowing, the present account thus construes it as a distinctive kind of epistemic possibility. It treats propositional justification as non-factive, both its presence and its absence as luminous conditions, and by assuming a weak non-normal modal logic for knowledge and being in a position to know, validates principles of positive and negative introspection for it. The account thereby attributes features to justification that internalists care about. But it does so without construing justification as an internal condition. The account allows one to systematically distinguish between the condition of being justified and the metaphysical grounds for its obtaining, thereby heeding externalist insights into the difference between the good cases and the bad cases envisaged by radical scepticism. Lines of argument that show the account’s potential, e.g. in dealing with the preface and lottery paradoxes, are previewed, and so are lines of defence against challenges and objections, including prominent anti-luminosity arguments.Less

Introduction

Daniel Whiting

in The Range of Reasons: in Ethics and Epistemology

This chapter introduces the idea that there are norms for belief and explains that one task of the book is to articulate some of those norms and the relations among them. This requires a theory of ... More

This chapter introduces the idea that there are norms for belief and explains that one task of the book is to articulate some of those norms and the relations among them. This requires a theory of reasons. It is the other task of the book to provide one. The chapter also introduces a working assumption that guides the project, namely, that the normative is unified, and indicates how that project relates to two recent and influential research programmes in ethics and epistemology, respectively, reasons first and knowledge first. The chapter concludes with an overview of the book’s remaining chapters.Less

Knowledge First: An Introduction

J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon, and Benjamin W. Jarvis

in Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind

In this introductory chapter, the volume’s editors provide a theoretical background to the volume’s topic and a brief overview of the papers included. The chapter is divided into five parts: Section ... More

In this introductory chapter, the volume’s editors provide a theoretical background to the volume’s topic and a brief overview of the papers included. The chapter is divided into five parts: Section 1 explains the main contours of the knowledge-first approach, as it was initially advanced by Timothy Williamson in Knowledge and its Limits. In Sections 2–3, some of the key philosophical motivations for the knowledge-first approach are reviewed, and several key contemporary research themes associated with this approach in epistemology, the philosophy of mind and elsewhere are outlined and briefly discussed. The volume’s papers are divided into two broad categories: foundational issues and applications and new directions. Section 4 discusses briefly the scope and aim of the volume as the editors have conceived it, and Section 5 offers an overview of each of the individual contributions in the volume.Less

How and Why Knowledge is First

Clayton Littlejohn

in Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind

This chapter’s dialectical aim has, as its focus, a sustained defence of the claim that one cannot have a reason in one’s possession unless it is something that one knows. This view is claimed to ... More

This chapter’s dialectical aim has, as its focus, a sustained defence of the claim that one cannot have a reason in one’s possession unless it is something that one knows. This view is claimed to have advantages over a different way of thinking about epistemic status. On the ‘reasons-first’ approach to epistemic status, reasons and the possession of them are prior to epistemic status. In reversing this picture, the chapter reveals an important sense in which knowledge comes first—namely, in that we first come to have reasons in our possession by coming to know that certain things are true; there is nothing prior to knowledge that puts these reasons in our possession. In the course of advancing this picture, the chapter furthermore offers a defence of Williamson’s identification of evidence and knowledge (E=K).Less

Against Knowledge-First Epistemology

Mikkel Gerken

in Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind

This chapter attacks, on several fronts, what is often cited as a theoretical advantage to regarding knowledge as a theoretical primitive—namely, that knowledge can be used to reductively analyse ... More

This chapter attacks, on several fronts, what is often cited as a theoretical advantage to regarding knowledge as a theoretical primitive—namely, that knowledge can be used to reductively analyse other epistemic phenomena. It suggests that proponents of such an approach commit a similar mistake to the one that they charge their opponents with—viz., the mistake of seeking to reductively analyse basic epistemic phenomena in terms of other allegedly more basic or fundamental phenomena. After leveling this charge against reductionist brands of knowledge-first epistemology, the chapter takes the knowledge norm of assertion as its critical focus and challenges non-reductionist brands of knowledge-first epistemology. It concludes by articulating an alternative to knowledge-first methodology: that is labeled ‘equilibristic epistemology’. According to equilibristic epistemology there isn’t a single epistemic phenomenon or concept that is ‘first’. Rather, there are a number of basic epistemic phenomena that are not reductively analysable although they may be co-elucidated in a non-reductive manner.Less

Mindreading Knowledge

Aidan McGlynn

in Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind

Is knowing a mental state in its own right, as believing is, or is it, at best, a mental state in an attenuated sense due to being a species of belief? Jennifer Nagel has recently contended that ... More

Is knowing a mental state in its own right, as believing is, or is it, at best, a mental state in an attenuated sense due to being a species of belief? Jennifer Nagel has recently contended that there is a strong empirical case for the former view of knowledge, arguing indirectly for this conclusion by drawing on work in developmental and comparative psychology that she takes to suggest that the concept of knowledge is acquired before the concept of belief. This chapter critically reassesses the bearing of the relevant empirical results and argues that they present a messy, complicated, and inherently inconclusive picture of when children and other creatures acquire the concepts in question. It concludes that the available empirical evidence does not support Nagel’s conceptual priority claim, let alone her further metaphysical conclusions about the nature of knowledge.Less

On Putting Knowledge ‘First’

Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and C. S. I. Jenkins

in Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind

This chapter claims that various views which travel under the banner of ‘knowledge first’ epistemology betray subtle differences in just how it is that they respectively regard knowledge as ‘first’. ... More

This chapter claims that various views which travel under the banner of ‘knowledge first’ epistemology betray subtle differences in just how it is that they respectively regard knowledge as ‘first’. It argues that these differences are problematic, in part because it is not straightforward to draw connections between certain of these views, which are, under closer inspection, more independent than they are often assumed to be. Its aim is, in the main, to tease apart various ‘knowledge first’ claims, and explore what connections they do or do not have with one another, in the service of a clearer understanding of just what the knowledge first theses are and how these theses might be evaluated.Less