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Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent

Anthony Brueckner

in Essays on Skepticism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199585861
eISBN:
9780191595332
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585861.003.0023
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter contains the author's half of a point-counterpoint exchange with McKinsey in Blackwell's Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind.


Lotteries, Insensitivity, and Closure

Keith DeRose

in The Appearance of Ignorance: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Volume 2

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
February 2018
ISBN:
9780199564477
eISBN:
9780191846021
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199564477.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

(1) Why does it seem that we don’t know we will lose a lottery, while it seems we do know other things with respect about which we are more likely to be wrong? (2) And do we really fail to know that ... More


Usage Challenges to Fallibilism

Jody Azzouni

in Attributing Knowledge: What It Means to Know Something

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
October 2020
ISBN:
9780197508817
eISBN:
9780197508848
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A definition of fallibility shows that agents are fallible about necessary truths. It is shown that fallibility of agents implies a denial of parity reasoning. Moorean paradoxes appear to undercut ... More


Attributing Knowledge: What It Means to Know Something

Jody Azzouni

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
October 2020
ISBN:
9780197508817
eISBN:
9780197508848
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780197508817.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The word “know” is revealed as vague, applicable to fallible agents, factive, and criterion-transcendent. It is invariant in its meaning across contexts and invariant relative to different agents. ... More


Conclusion

Jody Azzouni

in Attributing Knowledge: What It Means to Know Something

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
October 2020
ISBN:
9780197508817
eISBN:
9780197508848
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The hangman/surprise-examination/prediction paradox is solved. It is not solved by denying knowledge closure (although knowledge closure is false). It is not solved by denying KK or denying that ... More


Scepticism and Externalism

Michael Ayers

in Knowing and Seeing: Groundwork for a new empiricism

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
May 2019
ISBN:
9780198833567
eISBN:
9780191871993
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198833567.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Like Descartes, many analytic epistemologists employ sceptical argument ‘methodologically’, affording undue respect to its illusory force in order to present their own theory as the way to avoid its ... More


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