Maximilian de Gaynesford
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199287826
- eISBN:
- 9780191603570
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199287821.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The inferential role of I is irreducibly deictic. The inferential roles of singular terms are distinguished by appeal to the different mechanisms required to guarantee co-reference in a ...
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The inferential role of I is irreducibly deictic. The inferential roles of singular terms are distinguished by appeal to the different mechanisms required to guarantee co-reference in a knowledge-advancing way. Co-typicality is insufficient for variant terms. Anaphoric structures are insufficient for I and other terms used deictically; they depend on identity-judgements and keeping track. The inferential role of I and other deictic terms is irreducibly deictic: it is by singling out individuals made salient in the extra-sentential environment that their uses contribute systematically to what entails what.Less
The inferential role of I is irreducibly deictic. The inferential roles of singular terms are distinguished by appeal to the different mechanisms required to guarantee co-reference in a knowledge-advancing way. Co-typicality is insufficient for variant terms. Anaphoric structures are insufficient for I and other terms used deictically; they depend on identity-judgements and keeping track. The inferential role of I and other deictic terms is irreducibly deictic: it is by singling out individuals made salient in the extra-sentential environment that their uses contribute systematically to what entails what.
John Campbell
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199243815
- eISBN:
- 9780191597145
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199243816.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
We need the notion of sense to characterize which inferences involving demonstratives are valid; the account developed so far suggests that this will be when conscious attention uses the same ...
More
We need the notion of sense to characterize which inferences involving demonstratives are valid; the account developed so far suggests that this will be when conscious attention uses the same locations in keeping track of the object. This does not mean we have here a descriptivist account of the sense of a demonstrative; rather, the role of the content of the conscious attention emerges in which propositions involving the demonstrative term are immune to error through misidentification. There is a detailed comparison between the present approach and the views of Kaplan and Evans.Less
We need the notion of sense to characterize which inferences involving demonstratives are valid; the account developed so far suggests that this will be when conscious attention uses the same locations in keeping track of the object. This does not mean we have here a descriptivist account of the sense of a demonstrative; rather, the role of the content of the conscious attention emerges in which propositions involving the demonstrative term are immune to error through misidentification. There is a detailed comparison between the present approach and the views of Kaplan and Evans.
