Michael Bergmann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199275748
- eISBN:
- 9780191603907
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199275742.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, ...
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Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, or perhaps there is some other ‘good-making’ features it must have. But does a belief’s justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists insist that such awareness is required for justification whereas externalists insist that it is not. The first part of this book argues that internalism faces an inescapable dilemma: either it leads to vicious regress problems and, ultimately, radical skepticism or it is entirely unmotivated. The second part of the book begins by developing the author’s own externalist theory of justification, one imposing both a proper function and a no-defeater requirement. It concludes by demonstrating the failure of two prominent critiques of externalism: that it is infected with epistemic circularity and that it cannot respond adequately to skepticism. Together, the two parts of the book provide a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism.Less
Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, or perhaps there is some other ‘good-making’ features it must have. But does a belief’s justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists insist that such awareness is required for justification whereas externalists insist that it is not. The first part of this book argues that internalism faces an inescapable dilemma: either it leads to vicious regress problems and, ultimately, radical skepticism or it is entirely unmotivated. The second part of the book begins by developing the author’s own externalist theory of justification, one imposing both a proper function and a no-defeater requirement. It concludes by demonstrating the failure of two prominent critiques of externalism: that it is infected with epistemic circularity and that it cannot respond adequately to skepticism. Together, the two parts of the book provide a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism.
Albert Casullo
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195115055
- eISBN:
- 9780199786190
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195115058.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The major divide in contemporary epistemology is between those who embrace and those who reject a priori knowledge. This book aims to provide a systematic treatment of the primary epistemological ...
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The major divide in contemporary epistemology is between those who embrace and those who reject a priori knowledge. This book aims to provide a systematic treatment of the primary epistemological issues associated with the a priori that is sensitive to recent developments in the field of epistemology. Assessing the status of the a priori within contemporary epistemology requires distinguishing the requirements of the a priori from traditional assumptions about the nature of knowledge and justification. Freeing the a priori from those assumptions yields three major insights. First, the concept of a priori justification is minimal, it is simply the concept of nonexperiential justification. Second, the basic question that must be addressed to resolve the controversy over the existence of a priori knowledge is whether there are nonexperiential sources of justified beliefs. Third, is articulating the concept of nonexperiential justification and establishing that there are nonexperiential sources of justified belief that require empirical investigation. Hence, epistemologists must both acknowledge and embrace the role of empirical evidence in resolving these fundamental issues. The book concludes by arguing that traditional approaches to the a priori, which focus primarily on the concepts of necessary truth and analytic truth, are misguided.Less
The major divide in contemporary epistemology is between those who embrace and those who reject a priori knowledge. This book aims to provide a systematic treatment of the primary epistemological issues associated with the a priori that is sensitive to recent developments in the field of epistemology. Assessing the status of the a priori within contemporary epistemology requires distinguishing the requirements of the a priori from traditional assumptions about the nature of knowledge and justification. Freeing the a priori from those assumptions yields three major insights. First, the concept of a priori justification is minimal, it is simply the concept of nonexperiential justification. Second, the basic question that must be addressed to resolve the controversy over the existence of a priori knowledge is whether there are nonexperiential sources of justified beliefs. Third, is articulating the concept of nonexperiential justification and establishing that there are nonexperiential sources of justified belief that require empirical investigation. Hence, epistemologists must both acknowledge and embrace the role of empirical evidence in resolving these fundamental issues. The book concludes by arguing that traditional approaches to the a priori, which focus primarily on the concepts of necessary truth and analytic truth, are misguided.
Gregory Graybill
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199589487
- eISBN:
- 9780191594588
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589487.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Church History
If one is saved by faith alone in Jesus Christ, then what is the origin of that faith? Is it a preordained gift of God to elect individuals, or is some measure of human free choice involved? ...
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If one is saved by faith alone in Jesus Christ, then what is the origin of that faith? Is it a preordained gift of God to elect individuals, or is some measure of human free choice involved? Initially, Philipp Melanchthon concurred with Martin Luther—that the human will is completely bound by sin, and that the choice of faith can flow only from God's unilateral grace. But if this is so, what about those whom God has not chosen? Is he not casting people into hell who never even had a chance? What are the pastoral implications for believers thinking about the nature of God and their own relationship to him? As a result of practical concerns such as these, aided by an intellectual aversion to paradox, Melanchthon came to believe that the human will does play a key role in the origins of a saving faith in Jesus Christ. This was not the Roman Catholic free will of Erasmus, however. It was a limited free will tied to justification by faith alone. It was an evangelical free will.Less
If one is saved by faith alone in Jesus Christ, then what is the origin of that faith? Is it a preordained gift of God to elect individuals, or is some measure of human free choice involved? Initially, Philipp Melanchthon concurred with Martin Luther—that the human will is completely bound by sin, and that the choice of faith can flow only from God's unilateral grace. But if this is so, what about those whom God has not chosen? Is he not casting people into hell who never even had a chance? What are the pastoral implications for believers thinking about the nature of God and their own relationship to him? As a result of practical concerns such as these, aided by an intellectual aversion to paradox, Melanchthon came to believe that the human will does play a key role in the origins of a saving faith in Jesus Christ. This was not the Roman Catholic free will of Erasmus, however. It was a limited free will tied to justification by faith alone. It was an evangelical free will.
Jonathan Quong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199594870
- eISBN:
- 9780191723513
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199594870.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
A growing number of political philosophers favour a view called liberal perfectionism. According to this view, liberal political morality is characterized by a commitment to helping individuals lead ...
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A growing number of political philosophers favour a view called liberal perfectionism. According to this view, liberal political morality is characterized by a commitment to helping individuals lead autonomous lives and making other valuable choices. This book rejects this widely held view and offers an alternative account of liberal political morality. It argues that the liberal state should not be engaged in determining what constitutes a valuable or worthwhile life nor try to make sure that individuals live up to this ideal. Instead, it should remain neutral on the issue of the good life, and restrict itself to establishing the fair terms within which individuals can pursue their own beliefs about what gives value to their lives. The book thus defends a position known as political liberalism. The first part of the book subjects the liberal perfectionist position to critical scrutiny, advancing three major objections which raise serious doubts about the liberal perfectionist position with regard to autonomy, paternalism, and political legitimacy. The second part of the book presents and defends a distinctive version of political liberalism. In particular, it clarifies and develops political liberalism's central thesis: that political principles, in order to be legitimate, must be publicly justifiable to reasonable people. Drawing on the work of John Rawls, the author offers his own interpretation of this idea, and rebuts some of the main objections that have been pressed against it. In doing so, he provides novel arguments regarding the nature of an overlapping consensus, the structure of political justification, the idea of public reason, and the status of unreasonable persons.Less
A growing number of political philosophers favour a view called liberal perfectionism. According to this view, liberal political morality is characterized by a commitment to helping individuals lead autonomous lives and making other valuable choices. This book rejects this widely held view and offers an alternative account of liberal political morality. It argues that the liberal state should not be engaged in determining what constitutes a valuable or worthwhile life nor try to make sure that individuals live up to this ideal. Instead, it should remain neutral on the issue of the good life, and restrict itself to establishing the fair terms within which individuals can pursue their own beliefs about what gives value to their lives. The book thus defends a position known as political liberalism. The first part of the book subjects the liberal perfectionist position to critical scrutiny, advancing three major objections which raise serious doubts about the liberal perfectionist position with regard to autonomy, paternalism, and political legitimacy. The second part of the book presents and defends a distinctive version of political liberalism. In particular, it clarifies and develops political liberalism's central thesis: that political principles, in order to be legitimate, must be publicly justifiable to reasonable people. Drawing on the work of John Rawls, the author offers his own interpretation of this idea, and rebuts some of the main objections that have been pressed against it. In doing so, he provides novel arguments regarding the nature of an overlapping consensus, the structure of political justification, the idea of public reason, and the status of unreasonable persons.
Brian Lugioyo
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195387360
- eISBN:
- 9780199866663
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387360.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Church History
Martin Bucer has been predominantly portrayed as a diplomat, who attempted to reconcile divergent theological views, sometimes at any costs, or as a pragmatic pastor, who was more concerned with ...
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Martin Bucer has been predominantly portrayed as a diplomat, who attempted to reconcile divergent theological views, sometimes at any costs, or as a pragmatic pastor, who was more concerned with ethics than theology. These representations have led to the view that Bucer was a theological light-weight, a Vermittlungstheologe, rightly placed in the shadow of Luther and Calvin. This book argues differently. Bucer was an ecclesial diplomat and he was a pragmatic pastor, yet his ecclesial and practical approaches to reforming the church were guided by coherent theological convictions. Central to his theology was his understanding of the doctrine of justification, which the book argues has an integrity of its own and has been imprecisely represented as intentionally conciliatory (i.e. as Vermittlungstheologie). It was this solid doctrine that guided his irenicism and acted as a foundation for entering into discussions with Catholics between 1539 and 1541. He was consistent in his approach, and did not sacrifice his theological convictions for ecclesial expediency. His understanding was an accepted evangelical perspective on justification, one to be commended along with those of Luther and Calvin.Less
Martin Bucer has been predominantly portrayed as a diplomat, who attempted to reconcile divergent theological views, sometimes at any costs, or as a pragmatic pastor, who was more concerned with ethics than theology. These representations have led to the view that Bucer was a theological light-weight, a Vermittlungstheologe, rightly placed in the shadow of Luther and Calvin. This book argues differently. Bucer was an ecclesial diplomat and he was a pragmatic pastor, yet his ecclesial and practical approaches to reforming the church were guided by coherent theological convictions. Central to his theology was his understanding of the doctrine of justification, which the book argues has an integrity of its own and has been imprecisely represented as intentionally conciliatory (i.e. as Vermittlungstheologie). It was this solid doctrine that guided his irenicism and acted as a foundation for entering into discussions with Catholics between 1539 and 1541. He was consistent in his approach, and did not sacrifice his theological convictions for ecclesial expediency. His understanding was an accepted evangelical perspective on justification, one to be commended along with those of Luther and Calvin.
Jack C. Lyons
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195373578
- eISBN:
- 9780199871988
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195373578.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book addresses two central questions in epistemology: (1) which beliefs are epistemologically basic (i.e., noninferentially justified)? and (2) where does perception end and inferential ...
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This book addresses two central questions in epistemology: (1) which beliefs are epistemologically basic (i.e., noninferentially justified)? and (2) where does perception end and inferential cognition begin? The book offers a highly externalist theory, arguing that it is not introspectible features of the beliefs that determine their status as basic or as perceptual; instead, these are determined by the nature of the cognitive system, or module, that produced the beliefs. On this view, the sensory experiences that typically accompany perceptual beliefs play no indispensable role in the justification of these beliefs, and one can have perceptual beliefs—justified perceptual beliefs—even in the absence of any sensory experiences whatsoever. The book develops a general theory of basic beliefs and argues that perceptual beliefs are a species of basic beliefs. This results from the fact that perceptual modules are a special type of basic-belief-producing modules. Importantly, some beliefs are not the outputs of this class of cognitive module; these beliefs are nonbasic, thus requiring evidential support from other beliefs for their justification. This last point is used to defend a reliabilist epistemology against an important class of traditional objections (where the agent uses a reliable process that she doesn't know to be reliable). The overarching view defended in the book is a type of reliabilism, and the basic/nonbasic distinction developed here offers a version of reliabilism that takes inference seriously yet remains staunchly externalist.Less
This book addresses two central questions in epistemology: (1) which beliefs are epistemologically basic (i.e., noninferentially justified)? and (2) where does perception end and inferential cognition begin? The book offers a highly externalist theory, arguing that it is not introspectible features of the beliefs that determine their status as basic or as perceptual; instead, these are determined by the nature of the cognitive system, or module, that produced the beliefs. On this view, the sensory experiences that typically accompany perceptual beliefs play no indispensable role in the justification of these beliefs, and one can have perceptual beliefs—justified perceptual beliefs—even in the absence of any sensory experiences whatsoever. The book develops a general theory of basic beliefs and argues that perceptual beliefs are a species of basic beliefs. This results from the fact that perceptual modules are a special type of basic-belief-producing modules. Importantly, some beliefs are not the outputs of this class of cognitive module; these beliefs are nonbasic, thus requiring evidential support from other beliefs for their justification. This last point is used to defend a reliabilist epistemology against an important class of traditional objections (where the agent uses a reliable process that she doesn't know to be reliable). The overarching view defended in the book is a type of reliabilism, and the basic/nonbasic distinction developed here offers a version of reliabilism that takes inference seriously yet remains staunchly externalist.
Brian Lugioyo
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195387360
- eISBN:
- 9780199866663
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387360.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Church History
Chapter 6 reiterates that Bucer had a coherent and unified doctrine of justification, one that contributes to a broader and more complete understanding of Reformation theology.
Chapter 6 reiterates that Bucer had a coherent and unified doctrine of justification, one that contributes to a broader and more complete understanding of Reformation theology.
Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199226078
- eISBN:
- 9780191594236
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Disagreement is common. Even informed, intelligent, and generally reasonable people often come to different conclusions when confronted with what seems to be the same evidence. Can the competing ...
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Disagreement is common. Even informed, intelligent, and generally reasonable people often come to different conclusions when confronted with what seems to be the same evidence. Can the competing conclusions be reasonable? If not, what can we reasonably think about the situation? This book examines the epistemology of disagreement, with a focus on disagreements involving epistemic peers. Philosophical questions about disagreement arise in various areas, notably politics, ethics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion: this book focuses on the general epistemic issues arising from informed disagreement. Ten leading philosophers offer specially written chapters which together will offer a starting-point for future work on this topic.Less
Disagreement is common. Even informed, intelligent, and generally reasonable people often come to different conclusions when confronted with what seems to be the same evidence. Can the competing conclusions be reasonable? If not, what can we reasonably think about the situation? This book examines the epistemology of disagreement, with a focus on disagreements involving epistemic peers. Philosophical questions about disagreement arise in various areas, notably politics, ethics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion: this book focuses on the general epistemic issues arising from informed disagreement. Ten leading philosophers offer specially written chapters which together will offer a starting-point for future work on this topic.
Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199550623
- eISBN:
- 9780191722684
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550623.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
This book is an exploration of the relation between knowledge, reasons, and justification. According to the primary argument of the book, you can rely on what you know in action and belief, because ...
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This book is an exploration of the relation between knowledge, reasons, and justification. According to the primary argument of the book, you can rely on what you know in action and belief, because what you know can be a reason you have and you can rely on the reasons you have. If knowledge doesn't allow for a chance of error — if it requires certainty — then this result is unsurprising. But if knowledge does allow for a chance of error — as seems required if we know much of anything at all — this result entails the denial of a received position in epistemology. Because any chance of error, if the stakes are high enough, can make a difference to what can be relied on, two subjects with the same evidence and generally the same strength of epistemic position for a proposition can differ with respect to whether they are in a position to know. This phenomenon has come to be known as ‘pragmatic encroachment’. All of the points above, it is argued, apply equally well to justification for believing. The results, then, have ramifications for and are borne on by debates about epistemological externalism and contextualism, the value and importance of knowledge, Wittgensteinian hinge propositions, Bayesianism, and the nature of belief.Less
This book is an exploration of the relation between knowledge, reasons, and justification. According to the primary argument of the book, you can rely on what you know in action and belief, because what you know can be a reason you have and you can rely on the reasons you have. If knowledge doesn't allow for a chance of error — if it requires certainty — then this result is unsurprising. But if knowledge does allow for a chance of error — as seems required if we know much of anything at all — this result entails the denial of a received position in epistemology. Because any chance of error, if the stakes are high enough, can make a difference to what can be relied on, two subjects with the same evidence and generally the same strength of epistemic position for a proposition can differ with respect to whether they are in a position to know. This phenomenon has come to be known as ‘pragmatic encroachment’. All of the points above, it is argued, apply equally well to justification for believing. The results, then, have ramifications for and are borne on by debates about epistemological externalism and contextualism, the value and importance of knowledge, Wittgensteinian hinge propositions, Bayesianism, and the nature of belief.
Daniel Rynhold
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199274864
- eISBN:
- 9780191602450
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019927486X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Judaism is a religion that historically has emphasized the importance of a set of practical commandments, and in the history of Jewish philosophy various attempts have been made to rationalize or ...
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Judaism is a religion that historically has emphasized the importance of a set of practical commandments, and in the history of Jewish philosophy various attempts have been made to rationalize or justify these commandments. In this book, Daniel Rynhold attempts to formulate a general model for the justification of practices out of a critical analysis of approaches taken to the issue of ta’amei ha-mitzvot (the rationalization of the commandments) within Jewish philosophy.Bringing a modern analytical framework to bear on the methods of the medieval philosopher Moses Maimonides and the contemporary thinker Joseph Soloveitchik, Rynhold argues that despite being put forward as opposing approaches, their views on ta’amei ha-mitzvot share a central methodological presumption—the Priority of Theory (PoT). Rynhold’s critique of this method, based primarily on developing an argument from uncodifiability is followed by the development of his own original method of justifying practices that he terms the Priority of Practice (PoP). Rynhold’s innovative approach, based on an analysis of the concept of faith as presented in certain central strands of the Jewish tradition emphasizes the limits of propositional methods for justifying practices in general and the need for a more pragmatic line in which practices are justified practically rather than by reference to theories and principles. Whilst much work in Jewish philosophy is more historical than conceptual, Rynhold’s attempt to bring together Jewish and general philosophy yields a work that illustrates how Jewish philosophy can be of more than historical interest and make a genuine contribution to current philosophical debate.Less
Judaism is a religion that historically has emphasized the importance of a set of practical commandments, and in the history of Jewish philosophy various attempts have been made to rationalize or justify these commandments. In this book, Daniel Rynhold attempts to formulate a general model for the justification of practices out of a critical analysis of approaches taken to the issue of ta’amei ha-mitzvot (the rationalization of the commandments) within Jewish philosophy.
Bringing a modern analytical framework to bear on the methods of the medieval philosopher Moses Maimonides and the contemporary thinker Joseph Soloveitchik, Rynhold argues that despite being put forward as opposing approaches, their views on ta’amei ha-mitzvot share a central methodological presumption—the Priority of Theory (PoT). Rynhold’s critique of this method, based primarily on developing an argument from uncodifiability is followed by the development of his own original method of justifying practices that he terms the Priority of Practice (PoP). Rynhold’s innovative approach, based on an analysis of the concept of faith as presented in certain central strands of the Jewish tradition emphasizes the limits of propositional methods for justifying practices in general and the need for a more pragmatic line in which practices are justified practically rather than by reference to theories and principles. Whilst much work in Jewish philosophy is more historical than conceptual, Rynhold’s attempt to bring together Jewish and general philosophy yields a work that illustrates how Jewish philosophy can be of more than historical interest and make a genuine contribution to current philosophical debate.
Quentin Smith (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199264933
- eISBN:
- 9780191718472
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book offers a view of the current state of play in epistemology in the form of twelve chapters by some of the philosophers who have most influenced the course of debates in recent years. Topics ...
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This book offers a view of the current state of play in epistemology in the form of twelve chapters by some of the philosophers who have most influenced the course of debates in recent years. Topics include epistemic justification, solipsism, scepticism, and modal, moral, naturalistic, and probabilistic epistemology. Such approaches as reliabilism, evidentialism, infinitism, and virtue epistemology are here developed further by the philosophers who pioneered them.Less
This book offers a view of the current state of play in epistemology in the form of twelve chapters by some of the philosophers who have most influenced the course of debates in recent years. Topics include epistemic justification, solipsism, scepticism, and modal, moral, naturalistic, and probabilistic epistemology. Such approaches as reliabilism, evidentialism, infinitism, and virtue epistemology are here developed further by the philosophers who pioneered them.
Neil Tennant
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199655755
- eISBN:
- 9780191742125
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199655755.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This account of rational belief revision explains how a rational agent ought to proceed when adopting a new belief — a difficult matter if the new belief contradicts the agent’s old beliefs. Belief ...
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This account of rational belief revision explains how a rational agent ought to proceed when adopting a new belief — a difficult matter if the new belief contradicts the agent’s old beliefs. Belief systems are modeled as finite dependency networks. So one can attend not only to what the agent believes, but also to the variety of reasons the agent has for so believing. The computational complexity of the revision problem is characterized. Algorithms for belief revision are formulated, and implemented in Prolog. The implementation tests well on a range of simple belief‐revision problems that pose a variety of challenges for any account of belief‐revision. The notion of ‘minimal mutilation’ of a belief system is explicated precisely. The proposed revision methods are invariant across different global justificatory structures (foundationalist, coherentist, etc.). They respect the intuition that, when revising one's beliefs, one should not hold on to any belief that has lost all its former justifications. The limitation to finite dependency networks is shown not to compromise theoretical generality. This account affords a novel way to argue that there is an inviolable core of logical principles. These principles, which form the system of Core Logic, cannot be given up, on pain of not being able to carry out the reasoning involved in rationally revising beliefs. The book ends by comparing and contrasting the new account with some major representatives of earlier alternative approaches, from the fields of formal epistemology, artificial intelligence and mathematical logic.Less
This account of rational belief revision explains how a rational agent ought to proceed when adopting a new belief — a difficult matter if the new belief contradicts the agent’s old beliefs. Belief systems are modeled as finite dependency networks. So one can attend not only to what the agent believes, but also to the variety of reasons the agent has for so believing. The computational complexity of the revision problem is characterized. Algorithms for belief revision are formulated, and implemented in Prolog. The implementation tests well on a range of simple belief‐revision problems that pose a variety of challenges for any account of belief‐revision. The notion of ‘minimal mutilation’ of a belief system is explicated precisely. The proposed revision methods are invariant across different global justificatory structures (foundationalist, coherentist, etc.). They respect the intuition that, when revising one's beliefs, one should not hold on to any belief that has lost all its former justifications. The limitation to finite dependency networks is shown not to compromise theoretical generality. This account affords a novel way to argue that there is an inviolable core of logical principles. These principles, which form the system of Core Logic, cannot be given up, on pain of not being able to carry out the reasoning involved in rationally revising beliefs. The book ends by comparing and contrasting the new account with some major representatives of earlier alternative approaches, from the fields of formal epistemology, artificial intelligence and mathematical logic.
David S. Wendler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199730087
- eISBN:
- 9780199776689
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199730087.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Chapter 10 provides the conclusion for the text, arguing that the present justification satisfies the 3 conditions on an acceptable justification for nonbeneficial pediatric research. Specifically, ...
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Chapter 10 provides the conclusion for the text, arguing that the present justification satisfies the 3 conditions on an acceptable justification for nonbeneficial pediatric research. Specifically, the fact that contributing to valuable projects promotes one's interests provides justification for exposing children to some risks for the benefit of others. This is the risk allowance condition. Next, the fact that passive contributions have only minimal implications for our interests implies that this possibility can justify only minimal risks. This is the risk threshold condition. Finally, the fact that more active contributions promote our interests more provides a reason to prefer the enrollment of adults to the enrollment of children. This fact is consistent with the third condition that we should prefer the enrollment of adults to children even though it is the case that participation can be consistent with children's interests.Less
Chapter 10 provides the conclusion for the text, arguing that the present justification satisfies the 3 conditions on an acceptable justification for nonbeneficial pediatric research. Specifically, the fact that contributing to valuable projects promotes one's interests provides justification for exposing children to some risks for the benefit of others. This is the risk allowance condition. Next, the fact that passive contributions have only minimal implications for our interests implies that this possibility can justify only minimal risks. This is the risk threshold condition. Finally, the fact that more active contributions promote our interests more provides a reason to prefer the enrollment of adults to the enrollment of children. This fact is consistent with the third condition that we should prefer the enrollment of adults to children even though it is the case that participation can be consistent with children's interests.
Paul Boghossian
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199287185
- eISBN:
- 9780191713569
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287185.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
Relativist and constructivist conceptions of knowledge have become orthodoxy in vast stretches of the academic world in recent times. This book critically examines such views and argues that they are ...
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Relativist and constructivist conceptions of knowledge have become orthodoxy in vast stretches of the academic world in recent times. This book critically examines such views and argues that they are fundamentally flawed. The book focuses on three different ways of reading the claim that knowledge is socially constructed, one about facts and two about justification. All three are rejected. The intuitive, common sense view is that there is a way things are that is independent of human opinion, and that we are capable of arriving at belief about how things are that is objectively reasonable, and is binding on anyone capable of appreciating the relevant evidence, regardless of their social or cultural perspective. Difficult as these notions may be, it is a mistake to think that recent philosophy has uncovered powerful reasons for rejecting them.Less
Relativist and constructivist conceptions of knowledge have become orthodoxy in vast stretches of the academic world in recent times. This book critically examines such views and argues that they are fundamentally flawed. The book focuses on three different ways of reading the claim that knowledge is socially constructed, one about facts and two about justification. All three are rejected. The intuitive, common sense view is that there is a way things are that is independent of human opinion, and that we are capable of arriving at belief about how things are that is objectively reasonable, and is binding on anyone capable of appreciating the relevant evidence, regardless of their social or cultural perspective. Difficult as these notions may be, it is a mistake to think that recent philosophy has uncovered powerful reasons for rejecting them.
Albert Casullo
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199777860
- eISBN:
- 9780199933525
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199777860.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
There has been a major renewal of interest in the topic of a priori knowledge over the past twenty-five years. The sixteen essays in this collection, which span this entire period, document the ...
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There has been a major renewal of interest in the topic of a priori knowledge over the past twenty-five years. The sixteen essays in this collection, which span this entire period, document the complex set of issues motivating the renewed interest, identify the central epistemological questions, and provide the leading ideas of a unified response to them. They offer a systematic treatment of the concept of a priori knowledge, the existence of a priori knowledge, and the relationship between a priori knowledge and the related concepts of necessary truth and analytic truth. The essays fall into three categories: six published prior to my 〉i〈A Priori Justification〉/i〈 (Oxford University Press, 2003), four published after it, and four previously unpublished. The first six essays provide the background and an introduction to a number of the major themes of 〉i〈A Priori Justification〉/i〈: the articulation and defense of the minimal conception of a priori justification, an exposition of the limitations of the traditional arguments both for and against a priori knowledge, and the relevance of empirical investigation to providing supporting evidence for the claim that there are nonexperiential sources of justification. The remaining four published essays explore diverse themes that were introduced in 〉i〈A Priori Justification〉/i〈 but not developed in detail: epistemic overdetermination, the relationship between a priori knowledge and necessary truth, testimony and a priori knowledge, and the bearing of sociohistorical accounts of knowledge on the a priori. The four previously unpublished essays address issues that have either emerged or taken on more prominence in the literature on the a priori since the publication of 〉i〈A Priori Justification〉/i〈: the evidential status of intuitions, the nature of modal knowledge, and challenges to the cogency or the significance of the a priori–a posteriori distinction.Less
There has been a major renewal of interest in the topic of a priori knowledge over the past twenty-five years. The sixteen essays in this collection, which span this entire period, document the complex set of issues motivating the renewed interest, identify the central epistemological questions, and provide the leading ideas of a unified response to them. They offer a systematic treatment of the concept of a priori knowledge, the existence of a priori knowledge, and the relationship between a priori knowledge and the related concepts of necessary truth and analytic truth. The essays fall into three categories: six published prior to my 〉i〈A Priori Justification〉/i〈 (Oxford University Press, 2003), four published after it, and four previously unpublished. The first six essays provide the background and an introduction to a number of the major themes of 〉i〈A Priori Justification〉/i〈: the articulation and defense of the minimal conception of a priori justification, an exposition of the limitations of the traditional arguments both for and against a priori knowledge, and the relevance of empirical investigation to providing supporting evidence for the claim that there are nonexperiential sources of justification. The remaining four published essays explore diverse themes that were introduced in 〉i〈A Priori Justification〉/i〈 but not developed in detail: epistemic overdetermination, the relationship between a priori knowledge and necessary truth, testimony and a priori knowledge, and the bearing of sociohistorical accounts of knowledge on the a priori. The four previously unpublished essays address issues that have either emerged or taken on more prominence in the literature on the a priori since the publication of 〉i〈A Priori Justification〉/i〈: the evidential status of intuitions, the nature of modal knowledge, and challenges to the cogency or the significance of the a priori–a posteriori distinction.
Neil Tennant
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199655755
- eISBN:
- 9780191742125
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199655755.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter gives a suitably texturized proof of a deep result in mathematical logic by Harvey Friedman, which was produced on request. It states that every extant mathematical theory (by virtue of ...
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This chapter gives a suitably texturized proof of a deep result in mathematical logic by Harvey Friedman, which was produced on request. It states that every extant mathematical theory (by virtue of satisfying a very general characterization of possible forms of axiomatic presentation) provides, for each of its theorems, at most finitely many logically distinct choices of axioms from which it can be proved. This further bolsters the philosophical argument for the theoretical adequacy of a finitary approach to the problems of belief revision.Less
This chapter gives a suitably texturized proof of a deep result in mathematical logic by Harvey Friedman, which was produced on request. It states that every extant mathematical theory (by virtue of satisfying a very general characterization of possible forms of axiomatic presentation) provides, for each of its theorems, at most finitely many logically distinct choices of axioms from which it can be proved. This further bolsters the philosophical argument for the theoretical adequacy of a finitary approach to the problems of belief revision.
Ingrid Wassenaar
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198160045
- eISBN:
- 9780191673757
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198160045.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, European Literature, 20th-century Literature and Modernism
A la recherche du temps perdu occupies an undisputed place in the unfolding intellectual history of the ‘moi’ in France. There is, however, a general tendency in writing on this novel to ...
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A la recherche du temps perdu occupies an undisputed place in the unfolding intellectual history of the ‘moi’ in France. There is, however, a general tendency in writing on this novel to celebrate the wonders of the moi sensible uncritically. This effaces all that is morally dubious or frankly experimental about Proust’s account of selfhood. It denies the rigour with which Proust tries to understand exactly why it is so difficult to explain one’s own actions to another. The great party scenes, for example, or the countless digressions, read like manuals on how acts of self-justification take place. Proust, however, is not merely interested in some kind of taxonomy of excuses, hypocrisy, disingenuousness, and Schadenfreude. He wants to know why self-justification tends to be interpreted as indicative of moral or psychological weakness. He asks himself whether self-justification informs isolated moments of everyday existence or whether it endures in an overall conception of self that lasts an individual’s lifetime. He investigates whether it dictates the functioning of an entire social group. Can we decide, he asks, whether justifying one’s self should be written off as morally repugnant, or taken seriously as evidence of moral probity?Less
A la recherche du temps perdu occupies an undisputed place in the unfolding intellectual history of the ‘moi’ in France. There is, however, a general tendency in writing on this novel to celebrate the wonders of the moi sensible uncritically. This effaces all that is morally dubious or frankly experimental about Proust’s account of selfhood. It denies the rigour with which Proust tries to understand exactly why it is so difficult to explain one’s own actions to another. The great party scenes, for example, or the countless digressions, read like manuals on how acts of self-justification take place. Proust, however, is not merely interested in some kind of taxonomy of excuses, hypocrisy, disingenuousness, and Schadenfreude. He wants to know why self-justification tends to be interpreted as indicative of moral or psychological weakness. He asks himself whether self-justification informs isolated moments of everyday existence or whether it endures in an overall conception of self that lasts an individual’s lifetime. He investigates whether it dictates the functioning of an entire social group. Can we decide, he asks, whether justifying one’s self should be written off as morally repugnant, or taken seriously as evidence of moral probity?
Fiona Leverick
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199283460
- eISBN:
- 9780191712654
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283460.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
This book is a comprehensive analysis of the criminal defence of self-defence from a philosophical, legal, and human rights perspective. The primary focus is on self-defence as a defence to homicide, ...
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This book is a comprehensive analysis of the criminal defence of self-defence from a philosophical, legal, and human rights perspective. The primary focus is on self-defence as a defence to homicide, as this is the most difficult type of self-defensive force to justify. Although not always recognised as such, self-defence is a contentious defence, permitting as it does the victim of an attack to preserve her life at the expense of another. If one holds that all human life is of equal value, explaining why this is permissible poses something of a challenge. It is particularly difficult to explain where the aggressor is, for reasons of non-age or insanity for example, not responsible for her actions. The first part of the book identifies the proper theoretical basis of a claim of self-defence. It examines the classification of defences, and the concepts of justification and excuse in particular, and locates self-defence within this classification. It then proceeds critically to analyse various philosophical explanations of why self-defensive killing is justified, before concluding that the most convincing account is one that draws on the right to life with an accompanying theory of forfeiture. The book then proceeds to draw upon this analysis to examine various aspects of the law of self-defence, including retreat, imminence of harm, self-generated self-defence, mistake, and proportionality. The analysis draws on material from all of the major common law jurisdictions and the various jurisdictions of the US. The book concludes with an examination of the implications that the European Convention on Human Rights might have for the law of self-defence.Less
This book is a comprehensive analysis of the criminal defence of self-defence from a philosophical, legal, and human rights perspective. The primary focus is on self-defence as a defence to homicide, as this is the most difficult type of self-defensive force to justify. Although not always recognised as such, self-defence is a contentious defence, permitting as it does the victim of an attack to preserve her life at the expense of another. If one holds that all human life is of equal value, explaining why this is permissible poses something of a challenge. It is particularly difficult to explain where the aggressor is, for reasons of non-age or insanity for example, not responsible for her actions. The first part of the book identifies the proper theoretical basis of a claim of self-defence. It examines the classification of defences, and the concepts of justification and excuse in particular, and locates self-defence within this classification. It then proceeds critically to analyse various philosophical explanations of why self-defensive killing is justified, before concluding that the most convincing account is one that draws on the right to life with an accompanying theory of forfeiture. The book then proceeds to draw upon this analysis to examine various aspects of the law of self-defence, including retreat, imminence of harm, self-generated self-defence, mistake, and proportionality. The analysis draws on material from all of the major common law jurisdictions and the various jurisdictions of the US. The book concludes with an examination of the implications that the European Convention on Human Rights might have for the law of self-defence.
Jonathan Barnes
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199568178
- eISBN:
- 9780191702037
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199568178.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This book is a study of ancient logic based upon the John Locke lectures given in Oxford. Its six chapters discuss the following: firstly, certain ancient ideas about truth; secondly, the ...
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This book is a study of ancient logic based upon the John Locke lectures given in Oxford. Its six chapters discuss the following: firstly, certain ancient ideas about truth; secondly, the Aristotelian conception of predication; thirdly, various ideas about connectors which were developed by the ancient logicians and grammarians; fourthly, the notion of logical form, insofar as it may be discovered in the ancient texts; fifthly, the question of the ‘justification of deduction’; and sixthly, the attitude which has been called logical utilitarianism and which restricts the scope of logic to those forms of inference which are or might be useful for scientific proofs.Less
This book is a study of ancient logic based upon the John Locke lectures given in Oxford. Its six chapters discuss the following: firstly, certain ancient ideas about truth; secondly, the Aristotelian conception of predication; thirdly, various ideas about connectors which were developed by the ancient logicians and grammarians; fourthly, the notion of logical form, insofar as it may be discovered in the ancient texts; fifthly, the question of the ‘justification of deduction’; and sixthly, the attitude which has been called logical utilitarianism and which restricts the scope of logic to those forms of inference which are or might be useful for scientific proofs.
Michael C. Banner
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240198
- eISBN:
- 9780191680113
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240198.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Science
Believers and non-believers often take it for granted that traditional religious faith is, in principle, incapable of the sort of justification which might be given to a scientific theory. Yet how ...
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Believers and non-believers often take it for granted that traditional religious faith is, in principle, incapable of the sort of justification which might be given to a scientific theory. Yet how are scientific theories justified and is it the case that religious belief cannot satisfy the same standards of rationality? Based on a critical examination of recent accounts of the nature of science and of its justification given by Kuhn, Popper, Lakatos, Laudan, and Newton-Smith, this book contends that models of scientific rationality which are used in criticism of religious belief are in fact often inadequate as accounts of the nature of science. It is argued that a realist philosophy of science both reflects the character of science and scientific justification, and also suggests that religious belief could be given a justification of the same sort.Less
Believers and non-believers often take it for granted that traditional religious faith is, in principle, incapable of the sort of justification which might be given to a scientific theory. Yet how are scientific theories justified and is it the case that religious belief cannot satisfy the same standards of rationality? Based on a critical examination of recent accounts of the nature of science and of its justification given by Kuhn, Popper, Lakatos, Laudan, and Newton-Smith, this book contends that models of scientific rationality which are used in criticism of religious belief are in fact often inadequate as accounts of the nature of science. It is argued that a realist philosophy of science both reflects the character of science and scientific justification, and also suggests that religious belief could be given a justification of the same sort.
