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The introduction describes the aims of the book, gives an outline of the central tenets of just war theory, and informs the reader about the book's structure. It also points out that jus ad bellum (when may a war be fought) and ius in bello (how may a war be fought) cannot be completely separated.

Along with identifying a number of pitfalls to be avoided in this project of conceptualizing a Just Peace, Roberts proposes using the term ‘justifiable force’ rather than Just War. This would move the tradition away from appearing to approve of war as a whole, and towards recognizing something more conditional and cautious — that the threat and use of military force by a particular state or group of states may, in precise circumstances, be justifiable. Roberts writes about how the development of the European Union has affected the nations of this region, and encourages an idea of ‘induction’ through adherence to human rights law as the way to become a part of this union. It is through processes at the regional level that we can find positive illustrations of how justice can be maximized without the introduction of force. Since a desire to proliferate the ‘good’ has long been what has shaped human relations, this examination of ‘induction’ provides an example of how an internal focus on justice can create an environment that promotes promulgation.

This chapter distinguishes Just Peace from its closest ‘moral’ neighbours — a stable (but usually unjust) peace and positive peace. Drawing on both consequentialist and deontological considerations, Allan develops an international ethical scale to evaluate different acts from a moral standpoint, with different levels of conflict as the baseline of ethical behavior. The more extreme the discord, the worse it is considered on the scale; the more harmonious, the better. Arguing that absolute unhappiness (disappearance of humankind) and absolute happiness (agape-paradise) are not of this world, Allan presents eight intermediary moral situations, each being superseded by the next one in ethical terms: genocide, war, non-war, Just War, stable peace, Just Peace, positive peace, and Global Care. He develops an ethic of ‘global care’ based on feminist theories of care, religious and secular declarations on a global ethic, evolutionary theory arguments, and a critique of a liberal human rights approach.

Beilin was a former chief negotiator for the Israeli government in the Oslo process at Camp David and Taba. He brings a valuable contribution to this volume as a practitioner and political scientist involved directly in conflict negotiations. After fulfilling his post as the Minister of Justice for the Israeli government, he became one of the lead Israeli representatives in the Geneva Accord negotiations. In this sceptical work, Beilin points to the possible dangers of speaking about the combined concepts of justice and peace, believing that there cannot be one without the other. Peace treaties have often been signed and implemented by the victors of conflict, but have left the population on either side out of the determinations of justice. Beilin presents a history filled with examples in which political leaders have bypassed opportunities for peace because they did not deem the conditions just, and thus perpetuated conflict with untold costs.

War has always been a problem that has plagued our existence, and begged for civility and restriction in its use. The idea behind engaging in war has often been based on assuring a place for peace in the not so distant future, whether the motivation was normative, as within the Just War Doctrine, or simply the hope that victory would lead to the end of organized violence. A group of scholars, intellectuals, and practitioners has been brought together in this volume to posit an alternative route — through justice — to what has thus far been elusive for humankind: a durable peace among and between peoples.

The aim of this chapter is to analyse a number of prominent views concerning the nature of a just war and, having criticized them, to outline the account of a just war that follows from a cosmopolitan perspective. It explores different philosophical approaches at a general level, analysing their accounts of when war may be waged (jus ad bellum) and how it may be waged (jus in bello). To do this it begins, in Section I, with some methodological observations, and then, in the next three sections (II–IV), examines several leading perspectives on the nature of just war: Sections II and III explore Michael Walzer’s influential treatment of this subject in Just and Unjust Wars (1977), criticizing in particular his account of jus ad bellum and his derivation of rules of jus in bello; Section IV analyses Terry Nardin’s state-centric account of just war in Law, Morality and the Relations of States (1983). The following four sections (V–VIII) turn to more cosmopolitan perspectives: Section V outlines the general structure of a cosmopolitan theory of just war; Sections VI and VII examine particular cosmopolitan accounts of some aspects of just war, analysing utilitarian and deontological approaches; and Section VIII criticizes the utilitarian and deontological accounts given in the previous two sections, outlining an alternative cosmopolitan rights-based approach that avoids the objections levelled against these two theories. Sections IX–XI analyse realist misgivings about both traditional and cosmopolitan conceptions of jus ad bellum (IX) and jus in bello (X); and Section XI summarizes and concludes.

In this chapter, Said argues that in the case of the Palestinians and Israelis, histories and cultures are inextricably linked ‘contrapuntally’ in symbiotic rather than mutually exclusive terms. When this understanding of circumstances occurs, it no longer seems viable to eliminate the opposition because there will always be a tomorrow in which retribution will be demanded by those who feel that an injustice had been forced upon family members or previous generations. Said emphasizes the need to think about and resolve two histories that have become interwoven, despite the fact that many have tried to define the other in contradictory terms. Part of arriving at a Just Peace entails recognizing a shared identity and common history even if this approach highlights differences. This might be a monumental task considering the trials and tribulations that have often come to pass in a conflict, but for Said, an ‘abridged memory’ is not an option that will lead to Just Peace.

This chapter explores the question: What does it mean to care for others in international relations? Sara Ruddick, Fiona Robinson, and others have outlined international relations theories based upon care ethics, but their accounts are fairly general and say little about the rights and policies necessary for establishing caring relations among people across the world. The first half of this chapter develops a human rights framework based upon human beings' universal duty to care for others. The chapter argues that this framework avoids the central shortcomings of other international rights frameworks, and more generally provides a standard of justice that should be reasonably acceptable to people from diverse cultural and religious backgrounds. The second half of the chapter outlines some specific strategies and policies for enforcing human rights abroad and caring for distant others. In the last section, the chapter discusses the conditions under which care theory might justify the use of military force, especially for the sake of intervening into other countries for humanitarian purposes.

The Bush administration argued vigorously that the 2003 Iraq war was just. The war's critics similarly invoked the language and concepts of the just war tradition to register their opposition. These arguments are explored in the context of seven jus ad bellum criteria: just cause, right authority, right intention, goal of peace, proportionality, last resort, and reasonable hope of success. It is argued that the main source of controversy arose from the Bush administration's shift away from the more narrow, modern understanding of the just war by making arguments which rested on the broader moral tradition of the just war and the larger moral agenda of the ‘war on terror’.

This chapter argues that although Bush's preventive war in Iraq is morally wrong, and his policy is too broad, some exceptional preventive wars can still be morally justified. It develops and defends a version of consequentialism about war. It then criticizes the relevant part of the most common deontological alternative — just war theory. Finally, all of this theory is applied to preventive war in general and Bush's war and policy in particular.

Several conditions in the traditional theory of the just war — the just cause, hope of success, last resort, and proportionality conditions — assess war morally in light of its consequences, but do so differently than the consequentialist view Jonathan Glover has shown sympathy for. Unlike consequentialism, just war theory does not count all a war's good effects as morally relevant, sometimes discounts good or bad effects because of how they came about, and instead of weighing good and bad effects equally against each other sometimes gives more weight to the one and sometimes more to the other. This chapter examines these complexities in the just war assessment of consequences and shows how the resulting theory is sometimes more permissive about the resort to war than consequentialism and sometimes less permissive.

This chapter considers the issues in relation to humanitarian interventions, arguing that moral compassion without a sense of the political realities can be disastrous. It also looks at Niebuhr's ethical realism in relation to the Just War tradition.

Analyses the historical background of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. Demonstrates that the parties in conflict invoked all individual jus ad bellum principles of ‘just cause’, ‘right intentions’, ‘legitimate authority’, ‘likelihood of success’, ‘proportionality’ and ‘last resort’ in their legitimation of the use of force and of their position on the secession of Abkhazia.