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This chapter presents the English translation of the Introduction of the Criterion. Here, the author discusses the meaning of legal opinion, judicial ruling, and administrative acts, and how the book provides a comprehensive treatment of these issues. The book is composed in the form of a series of questions, in the manner that replicates the discussions that took place between the author's colleagues and himself. The answer immediately follows each question, pointing out the subtleties of these points and the issues that derive from them, as manifested in judicial decisions, legal opinions, and administrative acts of public officials. The book contains forty questions.

Civil procedure has been the primary focus of Adrian Zuckerman’s evidentiary scholarship in recent decades. In contributing to a celebration of his profound and lasting influence on the procedural law and scholarship of England and Wales, this essay concentrates on Zuckerman’s earlier work primarily addressing criminal evidence and procedure. It identifies and elaborates on three particularly significant conceptual innovations in Zuckerman’s evidentiary writings concerning the (1) disciplinary domain; (2) institutional context(s); and (3) normative sources of evidence law. These conceptual advances are expounded in terms of three correlative dynamic disciplinary and institutional transitions: (1) from ‘Law of Evidence’ to ‘Evidence and Proof’; (2) from transubstantivity to procedural differentiation; and (3) from evidentiary rules to principled discretion. In his ground-breaking work on the principles of criminal evidence, I argue, Zuckerman challenged us to rethink the disciplinary contours, normative foundations and jurisprudential methodologies of common law evidence. Against the prevailing common law orthodoxy of a Thayerite model of generic exclusionary rules, Zuckerman insisted that criminal evidence should be reconceptualized as the practical wisdom of principled discretion rooted in the normative values and objectives of penal justice.

The chapter addresses the role of civil society in the ECtHR's incremental transformation of human rights in Europe over the last 50 years. The chapter argues that the evolution of the Convention system was and continues to be critically linked to a dynamic interaction between civil society and the ECtHR. The chapter examines the interaction between NGOs and social activists and the ECtHR over a 50-year period and reveals the important linkages between social activism and the judicial rule-making of the Court. This larger historical analysis is complemented by an in-depth case study of Turkey and the UK in the area of minority rights to provide a more detailed analysis of this general mobilization—litigation dynamic over a fifteen-year period. The legitimacy of this legal process remains a fine balance between societal inclusion and domestic government support.

This chapter deals with attitudes in the United Kingdom to the attachment or execution of state property pursuant to a judicial ruling by a Court. It is divided into two parts: the first covers the attitude and practice of the United Kingdom with regard to the attachment or execution of foreign state property within the former’s jurisdiction. The second comments on the attitude and practice of the United Kingdom government to attachment or execution of its property located within the jurisdiction of foreign states. It is only very recently that the English Courts have moved away from a doctrine of absolute immunity in respect of claims made against foreign sovereigns. The United Kingdom has only just become a party to either of the major international treaties that touch on important aspects of state immunity. The United Kingdom has taken the position — even prior to the passing of the State Immunity Act of 1978 and prior to its stated intention to ratify the European Convention on State Immunity — that it would pay judgment debts.

This chapter is the first section of Kadivar’s ‘Treatise on Refuting the Punishment for Blasphemy and Apostasy’. In this section, the author’s aim is to respond to two questions: (1) can one issue judgements on blasphemy and apostasy outside the orbit of a competent court? and (2) can one delegate the responsibility for carrying out the punishment that is, in principle, the mandate of judicial functionaries, to “anyone who has access to the convicted”? One who replies “Yes, it is” to both of these questions is actually issuing a fatwa in favour of anarchy and disorder, which is certainly not the Lawgiver’s intent. After the introduction of the treatise, this section is divided into four subsections: Under which Jurist’s Jurisdiction is a Judicial Ruling Issued? Issuing a Judicial Order is the Exclusive Mandate of a Competent Court, Disorder Resulting from Allowing the General Public to Carry Out the Death Sentence, and Human Rights are not in Conflict with Islam.