Martin Shapiro
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256488
- eISBN:
- 9780191600234
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256489.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This is the first of two papers that explore the politics of constitutional review – the power of a court or other organ of government to review the constitutionality of public acts, including ...
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This is the first of two papers that explore the politics of constitutional review – the power of a court or other organ of government to review the constitutionality of public acts, including legislation, and to void those acts as unlawful when they are found to be in conflict with the constitutional law. The paper is a composite of portions of two articles: The Success of Judicial Review, published in 1999, and The European Court of Justice: Of Institutions and Democracy, published in 1998. Based largely on American experience, Shapiro argues that constitutional judicial review is most likely to be successful (1) as a solution to an acute commitment problem, (2) when a constitutional court is serving politically and economically powerful interests, or (3) when it has served such interests in the past and uses the legitimacy accumulated earlier to move on to the service of the less powerful. He maintains that there are both historical and a priori reasons to believe that federalism review has the best chance of success, while the success of human rights review would appear to be more problematic, at least when it is not a follow-on to long-established judicial service to the politically advantaged. The different sections of the paper look at: the causal hypotheses that have been advanced for the process of constitutional judicial review in various European countries, the United States, Canada, and Australia (the federalism-English hypothesis; the division of powers hypothesis; the rights hypothesis); the situation in post-Leninist states; constitutional courts; courts as institutions; courts of law; case-by-case decision-making; legal epistemic communities and the strength of constitutional courts; the division of powers and rights; and democracy and judicial institutions.Less
This is the first of two papers that explore the politics of constitutional review – the power of a court or other organ of government to review the constitutionality of public acts, including legislation, and to void those acts as unlawful when they are found to be in conflict with the constitutional law. The paper is a composite of portions of two articles: The Success of Judicial Review, published in 1999, and The European Court of Justice: Of Institutions and Democracy, published in 1998. Based largely on American experience, Shapiro argues that constitutional judicial review is most likely to be successful (1) as a solution to an acute commitment problem, (2) when a constitutional court is serving politically and economically powerful interests, or (3) when it has served such interests in the past and uses the legitimacy accumulated earlier to move on to the service of the less powerful. He maintains that there are both historical and a priori reasons to believe that federalism review has the best chance of success, while the success of human rights review would appear to be more problematic, at least when it is not a follow-on to long-established judicial service to the politically advantaged. The different sections of the paper look at: the causal hypotheses that have been advanced for the process of constitutional judicial review in various European countries, the United States, Canada, and Australia (the federalism-English hypothesis; the division of powers hypothesis; the rights hypothesis); the situation in post-Leninist states; constitutional courts; courts as institutions; courts of law; case-by-case decision-making; legal epistemic communities and the strength of constitutional courts; the division of powers and rights; and democracy and judicial institutions.
Justin Crowe
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691152936
- eISBN:
- 9781400842575
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691152936.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter examines the establishment of the federal judiciary from the beginning of George Washington's first term as president in 1789 to the end of Thomas Jefferson's first term in 1805. It ...
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This chapter examines the establishment of the federal judiciary from the beginning of George Washington's first term as president in 1789 to the end of Thomas Jefferson's first term in 1805. It considers three questions about the tumultuous politics of institutional design that followed the ratification of the Constitution: first, why judicial institution building was pursued; second, how it was accomplished; and third, what it achieved. It also discusses the three stages in which judicial institution building during this era occurred: stages: the policy compromise of 1789, the stalemate preventing large-scale judicial reform in the 1790s, and the flurry of policy and political initiatives of the early 1800s. The chapter concludes with an assessment of how Oliver Ellsworth's political entrepreneurship paved the way for a landmark, precedent-setting episode of judicial institution building that extended judicial power and expanded the judicial apparatus beyond simply the Supreme Court.Less
This chapter examines the establishment of the federal judiciary from the beginning of George Washington's first term as president in 1789 to the end of Thomas Jefferson's first term in 1805. It considers three questions about the tumultuous politics of institutional design that followed the ratification of the Constitution: first, why judicial institution building was pursued; second, how it was accomplished; and third, what it achieved. It also discusses the three stages in which judicial institution building during this era occurred: stages: the policy compromise of 1789, the stalemate preventing large-scale judicial reform in the 1790s, and the flurry of policy and political initiatives of the early 1800s. The chapter concludes with an assessment of how Oliver Ellsworth's political entrepreneurship paved the way for a landmark, precedent-setting episode of judicial institution building that extended judicial power and expanded the judicial apparatus beyond simply the Supreme Court.
Justin Crowe
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691152936
- eISBN:
- 9781400842575
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691152936.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This book explores the historical processes contributing to the rise of the federal judiciary as an independent and autonomous institution of governance in the American political system. More ...
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This book explores the historical processes contributing to the rise of the federal judiciary as an independent and autonomous institution of governance in the American political system. More specifically, it examines the puzzle of “judicial institution building” —the puzzle of understanding how the process of “building” the judiciary unfolded over the course of American political development. The book examines how the federal judiciary in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, overcame its early limitations and emerged as a powerful institution of American governance. It also considers the transformation of the federal judiciary from “judicial exceptionalism” to what might be called “architectonic” politics and offers a developmental account of judicial power. The book shows that the story of the judiciary's transformation involved a series of battles over law, courts, and the politics of institutional development.Less
This book explores the historical processes contributing to the rise of the federal judiciary as an independent and autonomous institution of governance in the American political system. More specifically, it examines the puzzle of “judicial institution building” —the puzzle of understanding how the process of “building” the judiciary unfolded over the course of American political development. The book examines how the federal judiciary in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, overcame its early limitations and emerged as a powerful institution of American governance. It also considers the transformation of the federal judiciary from “judicial exceptionalism” to what might be called “architectonic” politics and offers a developmental account of judicial power. The book shows that the story of the judiciary's transformation involved a series of battles over law, courts, and the politics of institutional development.
Justin Crowe
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691152936
- eISBN:
- 9781400842575
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691152936.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter examines the bureaucratization of the federal judiciary during the quarter century between the dawn of World War I in 1914 and the dawn of World War II in 1939. It shows how reformers ...
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This chapter examines the bureaucratization of the federal judiciary during the quarter century between the dawn of World War I in 1914 and the dawn of World War II in 1939. It shows how reformers during the interwar and New Deal periods insulated the judiciary from potentially dangerous (and increasingly unnecessary) relationships with the other branches of government and signaled the arrival of a more autonomous and self-governing branch. The chapter discusses the three stages in which judicial institution building occurred during the period in conjunction with the vast expansion of regulatory government. It also considers the role played by the political entrepreneurship of William Howard Taft and Homer Cummings in judicial institution building in the interwar and New Deal years.Less
This chapter examines the bureaucratization of the federal judiciary during the quarter century between the dawn of World War I in 1914 and the dawn of World War II in 1939. It shows how reformers during the interwar and New Deal periods insulated the judiciary from potentially dangerous (and increasingly unnecessary) relationships with the other branches of government and signaled the arrival of a more autonomous and self-governing branch. The chapter discusses the three stages in which judicial institution building occurred during the period in conjunction with the vast expansion of regulatory government. It also considers the role played by the political entrepreneurship of William Howard Taft and Homer Cummings in judicial institution building in the interwar and New Deal years.
Justin Crowe
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691152936
- eISBN:
- 9781400842575
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691152936.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter focuses on the empowerment of the federal judiciary from the Compromise of 1850 (admitting California into the Union as a free state and unofficially signifying the beginning of the ...
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This chapter focuses on the empowerment of the federal judiciary from the Compromise of 1850 (admitting California into the Union as a free state and unofficially signifying the beginning of the political crisis leading to the Civil War) to the Compromise of 1877 (settling the disputed 1876 presidential election between Samuel J. Tilden and Rutherford B. Hayes and representing the formal end of Reconstruction). The chapter asks why judicial institution building was pursued, how it was accomplished, and what it achieved within the context of mid-nineteenth century American politics. It examines the role of Republicans in Civil War and Reconstruction era institution building and how it resulted in a significant expansion of federal judicial power. It also considers the four stages in which the substantial empowerment of the judiciary occurred during the period, including the consolidation of a Republican-friendly Supreme Court through ameliorative reforms aimed at specific problems of judicial performance.Less
This chapter focuses on the empowerment of the federal judiciary from the Compromise of 1850 (admitting California into the Union as a free state and unofficially signifying the beginning of the political crisis leading to the Civil War) to the Compromise of 1877 (settling the disputed 1876 presidential election between Samuel J. Tilden and Rutherford B. Hayes and representing the formal end of Reconstruction). The chapter asks why judicial institution building was pursued, how it was accomplished, and what it achieved within the context of mid-nineteenth century American politics. It examines the role of Republicans in Civil War and Reconstruction era institution building and how it resulted in a significant expansion of federal judicial power. It also considers the four stages in which the substantial empowerment of the judiciary occurred during the period, including the consolidation of a Republican-friendly Supreme Court through ameliorative reforms aimed at specific problems of judicial performance.
Justin Crowe
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691152936
- eISBN:
- 9781400842575
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691152936.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter examines the reorganization of the federal judiciary from the beginning of Thomas Jefferson's second term as president in 1805 until just prior to the Compromise of 1850. During the ...
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This chapter examines the reorganization of the federal judiciary from the beginning of Thomas Jefferson's second term as president in 1805 until just prior to the Compromise of 1850. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the government faced a new set of challenges, many of which were the result of the vast territorial expansion. Territorial expansion and the politics of statehood admission intertwined with judicial reform attempts focused primarily on arranging states in circuits and ensuring regional geographic representation on the Supreme Court. The chapter considers the four stages in which the history of judicial institution building unfolded in the eras of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democracy: the Judiciary Act of 1807, the stalemate over the National Republicans' attempts to extend the circuit system to the West in the mid-1820s, the Whigs' failed consolidation plan of 1835, and the triumph of reform in the Judiciary Act of 1837.Less
This chapter examines the reorganization of the federal judiciary from the beginning of Thomas Jefferson's second term as president in 1805 until just prior to the Compromise of 1850. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the government faced a new set of challenges, many of which were the result of the vast territorial expansion. Territorial expansion and the politics of statehood admission intertwined with judicial reform attempts focused primarily on arranging states in circuits and ensuring regional geographic representation on the Supreme Court. The chapter considers the four stages in which the history of judicial institution building unfolded in the eras of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democracy: the Judiciary Act of 1807, the stalemate over the National Republicans' attempts to extend the circuit system to the West in the mid-1820s, the Whigs' failed consolidation plan of 1835, and the triumph of reform in the Judiciary Act of 1837.
Justin Crowe
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691152936
- eISBN:
- 9781400842575
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691152936.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter examines the specialization of the federal judiciary from the start of World War II in 1939 to the election of Bill Clinton's presidential successor in 2000. Coming out of the New Deal, ...
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This chapter examines the specialization of the federal judiciary from the start of World War II in 1939 to the election of Bill Clinton's presidential successor in 2000. Coming out of the New Deal, politicians of modern America broadened the institutional portfolios of courts and judges with a series of specialized functions and individuals. This deepening of the bureaucratic tendency toward division of labor cemented the key role played by judicial power in modern governance. The chapter discusses the three stages in which judicial institution building occurred during this period: the enhancement and expansion of judicial adjuncts to execute administrative duties for and to relieve the growing caseload burden on federal district court judges; the reorganization of existing courts and judges in order to develop and utilize expertise to handle patent law; and the creation of a new tribunal to provide judicial scrutiny over domestic surveillance and intelligence gathering.Less
This chapter examines the specialization of the federal judiciary from the start of World War II in 1939 to the election of Bill Clinton's presidential successor in 2000. Coming out of the New Deal, politicians of modern America broadened the institutional portfolios of courts and judges with a series of specialized functions and individuals. This deepening of the bureaucratic tendency toward division of labor cemented the key role played by judicial power in modern governance. The chapter discusses the three stages in which judicial institution building occurred during this period: the enhancement and expansion of judicial adjuncts to execute administrative duties for and to relieve the growing caseload burden on federal district court judges; the reorganization of existing courts and judges in order to develop and utilize expertise to handle patent law; and the creation of a new tribunal to provide judicial scrutiny over domestic surveillance and intelligence gathering.
Justin Crowe
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691152936
- eISBN:
- 9781400842575
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691152936.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter considers the restructuring of the federal judiciary during the period of Republican dominance from the inauguration of Rutherford B. Hayes in 1877 to the inauguration of Woodrow Wilson ...
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This chapter considers the restructuring of the federal judiciary during the period of Republican dominance from the inauguration of Rutherford B. Hayes in 1877 to the inauguration of Woodrow Wilson in 1913. It shows that Gilded Age and Progressive Era politicians pursued judicial reform that focused less on the extent of judicial power and more on the structural logic and internal consistency of the institutional judiciary more generally. The chapter discusses the two stages in which judicial institution building occurred during the period: first, the Gilded Age attempt to unburden the Supreme Court by appointing a new slate of judges to staff circuit courts (1877–1891); and second, the Progressive Era unification and synchronization of all laws concerning the judiciary in one statute (1892–1914). The role played by Republicans and Democrats in judicial institution building in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era is also examined.Less
This chapter considers the restructuring of the federal judiciary during the period of Republican dominance from the inauguration of Rutherford B. Hayes in 1877 to the inauguration of Woodrow Wilson in 1913. It shows that Gilded Age and Progressive Era politicians pursued judicial reform that focused less on the extent of judicial power and more on the structural logic and internal consistency of the institutional judiciary more generally. The chapter discusses the two stages in which judicial institution building occurred during the period: first, the Gilded Age attempt to unburden the Supreme Court by appointing a new slate of judges to staff circuit courts (1877–1891); and second, the Progressive Era unification and synchronization of all laws concerning the judiciary in one statute (1892–1914). The role played by Republicans and Democrats in judicial institution building in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era is also examined.
Richard Caplan
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199263455
- eISBN:
- 9780191602726
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199263450.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Public order and internal security are the sine qua non of civil rule and, by extension, of the international administration of a territory. Examines international engagement in relation to the triad ...
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Public order and internal security are the sine qua non of civil rule and, by extension, of the international administration of a territory. Examines international engagement in relation to the triad of responsibilities—policing, the administration of justice, and the establishment of penal systems—that are most critical for the maintenance of law and order in a war-torn territory. Some of the issues addressed include supervisory versus executive policing, the role of military forces in policing, extra-judicial detention, war criminals, and reconciliation processes.Less
Public order and internal security are the sine qua non of civil rule and, by extension, of the international administration of a territory. Examines international engagement in relation to the triad of responsibilities—policing, the administration of justice, and the establishment of penal systems—that are most critical for the maintenance of law and order in a war-torn territory. Some of the issues addressed include supervisory versus executive policing, the role of military forces in policing, extra-judicial detention, war criminals, and reconciliation processes.
Justin Crowe
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691152936
- eISBN:
- 9781400842575
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691152936.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This concluding chapter synthesizes the book's main findings about the architectonic politics of judicial institution building and contextualizes them within contemporary debates. It also reflects ...
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This concluding chapter synthesizes the book's main findings about the architectonic politics of judicial institution building and contextualizes them within contemporary debates. It also reflects upon the lessons of the more than 200-year historical lineage of the institutional judiciary for our understanding of judicial power in America. More specifically, it considers the place of the federal judiciary in America's past and future in empirical and normative terms, respectively. It argues that both political rhetoric and academic exegesis about the Supreme Court embody a fundamentally incorrect presumption about the judiciary being external to politics, and that such presumption leads to a series of misconceptions about the relationship between judicial power and democratic politics. The chapter offers a conception that not only locates the judicial branch squarely within the political arena but also places substantially greater emphasis on its cooperation rather than conflict with other actors and institutions in that arena.Less
This concluding chapter synthesizes the book's main findings about the architectonic politics of judicial institution building and contextualizes them within contemporary debates. It also reflects upon the lessons of the more than 200-year historical lineage of the institutional judiciary for our understanding of judicial power in America. More specifically, it considers the place of the federal judiciary in America's past and future in empirical and normative terms, respectively. It argues that both political rhetoric and academic exegesis about the Supreme Court embody a fundamentally incorrect presumption about the judiciary being external to politics, and that such presumption leads to a series of misconceptions about the relationship between judicial power and democratic politics. The chapter offers a conception that not only locates the judicial branch squarely within the political arena but also places substantially greater emphasis on its cooperation rather than conflict with other actors and institutions in that arena.
Justin Crowe
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691152936
- eISBN:
- 9781400842575
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691152936.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
How did the federal judiciary transcend early limitations to become a powerful institution of American governance? How did the Supreme Court move from political irrelevance to political centrality? ...
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How did the federal judiciary transcend early limitations to become a powerful institution of American governance? How did the Supreme Court move from political irrelevance to political centrality? This book uncovers the causes and consequences of judicial institution building in the United States from the commencement of the new government in 1789 through the close of the twentieth century. Explaining why and how the federal judiciary became an independent, autonomous, and powerful political institution, the book moves away from the notion that the judiciary is exceptional in the scheme of American politics, illustrating instead how it is subject to the same architectonic politics as other political institutions. Arguing that judicial institution building is fundamentally based on a series of contested questions regarding institutional design and delegation, the book develops a theory to explain why political actors seek to build the judiciary and the conditions under which they are successful. It both demonstrates how the motivations of institution-builders ranged from substantive policy to partisan and electoral politics to judicial performance, and details how reform was often provoked by substantial changes in the political universe or transformational entrepreneurship by political leaders. Embedding case studies of landmark institution-building episodes within a contextual understanding of each era under consideration, the book presents a historically rich narrative that offers analytically grounded explanations for why judicial institution building was pursued, how it was accomplished, and what—in the broader scheme of American constitutional democracy—it achieved.Less
How did the federal judiciary transcend early limitations to become a powerful institution of American governance? How did the Supreme Court move from political irrelevance to political centrality? This book uncovers the causes and consequences of judicial institution building in the United States from the commencement of the new government in 1789 through the close of the twentieth century. Explaining why and how the federal judiciary became an independent, autonomous, and powerful political institution, the book moves away from the notion that the judiciary is exceptional in the scheme of American politics, illustrating instead how it is subject to the same architectonic politics as other political institutions. Arguing that judicial institution building is fundamentally based on a series of contested questions regarding institutional design and delegation, the book develops a theory to explain why political actors seek to build the judiciary and the conditions under which they are successful. It both demonstrates how the motivations of institution-builders ranged from substantive policy to partisan and electoral politics to judicial performance, and details how reform was often provoked by substantial changes in the political universe or transformational entrepreneurship by political leaders. Embedding case studies of landmark institution-building episodes within a contextual understanding of each era under consideration, the book presents a historically rich narrative that offers analytically grounded explanations for why judicial institution building was pursued, how it was accomplished, and what—in the broader scheme of American constitutional democracy—it achieved.
Daniel Berkowitz and Karen B. Clay
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691136042
- eISBN:
- 9781400840540
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691136042.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History
Although political and legal institutions are essential to any nation's economic development, the forces that have shaped these institutions are poorly understood. Drawing on rich evidence about the ...
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Although political and legal institutions are essential to any nation's economic development, the forces that have shaped these institutions are poorly understood. Drawing on rich evidence about the development of the American states from the mid-nineteenth to the late twentieth century, this book documents the mechanisms through which geographical and historical conditions—such as climate, access to water transportation, and early legal systems—impacted political and judicial institutions and economic growth. The book shows how a state's geography and climate influenced whether elites based their wealth in agriculture or trade. States with more occupationally diverse elites in 1860 had greater levels of political competition in their legislature from 1866 to 2000. The book also examines the effects of early legal systems. Because of their colonial history, thirteen states had an operational civil-law legal system prior to statehood. All of these states except Louisiana would later adopt common law. By the late eighteenth century, the two legal systems differed in their balances of power. In civil-law systems, judiciaries were subordinate to legislatures, whereas in common-law systems, the two were more equal. Former civil-law states and common-law states exhibit persistent differences in the structure of their courts, the retention of judges, and judicial budgets. Moreover, changes in court structures, retention procedures, and budgets occur under very different conditions in civil-law and common-law states. This book illustrates how initial geographical and historical conditions can determine the evolution of political and legal institutions and long-run growth.Less
Although political and legal institutions are essential to any nation's economic development, the forces that have shaped these institutions are poorly understood. Drawing on rich evidence about the development of the American states from the mid-nineteenth to the late twentieth century, this book documents the mechanisms through which geographical and historical conditions—such as climate, access to water transportation, and early legal systems—impacted political and judicial institutions and economic growth. The book shows how a state's geography and climate influenced whether elites based their wealth in agriculture or trade. States with more occupationally diverse elites in 1860 had greater levels of political competition in their legislature from 1866 to 2000. The book also examines the effects of early legal systems. Because of their colonial history, thirteen states had an operational civil-law legal system prior to statehood. All of these states except Louisiana would later adopt common law. By the late eighteenth century, the two legal systems differed in their balances of power. In civil-law systems, judiciaries were subordinate to legislatures, whereas in common-law systems, the two were more equal. Former civil-law states and common-law states exhibit persistent differences in the structure of their courts, the retention of judges, and judicial budgets. Moreover, changes in court structures, retention procedures, and budgets occur under very different conditions in civil-law and common-law states. This book illustrates how initial geographical and historical conditions can determine the evolution of political and legal institutions and long-run growth.
al-Sayyed Mustapha Kamel
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9789774162015
- eISBN:
- 9781617970993
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- American University in Cairo Press
- DOI:
- 10.5743/cairo/9789774162015.003.0015
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter demonstrates how judges, acting as an arm of the state, curb the freedom of civil society institutions. It discusses the judges' involvement as a professional association through their ...
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This chapter demonstrates how judges, acting as an arm of the state, curb the freedom of civil society institutions. It discusses the judges' involvement as a professional association through their clubs in the fight by civil society organizations for more autonomy. It shows how certain judicial institutions strive to move civil and political liberties forward in order to expand the range of freedoms available to civil society organizations. It also surveys some of the ways civil society organizations have tried to win the judiciary to their side and get them to support their struggle for more respect for the civil and political rights of citizens. The period covered by this study is the duration of the Mubarak presidency, or twenty-six years at the time of writing, encompassing four presidential terms and two years of his fifth term.Less
This chapter demonstrates how judges, acting as an arm of the state, curb the freedom of civil society institutions. It discusses the judges' involvement as a professional association through their clubs in the fight by civil society organizations for more autonomy. It shows how certain judicial institutions strive to move civil and political liberties forward in order to expand the range of freedoms available to civil society organizations. It also surveys some of the ways civil society organizations have tried to win the judiciary to their side and get them to support their struggle for more respect for the civil and political rights of citizens. The period covered by this study is the duration of the Mubarak presidency, or twenty-six years at the time of writing, encompassing four presidential terms and two years of his fifth term.
Theodor Meron
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198257455
- eISBN:
- 9780191681769
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198257455.003.0005
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
Many human rights and humanitarian norms have already evolved into customary law. Many more norms will soon be recognized as customary law, and thus acquire universality, binding even those states ...
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Many human rights and humanitarian norms have already evolved into customary law. Many more norms will soon be recognized as customary law, and thus acquire universality, binding even those states that are not parties to the treaties to implement those norms. There has been an extensive interpenetration between the law of human rights and that of state responsibility. Each of these bodies of law has deeply affected the other. States can and should take advantage of the already-existing institutions and of the emerging principles of state responsibility to address violations of human rights and humanitarian norms through diplomatic channels or before international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. The states must recognize that compliance with the norms serves their own interests. Informed public opinion may even move states in this direction.Less
Many human rights and humanitarian norms have already evolved into customary law. Many more norms will soon be recognized as customary law, and thus acquire universality, binding even those states that are not parties to the treaties to implement those norms. There has been an extensive interpenetration between the law of human rights and that of state responsibility. Each of these bodies of law has deeply affected the other. States can and should take advantage of the already-existing institutions and of the emerging principles of state responsibility to address violations of human rights and humanitarian norms through diplomatic channels or before international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. The states must recognize that compliance with the norms serves their own interests. Informed public opinion may even move states in this direction.
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804758116
- eISBN:
- 9780804786799
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804758116.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This chapter discusses the theme of this book, which is about the role of the courts in public policy reform in Brazil. The book, which proposes a framework for understanding how courts are drawn ...
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This chapter discusses the theme of this book, which is about the role of the courts in public policy reform in Brazil. The book, which proposes a framework for understanding how courts are drawn into the policy game and how policy players use them to advance their strategic political objectives, attempts to integrate the courts into the body of existing research in comparative political science on political institutions and policy outcomes in Brazil. It also highlights the role of policy salience, political environment, and the judicial institutional environment in determining which public policies actually have their day in court.Less
This chapter discusses the theme of this book, which is about the role of the courts in public policy reform in Brazil. The book, which proposes a framework for understanding how courts are drawn into the policy game and how policy players use them to advance their strategic political objectives, attempts to integrate the courts into the body of existing research in comparative political science on political institutions and policy outcomes in Brazil. It also highlights the role of policy salience, political environment, and the judicial institutional environment in determining which public policies actually have their day in court.
Geoffrey Marshall
- Published in print:
- 1980
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198761211
- eISBN:
- 9780191695148
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198761211.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter illustrates the way in which the term ‘State’ is used in ordinary or political conversation, and examines its nature, characteristics, and its practical and theoretical importance. The ...
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This chapter illustrates the way in which the term ‘State’ is used in ordinary or political conversation, and examines its nature, characteristics, and its practical and theoretical importance. The variety of nomenclature for State agencies in Britain is chaotic but the distinctions which are represented may well have a positive value. With ‘the Crown’, ‘the public’, ‘ministers’, ‘the nation’, ‘Parliament’, and the ‘executive’, any proposition may be asserted in which it is possible to advance a sentence containing the word ‘State’, and often with some gain in clarity. It may be true that little harm arises in general conversation from using ‘State’ as a label for executive, legislative, and judicial institutions when nothing turns upon the difference between them, but any detailed argument about political institutions requires an awareness of the differences between forms of governmental activity, and the term ‘State’ in certain contexts can be dangerously misleading.Less
This chapter illustrates the way in which the term ‘State’ is used in ordinary or political conversation, and examines its nature, characteristics, and its practical and theoretical importance. The variety of nomenclature for State agencies in Britain is chaotic but the distinctions which are represented may well have a positive value. With ‘the Crown’, ‘the public’, ‘ministers’, ‘the nation’, ‘Parliament’, and the ‘executive’, any proposition may be asserted in which it is possible to advance a sentence containing the word ‘State’, and often with some gain in clarity. It may be true that little harm arises in general conversation from using ‘State’ as a label for executive, legislative, and judicial institutions when nothing turns upon the difference between them, but any detailed argument about political institutions requires an awareness of the differences between forms of governmental activity, and the term ‘State’ in certain contexts can be dangerously misleading.
Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer, and Mikael Rask Madsen
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198795582
- eISBN:
- 9780191836909
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198795582.003.0023
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
This concluding chapter returns to the conjectures developed in Chapter 2, extracting insights from the book’s empirical chapters to explore how context shapes the authority of ICs. While several of ...
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This concluding chapter returns to the conjectures developed in Chapter 2, extracting insights from the book’s empirical chapters to explore how context shapes the authority of ICs. While several of the conjectures were confirmed, others were not. We focus in particular on the limited impact of IC design features, the distinctive challenges faced by international criminal tribunals, and by ICs created during the post-Cold War era. The final section revisits the distinction between IC authority and IC power. We explain why IC authority is likely to remain fragile, and we revisit our claim that authority can not only increase but also stagnate or diminish over time.Less
This concluding chapter returns to the conjectures developed in Chapter 2, extracting insights from the book’s empirical chapters to explore how context shapes the authority of ICs. While several of the conjectures were confirmed, others were not. We focus in particular on the limited impact of IC design features, the distinctive challenges faced by international criminal tribunals, and by ICs created during the post-Cold War era. The final section revisits the distinction between IC authority and IC power. We explain why IC authority is likely to remain fragile, and we revisit our claim that authority can not only increase but also stagnate or diminish over time.
