Justin Crowe
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691152936
- eISBN:
- 9781400842575
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691152936.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter examines the establishment of the federal judiciary from the beginning of George Washington's first term as president in 1789 to the end of Thomas Jefferson's first term in 1805. It ...
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This chapter examines the establishment of the federal judiciary from the beginning of George Washington's first term as president in 1789 to the end of Thomas Jefferson's first term in 1805. It considers three questions about the tumultuous politics of institutional design that followed the ratification of the Constitution: first, why judicial institution building was pursued; second, how it was accomplished; and third, what it achieved. It also discusses the three stages in which judicial institution building during this era occurred: stages: the policy compromise of 1789, the stalemate preventing large-scale judicial reform in the 1790s, and the flurry of policy and political initiatives of the early 1800s. The chapter concludes with an assessment of how Oliver Ellsworth's political entrepreneurship paved the way for a landmark, precedent-setting episode of judicial institution building that extended judicial power and expanded the judicial apparatus beyond simply the Supreme Court.Less
This chapter examines the establishment of the federal judiciary from the beginning of George Washington's first term as president in 1789 to the end of Thomas Jefferson's first term in 1805. It considers three questions about the tumultuous politics of institutional design that followed the ratification of the Constitution: first, why judicial institution building was pursued; second, how it was accomplished; and third, what it achieved. It also discusses the three stages in which judicial institution building during this era occurred: stages: the policy compromise of 1789, the stalemate preventing large-scale judicial reform in the 1790s, and the flurry of policy and political initiatives of the early 1800s. The chapter concludes with an assessment of how Oliver Ellsworth's political entrepreneurship paved the way for a landmark, precedent-setting episode of judicial institution building that extended judicial power and expanded the judicial apparatus beyond simply the Supreme Court.
Justin Crowe
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691152936
- eISBN:
- 9781400842575
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691152936.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This book explores the historical processes contributing to the rise of the federal judiciary as an independent and autonomous institution of governance in the American political system. More ...
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This book explores the historical processes contributing to the rise of the federal judiciary as an independent and autonomous institution of governance in the American political system. More specifically, it examines the puzzle of “judicial institution building” —the puzzle of understanding how the process of “building” the judiciary unfolded over the course of American political development. The book examines how the federal judiciary in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, overcame its early limitations and emerged as a powerful institution of American governance. It also considers the transformation of the federal judiciary from “judicial exceptionalism” to what might be called “architectonic” politics and offers a developmental account of judicial power. The book shows that the story of the judiciary's transformation involved a series of battles over law, courts, and the politics of institutional development.Less
This book explores the historical processes contributing to the rise of the federal judiciary as an independent and autonomous institution of governance in the American political system. More specifically, it examines the puzzle of “judicial institution building” —the puzzle of understanding how the process of “building” the judiciary unfolded over the course of American political development. The book examines how the federal judiciary in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, overcame its early limitations and emerged as a powerful institution of American governance. It also considers the transformation of the federal judiciary from “judicial exceptionalism” to what might be called “architectonic” politics and offers a developmental account of judicial power. The book shows that the story of the judiciary's transformation involved a series of battles over law, courts, and the politics of institutional development.
Justin Crowe
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691152936
- eISBN:
- 9781400842575
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691152936.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter examines the bureaucratization of the federal judiciary during the quarter century between the dawn of World War I in 1914 and the dawn of World War II in 1939. It shows how reformers ...
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This chapter examines the bureaucratization of the federal judiciary during the quarter century between the dawn of World War I in 1914 and the dawn of World War II in 1939. It shows how reformers during the interwar and New Deal periods insulated the judiciary from potentially dangerous (and increasingly unnecessary) relationships with the other branches of government and signaled the arrival of a more autonomous and self-governing branch. The chapter discusses the three stages in which judicial institution building occurred during the period in conjunction with the vast expansion of regulatory government. It also considers the role played by the political entrepreneurship of William Howard Taft and Homer Cummings in judicial institution building in the interwar and New Deal years.Less
This chapter examines the bureaucratization of the federal judiciary during the quarter century between the dawn of World War I in 1914 and the dawn of World War II in 1939. It shows how reformers during the interwar and New Deal periods insulated the judiciary from potentially dangerous (and increasingly unnecessary) relationships with the other branches of government and signaled the arrival of a more autonomous and self-governing branch. The chapter discusses the three stages in which judicial institution building occurred during the period in conjunction with the vast expansion of regulatory government. It also considers the role played by the political entrepreneurship of William Howard Taft and Homer Cummings in judicial institution building in the interwar and New Deal years.
Justin Crowe
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691152936
- eISBN:
- 9781400842575
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691152936.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter examines the reorganization of the federal judiciary from the beginning of Thomas Jefferson's second term as president in 1805 until just prior to the Compromise of 1850. During the ...
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This chapter examines the reorganization of the federal judiciary from the beginning of Thomas Jefferson's second term as president in 1805 until just prior to the Compromise of 1850. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the government faced a new set of challenges, many of which were the result of the vast territorial expansion. Territorial expansion and the politics of statehood admission intertwined with judicial reform attempts focused primarily on arranging states in circuits and ensuring regional geographic representation on the Supreme Court. The chapter considers the four stages in which the history of judicial institution building unfolded in the eras of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democracy: the Judiciary Act of 1807, the stalemate over the National Republicans' attempts to extend the circuit system to the West in the mid-1820s, the Whigs' failed consolidation plan of 1835, and the triumph of reform in the Judiciary Act of 1837.Less
This chapter examines the reorganization of the federal judiciary from the beginning of Thomas Jefferson's second term as president in 1805 until just prior to the Compromise of 1850. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the government faced a new set of challenges, many of which were the result of the vast territorial expansion. Territorial expansion and the politics of statehood admission intertwined with judicial reform attempts focused primarily on arranging states in circuits and ensuring regional geographic representation on the Supreme Court. The chapter considers the four stages in which the history of judicial institution building unfolded in the eras of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democracy: the Judiciary Act of 1807, the stalemate over the National Republicans' attempts to extend the circuit system to the West in the mid-1820s, the Whigs' failed consolidation plan of 1835, and the triumph of reform in the Judiciary Act of 1837.
Justin Crowe
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691152936
- eISBN:
- 9781400842575
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691152936.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter focuses on the empowerment of the federal judiciary from the Compromise of 1850 (admitting California into the Union as a free state and unofficially signifying the beginning of the ...
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This chapter focuses on the empowerment of the federal judiciary from the Compromise of 1850 (admitting California into the Union as a free state and unofficially signifying the beginning of the political crisis leading to the Civil War) to the Compromise of 1877 (settling the disputed 1876 presidential election between Samuel J. Tilden and Rutherford B. Hayes and representing the formal end of Reconstruction). The chapter asks why judicial institution building was pursued, how it was accomplished, and what it achieved within the context of mid-nineteenth century American politics. It examines the role of Republicans in Civil War and Reconstruction era institution building and how it resulted in a significant expansion of federal judicial power. It also considers the four stages in which the substantial empowerment of the judiciary occurred during the period, including the consolidation of a Republican-friendly Supreme Court through ameliorative reforms aimed at specific problems of judicial performance.Less
This chapter focuses on the empowerment of the federal judiciary from the Compromise of 1850 (admitting California into the Union as a free state and unofficially signifying the beginning of the political crisis leading to the Civil War) to the Compromise of 1877 (settling the disputed 1876 presidential election between Samuel J. Tilden and Rutherford B. Hayes and representing the formal end of Reconstruction). The chapter asks why judicial institution building was pursued, how it was accomplished, and what it achieved within the context of mid-nineteenth century American politics. It examines the role of Republicans in Civil War and Reconstruction era institution building and how it resulted in a significant expansion of federal judicial power. It also considers the four stages in which the substantial empowerment of the judiciary occurred during the period, including the consolidation of a Republican-friendly Supreme Court through ameliorative reforms aimed at specific problems of judicial performance.
Justin Crowe
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691152936
- eISBN:
- 9781400842575
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691152936.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter examines the specialization of the federal judiciary from the start of World War II in 1939 to the election of Bill Clinton's presidential successor in 2000. Coming out of the New Deal, ...
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This chapter examines the specialization of the federal judiciary from the start of World War II in 1939 to the election of Bill Clinton's presidential successor in 2000. Coming out of the New Deal, politicians of modern America broadened the institutional portfolios of courts and judges with a series of specialized functions and individuals. This deepening of the bureaucratic tendency toward division of labor cemented the key role played by judicial power in modern governance. The chapter discusses the three stages in which judicial institution building occurred during this period: the enhancement and expansion of judicial adjuncts to execute administrative duties for and to relieve the growing caseload burden on federal district court judges; the reorganization of existing courts and judges in order to develop and utilize expertise to handle patent law; and the creation of a new tribunal to provide judicial scrutiny over domestic surveillance and intelligence gathering.Less
This chapter examines the specialization of the federal judiciary from the start of World War II in 1939 to the election of Bill Clinton's presidential successor in 2000. Coming out of the New Deal, politicians of modern America broadened the institutional portfolios of courts and judges with a series of specialized functions and individuals. This deepening of the bureaucratic tendency toward division of labor cemented the key role played by judicial power in modern governance. The chapter discusses the three stages in which judicial institution building occurred during this period: the enhancement and expansion of judicial adjuncts to execute administrative duties for and to relieve the growing caseload burden on federal district court judges; the reorganization of existing courts and judges in order to develop and utilize expertise to handle patent law; and the creation of a new tribunal to provide judicial scrutiny over domestic surveillance and intelligence gathering.
Justin Crowe
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691152936
- eISBN:
- 9781400842575
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691152936.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter considers the restructuring of the federal judiciary during the period of Republican dominance from the inauguration of Rutherford B. Hayes in 1877 to the inauguration of Woodrow Wilson ...
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This chapter considers the restructuring of the federal judiciary during the period of Republican dominance from the inauguration of Rutherford B. Hayes in 1877 to the inauguration of Woodrow Wilson in 1913. It shows that Gilded Age and Progressive Era politicians pursued judicial reform that focused less on the extent of judicial power and more on the structural logic and internal consistency of the institutional judiciary more generally. The chapter discusses the two stages in which judicial institution building occurred during the period: first, the Gilded Age attempt to unburden the Supreme Court by appointing a new slate of judges to staff circuit courts (1877–1891); and second, the Progressive Era unification and synchronization of all laws concerning the judiciary in one statute (1892–1914). The role played by Republicans and Democrats in judicial institution building in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era is also examined.Less
This chapter considers the restructuring of the federal judiciary during the period of Republican dominance from the inauguration of Rutherford B. Hayes in 1877 to the inauguration of Woodrow Wilson in 1913. It shows that Gilded Age and Progressive Era politicians pursued judicial reform that focused less on the extent of judicial power and more on the structural logic and internal consistency of the institutional judiciary more generally. The chapter discusses the two stages in which judicial institution building occurred during the period: first, the Gilded Age attempt to unburden the Supreme Court by appointing a new slate of judges to staff circuit courts (1877–1891); and second, the Progressive Era unification and synchronization of all laws concerning the judiciary in one statute (1892–1914). The role played by Republicans and Democrats in judicial institution building in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era is also examined.
Justin Crowe
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691152936
- eISBN:
- 9781400842575
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691152936.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This concluding chapter synthesizes the book's main findings about the architectonic politics of judicial institution building and contextualizes them within contemporary debates. It also reflects ...
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This concluding chapter synthesizes the book's main findings about the architectonic politics of judicial institution building and contextualizes them within contemporary debates. It also reflects upon the lessons of the more than 200-year historical lineage of the institutional judiciary for our understanding of judicial power in America. More specifically, it considers the place of the federal judiciary in America's past and future in empirical and normative terms, respectively. It argues that both political rhetoric and academic exegesis about the Supreme Court embody a fundamentally incorrect presumption about the judiciary being external to politics, and that such presumption leads to a series of misconceptions about the relationship between judicial power and democratic politics. The chapter offers a conception that not only locates the judicial branch squarely within the political arena but also places substantially greater emphasis on its cooperation rather than conflict with other actors and institutions in that arena.Less
This concluding chapter synthesizes the book's main findings about the architectonic politics of judicial institution building and contextualizes them within contemporary debates. It also reflects upon the lessons of the more than 200-year historical lineage of the institutional judiciary for our understanding of judicial power in America. More specifically, it considers the place of the federal judiciary in America's past and future in empirical and normative terms, respectively. It argues that both political rhetoric and academic exegesis about the Supreme Court embody a fundamentally incorrect presumption about the judiciary being external to politics, and that such presumption leads to a series of misconceptions about the relationship between judicial power and democratic politics. The chapter offers a conception that not only locates the judicial branch squarely within the political arena but also places substantially greater emphasis on its cooperation rather than conflict with other actors and institutions in that arena.
Justin Crowe
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691152936
- eISBN:
- 9781400842575
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691152936.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
How did the federal judiciary transcend early limitations to become a powerful institution of American governance? How did the Supreme Court move from political irrelevance to political centrality? ...
More
How did the federal judiciary transcend early limitations to become a powerful institution of American governance? How did the Supreme Court move from political irrelevance to political centrality? This book uncovers the causes and consequences of judicial institution building in the United States from the commencement of the new government in 1789 through the close of the twentieth century. Explaining why and how the federal judiciary became an independent, autonomous, and powerful political institution, the book moves away from the notion that the judiciary is exceptional in the scheme of American politics, illustrating instead how it is subject to the same architectonic politics as other political institutions. Arguing that judicial institution building is fundamentally based on a series of contested questions regarding institutional design and delegation, the book develops a theory to explain why political actors seek to build the judiciary and the conditions under which they are successful. It both demonstrates how the motivations of institution-builders ranged from substantive policy to partisan and electoral politics to judicial performance, and details how reform was often provoked by substantial changes in the political universe or transformational entrepreneurship by political leaders. Embedding case studies of landmark institution-building episodes within a contextual understanding of each era under consideration, the book presents a historically rich narrative that offers analytically grounded explanations for why judicial institution building was pursued, how it was accomplished, and what—in the broader scheme of American constitutional democracy—it achieved.Less
How did the federal judiciary transcend early limitations to become a powerful institution of American governance? How did the Supreme Court move from political irrelevance to political centrality? This book uncovers the causes and consequences of judicial institution building in the United States from the commencement of the new government in 1789 through the close of the twentieth century. Explaining why and how the federal judiciary became an independent, autonomous, and powerful political institution, the book moves away from the notion that the judiciary is exceptional in the scheme of American politics, illustrating instead how it is subject to the same architectonic politics as other political institutions. Arguing that judicial institution building is fundamentally based on a series of contested questions regarding institutional design and delegation, the book develops a theory to explain why political actors seek to build the judiciary and the conditions under which they are successful. It both demonstrates how the motivations of institution-builders ranged from substantive policy to partisan and electoral politics to judicial performance, and details how reform was often provoked by substantial changes in the political universe or transformational entrepreneurship by political leaders. Embedding case studies of landmark institution-building episodes within a contextual understanding of each era under consideration, the book presents a historically rich narrative that offers analytically grounded explanations for why judicial institution building was pursued, how it was accomplished, and what—in the broader scheme of American constitutional democracy—it achieved.
