Ian Carter
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294535
- eISBN:
- 9780191598951
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294530.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
When liberal political philosophers talk of equalizing, increasing or maximizing freedom (or liberty), they implicitly assume freedom to be a measurable attribute. Freedom is one of the currencies of ...
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When liberal political philosophers talk of equalizing, increasing or maximizing freedom (or liberty), they implicitly assume freedom to be a measurable attribute. Freedom is one of the currencies of a liberal theory of distributive justice, and is therefore assumed to be something that individuals can possess in varying degrees. Yet it is rarely clear what is meant by claims about degrees of freedom. To make sense of such claims, we need to clarify the concept of overall freedom and ask whether its measurement is theoretically possible. This concept is important because freedom has, for liberals, non-specific (or content-independent) value–i.e. value that is independent of the value of being free to do specific things. Liberals prescribe not only that individuals have certain specific freedom-types but also that they have a measure of (overall) freedom. Attempts to make sense of the concept of overall freedom by weighting particular options in terms of their values are erroneous, as these do not account for freedom’s non-specific value. On the other hand, a closer examination of the problems of the individuation of actions and of the various types of constraints on freedom shows overall freedom to be measurable in a way that reflects its non-specific value. To this end, actions need to be individuated in spatio-temporal terms and constraints on freedom need to be characterized in terms of the physical compossibility of actions. The comparative judgements about freedom implied by this analysis (with reference both to individuals and to groups) are more coherent with our intuitive judgements than might at first be expected.Less
When liberal political philosophers talk of equalizing, increasing or maximizing freedom (or liberty), they implicitly assume freedom to be a measurable attribute. Freedom is one of the currencies of a liberal theory of distributive justice, and is therefore assumed to be something that individuals can possess in varying degrees. Yet it is rarely clear what is meant by claims about degrees of freedom. To make sense of such claims, we need to clarify the concept of overall freedom and ask whether its measurement is theoretically possible. This concept is important because freedom has, for liberals, non-specific (or content-independent) value–i.e. value that is independent of the value of being free to do specific things. Liberals prescribe not only that individuals have certain specific freedom-types but also that they have a measure of (overall) freedom. Attempts to make sense of the concept of overall freedom by weighting particular options in terms of their values are erroneous, as these do not account for freedom’s non-specific value. On the other hand, a closer examination of the problems of the individuation of actions and of the various types of constraints on freedom shows overall freedom to be measurable in a way that reflects its non-specific value. To this end, actions need to be individuated in spatio-temporal terms and constraints on freedom need to be characterized in terms of the physical compossibility of actions. The comparative judgements about freedom implied by this analysis (with reference both to individuals and to groups) are more coherent with our intuitive judgements than might at first be expected.
A. W. Price
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199534791
- eISBN:
- 9780191715877
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534791.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book explores the varying ways in which context is relevant to our interpretation and assessment of practical inferences (especially from one intention to another), practical judgements ...
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This book explores the varying ways in which context is relevant to our interpretation and assessment of practical inferences (especially from one intention to another), practical judgements (especially involving the term ‘ought’), inferences from conditional ‘ought’-judgements, and the ascription to agents of reasons for action. Practical inferences are subject not to a special logic, but to a teleology that they share with action itself. Their inherent purpose is to forward an end of action, and not to be logically valid. Practical judgements are commonly to be understood relatively to an implicit context of goals and circumstances. Apparently conflicting ‘ought’s can show up as consistent once they are interpreted contextually, with an eye to different ends and different aspects of a situation. This makes acceptable certain patterns of inference that would otherwise yield counter-intuitive conclusions. What reasons for action are ascribable to an agent depends both on the context of action, and on the deliberative context. Facts tell in favour of acts against a background of particular circumstances, and in ways whose relevance to an ascription to an agent of a reason for action depends upon the perspective within which the ascription is made.Less
This book explores the varying ways in which context is relevant to our interpretation and assessment of practical inferences (especially from one intention to another), practical judgements (especially involving the term ‘ought’), inferences from conditional ‘ought’-judgements, and the ascription to agents of reasons for action. Practical inferences are subject not to a special logic, but to a teleology that they share with action itself. Their inherent purpose is to forward an end of action, and not to be logically valid. Practical judgements are commonly to be understood relatively to an implicit context of goals and circumstances. Apparently conflicting ‘ought’s can show up as consistent once they are interpreted contextually, with an eye to different ends and different aspects of a situation. This makes acceptable certain patterns of inference that would otherwise yield counter-intuitive conclusions. What reasons for action are ascribable to an agent depends both on the context of action, and on the deliberative context. Facts tell in favour of acts against a background of particular circumstances, and in ways whose relevance to an ascription to an agent of a reason for action depends upon the perspective within which the ascription is made.
Andrew Mason
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199264414
- eISBN:
- 9780191718489
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264414.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This chapter examines the most obvious way of developing a meritocratic account, one in terms of the idea of desert. According to this approach, the best-qualified candidates should be appointed to ...
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This chapter examines the most obvious way of developing a meritocratic account, one in terms of the idea of desert. According to this approach, the best-qualified candidates should be appointed to advantaged social positions because they deserve to be, provided there is fair access to qualifications. David Miller's version of this approach is examined. He maintains that the best-qualified applicants for jobs deserve them because they are the most likely to come to deserve the rewards attached to them, at least when the market is functioning properly. Against this approach, it is argued that ordinary judgements about economic desert are sensitive to effort-making, not just achievement, and the degree of effort that people make corresponds in a highly imperfect way to their qualifications.Less
This chapter examines the most obvious way of developing a meritocratic account, one in terms of the idea of desert. According to this approach, the best-qualified candidates should be appointed to advantaged social positions because they deserve to be, provided there is fair access to qualifications. David Miller's version of this approach is examined. He maintains that the best-qualified applicants for jobs deserve them because they are the most likely to come to deserve the rewards attached to them, at least when the market is functioning properly. Against this approach, it is argued that ordinary judgements about economic desert are sensitive to effort-making, not just achievement, and the degree of effort that people make corresponds in a highly imperfect way to their qualifications.
Donald Davidson
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198237549
- eISBN:
- 9780191601378
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198237545.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Applies Davidson's Unified Theory of thought, meaning, and action to three families of problems involving various aspects of rationality, some degree of which Davidson's theory of radical ...
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Applies Davidson's Unified Theory of thought, meaning, and action to three families of problems involving various aspects of rationality, some degree of which Davidson's theory of radical interpretation attributes to any creature, which can be said to have a mind. These problems are the nature and our understanding of value judgements, the adequacy conditions for attributing mental states to a being, and the problem of irrationality.The first four chapters apply Davidson's thesis that our interpretations of another person's mental states are a source of objectivity to value judgements: such judgements, Davidson argues in this section, are as objective as any judgement about the mind can be. Chs 5 to 10 develop Davidson's Unified Theory for interpreting thought, meaning, and action, the primary concern of this section being the specification of the minimal conditions for attributing mental states to an object or creature. Chs 11 to 14 deal primarily with the problems raised by those cognitive states and actions that seem to violate, in a fundamental way, the constraints of rationality. Since Davidson regards the constraints of rationality to be amongst the necessary conditions for both mind and interpretation, irrational thoughts, and actions pose a particular problem for his Unified Theory. The final four chapters attempt to remove the apparent contradiction.Less
Applies Davidson's Unified Theory of thought, meaning, and action to three families of problems involving various aspects of rationality, some degree of which Davidson's theory of radical interpretation attributes to any creature, which can be said to have a mind. These problems are the nature and our understanding of value judgements, the adequacy conditions for attributing mental states to a being, and the problem of irrationality.
The first four chapters apply Davidson's thesis that our interpretations of another person's mental states are a source of objectivity to value judgements: such judgements, Davidson argues in this section, are as objective as any judgement about the mind can be. Chs 5 to 10 develop Davidson's Unified Theory for interpreting thought, meaning, and action, the primary concern of this section being the specification of the minimal conditions for attributing mental states to an object or creature. Chs 11 to 14 deal primarily with the problems raised by those cognitive states and actions that seem to violate, in a fundamental way, the constraints of rationality. Since Davidson regards the constraints of rationality to be amongst the necessary conditions for both mind and interpretation, irrational thoughts, and actions pose a particular problem for his Unified Theory. The final four chapters attempt to remove the apparent contradiction.
A. E. Denham
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240105
- eISBN:
- 9780191680076
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240105.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Moral Philosophy
This book examines the parallels between moral and metaphorical discourse, and the ways in which our engagement with literary art, and metaphorical discourse in particular, informs our moral beliefs. ...
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This book examines the parallels between moral and metaphorical discourse, and the ways in which our engagement with literary art, and metaphorical discourse in particular, informs our moral beliefs. It suggests that there are three ways in which one's beliefs can be improved: if more of them are true, if more of them are warranted or justified, or if the warrant or justification for some of them is strengthened. So the book considers whether and how such improvements can be made to moral beliefs, and what role metaphor can play. It is an integral aim of the work to discern to what extent moral and metaphorical discourses deserve to be regarded as cognitive at all. This involves investigating to what extent such discourses are capable of truth or falsehood, warrant or justification, and how it is that we understand moral judgements and metaphorical expressions. This investigation is founded on an account of the nature of value and of our experience of value.Less
This book examines the parallels between moral and metaphorical discourse, and the ways in which our engagement with literary art, and metaphorical discourse in particular, informs our moral beliefs. It suggests that there are three ways in which one's beliefs can be improved: if more of them are true, if more of them are warranted or justified, or if the warrant or justification for some of them is strengthened. So the book considers whether and how such improvements can be made to moral beliefs, and what role metaphor can play. It is an integral aim of the work to discern to what extent moral and metaphorical discourses deserve to be regarded as cognitive at all. This involves investigating to what extent such discourses are capable of truth or falsehood, warrant or justification, and how it is that we understand moral judgements and metaphorical expressions. This investigation is founded on an account of the nature of value and of our experience of value.
Paul Grice and Judith Baker
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199243877
- eISBN:
- 9780191697302
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199243877.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The works of Paul Grice collected in this volume present his metaphysical defence of value, and represent a modern attempt to provide a metaphysical foundation for value. Value judgements are viewed ...
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The works of Paul Grice collected in this volume present his metaphysical defence of value, and represent a modern attempt to provide a metaphysical foundation for value. Value judgements are viewed as objective; value is part of the world we live in, but nonetheless is constructed by us. We inherit, or seem to inherit, the Aristotelian world in which objects and creatures are characterized in terms of what they are supposed to do. We are thereby enabled to evaluate by reference to function and finality. This much is not surprising. The most striking part of Grice's position, however, is his contention that the legitimacy of such evaluations rests ultimately on an argument for absolute value. The collection includes Grice's three previously unpublished Carus Lectures on the conception of value, a section of his ‘Reply to Richards’ (previously published in Grandy and Warner (eds.), Philosophical Grounds of Rationality, Oxford, 1986), and ‘Method in Philosophical Psychology’ (Presidential Address delivered to the Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, 1975).Less
The works of Paul Grice collected in this volume present his metaphysical defence of value, and represent a modern attempt to provide a metaphysical foundation for value. Value judgements are viewed as objective; value is part of the world we live in, but nonetheless is constructed by us. We inherit, or seem to inherit, the Aristotelian world in which objects and creatures are characterized in terms of what they are supposed to do. We are thereby enabled to evaluate by reference to function and finality. This much is not surprising. The most striking part of Grice's position, however, is his contention that the legitimacy of such evaluations rests ultimately on an argument for absolute value. The collection includes Grice's three previously unpublished Carus Lectures on the conception of value, a section of his ‘Reply to Richards’ (previously published in Grandy and Warner (eds.), Philosophical Grounds of Rationality, Oxford, 1986), and ‘Method in Philosophical Psychology’ (Presidential Address delivered to the Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, 1975).
Christian Illies
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198238324
- eISBN:
- 9780191679612
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238324.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Transcendental arguments have gained a lot of attention over the past twenty years, mainly in the field of theoretical reason. Yet few scholars have looked at their relevance to practical reason. ...
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Transcendental arguments have gained a lot of attention over the past twenty years, mainly in the field of theoretical reason. Yet few scholars have looked at their relevance to practical reason. This book argues that although this methodological avenue is not yet well-paved, transcendental arguments have great potential in ethics, as they promise rational justification of normative judgements. There are two main types of transcendental argument that have been developed for this purpose in recent years. One is based on an analysis of the implications of agency (mainly by Alan Gewirth), the other on an analysis of reason as a discursive process with normative presuppositions (Karl-Otto Apel and other continental philosophers, but also Onora O'Neill). This book finds that these arguments have severe limitations, and argues that practical reason should involve a different analysis: judgement formation must be analysed as a form of agency. Once this starting point is secured, by showing that it cannot rationally be denied, then two things can be transcendentally inferred: first, that there exists a categorical demand upon agents to arrive at true judgements, and second, that we must respect freedom of agency in general. Here our ordinary notions of right and wrong find secure ground.Less
Transcendental arguments have gained a lot of attention over the past twenty years, mainly in the field of theoretical reason. Yet few scholars have looked at their relevance to practical reason. This book argues that although this methodological avenue is not yet well-paved, transcendental arguments have great potential in ethics, as they promise rational justification of normative judgements. There are two main types of transcendental argument that have been developed for this purpose in recent years. One is based on an analysis of the implications of agency (mainly by Alan Gewirth), the other on an analysis of reason as a discursive process with normative presuppositions (Karl-Otto Apel and other continental philosophers, but also Onora O'Neill). This book finds that these arguments have severe limitations, and argues that practical reason should involve a different analysis: judgement formation must be analysed as a form of agency. Once this starting point is secured, by showing that it cannot rationally be denied, then two things can be transcendentally inferred: first, that there exists a categorical demand upon agents to arrive at true judgements, and second, that we must respect freedom of agency in general. Here our ordinary notions of right and wrong find secure ground.
Derek Matravers
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199243167
- eISBN:
- 9780191697227
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199243167.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Mind
The problem of expression has seemed more difficult than it actually is because philosophers have construed it in terms of intentional objects and necessary connections, when really the explanation ...
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The problem of expression has seemed more difficult than it actually is because philosophers have construed it in terms of intentional objects and necessary connections, when really the explanation is causal and there are only contingent collections. The problem has been to show that all that is wanted for a theory can be obtained from within the causal picture. This the book has attempted to do. However, the obstacles that need to be overcome are not solely philosophical ones. When we listen to music, walk around an art gallery, or read about the thoughts and experiences of composers and artists, it is difficult to believe that expression can be explained in a relatively clear way using familiar philosophical concepts. The experience of expression seems almost to require a complicated and mysterious analysis. Regardless of the importance ethical or aesthetic judgements have in our lives, they raise problems which it is proper for philosophy to look at.Less
The problem of expression has seemed more difficult than it actually is because philosophers have construed it in terms of intentional objects and necessary connections, when really the explanation is causal and there are only contingent collections. The problem has been to show that all that is wanted for a theory can be obtained from within the causal picture. This the book has attempted to do. However, the obstacles that need to be overcome are not solely philosophical ones. When we listen to music, walk around an art gallery, or read about the thoughts and experiences of composers and artists, it is difficult to believe that expression can be explained in a relatively clear way using familiar philosophical concepts. The experience of expression seems almost to require a complicated and mysterious analysis. Regardless of the importance ethical or aesthetic judgements have in our lives, they raise problems which it is proper for philosophy to look at.
Philippa Foot
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252862
- eISBN:
- 9780191597435
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252866.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This collection of essays, written between 1957 and 1977, contains discussions of the moral philosophy of David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, and some modern philosophers. It presents ...
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This collection of essays, written between 1957 and 1977, contains discussions of the moral philosophy of David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, and some modern philosophers. It presents virtues and vices rather than rights and duties as the central concepts in moral philosophy. Throughout, the author rejects contemporary anti‐ naturalistic moral philosophies such as emotivism and prescriptivism, but defends the view that moral judgements may be hypothetical rather than (as Kant thought) categorical imperatives. The author also applies her moral philosophy to the current debates on euthanasia and abortion, the latter discussed in relation to the doctrine of the double effect. She argues against the suggestion, on the part of A. J. Ayer and others, that free will actually requires determinism. In a final essay, she asks whether the concept of moral approval can be understood except against a particular background of social practices.Less
This collection of essays, written between 1957 and 1977, contains discussions of the moral philosophy of David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, and some modern philosophers. It presents virtues and vices rather than rights and duties as the central concepts in moral philosophy. Throughout, the author rejects contemporary anti‐ naturalistic moral philosophies such as emotivism and prescriptivism, but defends the view that moral judgements may be hypothetical rather than (as Kant thought) categorical imperatives. The author also applies her moral philosophy to the current debates on euthanasia and abortion, the latter discussed in relation to the doctrine of the double effect. She argues against the suggestion, on the part of A. J. Ayer and others, that free will actually requires determinism. In a final essay, she asks whether the concept of moral approval can be understood except against a particular background of social practices.
Maximilian de Gaynesford
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199287826
- eISBN:
- 9780191603570
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199287821.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The inferential role of I is irreducibly deictic. The inferential roles of singular terms are distinguished by appeal to the different mechanisms required to guarantee co-reference in a ...
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The inferential role of I is irreducibly deictic. The inferential roles of singular terms are distinguished by appeal to the different mechanisms required to guarantee co-reference in a knowledge-advancing way. Co-typicality is insufficient for variant terms. Anaphoric structures are insufficient for I and other terms used deictically; they depend on identity-judgements and keeping track. The inferential role of I and other deictic terms is irreducibly deictic: it is by singling out individuals made salient in the extra-sentential environment that their uses contribute systematically to what entails what.Less
The inferential role of I is irreducibly deictic. The inferential roles of singular terms are distinguished by appeal to the different mechanisms required to guarantee co-reference in a knowledge-advancing way. Co-typicality is insufficient for variant terms. Anaphoric structures are insufficient for I and other terms used deictically; they depend on identity-judgements and keeping track. The inferential role of I and other deictic terms is irreducibly deictic: it is by singling out individuals made salient in the extra-sentential environment that their uses contribute systematically to what entails what.
Richard Sorabji
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199256600
- eISBN:
- 9780191712609
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256600.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Posidonius denied that Chrysippus' judgements were necessary for emotion in the cases mentioned in Chapter 4 of disowned judgements, animals or infants, and response to wordless music. There may more ...
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Posidonius denied that Chrysippus' judgements were necessary for emotion in the cases mentioned in Chapter 4 of disowned judgements, animals or infants, and response to wordless music. There may more often be some appearance of good or bad, but not always judgement in Chrysippus' sense of assent to appearance.Less
Posidonius denied that Chrysippus' judgements were necessary for emotion in the cases mentioned in Chapter 4 of disowned judgements, animals or infants, and response to wordless music. There may more often be some appearance of good or bad, but not always judgement in Chrysippus' sense of assent to appearance.
Marcus Giaquinto
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199285945
- eISBN:
- 9780191713811
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285945.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter shows how, using basic beliefs, one can go on to make a geometrical discovery by visual means in a non-empirical manner. It focuses on a simple example in order to illustrate the general ...
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This chapter shows how, using basic beliefs, one can go on to make a geometrical discovery by visual means in a non-empirical manner. It focuses on a simple example in order to illustrate the general possibility of what Kant would call synthetic a priori judgements in geometry. It attempts to show how such a judgement can be knowledge. It is commonly asserted that diagrams have no non-redundant role in a proof, even in a geometric proof.Less
This chapter shows how, using basic beliefs, one can go on to make a geometrical discovery by visual means in a non-empirical manner. It focuses on a simple example in order to illustrate the general possibility of what Kant would call synthetic a priori judgements in geometry. It attempts to show how such a judgement can be knowledge. It is commonly asserted that diagrams have no non-redundant role in a proof, even in a geometric proof.
Julian Johnson
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195146813
- eISBN:
- 9780199849246
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195146813.001.0001
- Subject:
- Music, Philosophy of Music
In the last decades most cultural critics have come to agree that the division between “high” and “low” art is an artificial one, that Beethoven's Ninth and Blue Suede Shoes are equally valuable as ...
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In the last decades most cultural critics have come to agree that the division between “high” and “low” art is an artificial one, that Beethoven's Ninth and Blue Suede Shoes are equally valuable as cultural texts. This book challenges these dominant assumptions about the relativism of cultural judgements. The book maintains that music is more than just “a matter of taste”: while some music provides entertainment, or serves as background noise, other music functions as art. This book considers the value of classical music in contemporary society, arguing that it remains distinctive because it works in quite different ways to most of the other music that surrounds us. This long book aims to restore classical music's intrinsic aesthetic value and to rescue it from a designation as mere signifier of elitism or refinement.Less
In the last decades most cultural critics have come to agree that the division between “high” and “low” art is an artificial one, that Beethoven's Ninth and Blue Suede Shoes are equally valuable as cultural texts. This book challenges these dominant assumptions about the relativism of cultural judgements. The book maintains that music is more than just “a matter of taste”: while some music provides entertainment, or serves as background noise, other music functions as art. This book considers the value of classical music in contemporary society, arguing that it remains distinctive because it works in quite different ways to most of the other music that surrounds us. This long book aims to restore classical music's intrinsic aesthetic value and to rescue it from a designation as mere signifier of elitism or refinement.
Miranda Fricker
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198237907
- eISBN:
- 9780191706844
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter develops an initial account of a virtue to counteract the ever-present risk of doing testimonial injustices: the virtue of testimonial justice. The hearer who possesses this virtue ...
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This chapter develops an initial account of a virtue to counteract the ever-present risk of doing testimonial injustices: the virtue of testimonial justice. The hearer who possesses this virtue reliably neutralizes the impact of prejudice in her credibility judgements. Naïve and corrective forms of the virtue are distinguished. Issues of culpability are explored and the historical conditions under which one might be non-culpable in perpetrating a testimonial injustice. A distinction between routine and exceptional judgements is made and related to the question of moral relativism.Less
This chapter develops an initial account of a virtue to counteract the ever-present risk of doing testimonial injustices: the virtue of testimonial justice. The hearer who possesses this virtue reliably neutralizes the impact of prejudice in her credibility judgements. Naïve and corrective forms of the virtue are distinguished. Issues of culpability are explored and the historical conditions under which one might be non-culpable in perpetrating a testimonial injustice. A distinction between routine and exceptional judgements is made and related to the question of moral relativism.
R. Kevin Hill
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199285525
- eISBN:
- 9780191700354
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285525.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter defends Kant's claim that aesthetic and teleological judgments are both differing types of what he calls reflective judgements. It discusses that Nietzsche's reading of the Critique of ...
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This chapter defends Kant's claim that aesthetic and teleological judgments are both differing types of what he calls reflective judgements. It discusses that Nietzsche's reading of the Critique of Judgement was a vital influence on Birth of Tragedy. It also provides a brief account of the Critique of Judgement, hewing more closely to Kant's intentions in the third Critique. It explains that Kant's Critique of Judgement, like all of Kant's works shows an architectonic penchant. It discusses that the first Critique prepares the way for a metaphysics of morals. It also talks about Kant's identification of the correct inference-drawing faculty with the scientific theory producing faculty which he calls ‘reason’.Less
This chapter defends Kant's claim that aesthetic and teleological judgments are both differing types of what he calls reflective judgements. It discusses that Nietzsche's reading of the Critique of Judgement was a vital influence on Birth of Tragedy. It also provides a brief account of the Critique of Judgement, hewing more closely to Kant's intentions in the third Critique. It explains that Kant's Critique of Judgement, like all of Kant's works shows an architectonic penchant. It discusses that the first Critique prepares the way for a metaphysics of morals. It also talks about Kant's identification of the correct inference-drawing faculty with the scientific theory producing faculty which he calls ‘reason’.
Richard Sorabji
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199256600
- eISBN:
- 9780191712609
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256600.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
What is the missing element in the analysis of emotion as value judgement which Posidonius tried to fill with his movements of soul capacities? Perhaps the bodily reactions, only sometimes noticed, ...
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What is the missing element in the analysis of emotion as value judgement which Posidonius tried to fill with his movements of soul capacities? Perhaps the bodily reactions, only sometimes noticed, set up by the amygdala or other parts of the brain. Joseph LeDoux has argued that in fear these can occur independently of, and even before, the judgement of danger. They may be triggered by perception of something that we do not recognize as having been associated with a past danger, so that our bodies are a-tremble without our knowing why, or continue even after we have disowned judgements of danger. They may also correspond to Seneca's first movements before any judgement of danger, and to William James' being sad because we cry. Stoic therapy for emotions is cognitive, and attacks judgements very effectively. But we can see why in some cases a physical therapy may be needed.Less
What is the missing element in the analysis of emotion as value judgement which Posidonius tried to fill with his movements of soul capacities? Perhaps the bodily reactions, only sometimes noticed, set up by the amygdala or other parts of the brain. Joseph LeDoux has argued that in fear these can occur independently of, and even before, the judgement of danger. They may be triggered by perception of something that we do not recognize as having been associated with a past danger, so that our bodies are a-tremble without our knowing why, or continue even after we have disowned judgements of danger. They may also correspond to Seneca's first movements before any judgement of danger, and to William James' being sad because we cry. Stoic therapy for emotions is cognitive, and attacks judgements very effectively. But we can see why in some cases a physical therapy may be needed.
Richard Sorabji
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199256600
- eISBN:
- 9780191712609
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256600.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
First movements of the soul for the Stoic materialists include bites, which are small contractions of the physical soul sensed in distress. First movements of the body include pallor, tears, and ...
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First movements of the soul for the Stoic materialists include bites, which are small contractions of the physical soul sensed in distress. First movements of the body include pallor, tears, and sexual irritation. All are involuntary shocks unlike the judgements which constitute emotion, and emotional therapy should ignore them as unimportant. First movements are first clearly described by Cicero, bites by Galen. For Seneca (1st century CE), Posidonius' revision of Stoicism around 100 BCE was wrong to say that emotion can occur without the relevant judgements in the case of animals, of disowned judgements, and of emotion changed by wordless music. In all three cases we have not emotion, but only first movements.Less
First movements of the soul for the Stoic materialists include bites, which are small contractions of the physical soul sensed in distress. First movements of the body include pallor, tears, and sexual irritation. All are involuntary shocks unlike the judgements which constitute emotion, and emotional therapy should ignore them as unimportant. First movements are first clearly described by Cicero, bites by Galen. For Seneca (1st century CE), Posidonius' revision of Stoicism around 100 BCE was wrong to say that emotion can occur without the relevant judgements in the case of animals, of disowned judgements, and of emotion changed by wordless music. In all three cases we have not emotion, but only first movements.
Richard Sorabji
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199256600
- eISBN:
- 9780191712609
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256600.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
For Posidonius, the value judgements proposed by Chrysippus are not sufficient for emotion because they can remain intact while emotion fades through exhaustion, and because emotion requires us also ...
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For Posidonius, the value judgements proposed by Chrysippus are not sufficient for emotion because they can remain intact while emotion fades through exhaustion, and because emotion requires us also to imagine what is judged and to pay attention to it. Posidonius' explanation is that in exhaustion and without imagination, the movements of the irrational capacities are missing. These movements are spatial movements of physical soul, but not yet identified, like Seneca's first movements, with contractions and suchlike. Further, whereas Posidonius' emphasis is that in special cases the movements can be sufficient for emotion, Seneca's emphasis is that first movements need not lead on to emotion at all, because emotion is something of a very different kind, namely judgement.Less
For Posidonius, the value judgements proposed by Chrysippus are not sufficient for emotion because they can remain intact while emotion fades through exhaustion, and because emotion requires us also to imagine what is judged and to pay attention to it. Posidonius' explanation is that in exhaustion and without imagination, the movements of the irrational capacities are missing. These movements are spatial movements of physical soul, but not yet identified, like Seneca's first movements, with contractions and suchlike. Further, whereas Posidonius' emphasis is that in special cases the movements can be sufficient for emotion, Seneca's emphasis is that first movements need not lead on to emotion at all, because emotion is something of a very different kind, namely judgement.
André Béteille
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198080961
- eISBN:
- 9780199082049
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198080961.003.0009
- Subject:
- Sociology, Politics, Social Movements and Social Change
This chapter explores the relationship between sociology and ideology, drawing on the work of M. N. Srinivas, and argues that sociology and ideology must be kept apart. It considers sociology as ...
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This chapter explores the relationship between sociology and ideology, drawing on the work of M. N. Srinivas, and argues that sociology and ideology must be kept apart. It considers sociology as being inclusive of social anthropology and contends that it is an empirical science rather than a normative discipline, although opinions differ as to the relationship between value judgements and judgements of reality. The chapter also insists that scholarship and partisanship make uneasy bedfellows and examines Srinivas’s advocacy of the ‘field view’ as against the ‘book view’ of Indian society. It concludes by analysing the sociological approach to the study of religion and discusses whether the argument in favour of detachment, objectivity, and value-neutrality can be extended from the field of religion to other fields of sociological enquiry and analysis.Less
This chapter explores the relationship between sociology and ideology, drawing on the work of M. N. Srinivas, and argues that sociology and ideology must be kept apart. It considers sociology as being inclusive of social anthropology and contends that it is an empirical science rather than a normative discipline, although opinions differ as to the relationship between value judgements and judgements of reality. The chapter also insists that scholarship and partisanship make uneasy bedfellows and examines Srinivas’s advocacy of the ‘field view’ as against the ‘book view’ of Indian society. It concludes by analysing the sociological approach to the study of religion and discusses whether the argument in favour of detachment, objectivity, and value-neutrality can be extended from the field of religion to other fields of sociological enquiry and analysis.
Gary L. Francione
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195305104
- eISBN:
- 9780199850556
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305104.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
This chapter argues that the human attitude towards animals can best be described as moral schizophrenia. It explains that this moral schizophrenia is related to the status of animals as property, ...
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This chapter argues that the human attitude towards animals can best be described as moral schizophrenia. It explains that this moral schizophrenia is related to the status of animals as property, which means that animals are nothing more than things despite the many laws that supposedly protect them. The chapter contends that our current practices are entirely inconsistent because most human beings believe, in fact, that animals should not be made to suffer. It evaluates current practices in connection with meat eating, science, and entertainment, and suggests that our own moral judgements call for radical change.Less
This chapter argues that the human attitude towards animals can best be described as moral schizophrenia. It explains that this moral schizophrenia is related to the status of animals as property, which means that animals are nothing more than things despite the many laws that supposedly protect them. The chapter contends that our current practices are entirely inconsistent because most human beings believe, in fact, that animals should not be made to suffer. It evaluates current practices in connection with meat eating, science, and entertainment, and suggests that our own moral judgements call for radical change.
