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Amphibious warfare was critical to the success of Allied forces in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) during the Pacific War. However, at the beginning of the war both the Australian and United States forces in the SWPA had little knowledge, expertise, or experience in this form of warfare. This chapter by Peter J. Dean traces the development of amphibious warfare in the SWPA through organization, training, tactics, doctrine, and operations. While focusing on the Australian experience and highlighting the evolution of capabilities between 1942-45 through an analysis of the assaults on Lae (1943) and Balikpapan (1945), it contextualizes this experience within General Douglas MacArthur's maritime strategy and the friction inherent in combined amphibious operations in this theater. The chapter highlights the evolution of the Australian Army from a force almost totally unfamiliar with the practice of amphibious operations to one which, in combination with its United States coalition partner, becomes a practitioner par excellence in this form of warfare.

The preceding chapters have demonstrated that American joint land–sea operations, and in particular amphibious assaults, did not originate in the 20th century as the U.S. Marine Corps prepared for war in the Pacific. Still, there was little formal study of U.S. combined operations doctrine and methodology prior to the landing on Guadalcanal in August 1942. This oversight is unfortunate, because to some degree every major American war has witnessed a measure of army–navy cooperation. The chapters in this volume show that there was ample precedent for the massive amphibious operations of 1942–5, but there were also numerous antecedents for the combined operations of the Civil War era.

This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of why the subject of combined or joint operations during the American Civil War is one that has been largely overlooked. It then describes the absence of any protocol for effecting the efficient cooperation of army and navy forces—the Navy Department and the War Department were completely separate from each other; almost like a boundary, there was a bright line separating Neptune's domain from that of Mars. Because army and navy leaders were unwilling to subordinate their own service goals to the greater goal of Union victory, Union forces experienced a number of lost opportunities. An overview of the subsequent chapters is also presented.

By taking the first steps to weaken the powerful military services and establishing a unified DoD, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 increased the DoD’s influence in US foreign policy while also creating policy and structure that enabled and required future DoD/CIA collaboration. The failures in the field that motivated defense reform were the same failures that initiated discussions on intelligence support to military operations. Reviews of Operation Urgent Fury and the Beirut barracks bombing criticized the lack of intelligence support to commanders. In this regard, the defense reform enacted by Congress through Goldwater-Nichols was the initial phase of broader national security reforms. Although intelligence reform was initially not embraced to the same degree as defense reform, policy makers, motivated by perceived “intelligence failures,” looked to restructure intelligence for a post–Cold War environment.

The Norwegian campaign of 1940 was the first major confrontation between Germany and the Allies in World War II. Although both sides had been poised along the Western Front since September 1939, serious fighting did not break out there; instead, the belligerents first fought in the far north. Germany had sound strategic reasons for conquering Norway, but the Allies attacked them there simply because they did not wish to fight in France. Important lessons were learned in Norway, by both sides, regarding joint operations, unity of command, and airpower –specifically, the need for air superiority over naval forces.

Soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines have strong opinions on how the Pacific War was fought and how victory was achieved over Japan. Too often these views have been shaped by service parochialism dressed up in the guise of war principles. Regarding the issue of unity of command, there was actually more unity in the Pacific theater than there was in Europe. Strategy is similarly seen through parochial lenses and usually breaks into three camps: sailors and sea power advocates trumpet the importance of the Central Pacific thrust commanded by Admiral Chester Nimitz. Soldiers and land warfare historians instead hail General Douglas MacArthur’s island-hopping campaign in the Southwest Pacific Area. Airmen applaud the strategic bombing campaign culminating in the atomic bombs. In truth, it was a joint effort by all the services that defeated Japan.

After 9/11, the DoD sought to sever its perceived reliance on national intelligence. These changes were in part motivated by previous reviews of intelligence and in part by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s desire to consolidate power and capability within the DoD. The enacted changes resulted in a significant transformation of defense intelligence and influenced how the DoD interacted with the CIA and the broader Intelligence Community. For better or worse, individual leaders shaped the DoD/CIA relationship immediately following 9/11. These leaders’ influence highlights how parochial and nonparochial personalities affected the DoD/CIA relationship during the global war on terror. Fortunately, the influence of nonparochial leaders shaped the relationship in a more positive direction.

Determining principles of war and the mental effort required to articulate them are important for military officers. During a crisis when time is short and there are many demands on our attention, we must simplify and extract general rules from conflicting data points. Principles of War have been espoused for centuries, but the urge to codify such rules took on added impetus in the twentieth century. Today, such principles are considered invaluable learning tools at military schools. Yet, it is time for an update, because those used today were devised a century ago by a soldier who had little or no insight into warfare at sea or in the air. His precepts have survived, largely intact, until the present day. The result has been a distorted view of war. We must begin anew—not to reshape the earlier principles, but to look at modern war and devise new ones that govern the new environment.

This chapter reviews US military culture and how each service has a different tradition and ethos. These differences affect how soldiers, sailors, and airmen view war, and how they plan to fight. It is amazing how often the services disagree on fundamental concepts of military organization, doctrine, and the use of force. These deeply held differences of opinion were shaped by unique service cultures that have had a profound effect on American military strategy. The advent of “jointness” was an attempt to correct the short-sighted parochialism of previous generations and introduce a more holistic view of war.

Article 4(21)–(22) (Definitions, supervisory authority and supervisory authority concerned); Article 60 (Cooperation between the lead supervisory authority and the other supervisory authorities concerned); Article 61 (Mutual assistance) (see too recital 133); Article 62 (Joint operations of supervisory authorities) (see too recital 134); Article 63 (Consistency mechanism) (see too recital 135); Article 64 (Opinion of the Board), Article 65 (Dispute resolution by the Board) (see too recital 136); Article 70 (Tasks of the Board) (see too recital 136).

Article 28(8) (Adopting standard contractual clauses in accordance with the consistency mechanism) (see too recital 81); Article 35(6) (Adopting rules on data protection impact assessments in accordance with the consistency mechanism); Article 40(7) (Adopting or modifying draft codes of conduct in accordance with the consistency mechanism); Article 41(3) (Adopting draft criteria for bodies monitoring codes of conduct in accordance with the consistency mechanism); Article 42(5) (Issuing certification in accordance with the consistency mechanism); Article 43(3) (Establishing criteria for certification body accreditation in accordance with the consistency mechanism); Article 46 (Using the consistency mechanism in relation to transfers subject to appropriate safeguards); Article 47 (Approving binding corporate rules in accordance with the consistency mechanism); Article 60(4) (Submitting objections of a lead supervisory authority’s draft decision to the consistency mechanism) (see too recitals 124 and 130); Article 64 (Opinion of the Board) (see too recital 136); Article 65 (Dispute Resolution by the Board) (see too recital 136); Article 66 (Urgency Procedure) (see too recital 137); Article 67 (Exchange of Information) (see too recital 168).