Craig L. Symonds (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823232864
- eISBN:
- 9780823240777
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823232864.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 19th Century
Despite a wealth of books on the campaigns of the American Civil War, the subject of combined or joint operations has been largely neglected. This revealing book offers ten case studies of combined ...
More
Despite a wealth of books on the campaigns of the American Civil War, the subject of combined or joint operations has been largely neglected. This revealing book offers ten case studies of combined army–navy operations by Union forces. Presented in chronological order, each chapter illuminates an aspect of combined operations during a time of changing technology and doctrine. The chapters cover the war along the rebel coast, including the operations in the North Carolina Sounds in 1861, the Union thrusts up the York and James rivers during the Peninsular Campaign in 1862 and 1864, and the various Union efforts to seize rebel seaports from the Texas coast to Charleston and Wilmington in 1863–5. Concluding the volume are two chapters that evaluate the impact of Union combined operations on subsequent doctrine in both the United States and England.Less
Despite a wealth of books on the campaigns of the American Civil War, the subject of combined or joint operations has been largely neglected. This revealing book offers ten case studies of combined army–navy operations by Union forces. Presented in chronological order, each chapter illuminates an aspect of combined operations during a time of changing technology and doctrine. The chapters cover the war along the rebel coast, including the operations in the North Carolina Sounds in 1861, the Union thrusts up the York and James rivers during the Peninsular Campaign in 1862 and 1864, and the various Union efforts to seize rebel seaports from the Texas coast to Charleston and Wilmington in 1863–5. Concluding the volume are two chapters that evaluate the impact of Union combined operations on subsequent doctrine in both the United States and England.
Edward H. Wiser
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823232864
- eISBN:
- 9780823240777
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823232864.003.0011
- Subject:
- History, American History: 19th Century
The preceding chapters have demonstrated that American joint land–sea operations, and in particular amphibious assaults, did not originate in the 20th century as the U.S. Marine Corps prepared for ...
More
The preceding chapters have demonstrated that American joint land–sea operations, and in particular amphibious assaults, did not originate in the 20th century as the U.S. Marine Corps prepared for war in the Pacific. Still, there was little formal study of U.S. combined operations doctrine and methodology prior to the landing on Guadalcanal in August 1942. This oversight is unfortunate, because to some degree every major American war has witnessed a measure of army–navy cooperation. The chapters in this volume show that there was ample precedent for the massive amphibious operations of 1942–5, but there were also numerous antecedents for the combined operations of the Civil War era.Less
The preceding chapters have demonstrated that American joint land–sea operations, and in particular amphibious assaults, did not originate in the 20th century as the U.S. Marine Corps prepared for war in the Pacific. Still, there was little formal study of U.S. combined operations doctrine and methodology prior to the landing on Guadalcanal in August 1942. This oversight is unfortunate, because to some degree every major American war has witnessed a measure of army–navy cooperation. The chapters in this volume show that there was ample precedent for the massive amphibious operations of 1942–5, but there were also numerous antecedents for the combined operations of the Civil War era.
Craig L. Symonds
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823232864
- eISBN:
- 9780823240777
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823232864.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 19th Century
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of why the subject of combined or joint operations during the American Civil War is one that has been largely overlooked. It then describes the ...
More
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of why the subject of combined or joint operations during the American Civil War is one that has been largely overlooked. It then describes the absence of any protocol for effecting the efficient cooperation of army and navy forces—the Navy Department and the War Department were completely separate from each other; almost like a boundary, there was a bright line separating Neptune's domain from that of Mars. Because army and navy leaders were unwilling to subordinate their own service goals to the greater goal of Union victory, Union forces experienced a number of lost opportunities. An overview of the subsequent chapters is also presented.Less
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of why the subject of combined or joint operations during the American Civil War is one that has been largely overlooked. It then describes the absence of any protocol for effecting the efficient cooperation of army and navy forces—the Navy Department and the War Department were completely separate from each other; almost like a boundary, there was a bright line separating Neptune's domain from that of Mars. Because army and navy leaders were unwilling to subordinate their own service goals to the greater goal of Union victory, Union forces experienced a number of lost opportunities. An overview of the subsequent chapters is also presented.
David P. Oakley
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780813176703
- eISBN:
- 9780813176727
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813176703.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
By taking the first steps to weaken the powerful military services and establishing a unified DoD, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 increased the DoD’s influence in US foreign policy while also ...
More
By taking the first steps to weaken the powerful military services and establishing a unified DoD, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 increased the DoD’s influence in US foreign policy while also creating policy and structure that enabled and required future DoD/CIA collaboration. The failures in the field that motivated defense reform were the same failures that initiated discussions on intelligence support to military operations. Reviews of Operation Urgent Fury and the Beirut barracks bombing criticized the lack of intelligence support to commanders. In this regard, the defense reform enacted by Congress through Goldwater-Nichols was the initial phase of broader national security reforms. Although intelligence reform was initially not embraced to the same degree as defense reform, policy makers, motivated by perceived “intelligence failures,” looked to restructure intelligence for a post–Cold War environment.Less
By taking the first steps to weaken the powerful military services and establishing a unified DoD, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 increased the DoD’s influence in US foreign policy while also creating policy and structure that enabled and required future DoD/CIA collaboration. The failures in the field that motivated defense reform were the same failures that initiated discussions on intelligence support to military operations. Reviews of Operation Urgent Fury and the Beirut barracks bombing criticized the lack of intelligence support to commanders. In this regard, the defense reform enacted by Congress through Goldwater-Nichols was the initial phase of broader national security reforms. Although intelligence reform was initially not embraced to the same degree as defense reform, policy makers, motivated by perceived “intelligence failures,” looked to restructure intelligence for a post–Cold War environment.
David P. Oakley
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780813176703
- eISBN:
- 9780813176727
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813176703.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
After 9/11, the DoD sought to sever its perceived reliance on national intelligence. These changes were in part motivated by previous reviews of intelligence and in part by Secretary of Defense ...
More
After 9/11, the DoD sought to sever its perceived reliance on national intelligence. These changes were in part motivated by previous reviews of intelligence and in part by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s desire to consolidate power and capability within the DoD. The enacted changes resulted in a significant transformation of defense intelligence and influenced how the DoD interacted with the CIA and the broader Intelligence Community. For better or worse, individual leaders shaped the DoD/CIA relationship immediately following 9/11. These leaders’ influence highlights how parochial and nonparochial personalities affected the DoD/CIA relationship during the global war on terror. Fortunately, the influence of nonparochial leaders shaped the relationship in a more positive direction.Less
After 9/11, the DoD sought to sever its perceived reliance on national intelligence. These changes were in part motivated by previous reviews of intelligence and in part by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s desire to consolidate power and capability within the DoD. The enacted changes resulted in a significant transformation of defense intelligence and influenced how the DoD interacted with the CIA and the broader Intelligence Community. For better or worse, individual leaders shaped the DoD/CIA relationship immediately following 9/11. These leaders’ influence highlights how parochial and nonparochial personalities affected the DoD/CIA relationship during the global war on terror. Fortunately, the influence of nonparochial leaders shaped the relationship in a more positive direction.
