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“Jihadism in Comparative Perspective: Psychological Themes in Religiously Motivated Terrorism.” This chapter has two goals: first, to describe salient psychological-religious themes found in the statements of contemporary jidhadists and compare them to those of other world religions and, second, to use these descriptions to elaborate some of the most significant psychological-religious motifs characterizing contemporary religiously motivated terrorism. These motifs form the basis for the analysis carried out in the remainder of the book: the next two chapters provide additional illustrations from two disparate religious traditions, the fifth chapter provides a psychological analysis and commentary on them, and the final chapter discusses what they tell us about religion.

This chapter examines the incentives that can lead individuals to sacrifice their lives for a collective end. It examines the motives and strategies of jihadists, illustrating the incentives that make individuals so constrain their choices under one institution that they crowd out all other possible affiliations. It first considers empirical evidence to test existing claims regarding the link between madrasa affiliation and jihad. After establishing that jihadists are drawn from across the socioeconomic spectrum (with madrasa students constituting a small fraction of the total pool) it examines the motives and decision-making processes of this diverse group. The chapter also explores the factors that win jihad mass public appeal. These questions are addressed through three main sources of data: interviews with fifty jihadists; ethnographic fieldwork within the Red Mosque during its six-month confrontation with the state; and systematic observation of the public response to the Red Mosque operation.

This chapter explores the other side of the anti-Assad states' support, given to the different fighting opposition groups within Syria, with a pronounced profile of Qatar's role. The failures of foreign governments with the political opposition were nothing compared to their disastrous approach to the armed rebels. In different ways the key regional anti-Assad powers of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey came to actively support the armed rebellion, supplying a range of arms, finance, and nonlethal assistance. But none of them had detailed knowledge of Syria, nor were they experienced in supporting armed insurgencies in foreign countries. Moreover, each had a separate agenda within their desire to topple Assad, prompting them to back rival groups, exacerbating divisions among the rebels and facilitating the rise of Jihadists.

This chapter gives an overview of the situation in Turkey, the role of Turks in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Afghanistan, and their connections to Germany. Turkey is the most important way station and logistics hub for most German jihadists, many of whom are ethnic Turks or Kurds. Among others, it was the machinations of intelligence officer-turned-jihadist operative Mevlüt Kar that would bind the German jihadists to the Turkish scene; and Turkey itself was home to perhaps the most diverse, most fragmented, and arguably one of the most dangerous terrorist scenes worldwide. The nation's position as such would dwindle over time, though the Turkish jihadists along with an increasing number of Azeris would eventually make their way to Pakistan to establish themselves with the terrorist groups therein and found the Taifetül Mansura—an organization that would later act in concert with the German Taliban Mujahideen.

This chapter focuses on modes of radicalization and recruitment in Germany and looks at why increasing numbers of jihadists are leaving the country to go to Pakistan. Following the Sauerland incident, the German security authorities intensified measures against terrorism, though it came too late to stop the “second generation” of German recruits following in the footsteps of the Sauerland group. The number of German jihadists leaving the country continued to grow as a result of an increasing radicalization of young, German Salafists, an intensive propaganda campaign on jihadist websites. This represented an increasingly effective, if still quite haphazard, recruitment effort. Many of these recruits would eventually join the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) and later found the first German jihadist group, the German Taliban Muhajideen.

This chapter deals with the first exclusively German jihadist group, formed in Pakistan in 2009 as a result of the influx of German recruits in Pakistan. The German Taliban Mujahideen emerged out of the Islamic Jihad Union's (IJU) group of propagandists around Ahmet Manavbaşı—a Turkish criminal instrumental in raising the IJU's public profile by intensifying its propaganda drive. Besides the German Taliban Mujahideen's propaganda activities, the group's main importance lay in the fact that it highlighted the potential of German jihadism. Combined with increased proselytizing of the German Salafists and intensifying Internet propaganda, the emergence of a German jihadist group became a powerful recruitment tool, attracting dozens of young Germans and making clear that substantial numbers of German jihadists were willing to risk their lives in Afghanistan. The organization was effectively disbanded at the death of Manavbaşı after an unexpected encounter with the Pakistani military.

This chapter discusses the effects of the internationalization process discussed in the previous chapter, which became most palpable in the German area of operations in northern Afghanistan, where the German army, the Bundeswehr, was confronted not only with Afghan insurgents, but also with an increasing threat posed by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) fighters. The choice to maintain a German presence in the conflict in Afghanistan was an unpopular one, albeit one deemed necessary to advance Germany's efforts at counterterrorism. Yet the presence of German troops in Afghanistan proved to be disastrous as it was used to the terrorists' advantage, by encouraging the influx of German jihadists into local terrorist organizations, some of them motivated by a desire to go up against the German troops in particular.

This chapter explains the complex relationship between the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and the Alawi community. First, by analysing the historical relationship between the two groups, it examines the political development of the Brotherhood in Syria, tracing the roots of Alawi antipathy towards Islamism. It subsequently describes the Brotherhood's recent attempts to cultivate the support of Syria's minorities by adopting a more inclusive political and ideological posture and rebranding itself as a “centrist” Islamist force. Finally, it examines the effects of the re-emergence of the Brotherhood's military branch in 2011 on its relationship with the Syrian Alawis.

This chapter describes the growing rift between domestic and transnational jihadis who sought to internationalize jihad. Al-Qaeda's transnational jihad was embraced by a tiny minority within the jihadist family and has never grown deep roots in Muslim societies. No internal unity or coherence ever existed among jihadis who, while sharing a similar ideological viewpoint of the world, differed bitterly over tactics and strategy. From the beginning, divisions and rivalries between local and transnational militants limited al-Qaeda's military reach. These divisions and rivalries escalated into an open struggle after September 11.

This chapter assesses the factors contributing to the decline of al-Qaeda. These include the rounding up of bin Laden's men in various countries; bin Laden's relationship with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who set up his own organization modeled after al-Qaeda; the Iraqi and Muslim opposition to al-Qaeda; and the threat of revolt within al-Qaeda.

This chapter assesses the present state of the al-Qaeda organization. Al-Qaeda now consists of a collection of roving bands on the run, concentrated mainly on the Pakistan-Afghan border, its top leaders are deep in hiding. While calling themselves al-Qaeda, local branches are pitted in a fierce local struggle for survival against the near enemy and are unable to coordinate their actions with the parent organization. Remnants of transnational jihad, including al-Qaeda, are in leaderless disarray and face a hostile environment at home and abroad. However, many terrorism experts belittle the debilitating crisis of legitimacy faced by al-Qaeda, as well as the erosion of Muslim support for transnational jihadism. They claim that al-Qaeda is on the rise and consider transnational jihadism a success story.

This chapter examines the terrorist threats to Germany posed by native Germans trained in Pakistan and Afghanistan and the reaction in Germany to those threats. It considers the role of German converts to Islam, such as Eric Breininger, in the German jihad, with particular reference to the similarities between second-generation “reversion” and radical conversion. It also looks at the foreign jihadists who were part of the Hamburg Cell that planned and piloted the 9/11 attacks in the United States; the suitcase suicide bombers who orchestrated the attacks on a German stadium in 2006; and the proposals by Germany's Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble to address terrorism.