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This chapter provides a summary overview of the chapters in the book, examining their collective contribution to understanding the institutions, politics, and normative dimensions of global migration governance. In doing so, it (a) develops a conceptual typology for explaining the variation in the type and degree of institutionalized cooperation that exists in different areas of migration, (b) identifies the main cooperation problems that exist in relation to different areas of international migration, (c) highlights the principal normative trade-offs that are inherent to global migration governance. It concludes by setting out alternative and competing visions for the future of global migration governance.

The previous chapters developed a theory of environmental cooperation in isolation of other international affairs. This chapter considers the possibility of linking different issues, focusing on linkage to international trade. It explains that for many environmental problems, trade is automatically linked. One consequence of this is trade “leakage”. Cooperation to reduce pollution by some countries may, through the trade mechanism, cause other countries to increase their pollution. It explains how trade restrictions can more than neutralize this trade leakage; they can actually help in sustaining more cooperation without harming international trade. The theory is illustrated by reference to sea turtle protection, tuna conservation, and the Fur Seal and Montreal Protocol agreements.

This chapter focuses on the role of institutions in facilitating treaty effectiveness. It discusses the importance of international agreements in promoting and sustaining cooperation. It considers treaty design to further reflect on the type of treaties, and the various mechanisms stipulated in these agreements, that contribute to treaty effectiveness by assuaging conflict in situations of water scarcity and increased variability. The chapter argues that the design of a treaty seems particularly relevant in regions where climate change and water variability could impact the ability of basin states to effectively manage shared water. The chapter demonstrates how various mechanisms such as different water allocation mechanisms, as well as additional stipulations, such as, side-payments, issue-linkage, benefit-sharing, adaptability, and information exchange, affect the performance of the treaty in the context of water scarcity and variability. These mechanisms are examined from an empirical and large-n perspective, assessing how treaties with such mechanisms fare compared to treaties devoid of these mechanisms.

This chapter assesses the mechanisms introduced in Chapter 4 by considering actual cases and evaluating how the mechanism or strategy used contributed to cooperation. In addition to mechanisms such as issue-linkage, side-payments and compensation as well as benefit-sharing, the chapter also examines foreign policy considerations and reciprocity as mechanisms or strategies for promoting cooperation. Mechanisms and strategies such as these aim to incentivize cooperation and shift the payoff structure so that it favors a mutually beneficial outcome.

This chapter builds on the empirical results presented in Chapters 3 and 4 that consider the relationship between scarcity, variability and cooperation as well as treaty effectiveness. It also builds on Chapter 5, which examines various arrangements and principles (issue linkage, second-order resources strategies, supply-side solutions, demand-side solutions, income transfer—also regarded as ‘benefit transfer’ or ‘side-payments’—and inter-basin linkages) codified in treaties, by considering other arrangements not yet reviewed. Based on these arrangements and principles, the chapter assesses the effectiveness of a sampling of treaties from a handful of basins. The chapter also includes five case studies to infer the various ways riparian states negotiate treaties under conditions of scarcity and variability. The case studies demonstrate that there are a variety of arrangements developed to deal with water scarcity.

This chapter analyzes how topics are identified for the SDGs, the prospects for effective linkages between the individual topics, and longer term learning about managing complex issues. It compares the logics of substantive and tactical issues linkage. Empirically it looks at the presence or absence or epistemic communities as factors contributing to the identification of SDGs, and in particular which individual SDGs are compatible to build a more integrated approach to governing sustainability.

The WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation (TFA) embodies the first set of new multilateral rules to have been negotiated under auspices of the WTO, part of a small package of decisions centering on matters of interest to developing countries that was “harvested” from the broader Doha round. This paper analyzes the outcome of the trade facilitation talks and reflects on the lessons and possible implications of the TFA experience for the prospects for new rule-making and cooperation in the WTO. The TFA illustrates both the potential and the difficulty of negotiating generally applicable stand-alone agreements in the WTO and demonstrates the importance of issue linkage in achieving cooperation in trade policy matters.

Most discussions of cross-domain deterrence focus on variation in the means of coercion, but variation in political ends can be just as consequential. Cross-domain deterrence in the context of linkage politics, in which disparate political interests are tied together to create incentives for favorable outcomes, gives potential adversaries the opportunity to avoid confrontational meeting engagements by playing for time to clarify interests and choosing the means most suited to achieving new goals. A broader diplomatic conception of cross-domain deterrence can also highlight the potential of using financial, institutional, or other nonmilitary actions that render the threat or use of force less attractive. This chapter draws on newly available archival evidence to examine issue linkage politics in the context of changing strategic interests in the case of U.S. efforts to deter Soviet repression in Poland and East Germany at the end of the Cold War. In both cases, U.S. policymakers used diplomatic reassurance and threats of isolation to shape Soviet policy as the United States pressed its new-found political interests in Eastern Europe rather than its traditional preoccupation with military affairs.

Building on negotiation theory concerning issue and party linkage that have been sharpened through previous applied research in various geographic contexts, this chapter points to possible ways of reforming existing environmental diplomacy efforts. It starts with a description of game theoretic approaches to understanding cooperative behavior that can be used within this arena. It addresses what linkages between issues are synergistic and which are antagonistic, and how to prevent blackmail in the treaty-making process and the ways in which technology and transparency mechanisms can make it easier to manage complexity and make negotiation processes more efficient. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the term “sustainable development,” originally framed as a “win-win” negotiation mantra, has been rebranded through terms such as “green economy.” The importance of issue linkage that transcends the environmental sphere to incorporate matters such as trade policy and international security mechanisms receive special attention.

This chapter emphasizes the emergence of new organizations such as the G20 and their role in environmental consensus-building as well as numerous regional entities, most notably the EU but also softer regional cooperation organizations. The role of economic mechanisms such as carbon taxation that might provide a revenue stream to support enforcement is also discussed along with many of the original recommendations regarding reform, which included; building of decentralized alliances; providing prenegotiation assistance to developing countries; treaty drafting with new technologies; making more efficient and constructive use of civil society inputs; recategorizing countries for the purposes of prescribing action; articulating scientific primacy and acknowledging suboptimality in democratic decision-making; encouraging issue linkage where appropriate; removing penalties for constructive unilateral actions; working with the media to play a more educative role; and working within the UN system but allowing for regional organizational interface.

This chapter examines the complications that arise when a negotiation requires choices among multiple options or decisions on multiple issues. It first considers the problems that occur when there are more options, with particular emphasis on decision regret, option devaluation, context dependence, and noncompensatory decision making. It then turns to the tendency to filter information and the leakage of information during a negotiation before discussing problems caused by multiple issues, including contingency issues, issue linkage, and subtracting issues. It also explores the importance of agenda in a negotiation and concludes by offering practical advice on how to deal with multiple options and issues during a negotiation.