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This chapter explores the ideological construction and content of the politics of virtue in England and Wales in the mid-18th century. This politics was known at the time as the country interest or patriotism. In particular, the nature and content of patriot argument and ideology are analysed. A major theme is how far the focus and content of this argument changed during the period. Put simply, under the impact of political disillusionment from the later 1740s, patriot writers focused their attention much more closely than during the years of Robert Walpole's rule on society rather than politics as the source and well-spring of corruption. They also focused renewed attention on irreligion and declining morals as debilitating political ills. Such themes were in themselves hardly new; what was striking, none the less, was the insistence on how deeply and widely luxurious habits had penetrated throughout society, together with the general mood of pessimism which infused their commentaries on society and politics.

This chapter defines and introduces the conceptual category of ‘moral atheism’ — i.e. the denial of the existence of a deity with moral attributes — and distinguishes between two main versions of the position. A ‘weak moral atheist’ rejects the existence of a morally praiseworthy divinity; while a ‘strong moral atheist’ rejects the existence of a morally assessable divinity. The chapter also relates the category of moral atheism to early modern ways of thinking about religion, irreligion, and atheism. It introduces the main interpretive thesis of the book: the claim that Hume is a strong moral atheist. It also addresses a preliminary objection from the lack of explicit textual evidence.

This concluding chapter summarizes Hume's overall case for divine amorality and assesses the significance of his commitment to moral atheism, both for our wider understanding of his theoretical and practical philosophy, and for our understanding of the philosophical history of irreligion in the early modern period. It is argued that a proper understanding of Hume's commitment to moral atheism casts light on his general epistemology as well as the precise scope and force of his sceptical critique of traditional natural theology. Hume's moral atheism also has the important practical consequence of ruling out the fideistic proposal (found in Hamann, Jacobi, and Kant) that we might responsibly believe in or at least hope for a moral God even in the absence of knowledge.

This chapter aims to provide a summary account of the nature and significance of the irreligious interpretation of the Treatise. The solution to the riddle of the Treatise begins with a critique of the “castration” hypothesis, which in its unqualified form is simply a myth. Contrary to this hypothesis, the Treatise is systematically concerned with and directly relevant to issues of religion. The irreligious interpretation plainly serves to explain the character of Hume's motivation in the Treatise as it relates to both his skeptical and naturalistic commitments. It also serves to explain what unites or relates the highly varied component arguments and discussions that appear throughout this work (in contrast with the established accounts which leave us with a work that is disjointed and fragmented).

This chapter considers to what extent the irreligious interpretation of the Treatise supports the charge of “atheism” and how this relates to Hume's philosophical commitments in his later writings in so far as they concern religion. The most accurate and informative label for describing Hume's views on this subject is irreligion—which is the label used here to describe Hume's fundamental intentions in the Treatise. Irreligion is a term that both Hume's contemporaries and our own would understand and can apply to Hume's arguments and outlook without any serious misrepresentation. Calling Hume's views on this subject irreligious avoids, on one side, attributing any form of unqualified or dogmatic atheism to him, while, on the other, it also makes clear that his fundamental attitude toward religion is one of systematic hostility and criticism (i.e. he believes that we are better off without religion and religious hypotheses and speculations). Nevertheless, Hume's early critics were well justified in their view that the label of “atheism” was a natural fit, given their own understanding of this term and the evident irreligious features contained in Hume's writings.

Gibbon revised the text of the two final chapters of the first volume of The Decline and Fall, which had chiefly aroused the indignation of the clerical establishment on two occasions: for the second edition of 1776, and for the third edition of 1777. A meticulous collation of these revisions reveals an interesting drama of response on Gibbon's part. He was initially concerned by rumours that he was to be attacked for supposed irreligion, and, before any attacks had appeared, made concessive revisions for the second edition. However, once the first attacks had been published, Gibbon saw that they were mild and ineffective. His revisions for the third edition therefore reversed the concessions of the second edition, and indeed if anything intensified the deistical flavour of the book.

This introductory chapter explores the Scientific Revolution and its relationship with the supernatural, as well as the significance of atheism. It identifies two developments in the Scientific Revolution which have left an impact on magic. The first was the rise of the inductive philosophy which gave a methodological structure to the inchoate empiricism that had already begun to flourish in the Middle Ages and more notably in the sixteenth century. The second was the rise of the mechanical philosophy, the claim that everything in nature could be explained in terms of the interaction of matter and motion. In addition to this relation between science and the supernatural, the chapter delves into the question of atheism and why so much effort was invested in opposing it during this period.

This chapter discusses the opening of war in 1914. It particularly focuses on the experience of France as it was threatened by the invasion of Germany. With the German troops rapidly reaching the French capital and with the inability of France to halt the German advance pouring in from Belgium, French troops and their allies retreated to Marne. Parisians fled from the city, so did the government. In Montmartre, a different assembly was taking place. Amidst the fearful sound of the looming war, Parisians gathered in prayer. As they prayed, the German offensive stalled. An Allied counterattack to the north behind the offensive force of Alexander von Kluck threatened the line of communication of the German offensive force, forcing them to retreat to a more defensible position. Paris' capitulation had been spared. For French republicans, Marne was like Valmy, where the French Revolution was saved “miraculously”. From a secular republican point of view, the “the miracle of the Marne” of September 1914 was akin to a metaphorical “miracle”. For many Catholics however, the incident of Marne was not a sacred metaphor, rather it was simply a miracle. While they believed that the prayers alone did not stop the advancement of the German troops, they nevertheless acknowledged that it had made a difference. For many of the Catholics, the miracle of Marne was not only France's victory over Germany but also a victory over despair and irreligion, since France especially during this period was undergoing secularization and de-Christianization. For them, it was a triumph of the Christian France.

This chapter presents and critically evaluates the explanations for women's greater religiosity offered by scholars who see female religiosity as simply one symptom of a general greater aversion to risk, caused by biology or socialisation. Although apparently consistent with some sorts of evidence, it fails to establish that not believing is in any sense risky in modern societies. It also fails to fit with the observation that as irreligion grows (and non-belief becomes more common), so does the gender difference.

This essay contrasts religion as belief with religion as morality. The former understands religion as propositional, while the latter is a matter of divinely sanctioned sensibilities. Keane emphasizes that proponents of religion and irreligion alike are concerned with how individuals make decisions about questions of meaning and value.

This chapter presents excerpts from Jedidiah Morse's A Sermon, Delivered at the New North Church in Boston…May 9th, 1798, Being the Day Recommended by John Adams, President of the United States of America, for Solemn Humiliation, Fasting and Prayer (1798). Morse, a Congregationalist minister, is known as the “father of American geography,” but he is also remembered as one of America's leading conspiracy theorists. In the aftermath of the French Revolution, Morse rejected the Democratic-Republicans led by Thomas Jefferson in favor of Alexander Hamilton and the Federalists. At the close of the century, Morse came to the conclusion that a grand conspiracy involving the Illuminati, a German secret society affiliated with the Masons, was at the heart of France's irreligion. The source of his information was John Robison's 1797 book Proofs of a Conspiracy against All the Governments and Religions of Europe.

This chapter begins with some consideration of the libertine anti-clericalism of court wits such as Rochester, but its principal points of focus are the career of John Dryden in the 1670s and 1680s, the Exclusion Crisis of 1679–81, and the rhetoric of atheism and religious imposture to which both whigs and tories resorted at this time. The structure of contemporary political argument provides the basis for new readings of Dryden’s anti-exclusionist satires, Absalom and Achitophel and The Medall, although some consideration is also given to the former poem’s allusions to the writings of John Milton, along with Dryden’s Miltonic adaptation, The State of Innocence. The chapter concludes with a discussion of Religio Laici and The Hind and the Panther in their relation to the rapidly shifting ecclesiastical politics of the 1680s.

The size of individual denominations and faiths is documented, from their own returns of ‘membership’ or constituency, occasionally supplemented by external estimates. There were per capita falls in Anglican communicants and electoral rolls, but the most serious decline was in confirmands. The Roman Catholic Church advanced, although the pace slowed from the early 1960s, partly as a consequence of lapsation. Orthodox Churches expanded, notably in the 1970s, principally through immigration. Among the traditional Free Churches, the Congregational and Reformed cluster and Welsh Nonconformity suffered most losses. Strong countervailing (but only partially offsetting) growth was recorded especially by Pentecostal and Holiness Churches, House Churches, and New Churches (all Trinitarian) and Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses (non-Trinitarian). Muslims overtook Jews as Britain’s largest non-Christian community, through migration, which also led to big increases in Hindus and Sikhs. Paradoxically, despite an alleged religious crisis, the societies comprising organized irreligion were a weakening force.

More and more Americans are dropping out of religion; between 20 and 30 percent of Americans now claim to have no religious affiliation. Rates of atheism and agnosticism are at all-time highs. This recent wave of secularization is occurring in many other nations around the world, as well. So what do we know about men and women who live their lives without religion? This book has been written to provide as thorough and empirically grounded answer as possible to that question. This book presents a summation and analytical discussion of existing research on nonreligious people. The book also sharpens and improves upon existing conceptual frameworks, theoretical typologies, and empirical trajectories currently in place, so as to better advance the newly emerging enterprise of secular studies.