John V. Kulvicki
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199290758
- eISBN:
- 9780191604010
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019929075X.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This chapter and the next focus on pictorial realism, with an aim towards responding to some objections to the structural account of depiction. One important aspect of realism is verity: pictures are ...
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This chapter and the next focus on pictorial realism, with an aim towards responding to some objections to the structural account of depiction. One important aspect of realism is verity: pictures are veritable to the extent that they represent objects true to our conceptions of them. This is an unpopular way to think of pictorial realism, but it turns out that verity does a better job of accounting for realism in general than many have thought it could. This undercuts some of the motivation for other accounts of realism, discussed in the next chapter.Less
This chapter and the next focus on pictorial realism, with an aim towards responding to some objections to the structural account of depiction. One important aspect of realism is verity: pictures are veritable to the extent that they represent objects true to our conceptions of them. This is an unpopular way to think of pictorial realism, but it turns out that verity does a better job of accounting for realism in general than many have thought it could. This undercuts some of the motivation for other accounts of realism, discussed in the next chapter.
John Skorupski
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199587636
- eISBN:
- 9780191595394
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587636.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is about normativity and reasons. It works out the consequences of a currently much discussed account of normativity, according to which all normative propositions are reducible to ...
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This book is about normativity and reasons. It works out the consequences of a currently much discussed account of normativity, according to which all normative propositions are reducible to propositions about reasons, so that the normative domain is the domain of reasons. Part I sets out the foundations of this analysis, basing it on three primitive reason relations. Part II applies the analysis to epistemic reasons, hence to aprioricity, modality and probability, Part III to evaluative and practical reasons, hence value and morality. Part III also discusses the structure of practical reason, arguing that practical reasons have three normative sources, considers the nature of moral judgement, and discusses the relationship between moral judgement and practical reasons. Finally Part IV moves to the metatheory of reason relations, arguing for an irrealist form of cognitivism. It is shown how this metaphysics of reason grounds a new form of Critical philosophy. Freedom and knowledge are possible only if we can have a priori knowledge of reason relations, and such knowledge is only possible because it is grounded in pure spontaneity. Skorupski relates his argument to the insights of two traditions in the history of philosophy: the Critical or Kantian tradition, and the tradition of moral sentimentalism.Less
This book is about normativity and reasons. It works out the consequences of a currently much discussed account of normativity, according to which all normative propositions are reducible to propositions about reasons, so that the normative domain is the domain of reasons. Part I sets out the foundations of this analysis, basing it on three primitive reason relations. Part II applies the analysis to epistemic reasons, hence to aprioricity, modality and probability, Part III to evaluative and practical reasons, hence value and morality. Part III also discusses the structure of practical reason, arguing that practical reasons have three normative sources, considers the nature of moral judgement, and discusses the relationship between moral judgement and practical reasons. Finally Part IV moves to the metatheory of reason relations, arguing for an irrealist form of cognitivism. It is shown how this metaphysics of reason grounds a new form of Critical philosophy. Freedom and knowledge are possible only if we can have a priori knowledge of reason relations, and such knowledge is only possible because it is grounded in pure spontaneity. Skorupski relates his argument to the insights of two traditions in the history of philosophy: the Critical or Kantian tradition, and the tradition of moral sentimentalism.
Clotilde Calabi
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199272457
- eISBN:
- 9780191709951
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272457.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Philosophers generally acknowledge that our beliefs about the world and our actions call for reasons. Against the mainstream view, which identifies reasons either with experiences or with beliefs, ...
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Philosophers generally acknowledge that our beliefs about the world and our actions call for reasons. Against the mainstream view, which identifies reasons either with experiences or with beliefs, this chapter defends the thesis that the perceived situation provides such reasons. More precisely, it defends the thesis that the world's being in a certain way warrants a certain perception of the world and that a warranted perception provides reasons for acting appropriately and for beliefs. Such reasons should be identified with perceptual saliences. Perceptual saliences are objective and normative properties. They are objective properties, not to be read as naïf realism does. They are normative properties, not to be read as anti-realism does. The best account of perceptual saliences is given by a kind of cognitive irrealism, in which attention qua sensitivity to reasons plays a major role.Less
Philosophers generally acknowledge that our beliefs about the world and our actions call for reasons. Against the mainstream view, which identifies reasons either with experiences or with beliefs, this chapter defends the thesis that the perceived situation provides such reasons. More precisely, it defends the thesis that the world's being in a certain way warrants a certain perception of the world and that a warranted perception provides reasons for acting appropriately and for beliefs. Such reasons should be identified with perceptual saliences. Perceptual saliences are objective and normative properties. They are objective properties, not to be read as naïf realism does. They are normative properties, not to be read as anti-realism does. The best account of perceptual saliences is given by a kind of cognitive irrealism, in which attention qua sensitivity to reasons plays a major role.
John Skorupski
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199587636
- eISBN:
- 9780191595394
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587636.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is about normativity and reasons. The Introduction outlines the main themes of the book and introduces the topics to be covered.
This book is about normativity and reasons. The Introduction outlines the main themes of the book and introduces the topics to be covered.
Jaegwon Kim
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199585878
- eISBN:
- 9780191595349
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585878.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
“Explanatory Realism, Causal Realism, and Explanatory Exclusion” explores issues arising from taking a realist, or an irrealist, attitude toward explanation and causation. Explanatory realism is the ...
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“Explanatory Realism, Causal Realism, and Explanatory Exclusion” explores issues arising from taking a realist, or an irrealist, attitude toward explanation and causation. Explanatory realism is the view that when we invoke an event as explaining another event, there must be some objective relation holding for the two events if the explanation is to be correct. In the case of a causal explanation, for example, the explaining event must objectively be a cause of the event explained. Explanatory irrealism denies that such a relation needs to exist as an objective correlate of an explanatory relation. Causal realism is the view that causal relations are objectively real relations in the world, whereas causal irrealists claim that causal relations are in the eye of the beholder, or, in any case, that causal relations are not metaphysically real. The essay concludes with a discussion of how one's stance on these possible views affects the issue of explanatory exclusion, namely the seeming fact that two or more explanations of a single event exclude one another.Less
“Explanatory Realism, Causal Realism, and Explanatory Exclusion” explores issues arising from taking a realist, or an irrealist, attitude toward explanation and causation. Explanatory realism is the view that when we invoke an event as explaining another event, there must be some objective relation holding for the two events if the explanation is to be correct. In the case of a causal explanation, for example, the explaining event must objectively be a cause of the event explained. Explanatory irrealism denies that such a relation needs to exist as an objective correlate of an explanatory relation. Causal realism is the view that causal relations are objectively real relations in the world, whereas causal irrealists claim that causal relations are in the eye of the beholder, or, in any case, that causal relations are not metaphysically real. The essay concludes with a discussion of how one's stance on these possible views affects the issue of explanatory exclusion, namely the seeming fact that two or more explanations of a single event exclude one another.
Mohan Matthen
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199268504
- eISBN:
- 9780191602283
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199268509.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
A catalogue of mismatches between experienced colour and the physical counterparts of colour is presented. Does it show, as C. L. Hardin has argued, that colour is not real? No. It is proposed that a ...
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A catalogue of mismatches between experienced colour and the physical counterparts of colour is presented. Does it show, as C. L. Hardin has argued, that colour is not real? No. It is proposed that a physically specifiable sense feature is real in the action-relative sense if there is some innate activity that would be disrupted by a failure of classification. This permits a plurality of idiosyncratic sensory classifications, while at the same time makes room for the idea that a sensory state might be wrong.Less
A catalogue of mismatches between experienced colour and the physical counterparts of colour is presented. Does it show, as C. L. Hardin has argued, that colour is not real? No. It is proposed that a physically specifiable sense feature is real in the action-relative sense if there is some innate activity that would be disrupted by a failure of classification. This permits a plurality of idiosyncratic sensory classifications, while at the same time makes room for the idea that a sensory state might be wrong.
Neil Tennant
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199251605
- eISBN:
- 9780191698057
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251605.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Language
This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about the realist views of meaning the truth. This book discusses the realism debate, provides a brief survey of varieties of ...
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This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about the realist views of meaning the truth. This book discusses the realism debate, provides a brief survey of varieties of irrealism, and argues in defence of meaning objectivity. It explores the foundational relationships between manifestation, bivalence, and undecidability, and shows how to find an acceptable reading of knowability-in-principle.Less
This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about the realist views of meaning the truth. This book discusses the realism debate, provides a brief survey of varieties of irrealism, and argues in defence of meaning objectivity. It explores the foundational relationships between manifestation, bivalence, and undecidability, and shows how to find an acceptable reading of knowability-in-principle.
Neil Tennant
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199251605
- eISBN:
- 9780191698057
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251605.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Language
This chapter provides a brief survey of varieties of irrealism and neutralizes that brand of irrealism that would undermine the semantic realist's account of meaning. It argues that through ...
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This chapter provides a brief survey of varieties of irrealism and neutralizes that brand of irrealism that would undermine the semantic realist's account of meaning. It argues that through transcendental arguments for the incoherence of irrealism about semantic discourse can be defused, the global anti-realist need not advocate an irrealist view of semantic discourse. It explains that for the semantic anti-realist, meaning is determinate and facts about meaning provide the ultimate justification for one's choice of logic.Less
This chapter provides a brief survey of varieties of irrealism and neutralizes that brand of irrealism that would undermine the semantic realist's account of meaning. It argues that through transcendental arguments for the incoherence of irrealism about semantic discourse can be defused, the global anti-realist need not advocate an irrealist view of semantic discourse. It explains that for the semantic anti-realist, meaning is determinate and facts about meaning provide the ultimate justification for one's choice of logic.
JONATHAN COHEN
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199556168
- eISBN:
- 9780191701672
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556168.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
In this chapter, the author first presents a standard taxonomy of the major alternative positions about color ontology. The distinction between color realism and color irrealism is explored. Several ...
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In this chapter, the author first presents a standard taxonomy of the major alternative positions about color ontology. The distinction between color realism and color irrealism is explored. Several difficulties with the Standard Taxonomy are discussed including some directions in which one might proceed to refine the characterization of the options. The distinction between relationalist and non-relationalist accounts of color is then illustrated. The author argues that this distinction is useful in understanding the space of alternative views on color ontology because it crystallizes a central set of issues that divides the accounts, and does so while sidestepping problems that plague the Standard Taxonomy. Further, an alternative Refined Taxonomy of positions on color ontology is then provided as a useful way to clarify the relationship of color relationalism to other views.Less
In this chapter, the author first presents a standard taxonomy of the major alternative positions about color ontology. The distinction between color realism and color irrealism is explored. Several difficulties with the Standard Taxonomy are discussed including some directions in which one might proceed to refine the characterization of the options. The distinction between relationalist and non-relationalist accounts of color is then illustrated. The author argues that this distinction is useful in understanding the space of alternative views on color ontology because it crystallizes a central set of issues that divides the accounts, and does so while sidestepping problems that plague the Standard Taxonomy. Further, an alternative Refined Taxonomy of positions on color ontology is then provided as a useful way to clarify the relationship of color relationalism to other views.
JONATHAN COHEN
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199556168
- eISBN:
- 9780191701672
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556168.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter attempts to consider and respond to a series of challenges against the argument from perceptual variation. Three classes of objections are illustrated. The first concerns suggestions to ...
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This chapter attempts to consider and respond to a series of challenges against the argument from perceptual variation. Three classes of objections are illustrated. The first concerns suggestions to treat one's inability to single out a distinguished variant as a mere epistemic shortcoming with no ontological import. The second revolves on accepting irrealism about color. The third focuses on some that suggest non-relationalist ways of accepting ecumenicism with respect to multiple perceptual variants. The aim of this chapter is to respond to the objections of these three classes, thus strengthening the case for relationalism. Further, by discussing these objections, the goal is to throw into greater relief the connections between relationalism and other views that have shown up in the literature.Less
This chapter attempts to consider and respond to a series of challenges against the argument from perceptual variation. Three classes of objections are illustrated. The first concerns suggestions to treat one's inability to single out a distinguished variant as a mere epistemic shortcoming with no ontological import. The second revolves on accepting irrealism about color. The third focuses on some that suggest non-relationalist ways of accepting ecumenicism with respect to multiple perceptual variants. The aim of this chapter is to respond to the objections of these three classes, thus strengthening the case for relationalism. Further, by discussing these objections, the goal is to throw into greater relief the connections between relationalism and other views that have shown up in the literature.
JONATHAN COHEN
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199556168
- eISBN:
- 9780191701672
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556168.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
Addressing a series of challenges to the color relationalist's ontology is the main goal of this chapter. The first objection concerns the large plurality of color properties recognized by color ...
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Addressing a series of challenges to the color relationalist's ontology is the main goal of this chapter. The first objection concerns the large plurality of color properties recognized by color relationalism. The second objection focuses on the accusation that relationalism is committed to irrealism about color. Lastly, the charge that relationalism is an error theory is examined. As it is argued in this chapter, standard motivations for parsimony in counting properties are unpersuasive when applied to relational properties. In addition, while there are some construals of the real/unreal distinction according to which that relationalism is committed to irrealism, there is no compelling and philosophically substantive reason to reject those kinds of irrealism. Further, the accusation that relationalism is an error theory is considered insufficient by the author.Less
Addressing a series of challenges to the color relationalist's ontology is the main goal of this chapter. The first objection concerns the large plurality of color properties recognized by color relationalism. The second objection focuses on the accusation that relationalism is committed to irrealism about color. Lastly, the charge that relationalism is an error theory is examined. As it is argued in this chapter, standard motivations for parsimony in counting properties are unpersuasive when applied to relational properties. In addition, while there are some construals of the real/unreal distinction according to which that relationalism is committed to irrealism, there is no compelling and philosophically substantive reason to reject those kinds of irrealism. Further, the accusation that relationalism is an error theory is considered insufficient by the author.
WReC (Warwick Research Collective)
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9781781381892
- eISBN:
- 9781781382264
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Liverpool University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5949/liverpool/9781781381892.003.0002
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
This theoretical chapter examines the question of what has been called ‘peripheral realism–. Reviewing the texts selected for examination in the book overall – produced at different times and places ...
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This theoretical chapter examines the question of what has been called ‘peripheral realism–. Reviewing the texts selected for examination in the book overall – produced at different times and places across the span of the long 20th century – it shows that they share not only common themes, plots and subjects, but also a range of formal features that might be called ‘irrealist’. The argument is that these techniques and devices represent formal registers of (semi-) peripherality in the world-literary system, discernible wherever literary works are composed that mediate the lived experience of capitalism's bewildering creative destruction (or destructive creation). This argument is mounted through particular reference to such authors as Dostoevsky and Machado de Assis and to literary historical development in such regions as Russia and the Caribbean, the United States, Brazil, Mexico (and Latin America more generally).Less
This theoretical chapter examines the question of what has been called ‘peripheral realism–. Reviewing the texts selected for examination in the book overall – produced at different times and places across the span of the long 20th century – it shows that they share not only common themes, plots and subjects, but also a range of formal features that might be called ‘irrealist’. The argument is that these techniques and devices represent formal registers of (semi-) peripherality in the world-literary system, discernible wherever literary works are composed that mediate the lived experience of capitalism's bewildering creative destruction (or destructive creation). This argument is mounted through particular reference to such authors as Dostoevsky and Machado de Assis and to literary historical development in such regions as Russia and the Caribbean, the United States, Brazil, Mexico (and Latin America more generally).
WReC (Warwick Research Collective)
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9781781381892
- eISBN:
- 9781781382264
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Liverpool University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5949/liverpool/9781781381892.003.0003
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
This chapter examines Tayeb Salih's Season of Migration to the North, in the light of the idea of combined unevenness developed in chapters 1 and 2. Situating its discussion in the context of recent ...
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This chapter examines Tayeb Salih's Season of Migration to the North, in the light of the idea of combined unevenness developed in chapters 1 and 2. Situating its discussion in the context of recent attempts to uncouple the received link between literary modernism and western modernity, the chapter mobilises the notion of ‘critical irrealism’ as Michael Löwy has developed it in some of his recent writings. The focus of the chapter falls on the formal aspects of Salih's novel: the general suggestion is that the novel narrates the coexistence and clash of customary and emergent social and cultural practices in a traditional society in the throes of capitalist modernisation.Less
This chapter examines Tayeb Salih's Season of Migration to the North, in the light of the idea of combined unevenness developed in chapters 1 and 2. Situating its discussion in the context of recent attempts to uncouple the received link between literary modernism and western modernity, the chapter mobilises the notion of ‘critical irrealism’ as Michael Löwy has developed it in some of his recent writings. The focus of the chapter falls on the formal aspects of Salih's novel: the general suggestion is that the novel narrates the coexistence and clash of customary and emergent social and cultural practices in a traditional society in the throes of capitalist modernisation.
Jan Westerhoff
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- June 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198847915
- eISBN:
- 9780191882548
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198847915.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The book is concerned with the existence of the real world, that is, with the existence of a world of objects that exist independent of human interests, concerns, and cognitive activities. The main ...
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The book is concerned with the existence of the real world, that is, with the existence of a world of objects that exist independent of human interests, concerns, and cognitive activities. The main thesis defended is that we have good reason to deny the existence of such a world. The discussion is concerned with four main facets of assuming a real world: (a) the existence of an external world of physical objects in space and time; (b) the existence of an internal world, comprising various mental states congregated around a self; (c) the existence of an ontological foundation that grounds the existence of all the entities in the world; and (d) the existence of an ultimately true theory that provides a final account of all there is. I argue specifically that: (a) we should reject the postulation of an external world behind our representations; (b) the internal world is not as epistemically transparent as is usually assumed, and there is no substantial self acting as central unifier of our mental lives; (c) there are good reasons for adopting an anti-foundational account of ontological dependence; and (d) ontology, and philosophy more generally, must not be conceived of as providing an ultimately true theory of the world.Less
The book is concerned with the existence of the real world, that is, with the existence of a world of objects that exist independent of human interests, concerns, and cognitive activities. The main thesis defended is that we have good reason to deny the existence of such a world. The discussion is concerned with four main facets of assuming a real world: (a) the existence of an external world of physical objects in space and time; (b) the existence of an internal world, comprising various mental states congregated around a self; (c) the existence of an ontological foundation that grounds the existence of all the entities in the world; and (d) the existence of an ultimately true theory that provides a final account of all there is. I argue specifically that: (a) we should reject the postulation of an external world behind our representations; (b) the internal world is not as epistemically transparent as is usually assumed, and there is no substantial self acting as central unifier of our mental lives; (c) there are good reasons for adopting an anti-foundational account of ontological dependence; and (d) ontology, and philosophy more generally, must not be conceived of as providing an ultimately true theory of the world.
Sharae Deckard
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9781781382950
- eISBN:
- 9781781384022
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Liverpool University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5949/liverpool/9781781382950.003.0003
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Latin American Studies
In this chapter, Sharae Deckard explores the metaphorics and aesthetics of tropical storms and ocean-borne “disasters” in Caribbean fictions. The essay considers how Caribbean writers use ...
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In this chapter, Sharae Deckard explores the metaphorics and aesthetics of tropical storms and ocean-borne “disasters” in Caribbean fictions. The essay considers how Caribbean writers use storm-events to construct liminal narrative spaces which overturn social hierarchies and behaviours; to figure the operations and intrusions of ‘disaster capitalism’; and, finally, to generate formal disruptions that revitalize the possibility of collective action or consciousness in the face of the stasis or amnesia produced by colonialism and/or neo-colonialism in the service of neoliberal capital. Surveying texts from the Anglophone, Francophone and Hispanophone Caribbean, the chapter examines the ways in which the radical disruptive potential of tropical storms is embedded in literary form. In so doing, it demonstrates how storm aesthetics can correspond to political ecologies and materialize the specific socio-ecological conditions from which they emerge.Less
In this chapter, Sharae Deckard explores the metaphorics and aesthetics of tropical storms and ocean-borne “disasters” in Caribbean fictions. The essay considers how Caribbean writers use storm-events to construct liminal narrative spaces which overturn social hierarchies and behaviours; to figure the operations and intrusions of ‘disaster capitalism’; and, finally, to generate formal disruptions that revitalize the possibility of collective action or consciousness in the face of the stasis or amnesia produced by colonialism and/or neo-colonialism in the service of neoliberal capital. Surveying texts from the Anglophone, Francophone and Hispanophone Caribbean, the chapter examines the ways in which the radical disruptive potential of tropical storms is embedded in literary form. In so doing, it demonstrates how storm aesthetics can correspond to political ecologies and materialize the specific socio-ecological conditions from which they emerge.
Simon Robertson
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- July 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198722212
- eISBN:
- 9780191789069
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198722212.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This final main chapter tidies up some loose ends concerning the metaethical credentials of the evaluative and normative claims going into Nietzsche’s perfectionism. Nietzsche did not have a ...
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This final main chapter tidies up some loose ends concerning the metaethical credentials of the evaluative and normative claims going into Nietzsche’s perfectionism. Nietzsche did not have a well-worked-out metaethics; furthermore, his texts often underdetermine whatever views he might have intended. Nonetheless, the strategy is to gauge how well various positions (each with some textual support) satisfy certain basic interpretative desiderata, fit his revaluative purposes, and serve his wider philosophical needs. The chapter raises worries for a range of extant readings: realist, quasi-realist, fictionalist, and a hybrid realism/antirealism. It then attributes to Nietzsche a form of irrealism on which there are normative/evaluative truths but no metaphysically robust normative/evaluative properties.Less
This final main chapter tidies up some loose ends concerning the metaethical credentials of the evaluative and normative claims going into Nietzsche’s perfectionism. Nietzsche did not have a well-worked-out metaethics; furthermore, his texts often underdetermine whatever views he might have intended. Nonetheless, the strategy is to gauge how well various positions (each with some textual support) satisfy certain basic interpretative desiderata, fit his revaluative purposes, and serve his wider philosophical needs. The chapter raises worries for a range of extant readings: realist, quasi-realist, fictionalist, and a hybrid realism/antirealism. It then attributes to Nietzsche a form of irrealism on which there are normative/evaluative truths but no metaphysically robust normative/evaluative properties.
Julia Shpinitskaya
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- September 2021
- ISBN:
- 9781474437233
- eISBN:
- 9781474495349
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474437233.003.0009
- Subject:
- Film, Television and Radio, Film
This chapter focuses on Tarkovsky’s sound design that underwent several transformations throughout his career. Whereas in his early features the director used to employ a regular music track composed ...
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This chapter focuses on Tarkovsky’s sound design that underwent several transformations throughout his career. Whereas in his early features the director used to employ a regular music track composed by Viacheslav Ovchinnikov, in his later films made in in the 1970s he worked together with composer Eduard Artemiev who created original and highly experimental soundtracks. As the chapter demonstrates, Tarkovsky primarily strived for the realistic sound aesthetic, requesting a variety of noises and natural sounds, in conjunction with electronic arrangement. At the same time his sonic realism progressively tends towards irrealism in his later films when selected natural sounds manifest their otherworldly dimension. His preference for natural sounds sounding unnaturally is especially evident in his last film The Sacrifice (1986), when Tarkovsky decided to work with the sound mixer only, Owe Svensson, without a composer.Less
This chapter focuses on Tarkovsky’s sound design that underwent several transformations throughout his career. Whereas in his early features the director used to employ a regular music track composed by Viacheslav Ovchinnikov, in his later films made in in the 1970s he worked together with composer Eduard Artemiev who created original and highly experimental soundtracks. As the chapter demonstrates, Tarkovsky primarily strived for the realistic sound aesthetic, requesting a variety of noises and natural sounds, in conjunction with electronic arrangement. At the same time his sonic realism progressively tends towards irrealism in his later films when selected natural sounds manifest their otherworldly dimension. His preference for natural sounds sounding unnaturally is especially evident in his last film The Sacrifice (1986), when Tarkovsky decided to work with the sound mixer only, Owe Svensson, without a composer.
Matthew J. Moore
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- June 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780190465513
- eISBN:
- 9780190465537
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190465513.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This book provides a comprehensive survey and analysis of Buddhist political theory from the time of the Buddha to the present. Western scholars have long but mistakenly believed that Buddhism was ...
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This book provides a comprehensive survey and analysis of Buddhist political theory from the time of the Buddha to the present. Western scholars have long but mistakenly believed that Buddhism was antipolitical, but a careful examination of the primary texts reveals a rich and valuable political theory, based on three premises: that human beings are not selves, that politics is necessary but not very important, and that ethics is advice for living wisely but not a system of universal, obligatory rules. Buddhism and Political Theory provides careful readings of all the relevant primary texts and analyzes the existing scholarship on Buddhism and politics from a wide variety of disciplines. It also demonstrates the connections between Buddhist political theory and debates within contemporary Western political philosophy. In particular, it compares the Buddhist theory of no-self with the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, contrasts the Buddhist theory of limited citizenship with a parallel tradition in the West that begins with Epicurus, and connects the Buddhist approach to ethics with ethical irrealism/antirealism and the immanence politics of William Connolly.Less
This book provides a comprehensive survey and analysis of Buddhist political theory from the time of the Buddha to the present. Western scholars have long but mistakenly believed that Buddhism was antipolitical, but a careful examination of the primary texts reveals a rich and valuable political theory, based on three premises: that human beings are not selves, that politics is necessary but not very important, and that ethics is advice for living wisely but not a system of universal, obligatory rules. Buddhism and Political Theory provides careful readings of all the relevant primary texts and analyzes the existing scholarship on Buddhism and politics from a wide variety of disciplines. It also demonstrates the connections between Buddhist political theory and debates within contemporary Western political philosophy. In particular, it compares the Buddhist theory of no-self with the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, contrasts the Buddhist theory of limited citizenship with a parallel tradition in the West that begins with Epicurus, and connects the Buddhist approach to ethics with ethical irrealism/antirealism and the immanence politics of William Connolly.
Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198723172
- eISBN:
- 9780191789717
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198723172.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realist program seeks to accommodate the deeply embedded assumptions of commonsense morality, one of which is the thought that one’s current moral conviction on some topic ...
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Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realist program seeks to accommodate the deeply embedded assumptions of commonsense morality, one of which is the thought that one’s current moral conviction on some topic might be mistaken. Some errors in moral belief are due to mistaken (non-moral) factual beliefs, which present no particular challenge to the moral quasi-realist. More worrisome is the thought that one may be mistaken at the level of one’s current moral standards. The challenge of making sense of first-person affirmations of the possibility of deep moral error represents a hard challenge to the quasi-realist. Although Blackburn has addressed the issue of deep moral error, this chapter aims to offer a more detailed irrealist expressivist treatment of moral error than has hitherto been offered by Blackburn or by other expressivists. This will advance the cause of quasi-realism and that of moral expressivism generally.Less
Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realist program seeks to accommodate the deeply embedded assumptions of commonsense morality, one of which is the thought that one’s current moral conviction on some topic might be mistaken. Some errors in moral belief are due to mistaken (non-moral) factual beliefs, which present no particular challenge to the moral quasi-realist. More worrisome is the thought that one may be mistaken at the level of one’s current moral standards. The challenge of making sense of first-person affirmations of the possibility of deep moral error represents a hard challenge to the quasi-realist. Although Blackburn has addressed the issue of deep moral error, this chapter aims to offer a more detailed irrealist expressivist treatment of moral error than has hitherto been offered by Blackburn or by other expressivists. This will advance the cause of quasi-realism and that of moral expressivism generally.
Matthew J. Moore
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- June 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780190465513
- eISBN:
- 9780190465537
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190465513.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The introduction argues that Western political theory has overlooked the political philosophy of Buddhism, and that it would benefit from engaging with Buddhism as a political theory. The Buddhist ...
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The introduction argues that Western political theory has overlooked the political philosophy of Buddhism, and that it would benefit from engaging with Buddhism as a political theory. The Buddhist political philosophy rests on three ideas, which are both similar to and different from the concerns of Western scholars: that human beings are not selves; that politics is necessary but not very important; and that moral norms are advice for wise living rather than categorical obligations. The introduction summarizes the author’s understandings of political theory and Buddhism generally, and argues that Western political theorists stand to benefit from learning more about Buddhism.Less
The introduction argues that Western political theory has overlooked the political philosophy of Buddhism, and that it would benefit from engaging with Buddhism as a political theory. The Buddhist political philosophy rests on three ideas, which are both similar to and different from the concerns of Western scholars: that human beings are not selves; that politics is necessary but not very important; and that moral norms are advice for wise living rather than categorical obligations. The introduction summarizes the author’s understandings of political theory and Buddhism generally, and argues that Western political theorists stand to benefit from learning more about Buddhism.