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BIOETHICS: A Systematic Approach is an extensive revision of Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals. The subtitle has changed in order to emphasize that what distinguishes the authors’ approach to bioethics from almost all others is that it is systematic. It applies the account of morality and rationality presented in COMMON MORALITY: Deciding What To Do (2004) and MORALITY: Its Nature and Justification, Revised Edition (2005) to the moral problems that arise in the practice of medicine. The concept of rationality used to justify morality is the same concept that is used to define the concept of malady or disease. The book offers an account of the concept of death, and provides an account of euthanasia that fits within the systematic account of morality and rationality that have been provided. It also shows that this systematic account explains the controversy about the morality of abortion. There are new chapters on moral disagreements, abortion, and on “what doctors must know”, and significant improvements have been made in the treatment of the concepts of consent and malady. An entire chapter is devoted to the concept of mental maladies. Arguments are also developed against principlism and shows how principlism’s authors’ misunderstanding of this view undermines their criticisms.

In a world where natural selection has shaped adaptations of astonishing ingenuity, what is the scope and unique power of rational thinking? This book looks at the twin set of issues surrounding the power of natural selection to mimic rational design, and rational thinking as itself a product of natural selection. While we commonly deem ourselves superior to other species, the logic of natural selection should not lead us to expect that nature does everything for the best. Similarly, rational action does not always promote the best possible outcomes. So what is the difference? Is the pursuit of rationality actually an effective strategy? Part of the answer lies in language, including mathematics and science. Language is the most striking device by which we have made ourselves smarter than our nearest primate cousins. Sometimes the purely instinctual responses we share with other animals put explicit reasoning to shame: the movements of a trained athlete are faster and more accurate than anything she could explicitly calculate. Language, however, with its power to abstract from concrete experience and to range over all aspects of nature, enables breathtakingly precise calculations, which have taken us to the moon and beyond. Most importantly, however, language enables us to formulate an endless multiplicity of values, in potential conflict with one another as well as with instinctual imperatives. This book shows how our rationality and our irrationality are inextricably intertwined. It explores the true ramifications of being human in the natural world.

The first part of this book critically assesses some of the bold claims that have been made about films' contributions to philosophy and defends a balanced perspective on the topic. It argues that in many cases, it is the philosophical commentator and not ‘the film itself’ that is the actual source of the philosophizing attributed to a movie. In some cases, however, it is the film-maker who, by working with a background of specific philosophical sources, creates a work that expresses philosophical ideas. With this possibility in mind, the second part of the book outlines a ‘partial intentionalist’ approach. In response to a series of objections, the book defends underlying assumptions about interpretation, expression, and authorship. The book's partial intentionalist approach is exemplified in the third part of the book, which focuses on the work of Ingmar Bergman. The book argues that Bergman was profoundly influenced by a Finnish philosopher, Eino Kaila. Bergman proclaimed that reading Kaila's book on philosophical psychology a tremendous philosophical experience for him and that he ‘built on this ground’. With reference to unpublished materials in the newly created Ingmar Bergman archive in Stockholm, the book shows how, in works such as Wild Strawberries, Persona, and In the Life of the Marionettes, the Swedish director took up and responded to Kaila's views on motivated irrationality, inauthenticity, ethics, and the problem of self-knowledge.

Applies Davidson's Unified Theory of thought, meaning, and action to three families of problems involving various aspects of rationality, some degree of which Davidson's theory of radical interpretation attributes to any creature, which can be said to have a mind. These problems are the nature and our understanding of value judgements, the adequacy conditions for attributing mental states to a being, and the problem of irrationality.

The first four chapters apply Davidson's thesis that our interpretations of another person's mental states are a source of objectivity to value judgements: such judgements, Davidson argues in this section, are as objective as any judgement about the mind can be. Chs 5 to 10 develop Davidson's Unified Theory for interpreting thought, meaning, and action, the primary concern of this section being the specification of the minimal conditions for attributing mental states to an object or creature. Chs 11 to 14 deal primarily with the problems raised by those cognitive states and actions that seem to violate, in a fundamental way, the constraints of rationality. Since Davidson regards the constraints of rationality to be amongst the necessary conditions for both mind and interpretation, irrational thoughts, and actions pose a particular problem for his Unified Theory. The final four chapters attempt to remove the apparent contradiction.

Are humans rational? Various experiments performed over the last several decades have been interpreted as showing that humans are irrational: we make significant and consistent errors in logical reasoning, probabilistic reasoning, similarity judgements, and risk assessment, to name a few areas. But can these experiments establish human irrationality, or is it a conceptual truth that humans must be rational, as various philosophers have argued? This book offers a critical account of this debate about rationality in philosophy and cognitive science. It discusses concepts of rationality – the pictures of rationality that the debate centres on – and assesses the empirical evidence used to argue that humans are irrational. The book concludes that the question of human rationality must be answered not conceptually but empirically, using the full resources of an advanced cognitive science. Furthermore, it extends this conclusion to argue that empirical considerations are also relevant to the theory of knowledge; in other words, that epistemology should be naturalized.

Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness of will and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existence of the will. They also include new topics, such as group akrasia, strength of will, the nature of correct choice, the structure of decision theory, the temporality of prudential reasons, and emotional rationality. The essays advance two central tasks: exploration of the implications of akrasia and other putatively irrational phenomena for the nature of practical reason and rationality; and consideration of possible explanations for such phenomena. The former intersects with recent theorizing about the nature of practical reason in general, and the latter with work in the philosophy of mind about the kinds of mental states and entities we need to posit in order adequately to understand human action.

This volume is divided into two main parts. The first examines the nature of rationality broadly understood, which is customarily divided into the theoretical and the practical. Whereas theoretical or epistemic rationality is concerned with what it is rational to believe and sometimes with rational degrees of belief, practical rationality is concerned with what it is rational to do, or intend or desire to do. Included in part I are discussions of practical and theoretical rationality and the relations between them; the relation between reasoning and rationality; rationality as internal consistency; rationality and morality; formal methods in the study of rationality (Bayesianism, decision theory and game theory); rationality and emotion; rationality and rule-following; procedural and substantive rationality; internalism and externalism about practical reasons; Humean rationality; Kantian rationality; motivated irrationality; and paradoxes of rationality. Part II explores rationality’s role in and relation to other domains of inquiry: psychology, gender, personhood, language, science, economics, law, and evolution.

This book is a passionate yet analytical critique of and polemic against Jewish, Christian, and Muslim scriptural fundamentalists. It examines the ways in which otherwise intelligent and bright Jews, Christians, and Muslims defend their belief in the divine authorship of the Bible or of the Koran, as well as other religious beliefs derived from those claims, against overwhelming evidence and argument to the contrary from science, scholarship, common sense, and rational analysis. The book also examines the motives, fears, and anxieties of scriptural fundamentalists that induce them to cling tenaciously to their unreasonable beliefs. The author begins with reflections on his own journey from commitment to Orthodox Judaism, through doubts about its theological claims, and eventually to denial of their truth. This is followed by an examination of theological and philosophical debate about the proper relationships between faith, reason, and revelation. The book then devotes one chapter of detailed analysis to Jewish, Christian, and Muslim scriptural fundamentalism, noting their differences and similarities. It then analyzes the psychological and social reasons why people acquire, maintain, and protect unreasonable religious beliefs. The book also discusses some unethical and immoral consequences of scriptural fundamentalism, such as gender inequality, homophobia, lack of intellectual honesty, self‐righteousness, intolerance, propagation of falsehood, and in some instances (especially among some Muslim fundamentalists) the advocacy of violence and terrorism. It concludes with a discussion of why, when, and where it is appropriate to critique and assertively challenge and combat scriptural fundamentalists.