Bernard Gert, Charles M. Culver, and K. Danner Clouser
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195159066
- eISBN:
- 9780199786466
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195159063.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
BIOETHICS: A Systematic Approach is an extensive revision of Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals. The subtitle has changed in order to emphasize that what distinguishes the authors’ ...
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BIOETHICS: A Systematic Approach is an extensive revision of Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals. The subtitle has changed in order to emphasize that what distinguishes the authors’ approach to bioethics from almost all others is that it is systematic. It applies the account of morality and rationality presented in COMMON MORALITY: Deciding What To Do (2004) and MORALITY: Its Nature and Justification, Revised Edition (2005) to the moral problems that arise in the practice of medicine. The concept of rationality used to justify morality is the same concept that is used to define the concept of malady or disease. The book offers an account of the concept of death, and provides an account of euthanasia that fits within the systematic account of morality and rationality that have been provided. It also shows that this systematic account explains the controversy about the morality of abortion. There are new chapters on moral disagreements, abortion, and on “what doctors must know”, and significant improvements have been made in the treatment of the concepts of consent and malady. An entire chapter is devoted to the concept of mental maladies. Arguments are also developed against principlism and shows how principlism’s authors’ misunderstanding of this view undermines their criticisms.Less
BIOETHICS: A Systematic Approach is an extensive revision of Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals. The subtitle has changed in order to emphasize that what distinguishes the authors’ approach to bioethics from almost all others is that it is systematic. It applies the account of morality and rationality presented in COMMON MORALITY: Deciding What To Do (2004) and MORALITY: Its Nature and Justification, Revised Edition (2005) to the moral problems that arise in the practice of medicine. The concept of rationality used to justify morality is the same concept that is used to define the concept of malady or disease. The book offers an account of the concept of death, and provides an account of euthanasia that fits within the systematic account of morality and rationality that have been provided. It also shows that this systematic account explains the controversy about the morality of abortion. There are new chapters on moral disagreements, abortion, and on “what doctors must know”, and significant improvements have been made in the treatment of the concepts of consent and malady. An entire chapter is devoted to the concept of mental maladies. Arguments are also developed against principlism and shows how principlism’s authors’ misunderstanding of this view undermines their criticisms.
Ronald de Sousa
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195189858
- eISBN:
- 9780199868377
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189858.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
In a world where natural selection has shaped adaptations of astonishing ingenuity, what is the scope and unique power of rational thinking? This book looks at the twin set of issues surrounding the ...
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In a world where natural selection has shaped adaptations of astonishing ingenuity, what is the scope and unique power of rational thinking? This book looks at the twin set of issues surrounding the power of natural selection to mimic rational design, and rational thinking as itself a product of natural selection. While we commonly deem ourselves superior to other species, the logic of natural selection should not lead us to expect that nature does everything for the best. Similarly, rational action does not always promote the best possible outcomes. So what is the difference? Is the pursuit of rationality actually an effective strategy? Part of the answer lies in language, including mathematics and science. Language is the most striking device by which we have made ourselves smarter than our nearest primate cousins. Sometimes the purely instinctual responses we share with other animals put explicit reasoning to shame: the movements of a trained athlete are faster and more accurate than anything she could explicitly calculate. Language, however, with its power to abstract from concrete experience and to range over all aspects of nature, enables breathtakingly precise calculations, which have taken us to the moon and beyond. Most importantly, however, language enables us to formulate an endless multiplicity of values, in potential conflict with one another as well as with instinctual imperatives. This book shows how our rationality and our irrationality are inextricably intertwined. It explores the true ramifications of being human in the natural world.Less
In a world where natural selection has shaped adaptations of astonishing ingenuity, what is the scope and unique power of rational thinking? This book looks at the twin set of issues surrounding the power of natural selection to mimic rational design, and rational thinking as itself a product of natural selection. While we commonly deem ourselves superior to other species, the logic of natural selection should not lead us to expect that nature does everything for the best. Similarly, rational action does not always promote the best possible outcomes. So what is the difference? Is the pursuit of rationality actually an effective strategy? Part of the answer lies in language, including mathematics and science. Language is the most striking device by which we have made ourselves smarter than our nearest primate cousins. Sometimes the purely instinctual responses we share with other animals put explicit reasoning to shame: the movements of a trained athlete are faster and more accurate than anything she could explicitly calculate. Language, however, with its power to abstract from concrete experience and to range over all aspects of nature, enables breathtakingly precise calculations, which have taken us to the moon and beyond. Most importantly, however, language enables us to formulate an endless multiplicity of values, in potential conflict with one another as well as with instinctual imperatives. This book shows how our rationality and our irrationality are inextricably intertwined. It explores the true ramifications of being human in the natural world.
Paisley Livingston
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199570171
- eISBN:
- 9780191721540
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570171.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics, General
The first part of this book critically assesses some of the bold claims that have been made about films' contributions to philosophy and defends a balanced perspective on the topic. It argues that in ...
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The first part of this book critically assesses some of the bold claims that have been made about films' contributions to philosophy and defends a balanced perspective on the topic. It argues that in many cases, it is the philosophical commentator and not ‘the film itself’ that is the actual source of the philosophizing attributed to a movie. In some cases, however, it is the film-maker who, by working with a background of specific philosophical sources, creates a work that expresses philosophical ideas. With this possibility in mind, the second part of the book outlines a ‘partial intentionalist’ approach. In response to a series of objections, the book defends underlying assumptions about interpretation, expression, and authorship. The book's partial intentionalist approach is exemplified in the third part of the book, which focuses on the work of Ingmar Bergman. The book argues that Bergman was profoundly influenced by a Finnish philosopher, Eino Kaila. Bergman proclaimed that reading Kaila's book on philosophical psychology a tremendous philosophical experience for him and that he ‘built on this ground’. With reference to unpublished materials in the newly created Ingmar Bergman archive in Stockholm, the book shows how, in works such as Wild Strawberries, Persona, and In the Life of the Marionettes, the Swedish director took up and responded to Kaila's views on motivated irrationality, inauthenticity, ethics, and the problem of self-knowledge.Less
The first part of this book critically assesses some of the bold claims that have been made about films' contributions to philosophy and defends a balanced perspective on the topic. It argues that in many cases, it is the philosophical commentator and not ‘the film itself’ that is the actual source of the philosophizing attributed to a movie. In some cases, however, it is the film-maker who, by working with a background of specific philosophical sources, creates a work that expresses philosophical ideas. With this possibility in mind, the second part of the book outlines a ‘partial intentionalist’ approach. In response to a series of objections, the book defends underlying assumptions about interpretation, expression, and authorship. The book's partial intentionalist approach is exemplified in the third part of the book, which focuses on the work of Ingmar Bergman. The book argues that Bergman was profoundly influenced by a Finnish philosopher, Eino Kaila. Bergman proclaimed that reading Kaila's book on philosophical psychology a tremendous philosophical experience for him and that he ‘built on this ground’. With reference to unpublished materials in the newly created Ingmar Bergman archive in Stockholm, the book shows how, in works such as Wild Strawberries, Persona, and In the Life of the Marionettes, the Swedish director took up and responded to Kaila's views on motivated irrationality, inauthenticity, ethics, and the problem of self-knowledge.
W. Kip Viscusi
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198293637
- eISBN:
- 9780191596995
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198293631.003.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This chapter introduces the linkage between economic behaviour and risk regulation policies. Analysis of individual behaviour often reveals the nature of private market failures and provides guidance ...
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This chapter introduces the linkage between economic behaviour and risk regulation policies. Analysis of individual behaviour often reveals the nature of private market failures and provides guidance with respect to the appropriate forms of intervention. However, irrationality in behaviour can also generate the impetus for misguided government policies to the extent that policies are responsive to citizen preferences even when they are irrational.Less
This chapter introduces the linkage between economic behaviour and risk regulation policies. Analysis of individual behaviour often reveals the nature of private market failures and provides guidance with respect to the appropriate forms of intervention. However, irrationality in behaviour can also generate the impetus for misguided government policies to the extent that policies are responsive to citizen preferences even when they are irrational.
W. Kip Viscusi
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198293637
- eISBN:
- 9780191596995
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198293631.003.0008
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
Various forms of irrationality often provide the rationale for intervention to address market failures. However, in a democratic society, these forms of irrationality often provide the impetus for ...
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Various forms of irrationality often provide the rationale for intervention to address market failures. However, in a democratic society, these forms of irrationality often provide the impetus for government policy. The policy task is to develop risk regulation policies that would emerge if the public responded rationally to risk.Less
Various forms of irrationality often provide the rationale for intervention to address market failures. However, in a democratic society, these forms of irrationality often provide the impetus for government policy. The policy task is to develop risk regulation policies that would emerge if the public responded rationally to risk.
Edward Stein
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198237730
- eISBN:
- 9780191679520
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237730.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
Are humans rational? Various experiments performed over the last several decades have been interpreted as showing that humans are irrational: we make significant and consistent errors in logical ...
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Are humans rational? Various experiments performed over the last several decades have been interpreted as showing that humans are irrational: we make significant and consistent errors in logical reasoning, probabilistic reasoning, similarity judgements, and risk assessment, to name a few areas. But can these experiments establish human irrationality, or is it a conceptual truth that humans must be rational, as various philosophers have argued? This book offers a critical account of this debate about rationality in philosophy and cognitive science. It discusses concepts of rationality – the pictures of rationality that the debate centres on – and assesses the empirical evidence used to argue that humans are irrational. The book concludes that the question of human rationality must be answered not conceptually but empirically, using the full resources of an advanced cognitive science. Furthermore, it extends this conclusion to argue that empirical considerations are also relevant to the theory of knowledge; in other words, that epistemology should be naturalized.Less
Are humans rational? Various experiments performed over the last several decades have been interpreted as showing that humans are irrational: we make significant and consistent errors in logical reasoning, probabilistic reasoning, similarity judgements, and risk assessment, to name a few areas. But can these experiments establish human irrationality, or is it a conceptual truth that humans must be rational, as various philosophers have argued? This book offers a critical account of this debate about rationality in philosophy and cognitive science. It discusses concepts of rationality – the pictures of rationality that the debate centres on – and assesses the empirical evidence used to argue that humans are irrational. The book concludes that the question of human rationality must be answered not conceptually but empirically, using the full resources of an advanced cognitive science. Furthermore, it extends this conclusion to argue that empirical considerations are also relevant to the theory of knowledge; in other words, that epistemology should be naturalized.
Donald Davidson
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198237549
- eISBN:
- 9780191601378
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198237545.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Applies Davidson's Unified Theory of thought, meaning, and action to three families of problems involving various aspects of rationality, some degree of which Davidson's theory of radical ...
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Applies Davidson's Unified Theory of thought, meaning, and action to three families of problems involving various aspects of rationality, some degree of which Davidson's theory of radical interpretation attributes to any creature, which can be said to have a mind. These problems are the nature and our understanding of value judgements, the adequacy conditions for attributing mental states to a being, and the problem of irrationality.The first four chapters apply Davidson's thesis that our interpretations of another person's mental states are a source of objectivity to value judgements: such judgements, Davidson argues in this section, are as objective as any judgement about the mind can be. Chs 5 to 10 develop Davidson's Unified Theory for interpreting thought, meaning, and action, the primary concern of this section being the specification of the minimal conditions for attributing mental states to an object or creature. Chs 11 to 14 deal primarily with the problems raised by those cognitive states and actions that seem to violate, in a fundamental way, the constraints of rationality. Since Davidson regards the constraints of rationality to be amongst the necessary conditions for both mind and interpretation, irrational thoughts, and actions pose a particular problem for his Unified Theory. The final four chapters attempt to remove the apparent contradiction.Less
Applies Davidson's Unified Theory of thought, meaning, and action to three families of problems involving various aspects of rationality, some degree of which Davidson's theory of radical interpretation attributes to any creature, which can be said to have a mind. These problems are the nature and our understanding of value judgements, the adequacy conditions for attributing mental states to a being, and the problem of irrationality.
The first four chapters apply Davidson's thesis that our interpretations of another person's mental states are a source of objectivity to value judgements: such judgements, Davidson argues in this section, are as objective as any judgement about the mind can be. Chs 5 to 10 develop Davidson's Unified Theory for interpreting thought, meaning, and action, the primary concern of this section being the specification of the minimal conditions for attributing mental states to an object or creature. Chs 11 to 14 deal primarily with the problems raised by those cognitive states and actions that seem to violate, in a fundamental way, the constraints of rationality. Since Davidson regards the constraints of rationality to be amongst the necessary conditions for both mind and interpretation, irrational thoughts, and actions pose a particular problem for his Unified Theory. The final four chapters attempt to remove the apparent contradiction.
Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199257362
- eISBN:
- 9780191601842
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257361.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection give a rich overview of ...
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Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness of will and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existence of the will. They also include new topics, such as group akrasia, strength of will, the nature of correct choice, the structure of decision theory, the temporality of prudential reasons, and emotional rationality. The essays advance two central tasks: exploration of the implications of akrasia and other putatively irrational phenomena for the nature of practical reason and rationality; and consideration of possible explanations for such phenomena. The former intersects with recent theorizing about the nature of practical reason in general, and the latter with work in the philosophy of mind about the kinds of mental states and entities we need to posit in order adequately to understand human action.Less
Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness of will and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existence of the will. They also include new topics, such as group akrasia, strength of will, the nature of correct choice, the structure of decision theory, the temporality of prudential reasons, and emotional rationality. The essays advance two central tasks: exploration of the implications of akrasia and other putatively irrational phenomena for the nature of practical reason and rationality; and consideration of possible explanations for such phenomena. The former intersects with recent theorizing about the nature of practical reason in general, and the latter with work in the philosophy of mind about the kinds of mental states and entities we need to posit in order adequately to understand human action.
Alfred R. Mele and Piers Rawling (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195145397
- eISBN:
- 9780199752393
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195145399.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This volume is divided into two main parts. The first examines the nature of rationality broadly understood, which is customarily divided into the theoretical and the practical. Whereas theoretical ...
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This volume is divided into two main parts. The first examines the nature of rationality broadly understood, which is customarily divided into the theoretical and the practical. Whereas theoretical or epistemic rationality is concerned with what it is rational to believe and sometimes with rational degrees of belief, practical rationality is concerned with what it is rational to do, or intend or desire to do. Included in part I are discussions of practical and theoretical rationality and the relations between them; the relation between reasoning and rationality; rationality as internal consistency; rationality and morality; formal methods in the study of rationality (Bayesianism, decision theory and game theory); rationality and emotion; rationality and rule-following; procedural and substantive rationality; internalism and externalism about practical reasons; Humean rationality; Kantian rationality; motivated irrationality; and paradoxes of rationality. Part II explores rationality’s role in and relation to other domains of inquiry: psychology, gender, personhood, language, science, economics, law, and evolution.Less
This volume is divided into two main parts. The first examines the nature of rationality broadly understood, which is customarily divided into the theoretical and the practical. Whereas theoretical or epistemic rationality is concerned with what it is rational to believe and sometimes with rational degrees of belief, practical rationality is concerned with what it is rational to do, or intend or desire to do. Included in part I are discussions of practical and theoretical rationality and the relations between them; the relation between reasoning and rationality; rationality as internal consistency; rationality and morality; formal methods in the study of rationality (Bayesianism, decision theory and game theory); rationality and emotion; rationality and rule-following; procedural and substantive rationality; internalism and externalism about practical reasons; Humean rationality; Kantian rationality; motivated irrationality; and paradoxes of rationality. Part II explores rationality’s role in and relation to other domains of inquiry: psychology, gender, personhood, language, science, economics, law, and evolution.
Michael Suk-Young Chwe
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691158280
- eISBN:
- 9781400846436
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691158280.003.0004
- Subject:
- Sociology, Social Theory
This concluding chapter summarizes key themes. The book has attempted to show that the distinction between rationality and irrationality in the Western tradition cannot be easily maintained. It ...
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This concluding chapter summarizes key themes. The book has attempted to show that the distinction between rationality and irrationality in the Western tradition cannot be easily maintained. It starts with a narrow, unadorned conception of rationality in the context of coordination problems and shows that the common knowledge required is substantially related to issues of intersubjectivity, collective consciousness, and group identity. It starts with isolated individuals facing real, practical problems of coordination and shows that transcending the “transmission” view of communication (first-order knowledge) and including the “ritual” view (common knowledge) is exactly what is required. By associating common knowledge with cultural practices, this book suggests a close and reciprocal relationship between the perspectives of rationality and culture, which are often thought separate or even antagonistic.Less
This concluding chapter summarizes key themes. The book has attempted to show that the distinction between rationality and irrationality in the Western tradition cannot be easily maintained. It starts with a narrow, unadorned conception of rationality in the context of coordination problems and shows that the common knowledge required is substantially related to issues of intersubjectivity, collective consciousness, and group identity. It starts with isolated individuals facing real, practical problems of coordination and shows that transcending the “transmission” view of communication (first-order knowledge) and including the “ritual” view (common knowledge) is exactly what is required. By associating common knowledge with cultural practices, this book suggests a close and reciprocal relationship between the perspectives of rationality and culture, which are often thought separate or even antagonistic.
Bernard Gert, Charles M. Culver, and K. Danner Clouser
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195159066
- eISBN:
- 9780199786466
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195159063.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter provides a preview of the rest of the book, concentrating on the concept of morality. It distinguishes between a moral system and a moral theory, and gives a preliminary account of ...
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This chapter provides a preview of the rest of the book, concentrating on the concept of morality. It distinguishes between a moral system and a moral theory, and gives a preliminary account of rationality and irrationality. It discusses the content of morality, showing that the avoidance of causing harms and the preventing of harms, rather than the promoting of benefits, is central to morality. It explains why, in addition to the general moral rules and ideals, there are particular moral rules and special duties that are part of the ethics of every profession.Less
This chapter provides a preview of the rest of the book, concentrating on the concept of morality. It distinguishes between a moral system and a moral theory, and gives a preliminary account of rationality and irrationality. It discusses the content of morality, showing that the avoidance of causing harms and the preventing of harms, rather than the promoting of benefits, is central to morality. It explains why, in addition to the general moral rules and ideals, there are particular moral rules and special duties that are part of the ethics of every profession.
Bernard Gert, Charles M. Culver, and K. Danner Clouser
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195159066
- eISBN:
- 9780199786466
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195159063.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter distinguishes between morality, the informal public system that people use when making moral decisions, and a moral theory, which provides an explanation and justification of morality. ...
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This chapter distinguishes between morality, the informal public system that people use when making moral decisions, and a moral theory, which provides an explanation and justification of morality. It presents some examples of mistaken accounts of morality, shows the relation between morality and rationality, and provides an account of impartiality. It gives an account of moral rules and moral ideals, and of the morally relevant features that are used when justifying a violation of a moral rule.Less
This chapter distinguishes between morality, the informal public system that people use when making moral decisions, and a moral theory, which provides an explanation and justification of morality. It presents some examples of mistaken accounts of morality, shows the relation between morality and rationality, and provides an account of impartiality. It gives an account of moral rules and moral ideals, and of the morally relevant features that are used when justifying a violation of a moral rule.
Marcia Cavell
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199287086
- eISBN:
- 9780191603921
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199287082.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter discusses the thoughts of Davidson and Freud about irrationality. It then examines the problem of self-transcendence, where a person forms a positive or negative judgment of some of his ...
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This chapter discusses the thoughts of Davidson and Freud about irrationality. It then examines the problem of self-transcendence, where a person forms a positive or negative judgment of some of his own desires, and acts to change these desires. From the point of view of the changed desire, there is no reason for the change — the reason comes from an independent source, and is based on further, and partly contrary, considerations.Less
This chapter discusses the thoughts of Davidson and Freud about irrationality. It then examines the problem of self-transcendence, where a person forms a positive or negative judgment of some of his own desires, and acts to change these desires. From the point of view of the changed desire, there is no reason for the change — the reason comes from an independent source, and is based on further, and partly contrary, considerations.
Solomon Schimmel
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195188264
- eISBN:
- 9780199870509
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195188264.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This book is a passionate yet analytical critique of and polemic against Jewish, Christian, and Muslim scriptural fundamentalists. It examines the ways in which otherwise intelligent and bright Jews, ...
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This book is a passionate yet analytical critique of and polemic against Jewish, Christian, and Muslim scriptural fundamentalists. It examines the ways in which otherwise intelligent and bright Jews, Christians, and Muslims defend their belief in the divine authorship of the Bible or of the Koran, as well as other religious beliefs derived from those claims, against overwhelming evidence and argument to the contrary from science, scholarship, common sense, and rational analysis. The book also examines the motives, fears, and anxieties of scriptural fundamentalists that induce them to cling tenaciously to their unreasonable beliefs. The author begins with reflections on his own journey from commitment to Orthodox Judaism, through doubts about its theological claims, and eventually to denial of their truth. This is followed by an examination of theological and philosophical debate about the proper relationships between faith, reason, and revelation. The book then devotes one chapter of detailed analysis to Jewish, Christian, and Muslim scriptural fundamentalism, noting their differences and similarities. It then analyzes the psychological and social reasons why people acquire, maintain, and protect unreasonable religious beliefs. The book also discusses some unethical and immoral consequences of scriptural fundamentalism, such as gender inequality, homophobia, lack of intellectual honesty, self‐righteousness, intolerance, propagation of falsehood, and in some instances (especially among some Muslim fundamentalists) the advocacy of violence and terrorism. It concludes with a discussion of why, when, and where it is appropriate to critique and assertively challenge and combat scriptural fundamentalists.Less
This book is a passionate yet analytical critique of and polemic against Jewish, Christian, and Muslim scriptural fundamentalists. It examines the ways in which otherwise intelligent and bright Jews, Christians, and Muslims defend their belief in the divine authorship of the Bible or of the Koran, as well as other religious beliefs derived from those claims, against overwhelming evidence and argument to the contrary from science, scholarship, common sense, and rational analysis. The book also examines the motives, fears, and anxieties of scriptural fundamentalists that induce them to cling tenaciously to their unreasonable beliefs. The author begins with reflections on his own journey from commitment to Orthodox Judaism, through doubts about its theological claims, and eventually to denial of their truth. This is followed by an examination of theological and philosophical debate about the proper relationships between faith, reason, and revelation. The book then devotes one chapter of detailed analysis to Jewish, Christian, and Muslim scriptural fundamentalism, noting their differences and similarities. It then analyzes the psychological and social reasons why people acquire, maintain, and protect unreasonable religious beliefs. The book also discusses some unethical and immoral consequences of scriptural fundamentalism, such as gender inequality, homophobia, lack of intellectual honesty, self‐righteousness, intolerance, propagation of falsehood, and in some instances (especially among some Muslim fundamentalists) the advocacy of violence and terrorism. It concludes with a discussion of why, when, and where it is appropriate to critique and assertively challenge and combat scriptural fundamentalists.
Timothy Fitzgerald
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195300093
- eISBN:
- 9780199868636
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300093.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Literature
This chapter argues that throughout the vicissitudes of discourses on Religion and religions, there has always been a significant overlap with a parallel discourse on civility and barbarity. By ...
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This chapter argues that throughout the vicissitudes of discourses on Religion and religions, there has always been a significant overlap with a parallel discourse on civility and barbarity. By noticing this overlap of discursive formations we can see a major source of continuity underlying the radical change in cosmological assumptions that have led to the invention of the modern “secular.” The Church, which was also a State, drew on earlier Greek and Roman self‐representations between “our” civility and rationality as against “their” barbarity and madness. Religion as Our Truth is difficult to separate from the self‐representations of Christian male elites as the upholders of a rational civility which provided salvation from pagan madness. As modern ideology transformed the meanings of terms like “religion” and “natural reason,” and generated new dichotomies such as faith and science or private piety and public rationality, the persistent discourse on civility and barbarity became attached to modern imperial and orientalist representations of white, Protestant males, imbued with scientific reason and rational religion, offering the salvational disciplines of civility to barbaric, irrational, and feminine orientals unable to organize their own polities.Less
This chapter argues that throughout the vicissitudes of discourses on Religion and religions, there has always been a significant overlap with a parallel discourse on civility and barbarity. By noticing this overlap of discursive formations we can see a major source of continuity underlying the radical change in cosmological assumptions that have led to the invention of the modern “secular.” The Church, which was also a State, drew on earlier Greek and Roman self‐representations between “our” civility and rationality as against “their” barbarity and madness. Religion as Our Truth is difficult to separate from the self‐representations of Christian male elites as the upholders of a rational civility which provided salvation from pagan madness. As modern ideology transformed the meanings of terms like “religion” and “natural reason,” and generated new dichotomies such as faith and science or private piety and public rationality, the persistent discourse on civility and barbarity became attached to modern imperial and orientalist representations of white, Protestant males, imbued with scientific reason and rational religion, offering the salvational disciplines of civility to barbaric, irrational, and feminine orientals unable to organize their own polities.
Gordon Graham
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199265961
- eISBN:
- 9780191708756
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199265961.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This chapter traces the rise of the ‘science of religion’ and traces its impact on painting and the visual arts. It focuses on the surrealist movement and argues that its attempt to depict a ...
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This chapter traces the rise of the ‘science of religion’ and traces its impact on painting and the visual arts. It focuses on the surrealist movement and argues that its attempt to depict a mysteriously irrational reality fails.Less
This chapter traces the rise of the ‘science of religion’ and traces its impact on painting and the visual arts. It focuses on the surrealist movement and argues that its attempt to depict a mysteriously irrational reality fails.
C. C. W. Taylor
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199226399
- eISBN:
- 9780191710209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226399.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter examines the relation between rationality and happiness in Plato's thought. In some early dialogues a correct conception of what happiness is, is sufficient to achieve it; hence all ...
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This chapter examines the relation between rationality and happiness in Plato's thought. In some early dialogues a correct conception of what happiness is, is sufficient to achieve it; hence all wrong-doing is caused by misconception or miscalculation, which are kinds of irrationality. In some dialogues, miscalculation is itself caused by inappropriate desires, which gives the latter motivational force, albeit not independent of cognitive irrationality. In the Republic and subsequent dialogues, non-rational impulses have independent motivational force, and rationality consists in co-ordinating them under the direction of reason to promote the individual's happiness. In the Republic, Plato is optimistic about the possibility of achieving that co-ordination, but other dialogues show a more pessimistic picture, in which one prominent type of non-rational drive, desire for bodily satisfaction, cannot be genuinely co-ordinated with reason, but can at best be suppressed. That pessimistic picture reflects a heightened insistence on the distinction between the rational soul (which alone is immortal, and which is identified with the real self) and the non-rational parts, which are temporary features of the embodied soul.Less
This chapter examines the relation between rationality and happiness in Plato's thought. In some early dialogues a correct conception of what happiness is, is sufficient to achieve it; hence all wrong-doing is caused by misconception or miscalculation, which are kinds of irrationality. In some dialogues, miscalculation is itself caused by inappropriate desires, which gives the latter motivational force, albeit not independent of cognitive irrationality. In the Republic and subsequent dialogues, non-rational impulses have independent motivational force, and rationality consists in co-ordinating them under the direction of reason to promote the individual's happiness. In the Republic, Plato is optimistic about the possibility of achieving that co-ordination, but other dialogues show a more pessimistic picture, in which one prominent type of non-rational drive, desire for bodily satisfaction, cannot be genuinely co-ordinated with reason, but can at best be suppressed. That pessimistic picture reflects a heightened insistence on the distinction between the rational soul (which alone is immortal, and which is identified with the real self) and the non-rational parts, which are temporary features of the embodied soul.
Aurora Szentagotai and Jason Jones
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195182231
- eISBN:
- 9780199870684
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195182231.003.0005
- Subject:
- Psychology, Clinical Psychology
This chapter examines the relation between rational/irrational thinking and behavior. It reviews studies assessing the irrational beliefs-dysfunctional/maladaptive behavior relationship, and focused ...
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This chapter examines the relation between rational/irrational thinking and behavior. It reviews studies assessing the irrational beliefs-dysfunctional/maladaptive behavior relationship, and focused mainly on research that evaluates the four types of beliefs separately, rather than global irrationality. Despite an obvious degree of specificity in the behavioral consequences of individual irrational beliefs, there is also an overlap in their effects (e.g., the aggressive expression of anger is related to high levels of low frustration tolerance, self-downing, and demandingness). This is not surprising considering the hypothesized mutual interdependence among diverse irrational beliefs.Less
This chapter examines the relation between rational/irrational thinking and behavior. It reviews studies assessing the irrational beliefs-dysfunctional/maladaptive behavior relationship, and focused mainly on research that evaluates the four types of beliefs separately, rather than global irrationality. Despite an obvious degree of specificity in the behavioral consequences of individual irrational beliefs, there is also an overlap in their effects (e.g., the aggressive expression of anger is related to high levels of low frustration tolerance, self-downing, and demandingness). This is not surprising considering the hypothesized mutual interdependence among diverse irrational beliefs.
Chrisoula Andreou and Mark D. White
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195376685
- eISBN:
- 9780199776306
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195376685.003.0000
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This introductory chapter considers some promising characterizations of procrastination and raises a variety of complications concerning this philosophically interesting but underexplored phenomenon. ...
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This introductory chapter considers some promising characterizations of procrastination and raises a variety of complications concerning this philosophically interesting but underexplored phenomenon. Procrastination is discussed in relation to irrationality, self-deception, akrasia, irresoluteness, vague goals, hypocrisy, and fragmented agency. Two quasi-economic models of procrastination, one focused on discounting-induced preference reversals and the other on intransitive preferences, are highlighted. The chapters in the rest of the volume, which is divided into three parts, are introduced: the chapters in the first part are primarily concerned with analyzing procrastination or uncovering its sources; the chapters in the second part explore the connection between procrastination and imprudence or vice; and the chapters in the third part are concerned primarily with strategies for coping with procrastination.Less
This introductory chapter considers some promising characterizations of procrastination and raises a variety of complications concerning this philosophically interesting but underexplored phenomenon. Procrastination is discussed in relation to irrationality, self-deception, akrasia, irresoluteness, vague goals, hypocrisy, and fragmented agency. Two quasi-economic models of procrastination, one focused on discounting-induced preference reversals and the other on intransitive preferences, are highlighted. The chapters in the rest of the volume, which is divided into three parts, are introduced: the chapters in the first part are primarily concerned with analyzing procrastination or uncovering its sources; the chapters in the second part explore the connection between procrastination and imprudence or vice; and the chapters in the third part are concerned primarily with strategies for coping with procrastination.
Jon Elster
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195376685
- eISBN:
- 9780199776306
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195376685.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
In this chapter, procrastination is viewed as a species of a more general phenomenon, bad timing, which also includes premature decisions. The badness of bad timing is defined in terms of ...
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In this chapter, procrastination is viewed as a species of a more general phenomenon, bad timing, which also includes premature decisions. The badness of bad timing is defined in terms of rational-choice theory. Sources of premature decisions include emotionally induced urgency and hyperbolic time discounting. Procrastination may also result from the latter mechanism, as well as from loss aversion and the need to act for sufficient reasons.Less
In this chapter, procrastination is viewed as a species of a more general phenomenon, bad timing, which also includes premature decisions. The badness of bad timing is defined in terms of rational-choice theory. Sources of premature decisions include emotionally induced urgency and hyperbolic time discounting. Procrastination may also result from the latter mechanism, as well as from loss aversion and the need to act for sufficient reasons.
