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Governments are rightly discussing reform of investment treaties, and of the powerful system of ‘investor–state dispute settlement’ (ISDS) upon which they rest. It is therefore important to be clear about the crux of the problem. ISDS treaties are flawed fundamentally because they firmly institute wealth-based inequality under international law. That is, they use cross-border ownership of assets, mostly by multinationals and billionaires, as the gateway to extraordinary protections, while denying equivalent safeguards to those who lack the wealth required to qualify as foreign investors. The treaties thus have the main effect of safeguarding an awe-inspiring set of rights and privileges for the ultra-wealthy at the expense of countries and their populations. This book shows how ISDS came to explode in a global context of extreme concentration of wealth and of widespread poverty. The history of early ISDS treaties is highlighted to show their ties to decolonization and, sometimes, extreme violence and authoritarianism. Focusing on early ISDS lawsuits and rulings reveals how a small group of lawyers and arbitrators worked to create the legal foundations for massive growth of ISDS since 2000. ISDS-based protections are examined in detail to demonstrate how they give exceptional advantages to the wealthy. Examples are offered of how the protections have been used to reconfigure state decision making and shift sovereign minds in favour of foreign investors. Finally, the ongoing efforts of governments to reform ISDS are surveyed, with a call to go further or, even better, to withdraw from the treaties.

Today, investor–state arbitration embodies the worst fears of those concerned about runaway globalization—a far cry from its framers’ intentions. Why did governments create a special legal system in which foreign investors can bring cases directly against states? This book takes readers through the key decisions that created investor–state arbitration, drawing on internal documents from several governments and extensive interviews to illustrate the politics behind this new legal system. The corporations and law firms that dominate investor–state arbitration today were not present at its creation. In fact, there was almost no lobbying from investors. Nor did powerful states have a strong preference for it. Nor was it created because there was evidence that it facilitates investment—there was no such evidence. International officials with peacebuilding and development aims drove the rise of investor–state arbitration. This book puts forward a new historical institutionalist explanation to illuminate how the actions of these officials kicked off a process of gradual institutional development. While these officials anticipated many developments, including an enormous caseload from investment treaties, over time this institutional framework they created has been put to new purposes by different actors. Institutions do not determine the purposes to which they may be put, and this book’s analysis illustrates how unintended consequences emerge and why institutions persist regardless.

The phenomenal story of China’s ‘unprecedented disposition to engage the international legal order’ has been primarily told and examined by political scientists and economists. Since China adopted its ‘open door’ policy in 1978, which altered its development strategy from self-sufficiency to active participation in the world market and aimed at attracting foreign investment to fuel its economic development, the underlying policy for mobilizing inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) remains unchanged to date. With the 1997 launch of the ‘Going Global’ policy, an outward focus regarding foreign investment has been added, to circumvent trade barriers and improve the competitiveness of Chinese firms, typically its state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In order to accommodate inward and outward FDI, China’s participation in the international investment regime has underpinned its efforts to join multi-lateral investment-related legal instruments and conclude international investment agreements (IIAs). China began by selectively concluding bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with developed countries (major capital exporting states to China at that time), signing its first BIT with Sweden in 1982. Despite being a latecomer, over time China’s experience and practice with the international investment regime have allowed it to evolve towards liberalizing its IIAs regime and balancing the duties and benefits associated with IIAs. The book spans a broad spectrum of China’s contemporary international investment law and policy: domestic foreign investment law and reforms, tax policy, bilateral investment treaties, free trade agreements, G20 initiatives, the ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative, international dispute resolution, and inter-regime coordination.