Stephen Mulhall
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199208548
- eISBN:
- 9780191709067
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208548.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This book presents a detailed critical commentary on sections 243-315 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: the famous remarks on ‘private language’. It makes detailed use of Stanley ...
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This book presents a detailed critical commentary on sections 243-315 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: the famous remarks on ‘private language’. It makes detailed use of Stanley Cavell's interpretations of these remarks. It relates disputes about the interpretation of this aspect of Wittgenstein's later philosophy to a recent, highly influential controversy about how to interpret Wittgenstein's early text, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, by drawing and testing out a distinction between resolute and substantial understandings of the related notions of grammar, nonsense and the imagination. Throughout, the book seeks to elucidate Wittgenstein's philosophical method, and to establish the importance of the form or style of his writing to the proper application of this method.Less
This book presents a detailed critical commentary on sections 243-315 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: the famous remarks on ‘private language’. It makes detailed use of Stanley Cavell's interpretations of these remarks. It relates disputes about the interpretation of this aspect of Wittgenstein's later philosophy to a recent, highly influential controversy about how to interpret Wittgenstein's early text, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, by drawing and testing out a distinction between resolute and substantial understandings of the related notions of grammar, nonsense and the imagination. Throughout, the book seeks to elucidate Wittgenstein's philosophical method, and to establish the importance of the form or style of his writing to the proper application of this method.
Katja Maria Vogt
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199916818
- eISBN:
- 9780199980291
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199916818.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This book explores a Socratic intuition about the difference between belief and knowledge. Beliefs—doxai—are deficient cognitive attitudes. In believing something, one accepts some content as true ...
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This book explores a Socratic intuition about the difference between belief and knowledge. Beliefs—doxai—are deficient cognitive attitudes. In believing something, one accepts some content as true without knowing that it is true; one holds something to be true that could turn out to be false. Since our actions reflect what we hold to be true, holding beliefs is potentially harmful for oneself and others. Accordingly, beliefs are ethically worrisome and even, in the words of Plato's Socrates, “shameful.” As the book argues, this is a serious philosophical proposal and it speaks to intuitions that we are likely to share. But it involves a notion of belief that is rather different from contemporary notions. Today, it is a widespread assumption that true beliefs are better than false beliefs, and that some true beliefs (perhaps those that come with justifications) qualify as knowledge. Socratic epistemology offers a genuinely different picture. In aiming for knowledge, one must aim to get rid of beliefs. Knowledge does not entail belief—belief and knowledge differ in such important ways that they cannot both count as kinds of belief. As long as one does not have knowledge, one should reserve judgment and investigate. It is argued that the ancient skeptics and Stoics draw many of these ideas from Plato's dialogues, revising Socratic-Platonic arguments as they see fit. The book retraces their steps through interpretations of the Apology, Ion, Republic, Theaetetus, and Philebus, reconstructs Pyrrhonian investigation and thought, and illuminates the connections between ancient skepticism and relativism, as well as the Stoic view that beliefs do not even merit the evaluations “true” and “false.”Less
This book explores a Socratic intuition about the difference between belief and knowledge. Beliefs—doxai—are deficient cognitive attitudes. In believing something, one accepts some content as true without knowing that it is true; one holds something to be true that could turn out to be false. Since our actions reflect what we hold to be true, holding beliefs is potentially harmful for oneself and others. Accordingly, beliefs are ethically worrisome and even, in the words of Plato's Socrates, “shameful.” As the book argues, this is a serious philosophical proposal and it speaks to intuitions that we are likely to share. But it involves a notion of belief that is rather different from contemporary notions. Today, it is a widespread assumption that true beliefs are better than false beliefs, and that some true beliefs (perhaps those that come with justifications) qualify as knowledge. Socratic epistemology offers a genuinely different picture. In aiming for knowledge, one must aim to get rid of beliefs. Knowledge does not entail belief—belief and knowledge differ in such important ways that they cannot both count as kinds of belief. As long as one does not have knowledge, one should reserve judgment and investigate. It is argued that the ancient skeptics and Stoics draw many of these ideas from Plato's dialogues, revising Socratic-Platonic arguments as they see fit. The book retraces their steps through interpretations of the Apology, Ion, Republic, Theaetetus, and Philebus, reconstructs Pyrrhonian investigation and thought, and illuminates the connections between ancient skepticism and relativism, as well as the Stoic view that beliefs do not even merit the evaluations “true” and “false.”
Jean-Paul Brodeur
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199740598
- eISBN:
- 9780199866083
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199740598.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
This book seeks to give a comprehensive theory of policing. To set out the background for such a theory, the diverse types of agencies involved in policing, the history of policing, and the ...
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This book seeks to give a comprehensive theory of policing. To set out the background for such a theory, the diverse types of agencies involved in policing, the history of policing, and the representations of policing in the press and in police literature are examined. The police are then defined by their use of a wide array of means, including violence, which are prohibited as legal violations for all other citizens. This definition is tested in the subsequent chapters bearing on the main components of the police web. First, the public police working in uniform are described in respect of who they are, what part of their activities are devoted to crime control, and the ways in which they operate. Second, criminal investigators are put in focus and empirical findings on how they clear up cases are discussed. The security and intelligence services are the subject of the next chapter, which develops a model that contrasts “high policing” (intelligence services) with “low policing” (public constabularies). The following chapter addresses the crucial issues that relate to private security, stressing the uncertainty of our current knowledge, and proposes a fully developed model integrating public and private security. The last chapter is devoted to military policing in its democratic and undemocratic variants, and to the extra‐legal social control exercised by criminal organizations such as the Mafia. In conclusion, the book tries to link the theoretical issues raised throughout the book and make his position explicit with respect to all of them.Less
This book seeks to give a comprehensive theory of policing. To set out the background for such a theory, the diverse types of agencies involved in policing, the history of policing, and the representations of policing in the press and in police literature are examined. The police are then defined by their use of a wide array of means, including violence, which are prohibited as legal violations for all other citizens. This definition is tested in the subsequent chapters bearing on the main components of the police web. First, the public police working in uniform are described in respect of who they are, what part of their activities are devoted to crime control, and the ways in which they operate. Second, criminal investigators are put in focus and empirical findings on how they clear up cases are discussed. The security and intelligence services are the subject of the next chapter, which develops a model that contrasts “high policing” (intelligence services) with “low policing” (public constabularies). The following chapter addresses the crucial issues that relate to private security, stressing the uncertainty of our current knowledge, and proposes a fully developed model integrating public and private security. The last chapter is devoted to military policing in its democratic and undemocratic variants, and to the extra‐legal social control exercised by criminal organizations such as the Mafia. In conclusion, the book tries to link the theoretical issues raised throughout the book and make his position explicit with respect to all of them.
P. Kyle Stanford
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195174083
- eISBN:
- 9780199786367
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195174089.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
The incredible achievements of modern scientific theories lead most of us to embrace scientific realism: the view that our best theories offer us at least roughly accurate descriptions of otherwise ...
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The incredible achievements of modern scientific theories lead most of us to embrace scientific realism: the view that our best theories offer us at least roughly accurate descriptions of otherwise inaccessible parts of the world like genes, atoms, and the big bang. This book argues that careful attention to the history of scientific investigation invites a challenge to this view that is not well represented in contemporary debates about the nature of the scientific enterprise. The historical record of scientific inquiry, the book suggests, is characterized by the problem of unconceived alternatives. Past scientists have routinely failed even to conceive of alternatives to their own theories and lines of theoretical investigation, alternatives that were both well-confirmed by the evidence available at the time and sufficiently serious as to be ultimately accepted by later scientific communities. The book supports this claim with a detailed investigation of the mid-to-late 19th-century theories of inheritance and generation proposed in turn by Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann. It goes on to argue that this historical pattern strongly suggests that there are equally well-confirmed and scientifically serious alternatives to our own best theories that remain currently unconceived. Moreover, this challenge is more serious than those rooted in either the so-called pessimistic induction or the underdetermination of theories by evidence, in part because existing realist responses to these latter challenges offer no relief from the problem of unconceived alternatives itself.Less
The incredible achievements of modern scientific theories lead most of us to embrace scientific realism: the view that our best theories offer us at least roughly accurate descriptions of otherwise inaccessible parts of the world like genes, atoms, and the big bang. This book argues that careful attention to the history of scientific investigation invites a challenge to this view that is not well represented in contemporary debates about the nature of the scientific enterprise. The historical record of scientific inquiry, the book suggests, is characterized by the problem of unconceived alternatives. Past scientists have routinely failed even to conceive of alternatives to their own theories and lines of theoretical investigation, alternatives that were both well-confirmed by the evidence available at the time and sufficiently serious as to be ultimately accepted by later scientific communities. The book supports this claim with a detailed investigation of the mid-to-late 19th-century theories of inheritance and generation proposed in turn by Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann. It goes on to argue that this historical pattern strongly suggests that there are equally well-confirmed and scientifically serious alternatives to our own best theories that remain currently unconceived. Moreover, this challenge is more serious than those rooted in either the so-called pessimistic induction or the underdetermination of theories by evidence, in part because existing realist responses to these latter challenges offer no relief from the problem of unconceived alternatives itself.
Gilberto Artioli
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199548262
- eISBN:
- 9780191723308
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548262.003.0004
- Subject:
- Physics, History of Physics
Present trends in the analytical characterization of cultural heritage materials are briefly reviewed, including the use of microbeams, portable instrumentation, non-invasive investigations, and ...
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Present trends in the analytical characterization of cultural heritage materials are briefly reviewed, including the use of microbeams, portable instrumentation, non-invasive investigations, and standardization of the results. Some of the persisting problems and pitfalls are discussed in the general frame of cultural heritage investigations. Digital databases and virtual reality are a growing area that ought to make life easier for cultural heritage management and research, provided that academic curricula keep up with the pace of current developments.Less
Present trends in the analytical characterization of cultural heritage materials are briefly reviewed, including the use of microbeams, portable instrumentation, non-invasive investigations, and standardization of the results. Some of the persisting problems and pitfalls are discussed in the general frame of cultural heritage investigations. Digital databases and virtual reality are a growing area that ought to make life easier for cultural heritage management and research, provided that academic curricula keep up with the pace of current developments.
Margaret Gilbert
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274956
- eISBN:
- 9780191603976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274959.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
The book’s argument is summarized and its conclusions are brought to hear on two classic situations of crisis: Socrates awaiting the death penalty in prison, and Antigone in her conflict with the ...
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The book’s argument is summarized and its conclusions are brought to hear on two classic situations of crisis: Socrates awaiting the death penalty in prison, and Antigone in her conflict with the ruler of her political society, Creon. Emphasis is given to the point that though obligations of joint commitment are absolute in the sense discussed, and supersede one’s personal inclinations and self-interest as such, it is possible for other considerations to ‘trump’ them. Antigone believed there were such considerations in her case; Socrates seems not to have thought so. A number of avenues for further empirical investigation and moral inquiry are noted.Less
The book’s argument is summarized and its conclusions are brought to hear on two classic situations of crisis: Socrates awaiting the death penalty in prison, and Antigone in her conflict with the ruler of her political society, Creon. Emphasis is given to the point that though obligations of joint commitment are absolute in the sense discussed, and supersede one’s personal inclinations and self-interest as such, it is possible for other considerations to ‘trump’ them. Antigone believed there were such considerations in her case; Socrates seems not to have thought so. A number of avenues for further empirical investigation and moral inquiry are noted.
Edmund Cannon and Ian Tonks
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199216994
- eISBN:
- 9780191711978
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199216994.003.0004
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Pensions and Pension Management
The actuarial profession has developed to enable insurance companies to value life insurance products on a scientific basis. This chapter considers the methods used by actuaries to price annuities ...
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The actuarial profession has developed to enable insurance companies to value life insurance products on a scientific basis. This chapter considers the methods used by actuaries to price annuities and describes the measurement of life expectancy. It reports on the life data collected by the Continuous Mortality Investigation Bureau and the recent trends in life expectancy.Less
The actuarial profession has developed to enable insurance companies to value life insurance products on a scientific basis. This chapter considers the methods used by actuaries to price annuities and describes the measurement of life expectancy. It reports on the life data collected by the Continuous Mortality Investigation Bureau and the recent trends in life expectancy.
David Pears
- Published in print:
- 1988
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198244868
- eISBN:
- 9780191598210
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019824486X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This is the second of David Pears's acclaimed two‐volume work on the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy, covering the Philosophical Investigations and other writings from 1929 onwards. Though ...
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This is the second of David Pears's acclaimed two‐volume work on the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy, covering the Philosophical Investigations and other writings from 1929 onwards. Though more selective in its coverage than the first volume (it deals mainly with Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology and the ego, the possibility of a private language and rule‐following), the book reveals with great clarity the style, method, and content of Wittgenstein's later thought. While this volume is independently comprehensible, Pears remains largely within the structural framework of the first volume and uncovers thereby the general overall configuration and internal organization of Wittgenstein's thought.Less
This is the second of David Pears's acclaimed two‐volume work on the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy, covering the Philosophical Investigations and other writings from 1929 onwards. Though more selective in its coverage than the first volume (it deals mainly with Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology and the ego, the possibility of a private language and rule‐following), the book reveals with great clarity the style, method, and content of Wittgenstein's later thought. While this volume is independently comprehensible, Pears remains largely within the structural framework of the first volume and uncovers thereby the general overall configuration and internal organization of Wittgenstein's thought.
Stephen Mulhall
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199208548
- eISBN:
- 9780191709067
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208548.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the basis of the author's approach to the sequence of remarks on the idea of a private language in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. ...
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This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the basis of the author's approach to the sequence of remarks on the idea of a private language in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. It presents an alternative way of interpreting the Tractatus, which involves a so-called austere conception of nonsense. According to this ‘resolute’ reading, the author of the Tractatus recognized only one species of nonsense — mere gibberish; from the point of view of logic, mere nonsense is the only kind of nonsense there is. The objectives of the essay are then described.Less
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the basis of the author's approach to the sequence of remarks on the idea of a private language in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. It presents an alternative way of interpreting the Tractatus, which involves a so-called austere conception of nonsense. According to this ‘resolute’ reading, the author of the Tractatus recognized only one species of nonsense — mere gibberish; from the point of view of logic, mere nonsense is the only kind of nonsense there is. The objectives of the essay are then described.
Stephen Mulhall
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199208548
- eISBN:
- 9780191709067
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208548.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter presents two ways of reading the second paragraph of §243 in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. If we follow through with the first (substantial) reading of §243, then the most ...
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This chapter presents two ways of reading the second paragraph of §243 in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. If we follow through with the first (substantial) reading of §243, then the most famous succeeding sections — §§244, 246, 253, and 258 — constitute points at which Wittgenstein shows that given the meaning of the words in the interlocutor's penultimate sentence, the idea of a private language that he attempts to construct out of them must be nonsensical or incoherent, a violation of grammar. If we follow through with the second (resolute) reading of §243, then those succeeding sections appear as points at which Wittgenstein tries to imagine, and then tries out, ways of giving meaning to the constituent terms of the interlocutor's formulation.Less
This chapter presents two ways of reading the second paragraph of §243 in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. If we follow through with the first (substantial) reading of §243, then the most famous succeeding sections — §§244, 246, 253, and 258 — constitute points at which Wittgenstein shows that given the meaning of the words in the interlocutor's penultimate sentence, the idea of a private language that he attempts to construct out of them must be nonsensical or incoherent, a violation of grammar. If we follow through with the second (resolute) reading of §243, then those succeeding sections appear as points at which Wittgenstein tries to imagine, and then tries out, ways of giving meaning to the constituent terms of the interlocutor's formulation.
Stephen Mulhall
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199208548
- eISBN:
- 9780191709067
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208548.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter analyzes how words refer to sensations through Wittgenstein's tale of the hurt child. The child, who hurts himself, cries; it is not he, but the adults around him, who make the ...
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This chapter analyzes how words refer to sensations through Wittgenstein's tale of the hurt child. The child, who hurts himself, cries; it is not he, but the adults around him, who make the connection between his cries and the domain of exclamations and sentences in the language of pain. There is no moment of recognition on his part that mediates between his pain and his crying, certainly none that involves an act of identifying or naming what he is feeling as pain. It is the adults who recognize his cries as cries of pain, and hence are in a position to replace them with primitive linguistic forms of pain behaviour, and so induct him into (this dimension of) life with language. In other words, the relevant linguistic connection between ‘pain’ and pain is set up for the individual learner by the society of which he is a part.Less
This chapter analyzes how words refer to sensations through Wittgenstein's tale of the hurt child. The child, who hurts himself, cries; it is not he, but the adults around him, who make the connection between his cries and the domain of exclamations and sentences in the language of pain. There is no moment of recognition on his part that mediates between his pain and his crying, certainly none that involves an act of identifying or naming what he is feeling as pain. It is the adults who recognize his cries as cries of pain, and hence are in a position to replace them with primitive linguistic forms of pain behaviour, and so induct him into (this dimension of) life with language. In other words, the relevant linguistic connection between ‘pain’ and pain is set up for the individual learner by the society of which he is a part.
Stephen Mulhall
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199208548
- eISBN:
- 9780191709067
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208548.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter examines §246 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, which begins to question the conception of sensations as ‘private’. Wittgenstein seems essentially uninterested in the ...
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This chapter examines §246 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, which begins to question the conception of sensations as ‘private’. Wittgenstein seems essentially uninterested in the possibility of any lack of clarity or ambiguity in what his interlocutor might mean by his answer to the opening question; he does not ask himself, and thereby invite us to ask ourselves, what the interlocutor might be trying to get at through his invocation of a cognitive disparity between the first-person and third-person cases. Instead, he responds as if the meanings of the words he employs are either self-evident and singular (adverting to the normal use of the word ‘to know’), or barely capable of an alternative interpretation (‘except perhaps as a joke’). This apparent refusal to open himself to other possibilities of sense is epitomized by the moment when he turns words which might have been used to invite an exercise of the sympathetic imagination to purely sarcastic intent (‘How else are we to use it?’, ‘What is it supposed to mean?’). And without allowing such space for the imagination to be exercised, there seems to be little ground for attributing a resolute strategy to Wittgenstein at this point.Less
This chapter examines §246 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, which begins to question the conception of sensations as ‘private’. Wittgenstein seems essentially uninterested in the possibility of any lack of clarity or ambiguity in what his interlocutor might mean by his answer to the opening question; he does not ask himself, and thereby invite us to ask ourselves, what the interlocutor might be trying to get at through his invocation of a cognitive disparity between the first-person and third-person cases. Instead, he responds as if the meanings of the words he employs are either self-evident and singular (adverting to the normal use of the word ‘to know’), or barely capable of an alternative interpretation (‘except perhaps as a joke’). This apparent refusal to open himself to other possibilities of sense is epitomized by the moment when he turns words which might have been used to invite an exercise of the sympathetic imagination to purely sarcastic intent (‘How else are we to use it?’, ‘What is it supposed to mean?’). And without allowing such space for the imagination to be exercised, there seems to be little ground for attributing a resolute strategy to Wittgenstein at this point.
Glenn Dynner
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195175226
- eISBN:
- 9780199785148
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195175226.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Judaism
The successful Hasidic ascendancy of the prior chapter is, in great part, attributable to Polish Hasidism's vast patronage network among the region's Jewish mercantile elite. The chapter commences ...
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The successful Hasidic ascendancy of the prior chapter is, in great part, attributable to Polish Hasidism's vast patronage network among the region's Jewish mercantile elite. The chapter commences with an account of the rise of the Jewish mercantile elite in Warsaw. This is followed by a reconstruction of the penetration of this elite group by Hasidic leaders, with a focus on the preeminent mercantile family, the Bergsons. This includes an in-depth look at the legendary patroness of Polish Hasidism, Temerel Sonenberg-Bergson. A fresh analysis of the 1824 anti-Hasidic investigation is presented, based on new archival sources, highlighting the pivotal role of the Jewish plutocracy. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the appeal that Hasidism held for these entrepreneurs.Less
The successful Hasidic ascendancy of the prior chapter is, in great part, attributable to Polish Hasidism's vast patronage network among the region's Jewish mercantile elite. The chapter commences with an account of the rise of the Jewish mercantile elite in Warsaw. This is followed by a reconstruction of the penetration of this elite group by Hasidic leaders, with a focus on the preeminent mercantile family, the Bergsons. This includes an in-depth look at the legendary patroness of Polish Hasidism, Temerel Sonenberg-Bergson. A fresh analysis of the 1824 anti-Hasidic investigation is presented, based on new archival sources, highlighting the pivotal role of the Jewish plutocracy. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the appeal that Hasidism held for these entrepreneurs.
Paul Horwich
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199588879
- eISBN:
- 9780191744716
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588879.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, General
This book develops an interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later writings (in particular, his Philosophical Investigations) that differs in substantial respects from what can already be found in ...
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This book develops an interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later writings (in particular, his Philosophical Investigations) that differs in substantial respects from what can already be found in the literature. For it is argued here that his fundamental idea is not a new conception of language (as most commentators have supposed), but rather a revolutionary conception of what philosophy is — one that is opposed to the construction of philosophical theories. This idea is what lies behind Wittgenstein's distinctive treatments of specific issues within the subject: issues concerning language, the mind, mathematics, knowledge, art, religion, and so on. Thus the first aim of the present work is to preset a clear and compelling account of his meta-perspective, to explain and justify his view of how philosophy should (and should not) be conducted, and of what it might achieve. The second aim is to defend that view against a variety of objections, and thereby to display its virtues, not merely as an accurate reading of Wittgenstein, but as a good analysis of philosophy itself. The third aim is to examine its application to a wide collection of particular topics, but most thoroughly to meaning and to experience. The centrality of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy and its susceptibility to rigorous articulation and rational support are admittedly controversial assumptions, but they are vindicated here — not just textually, but by the power and plausibility of the philosophy that results from them. Thus the book simultaneously offers a fresh account of Wittgenstein's thought and dramatically deflationary picture of the entire subject.Less
This book develops an interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later writings (in particular, his Philosophical Investigations) that differs in substantial respects from what can already be found in the literature. For it is argued here that his fundamental idea is not a new conception of language (as most commentators have supposed), but rather a revolutionary conception of what philosophy is — one that is opposed to the construction of philosophical theories. This idea is what lies behind Wittgenstein's distinctive treatments of specific issues within the subject: issues concerning language, the mind, mathematics, knowledge, art, religion, and so on. Thus the first aim of the present work is to preset a clear and compelling account of his meta-perspective, to explain and justify his view of how philosophy should (and should not) be conducted, and of what it might achieve. The second aim is to defend that view against a variety of objections, and thereby to display its virtues, not merely as an accurate reading of Wittgenstein, but as a good analysis of philosophy itself. The third aim is to examine its application to a wide collection of particular topics, but most thoroughly to meaning and to experience. The centrality of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy and its susceptibility to rigorous articulation and rational support are admittedly controversial assumptions, but they are vindicated here — not just textually, but by the power and plausibility of the philosophy that results from them. Thus the book simultaneously offers a fresh account of Wittgenstein's thought and dramatically deflationary picture of the entire subject.
Charles Travis
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199291465
- eISBN:
- 9780191710667
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291465.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This introductory chapter begins with an explanation of the central methodological principle that to understand what Wittgenstein is up to at any given point in the Philosophical Investigations one ...
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This introductory chapter begins with an explanation of the central methodological principle that to understand what Wittgenstein is up to at any given point in the Philosophical Investigations one should look to Frege: how what Wittgenstein says may be a reaction to something Frege said. It describes a closely knit line of thought as it develops in the Investigations. An overview of the chapters included in the volume is also presented.Less
This introductory chapter begins with an explanation of the central methodological principle that to understand what Wittgenstein is up to at any given point in the Philosophical Investigations one should look to Frege: how what Wittgenstein says may be a reaction to something Frege said. It describes a closely knit line of thought as it develops in the Investigations. An overview of the chapters included in the volume is also presented.
Charles Travis
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199291465
- eISBN:
- 9780191710667
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291465.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter focuses on the discussion of language games at the beginning of the Investigations (broadly, in the first twenty-five paragraphs). It shows how there can be room for the parochial in ...
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This chapter focuses on the discussion of language games at the beginning of the Investigations (broadly, in the first twenty-five paragraphs). It shows how there can be room for the parochial in forming perceptions as to when things will have been described correctly (truly). It does this by discussing and rejecting a principle of Michael Dummett's, namely that any practical ability can be represented in terms of propositional knowledge. It ends by noting that room for the parochial can invoke idealist spectres, and that it is part of Wittgenstein's project to disarm these.Less
This chapter focuses on the discussion of language games at the beginning of the Investigations (broadly, in the first twenty-five paragraphs). It shows how there can be room for the parochial in forming perceptions as to when things will have been described correctly (truly). It does this by discussing and rejecting a principle of Michael Dummett's, namely that any practical ability can be represented in terms of propositional knowledge. It ends by noting that room for the parochial can invoke idealist spectres, and that it is part of Wittgenstein's project to disarm these.
Charles Travis
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199291465
- eISBN:
- 9780191710667
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291465.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter focuses on Investigations, §§36-64. It treats a problem raised by Russell in c. 1918: How can a human thinker ever think a singular thought? This discussion of naming individuals (of ...
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This chapter focuses on Investigations, §§36-64. It treats a problem raised by Russell in c. 1918: How can a human thinker ever think a singular thought? This discussion of naming individuals (of singular thought) makes two main ideas emerge. The first is that there is a way of thinking of an individual (or, equally, of a way for things to be), which distinguishes between identification, so re-identification, tasks of an occasion and a general, occasion-independent, question as to when it would be such-and-such, or so-and-so, that (who) was in question. The second is that it may be an occasion-sensitive matter as to whether a certain status is enjoyed; a question not answered merely by the ‘enjoyer’ of that status being as he is.Less
This chapter focuses on Investigations, §§36-64. It treats a problem raised by Russell in c. 1918: How can a human thinker ever think a singular thought? This discussion of naming individuals (of singular thought) makes two main ideas emerge. The first is that there is a way of thinking of an individual (or, equally, of a way for things to be), which distinguishes between identification, so re-identification, tasks of an occasion and a general, occasion-independent, question as to when it would be such-and-such, or so-and-so, that (who) was in question. The second is that it may be an occasion-sensitive matter as to whether a certain status is enjoyed; a question not answered merely by the ‘enjoyer’ of that status being as he is.
Charles Travis
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199291465
- eISBN:
- 9780191710667
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291465.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter compares Wittgenstein's pre-Grammar view of logic with his view of it in the Investigations. Among other things, it paves the way for the discussion of bearing a truth-value which occurs ...
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This chapter compares Wittgenstein's pre-Grammar view of logic with his view of it in the Investigations. Among other things, it paves the way for the discussion of bearing a truth-value which occurs in §§134-37. The discussion here parallels very closely a discussion in the Grammar, but also takes a step beyond the Grammar. A common theme is that the notion proposition needs to get more determinate content from something about a particular application of it before it can begin to pick out anything like an extension.Less
This chapter compares Wittgenstein's pre-Grammar view of logic with his view of it in the Investigations. Among other things, it paves the way for the discussion of bearing a truth-value which occurs in §§134-37. The discussion here parallels very closely a discussion in the Grammar, but also takes a step beyond the Grammar. A common theme is that the notion proposition needs to get more determinate content from something about a particular application of it before it can begin to pick out anything like an extension.
Charles Travis
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199291465
- eISBN:
- 9780191710667
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291465.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter focuses on the two rule-following discussions in the Investigations, the first in §§84-7, the second beginning at §138 and continuing to §242. The avowed aim is to achieve greater ...
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This chapter focuses on the two rule-following discussions in the Investigations, the first in §§84-7, the second beginning at §138 and continuing to §242. The avowed aim is to achieve greater clarity about the nature of meaning, understanding, thinking, and, in the first discussion, saying — about the representing we go in for. Central to this work is the idea that an understanding for words to bear consists in part of singular thoughts: of what is encountered (or to be encountered) in given episodes that things being thus would be their being thus and so.Less
This chapter focuses on the two rule-following discussions in the Investigations, the first in §§84-7, the second beginning at §138 and continuing to §242. The avowed aim is to achieve greater clarity about the nature of meaning, understanding, thinking, and, in the first discussion, saying — about the representing we go in for. Central to this work is the idea that an understanding for words to bear consists in part of singular thoughts: of what is encountered (or to be encountered) in given episodes that things being thus would be their being thus and so.
Charles Travis
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199291465
- eISBN:
- 9780191710667
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291465.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter elaborates an application of Wittgenstein's new (Investigations) view of nonsense. It raises the question: are there lessons to be learned from privacy, which bear on the worry broached ...
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This chapter elaborates an application of Wittgenstein's new (Investigations) view of nonsense. It raises the question: are there lessons to be learned from privacy, which bear on the worry broached in §242 — which, perhaps, help put it to rest? Wittgenstein provides assurance that the ‘agreement in judgement’ of which he speaks does not abolish logic. Is the private language discussion meant as, inter alia, an elaboration of that thought? Three simple ideas on how this might be are discussed.Less
This chapter elaborates an application of Wittgenstein's new (Investigations) view of nonsense. It raises the question: are there lessons to be learned from privacy, which bear on the worry broached in §242 — which, perhaps, help put it to rest? Wittgenstein provides assurance that the ‘agreement in judgement’ of which he speaks does not abolish logic. Is the private language discussion meant as, inter alia, an elaboration of that thought? Three simple ideas on how this might be are discussed.
