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The Character of Raw Feeling

Robert Kirk

in Raw Feeling: A philosophical account of the essence of consciousness

Published in print:
1996
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198236795
eISBN:
9780191679353
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236795.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The inverted spectrum appears to be a serious threat to the book's broadly functionalist approach. The two different ways of seeing colours would seem to perform exactly the same functions. At any ... More


Comparing Qualia across Persons (2000 )

Robert C. Stalnaker

in Ways a World Might Be: Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199251483
eISBN:
9780191602320
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199251487.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Sydney Shoemaker has reconciled a broadly functionalist and materialist conception of the mind with what he calls “the common-sense view” of the inverted spectrum. This paper explores Shoemaker’s ... More


The “mystery” of consciousness

Paul Horwich

in Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199588879
eISBN:
9780191744716
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588879.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, General

The goal of this chapter is to explain Wittgenstein's view that the familiar philosophical perplexities of consciousness are the result of recognizably defective assumptions rather than the ... More


The Intrinsic Quality of Experience

Gilbert Harman

in Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind

Published in print:
1999
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198238027
eISBN:
9780191597633
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198238029.003.0015
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Replies to three related arguments against wide functionalism. The first says that we are directly aware of intrinsic features of our experience and points out that there is no way to account for ... More


Four Puzzles for Consciousness

Craig Delancey

in Passionate Engines: What Emotions Reveal about the Mind and Artificial Intelligence

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195142716
eISBN:
9780199833153
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195142713.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

After a basic review of the contemporary debate about phenomenal consciousness, four puzzles about emotional experience are discussed. First, emotions appear to be essentially motivational states, ... More


Zapping the Zombie Idea

Robert Kirk

in Zombies and Consciousness

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780199285488
eISBN:
9780191603150
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199285489.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Although the zombie idea seems to fit in with some ‘natural and plain’ intuitions (Chalmers), it conflicts with others. Reinforced by the ‘jacket fallacy’, it both feeds on and feeds an incoherent ... More


Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience

Joshua Gert

in Primitive Colors: A Case Study in Neo-pragmatist Metaphysics and Philosophy of Perception

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
July 2017
ISBN:
9780198785910
eISBN:
9780191840579
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198785910.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter discusses the twin theses of representationalism and the transparency of experience. In place of standard representationalism, the chapter argues for “modest representationalism”: the ... More


The Sensory Classification Thesis

Mohan Matthen

in Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199268504
eISBN:
9780191602283
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199268509.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Sensory systems are automatic sorting machines which assign external sensed objects (distal stimuli) to classes on the basis of useful commonalities found in them. The results of a system=s sorting ... More


Brentanianism, Standard Representationalism, and Fregean Representationalism

Michelle Montague

in The Given: Experience and its Content

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
August 2016
ISBN:
9780198748908
eISBN:
9780191811661
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198748908.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

Chapter 5 focuses on perceptual experience, and in particular visual experience. It considers the property attributions that we may be said to make simply in having experience as we do—the property ... More


Projection, Revelation, and the Function of Perception

Paul Coates

in Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
September 2015
ISBN:
9780198712718
eISBN:
9780191781049
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712718.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter defends a projectivist account of perception. Distinctions are drawn between theories of perception, the philosophical pictures that motivate such theories, and the functions of ... More


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