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Knowledge and Practical Interests

Jason Stanley

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
May 2006
ISBN:
9780199288038
eISBN:
9780191603679
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199288038.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The thesis of this book is that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e., by how much is at stake for that person at ... More


The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1

Keith DeRose

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780199564460
eISBN:
9780191721410
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564460.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

Contextualism is the view that the epistemic standards that a subject must meet in order for a sentence attributing knowledge to her to be true vary according to the contexts in which those sentences ... More


Philosophical Relativity

Peter Unger

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195155532
eISBN:
9780199833818
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515553X.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, General

Challenges the deeply held assumption that many of the most central philosophical problems admit of deterministic, objective solutions. The position argued for here, philosophical relativism, is the ... More


Interest‐Relative Invariantism

Jason Stanley

in Knowledge and Practical Interests

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
May 2006
ISBN:
9780199288038
eISBN:
9780191603679
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199288038.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter explains and develops a version of Interest-Relative Invariantism about knowledge, according to which whether or not someone knows that p at a certain time depends in part on what is at ... More


Interest‐Relative Invariantism versus Contextualism

Jason Stanley

in Knowledge and Practical Interests

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
May 2006
ISBN:
9780199288038
eISBN:
9780191603679
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199288038.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter is devoted to a thorough-going comparison of Interest-Relativism Invariantism and contextualism. It argues that the contextualist is committed to a worse error-theory than the advocate ... More


Interest‐Relative Invariantism versus Relativism

Jason Stanley

in Knowledge and Practical Interests

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
May 2006
ISBN:
9780199288038
eISBN:
9780191603679
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199288038.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Relativism about knowledge-attributions is the thesis that knowledge attributions express propositions the truth of which is relative to a judge. On this view, a knowledge attribution may express a ... More


Contextualism, Interest‐Relativism, and Philosophical Paradox

Jason Stanley

in Knowledge and Practical Interests

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
May 2006
ISBN:
9780199288038
eISBN:
9780191603679
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199288038.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter discusses contextualist and interest-relative accounts of the sorites paradox and the Liar Paradox. It concludes that a pure interest-relative account is completely untenable for such ... More


Introduction: Contextualism, Invariantism, Skepticism, and What Goes On in Ordinary Conversation

Keith DeRose

in The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780199564460
eISBN:
9780191721410
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564460.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

In this initial exposition of contextualism, the view is explained and distinguished from other views, and especially from its rival, invariantism, whose two main forms, classical invariantism and ... More


Epistemic Scorekeeping

Patrick Rysiew

in Knowledge Ascriptions

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199693702
eISBN:
9780191741265
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Edward Craig urged that instead of analyzing ‘knows’ and its cognates, we should ask, ‘what knowledge does for us, what its role in our life might be, and then ask what a concept having that role ... More


On the Cognitive Bases of Knowledge Ascriptions

Mikkel Gerken

in Knowledge Ascriptions

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199693702
eISBN:
9780191741265
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The chapter develops an epistemic focal bias account of certain patterns of judgments about knowledge ascriptions by integrating it with a general dual process framework of human cognition. According ... More


Responsibilitys 1

Joshua Knobe and John M. Doris

in The Moral Psychology Handbook

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199582143
eISBN:
9780191594496
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

A long tradition of research, both in philosophy and in psychology, has sought to uncover the criteria that people use when assigning moral responsibility. Nonetheless, it seems that most existing ... More


Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge

Matthew Weiner

in Epistemic Value

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780199231188
eISBN:
9780191710827
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, General

Hawthorne has argued for subject-sensitive invariantism, on which whether a speaker knows that p depends on whether her practical environment makes it appropriate for her to use p in practical ... More


Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value

Pascal Engel

in Epistemic Value

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780199231188
eISBN:
9780191710827
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, General

Some philosophers, who defend ‘pragmatic encroachment’ and ‘subject-sensitive invariantism’, argue that changes in the importance of being right and significant increases of the costs of error in ... More


The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism

Keith DeRose

in The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780199564460
eISBN:
9780191721410
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564460.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

This chapter presents the main argument for contextualism: the argument from the ordinary, non-philosophical usage of ‘knows’. Both the features of ordinary usage that support contextualism and the ... More


Now You Know It, Now You Don't: Intellectualism, Contextualism, and Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism

Keith DeRose

in The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780199564460
eISBN:
9780191721410
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564460.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

Contextualism is shown to avoid certain problems, and to thereby gain an important advantage over subject-sensitive invariantism, by its ability to respect ‘intellectualism’, the thesis that ... More


Knowledge, Assertion, and Action: Contextualism vs. Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism

Keith DeRose

in The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780199564460
eISBN:
9780191721410
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564460.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

Subject-sensitive invariantism is shown to be wrong by its inability to handle certain important third-person uses of ‘know(s)’. Attention is then turned to important uses of ‘know(s)’ made in ... More


Knowing How and Knowing Answers

David Braun

in Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780195389364
eISBN:
9780199932368
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389364.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, General, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I favor a version of intellectualism about knowing how. According to my version, which I call ‘The Answer Theory’, an agent knows how to G if and only if she knows a proposition that answers the ... More


Believing what the Man Says about His Own Feelings

Benjamin McMyler

in The Philosophy of J. L. Austin

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199219759
eISBN:
9780191730818
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219759.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

Inspired by Austin’s ‘Other Minds’, this paper argues that what is said by means of ‘indicative’ sentences featuring ‘know that’ or one of its cognates is inseparable from what is done with them. As ... More


The Hypothesis of Philosophical Relativity

Peter Unger

in Philosophical Relativity

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195155532
eISBN:
9780199833818
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515553X.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, General

Introduces the notion of philosophical relativity, the thesis that the answers we give for many philosophical problems are functions of arbitrary assumptions made at the initial stages of inquiry, ... More


Aspects of Semantic Relativity

Peter Unger

in Philosophical Relativity

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195155532
eISBN:
9780199833818
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515553X.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, General

Examines the common sense attractiveness of contextualism over invariantism, and ultimately takes such a common sense attractiveness to be a function of our intellectual habits as opposed to a ... More


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