Nick Zangwill
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199261871
- eISBN:
- 9780191718670
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261871.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
The first chapter addresses the criteria of adequacy of a theory of art. Chapters 2-5 are constructive — they advance a positive view of the nature of art, explore its consequences, and defend it ...
More
The first chapter addresses the criteria of adequacy of a theory of art. Chapters 2-5 are constructive — they advance a positive view of the nature of art, explore its consequences, and defend it against objections. The last two chapters are destructive — they argue against other views of the nature of art, and they do so by contrast with the kind of view put forward earlier, and in the light of the groundrules laid down in the first chapter.Less
The first chapter addresses the criteria of adequacy of a theory of art. Chapters 2-5 are constructive — they advance a positive view of the nature of art, explore its consequences, and defend it against objections. The last two chapters are destructive — they argue against other views of the nature of art, and they do so by contrast with the kind of view put forward earlier, and in the light of the groundrules laid down in the first chapter.
Ilkka Pyysiäinen
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195380026
- eISBN:
- 9780199869046
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195380026.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This book provides a cognitive scientific perspective to beliefs about supernatural agents. First, human intuitions about agents, agency, and counterintuitive concepts are outlined and explained. ...
More
This book provides a cognitive scientific perspective to beliefs about supernatural agents. First, human intuitions about agents, agency, and counterintuitive concepts are outlined and explained. Second, various kinds of folk beliefs and theological doctrines about souls and spirits are analyzed in the light of the human cognitive architecture, using descriptions of spirit possession and shamanism as materials. Third, scholastic discussions of God’s cognitive capacities as well as folk-psychological God beliefs are analyzed. This analysis combines with a discussion of Buddhist ideas of soullesness and of buddhahood in textual traditions and in folk beliefs. Beliefs about God and buddhas are shown to rest on the same cognitive capacities of understanding agency and intentionality that underlie spirit beliefs. The Buddhist doctrine of soullessness was originally a denial of the self as a separate spiritual entity, not a denial of personal agency. God and buddhas differ from ordinary agents in that they are believed to have open access to all minds. Therefore, they can serve as means of representing what persons believe others to believe. Such divine minds are also used as an explanation for the fact that the whole of reality is intuitively experienced as if intentionally directed by a personal will. The book ends with a discussion of the future of religion and atheism.Less
This book provides a cognitive scientific perspective to beliefs about supernatural agents. First, human intuitions about agents, agency, and counterintuitive concepts are outlined and explained. Second, various kinds of folk beliefs and theological doctrines about souls and spirits are analyzed in the light of the human cognitive architecture, using descriptions of spirit possession and shamanism as materials. Third, scholastic discussions of God’s cognitive capacities as well as folk-psychological God beliefs are analyzed. This analysis combines with a discussion of Buddhist ideas of soullesness and of buddhahood in textual traditions and in folk beliefs. Beliefs about God and buddhas are shown to rest on the same cognitive capacities of understanding agency and intentionality that underlie spirit beliefs. The Buddhist doctrine of soullessness was originally a denial of the self as a separate spiritual entity, not a denial of personal agency. God and buddhas differ from ordinary agents in that they are believed to have open access to all minds. Therefore, they can serve as means of representing what persons believe others to believe. Such divine minds are also used as an explanation for the fact that the whole of reality is intuitively experienced as if intentionally directed by a personal will. The book ends with a discussion of the future of religion and atheism.
John Gibson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199299522
- eISBN:
- 9780191714900
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299522.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This concluding chapter presents some final thoughts. Perhaps the most significant feature of the approach to humanism recommended in this book is that it shows us that we need not fear that we will ...
More
This concluding chapter presents some final thoughts. Perhaps the most significant feature of the approach to humanism recommended in this book is that it shows us that we need not fear that we will lose touch with the literary if we embrace the humanist intuition. The distrust many have of literary humanism is that it often seems that becoming humanists is tantamount to renouncing the promise to say something informative of the nature of literature. The theory of humanism offered in this book shows us that we can be both humanists and faithful literary theorists. It reveals the connection between literature and life to be a proper feature of literary content. And, if this is so, it gives us a way of seeing how a reasonably developed theory of humanism can cast light on rather than turn us away from the nature of literary experience.Less
This concluding chapter presents some final thoughts. Perhaps the most significant feature of the approach to humanism recommended in this book is that it shows us that we need not fear that we will lose touch with the literary if we embrace the humanist intuition. The distrust many have of literary humanism is that it often seems that becoming humanists is tantamount to renouncing the promise to say something informative of the nature of literature. The theory of humanism offered in this book shows us that we can be both humanists and faithful literary theorists. It reveals the connection between literature and life to be a proper feature of literary content. And, if this is so, it gives us a way of seeing how a reasonably developed theory of humanism can cast light on rather than turn us away from the nature of literary experience.
Gary Kemp
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199695621
- eISBN:
- 9780191738524
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695621.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
So far as language and meaning are concerned, Donald Davidson and Willard Van Orman Quine are typically regarded as birds of a feather. This book urges first of all that they cannot be. Quine’s most ...
More
So far as language and meaning are concerned, Donald Davidson and Willard Van Orman Quine are typically regarded as birds of a feather. This book urges first of all that they cannot be. Quine’s most basic and general philosophical commitment is to his methodological naturalism, which is incompatible with Davidson’s main commitments. In particular, it is not possible to endorse, from Quine’s perspective, the roles played by the concepts truth and reference in Davidson’s philosophy of language; Davidson’s employment of the concept of truth is from Quine’s point of view needlessly ambitious; and his use of the concept of reference cannot be divorced from unscientific ‘intuition’. Second, the book puts the case positively in favour of Quine’s naturalism and its corollary, naturalized epistemology. It is possible to give a consistent account of language without problematic uses of the concepts truth and reference, which in turn makes a strident naturalism much more plausible.Less
So far as language and meaning are concerned, Donald Davidson and Willard Van Orman Quine are typically regarded as birds of a feather. This book urges first of all that they cannot be. Quine’s most basic and general philosophical commitment is to his methodological naturalism, which is incompatible with Davidson’s main commitments. In particular, it is not possible to endorse, from Quine’s perspective, the roles played by the concepts truth and reference in Davidson’s philosophy of language; Davidson’s employment of the concept of truth is from Quine’s point of view needlessly ambitious; and his use of the concept of reference cannot be divorced from unscientific ‘intuition’. Second, the book puts the case positively in favour of Quine’s naturalism and its corollary, naturalized epistemology. It is possible to give a consistent account of language without problematic uses of the concepts truth and reference, which in turn makes a strident naturalism much more plausible.
Albert Casullo
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199777860
- eISBN:
- 9780199933525
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199777860.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
There has been a major renewal of interest in the topic of a priori knowledge over the past twenty-five years. The sixteen essays in this collection, which span this entire period, document the ...
More
There has been a major renewal of interest in the topic of a priori knowledge over the past twenty-five years. The sixteen essays in this collection, which span this entire period, document the complex set of issues motivating the renewed interest, identify the central epistemological questions, and provide the leading ideas of a unified response to them. They offer a systematic treatment of the concept of a priori knowledge, the existence of a priori knowledge, and the relationship between a priori knowledge and the related concepts of necessary truth and analytic truth. The essays fall into three categories: six published prior to my 〉i〈A Priori Justification〉/i〈 (Oxford University Press, 2003), four published after it, and four previously unpublished. The first six essays provide the background and an introduction to a number of the major themes of 〉i〈A Priori Justification〉/i〈: the articulation and defense of the minimal conception of a priori justification, an exposition of the limitations of the traditional arguments both for and against a priori knowledge, and the relevance of empirical investigation to providing supporting evidence for the claim that there are nonexperiential sources of justification. The remaining four published essays explore diverse themes that were introduced in 〉i〈A Priori Justification〉/i〈 but not developed in detail: epistemic overdetermination, the relationship between a priori knowledge and necessary truth, testimony and a priori knowledge, and the bearing of sociohistorical accounts of knowledge on the a priori. The four previously unpublished essays address issues that have either emerged or taken on more prominence in the literature on the a priori since the publication of 〉i〈A Priori Justification〉/i〈: the evidential status of intuitions, the nature of modal knowledge, and challenges to the cogency or the significance of the a priori–a posteriori distinction.Less
There has been a major renewal of interest in the topic of a priori knowledge over the past twenty-five years. The sixteen essays in this collection, which span this entire period, document the complex set of issues motivating the renewed interest, identify the central epistemological questions, and provide the leading ideas of a unified response to them. They offer a systematic treatment of the concept of a priori knowledge, the existence of a priori knowledge, and the relationship between a priori knowledge and the related concepts of necessary truth and analytic truth. The essays fall into three categories: six published prior to my 〉i〈A Priori Justification〉/i〈 (Oxford University Press, 2003), four published after it, and four previously unpublished. The first six essays provide the background and an introduction to a number of the major themes of 〉i〈A Priori Justification〉/i〈: the articulation and defense of the minimal conception of a priori justification, an exposition of the limitations of the traditional arguments both for and against a priori knowledge, and the relevance of empirical investigation to providing supporting evidence for the claim that there are nonexperiential sources of justification. The remaining four published essays explore diverse themes that were introduced in 〉i〈A Priori Justification〉/i〈 but not developed in detail: epistemic overdetermination, the relationship between a priori knowledge and necessary truth, testimony and a priori knowledge, and the bearing of sociohistorical accounts of knowledge on the a priori. The four previously unpublished essays address issues that have either emerged or taken on more prominence in the literature on the a priori since the publication of 〉i〈A Priori Justification〉/i〈: the evidential status of intuitions, the nature of modal knowledge, and challenges to the cogency or the significance of the a priori–a posteriori distinction.
Joel J. Kupperman
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195308198
- eISBN:
- 9780199867325
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195308198.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book looks at what enters into ethical judgment and choice. Interpretation of a case and of what the options are is always a factor, as is a sense of the possible values at stake. Intuitions ...
More
This book looks at what enters into ethical judgment and choice. Interpretation of a case and of what the options are is always a factor, as is a sense of the possible values at stake. Intuitions also enter in, but often are unreliable. For a long time it seemed only fair that oldest sons inherited, and it struck few people as unfair that women were not allowed to attend universities. A moral judgment is putatively part of a moral order in a society that any reasonable person would accept. But what counts as “reasonable” is generally contestable. The unreliability of intuitions leads naturally to ethical theory. Kantian, contractualist, and consequentialist theories all have some important truth in them, but not the whole truth. Contractualism lacks the resources required for a fully determinate account of what counts as “reasonable.” Broad general rules are important to Kant and are at the center of everyday morality. But can Kantian ethics explain why they have to have this central role? Our evolving social contract now contains elements (e.g., the rejection of racism and sexism) that once would have seemed counter-intuitive to most people. But could consequentialists have predicted with entire confidence the consequences of social changes that we now think were desirable? The last part of this book contains a double argument. One is that ethical theory is employed by humans in a state of semi-ignorance of relevant factors, grasping at likely truths and evolved intuitions. The other is that consequentialist considerations have a major role at the fundamental level, but much more in justification or criticism than in ethical discovery.Less
This book looks at what enters into ethical judgment and choice. Interpretation of a case and of what the options are is always a factor, as is a sense of the possible values at stake. Intuitions also enter in, but often are unreliable. For a long time it seemed only fair that oldest sons inherited, and it struck few people as unfair that women were not allowed to attend universities. A moral judgment is putatively part of a moral order in a society that any reasonable person would accept. But what counts as “reasonable” is generally contestable. The unreliability of intuitions leads naturally to ethical theory. Kantian, contractualist, and consequentialist theories all have some important truth in them, but not the whole truth. Contractualism lacks the resources required for a fully determinate account of what counts as “reasonable.” Broad general rules are important to Kant and are at the center of everyday morality. But can Kantian ethics explain why they have to have this central role? Our evolving social contract now contains elements (e.g., the rejection of racism and sexism) that once would have seemed counter-intuitive to most people. But could consequentialists have predicted with entire confidence the consequences of social changes that we now think were desirable? The last part of this book contains a double argument. One is that ethical theory is employed by humans in a state of semi-ignorance of relevant factors, grasping at likely truths and evolved intuitions. The other is that consequentialist considerations have a major role at the fundamental level, but much more in justification or criticism than in ethical discovery.
Louis A. Girifalco
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199228966
- eISBN:
- 9780191711183
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228966.003.0022
- Subject:
- Physics, History of Physics
Relativity gives us a picture of the world that is bizarre: rulers that shrink, clocks that slow down, light that bends, mass and energy being the same, black holes that snuff out existence. These ...
More
Relativity gives us a picture of the world that is bizarre: rulers that shrink, clocks that slow down, light that bends, mass and energy being the same, black holes that snuff out existence. These things can be true and such notions all arise from actual experiment and ordinary, rigorous logic. They are strange to us because they are not part of our intuition, which was shaped by events at ordinary speeds and low gravity. But we must go where experiment and logic take us.Less
Relativity gives us a picture of the world that is bizarre: rulers that shrink, clocks that slow down, light that bends, mass and energy being the same, black holes that snuff out existence. These things can be true and such notions all arise from actual experiment and ordinary, rigorous logic. They are strange to us because they are not part of our intuition, which was shaped by events at ordinary speeds and low gravity. But we must go where experiment and logic take us.
Graham Oddie
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199273416
- eISBN:
- 9780191602658
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199273413.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book presents an extended argument for a robust realism about value. The robust realist affirms the following distinctive theses. There are genuine claims about value which are true or false — ...
More
This book presents an extended argument for a robust realism about value. The robust realist affirms the following distinctive theses. There are genuine claims about value which are true or false — there are facts about value. These value-facts are mind-independent — they are not reducible to desires or other mental states, or indeed to any non-mental facts of a non-evaluative kind. And these genuine, mind-independent, irreducible value-facts are causally efficacious. Values, quite literally, affect us. These are not particularly fashionable theses, and taken as a whole they go somewhat against the grain of quite a lot of recent work in the metaphysics of value. Further, against the received view, this book argues that we can have knowledge of values by experiential acquaintance, that there are experiences of value which can be both veridical and appropriately responsive to the values themselves. Finally, these value-experiences are not the products of some exotic and implausible faculty of ‘intuition’. Rather, they are perfectly mundane and familiar mental states — namely, desires. This view explains how values can be ‘intrinsically motivating’, without falling foul of the widely accepted ‘queerness’ objection. There are, of course, other objections to each of the realist's claims. In showing how and why these objections fail, the book introduces a wealth of interesting and original insights about issues of wider interest — including the nature of properties, reduction, supervenience, and causation.Less
This book presents an extended argument for a robust realism about value. The robust realist affirms the following distinctive theses. There are genuine claims about value which are true or false — there are facts about value. These value-facts are mind-independent — they are not reducible to desires or other mental states, or indeed to any non-mental facts of a non-evaluative kind. And these genuine, mind-independent, irreducible value-facts are causally efficacious. Values, quite literally, affect us. These are not particularly fashionable theses, and taken as a whole they go somewhat against the grain of quite a lot of recent work in the metaphysics of value. Further, against the received view, this book argues that we can have knowledge of values by experiential acquaintance, that there are experiences of value which can be both veridical and appropriately responsive to the values themselves. Finally, these value-experiences are not the products of some exotic and implausible faculty of ‘intuition’. Rather, they are perfectly mundane and familiar mental states — namely, desires. This view explains how values can be ‘intrinsically motivating’, without falling foul of the widely accepted ‘queerness’ objection. There are, of course, other objections to each of the realist's claims. In showing how and why these objections fail, the book introduces a wealth of interesting and original insights about issues of wider interest — including the nature of properties, reduction, supervenience, and causation.
Herman Cappelen
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199644865
- eISBN:
- 9780191739026
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644865.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our ...
More
The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers. No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: Only if philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence are data about non-philosophers’ intuitions of any interest to us. Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many philosophers who don’t work on meta-philosophy concerned about their own discipline: they are unsure what intuitions are and whether they can carry the evidential weight we allegedly assign to them. The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is unwarranted since the claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively (or even a little bit) on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of ‘intuition’-vocabulary. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: It has encouraged meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is.Less
The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers. No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: Only if philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence are data about non-philosophers’ intuitions of any interest to us. Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many philosophers who don’t work on meta-philosophy concerned about their own discipline: they are unsure what intuitions are and whether they can carry the evidential weight we allegedly assign to them. The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is unwarranted since the claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively (or even a little bit) on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of ‘intuition’-vocabulary. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: It has encouraged meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is.
JC Beall and Greg Restall
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199288403
- eISBN:
- 9780191700491
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288403.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Consequence is at the heart of logic; an account of consequence, of what follows from what, offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. Since philosophy itself proceeds by way of argument and ...
More
Consequence is at the heart of logic; an account of consequence, of what follows from what, offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. Since philosophy itself proceeds by way of argument and inference, a clear view of what logical consequence amounts to is of central importance to the whole discipline of philosophy. This book presents and defends what it calls logical pluralism, arguing that the notion of logical consequence does not pin down one deductive consequence relation; it allows for many of them. In particular, the book argues that broadly classical, intuitionistic, and relevant accounts of deductive logic are genuine logical consequence relations; we should not search for one true logic, since there are many. The book's conclusions have profound implications for many linguists as well as for philosophers.Less
Consequence is at the heart of logic; an account of consequence, of what follows from what, offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. Since philosophy itself proceeds by way of argument and inference, a clear view of what logical consequence amounts to is of central importance to the whole discipline of philosophy. This book presents and defends what it calls logical pluralism, arguing that the notion of logical consequence does not pin down one deductive consequence relation; it allows for many of them. In particular, the book argues that broadly classical, intuitionistic, and relevant accounts of deductive logic are genuine logical consequence relations; we should not search for one true logic, since there are many. The book's conclusions have profound implications for many linguists as well as for philosophers.
Elliott Sober
- Published in print:
- 1975
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198244073
- eISBN:
- 9780191680724
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244073.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
The diversity of our intuitions about simplicity is matched only by the tenacity with which these intuitions refuse to yield to formal characterization. Our intuitions seem unanimous in favour of ...
More
The diversity of our intuitions about simplicity is matched only by the tenacity with which these intuitions refuse to yield to formal characterization. Our intuitions seem unanimous in favour of sparse ontologies, smooth curves, homogeneous universes, invariant equations, and impoverished assumptions. Yet recent theorizing about simplicity presents a veritable chaos of opinion. Here one finds arguments that simplicity is high probability, that it is low probability, and that it is not a probability at all. Indeed, the complexities of the problem of simplicity have led some to question the possibility and the fruitfulness of trying to define the notion of simplicity that seems to be involved in hypothesis choice. This book tries to show that the simplicity of a hypothesis can be measured by attending to how well it answers certain kinds of questions. The more informative a hypothesis is in answering these questions, the simpler it is. The informativeness of hypotheses relative to questions is characterized by the amount of extra information they need to yield answers. The more additional information a hypothesis needs to answer a question, the less informative it is relative to that question.Less
The diversity of our intuitions about simplicity is matched only by the tenacity with which these intuitions refuse to yield to formal characterization. Our intuitions seem unanimous in favour of sparse ontologies, smooth curves, homogeneous universes, invariant equations, and impoverished assumptions. Yet recent theorizing about simplicity presents a veritable chaos of opinion. Here one finds arguments that simplicity is high probability, that it is low probability, and that it is not a probability at all. Indeed, the complexities of the problem of simplicity have led some to question the possibility and the fruitfulness of trying to define the notion of simplicity that seems to be involved in hypothesis choice. This book tries to show that the simplicity of a hypothesis can be measured by attending to how well it answers certain kinds of questions. The more informative a hypothesis is in answering these questions, the simpler it is. The informativeness of hypotheses relative to questions is characterized by the amount of extra information they need to yield answers. The more additional information a hypothesis needs to answer a question, the less informative it is relative to that question.
Michael Devitt
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199250967
- eISBN:
- 9780191603945
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250960.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Is Chomsky right about the psychological reality of language? What is linguistics about? What role should linguistic intuitions play in constructing grammars? What is innate about language? Is there ...
More
Is Chomsky right about the psychological reality of language? What is linguistics about? What role should linguistic intuitions play in constructing grammars? What is innate about language? Is there “a language faculty”? The book gives controversial answers to such questions: that linguistics is about linguistic reality and not part of psychology; that linguistic rules are not represented in the mind; that speakers are largely ignorant of their language; that speakers’ intuitions do not reflect information supplied by the language faculty and are not the main evidence for grammars; that thought is prior to language in various ways; that linguistics should be concerned with what idiolects share, not with idiolects; that language processing is a fairly brute-causal associationist matter; that the rules of “Universal Grammar” are largely, if not entirely, innate structure rules of thought; and that there is little or nothing to the language faculty.Less
Is Chomsky right about the psychological reality of language? What is linguistics about? What role should linguistic intuitions play in constructing grammars? What is innate about language? Is there “a language faculty”? The book gives controversial answers to such questions: that linguistics is about linguistic reality and not part of psychology; that linguistic rules are not represented in the mind; that speakers are largely ignorant of their language; that speakers’ intuitions do not reflect information supplied by the language faculty and are not the main evidence for grammars; that thought is prior to language in various ways; that linguistics should be concerned with what idiolects share, not with idiolects; that language processing is a fairly brute-causal associationist matter; that the rules of “Universal Grammar” are largely, if not entirely, innate structure rules of thought; and that there is little or nothing to the language faculty.
Michael D. Resnik
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250142
- eISBN:
- 9780191598296
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250142.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Mathematics is regarded as our most developed science, and yet philosophical troubles surface as soon as we inquire about its subject matter partly because mathematics itself says nothing about the ...
More
Mathematics is regarded as our most developed science, and yet philosophical troubles surface as soon as we inquire about its subject matter partly because mathematics itself says nothing about the metaphysical nature of its objects. Taking mathematics at face value seems to favour the Platonist view according to which mathematics concerns causally inert objects existing outside space‐time, but this view seems to preclude any account of how we acquire mathematical knowledge without using some mysterious intellectual intuition. In this book, I defend a version of mathematical realism, motivated by the indispensability of mathematics in science, according to which (1) mathematical objects exist independently of us and our constructions, (2) much of contemporary mathematics is true, and (3) mathematical truths obtain independently of our beliefs, theories, and proofs.The ontological component of my realism is a form of structuralism according to which mathematical objects are featureless, abstract positions in structures, or patterns, and like geometric points, their identities are fixed only through their relationships to each other. Structuralism is also part of my epistemology in that material objects ‘fit’ simple patterns, and in doing so, they ‘fill’ the positions of simple mathematical structures. We may perceive the arrangements of objects but we cannot perceive their positions i.e. the abstract, non‐spatiotemporal mathematical objects, and the problem then consists in explaining how we can form beliefs about them.Answering this question introduces a central notion of my epistemology, that of a posit: by representing and designing patterned objects our ancestors posited geometric objects as sui generis and started describing them by describing the patterns in which they are positions. Since positing mathematical objects, like positing new scientific entities, is an activity similar to making up a story, one might wonder how such an activity can lead to mathematical knowledge and truth, but I believe that our ancestors were justified in introducing mathematical objects and we are justified in retaining them, by pragmatic and global considerations: mathematics has proved immensely fruitful for science, technology, and practical life, and doing without it is now virtually impossible.This account of justification introduces a further problem: if our justification for believing in mathematical truths is global and pragmatic, then it might turn out that one is not justified in accepting a mathematical claim unless it is accepted by science, and this is clearly at odds with the practice of mathematics where we hardly ever invoke such global considerations in order to justify a mathematical claim. In mathematics, we usually employ a local conception of evidence made up mainly of a priori proofs. However, arguing from the perspective of a Quinean epistemic holism, I claim that this feature of the practice should not make us conclude that mathematics is an a priori science, disconnected evidentially from both observation and natural science, for observation is relevant to mathematics, and technological and scientific success forms a vital part of our justification for believing in the truth of mathematics.Less
Mathematics is regarded as our most developed science, and yet philosophical troubles surface as soon as we inquire about its subject matter partly because mathematics itself says nothing about the metaphysical nature of its objects. Taking mathematics at face value seems to favour the Platonist view according to which mathematics concerns causally inert objects existing outside space‐time, but this view seems to preclude any account of how we acquire mathematical knowledge without using some mysterious intellectual intuition. In this book, I defend a version of mathematical realism, motivated by the indispensability of mathematics in science, according to which (1) mathematical objects exist independently of us and our constructions, (2) much of contemporary mathematics is true, and (3) mathematical truths obtain independently of our beliefs, theories, and proofs.
The ontological component of my realism is a form of structuralism according to which mathematical objects are featureless, abstract positions in structures, or patterns, and like geometric points, their identities are fixed only through their relationships to each other. Structuralism is also part of my epistemology in that material objects ‘fit’ simple patterns, and in doing so, they ‘fill’ the positions of simple mathematical structures. We may perceive the arrangements of objects but we cannot perceive their positions i.e. the abstract, non‐spatiotemporal mathematical objects, and the problem then consists in explaining how we can form beliefs about them.
Answering this question introduces a central notion of my epistemology, that of a posit: by representing and designing patterned objects our ancestors posited geometric objects as sui generis and started describing them by describing the patterns in which they are positions. Since positing mathematical objects, like positing new scientific entities, is an activity similar to making up a story, one might wonder how such an activity can lead to mathematical knowledge and truth, but I believe that our ancestors were justified in introducing mathematical objects and we are justified in retaining them, by pragmatic and global considerations: mathematics has proved immensely fruitful for science, technology, and practical life, and doing without it is now virtually impossible.
This account of justification introduces a further problem: if our justification for believing in mathematical truths is global and pragmatic, then it might turn out that one is not justified in accepting a mathematical claim unless it is accepted by science, and this is clearly at odds with the practice of mathematics where we hardly ever invoke such global considerations in order to justify a mathematical claim. In mathematics, we usually employ a local conception of evidence made up mainly of a priori proofs. However, arguing from the perspective of a Quinean epistemic holism, I claim that this feature of the practice should not make us conclude that mathematics is an a priori science, disconnected evidentially from both observation and natural science, for observation is relevant to mathematics, and technological and scientific success forms a vital part of our justification for believing in the truth of mathematics.
Shelly Kagan
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198239161
- eISBN:
- 9780191597848
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198239165.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book is a sustained attack on two of the most fundamental features of ‘ordinary morality’, the common‐sense moral view that most of us accept. According to this view, morality involves two ...
More
This book is a sustained attack on two of the most fundamental features of ‘ordinary morality’, the common‐sense moral view that most of us accept. According to this view, morality involves two different kinds of limits. First, morality imposes certain limits on our actions, ruling out various kinds of acts – for example, harming the innocent – even if more good might be brought about by performing an act of this kind. Second, there are limits imposed on morality, limits to what morality can demand of us; in particular, we are not required to make our greatest possible contribution to the overall good. I argue that despite their intuitive appeal, neither sort of limit can be adequately defended.Less
This book is a sustained attack on two of the most fundamental features of ‘ordinary morality’, the common‐sense moral view that most of us accept. According to this view, morality involves two different kinds of limits. First, morality imposes certain limits on our actions, ruling out various kinds of acts – for example, harming the innocent – even if more good might be brought about by performing an act of this kind. Second, there are limits imposed on morality, limits to what morality can demand of us; in particular, we are not required to make our greatest possible contribution to the overall good. I argue that despite their intuitive appeal, neither sort of limit can be adequately defended.
Michael Devitt
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199250967
- eISBN:
- 9780191603945
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250960.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
In Chomsky’s view, linguistics is about a psychological state, the speaker’s knowledge of language which constitutes her linguistic competence. This knowledge is said to underlie her linguistic ...
More
In Chomsky’s view, linguistics is about a psychological state, the speaker’s knowledge of language which constitutes her linguistic competence. This knowledge is said to underlie her linguistic intuitions. The rules (principles) of the language are thought to be “psychologically real” in that they are represented — the Representational Thesis (RT) — or otherwise embodied in the language faculty. This book’s plan is described, which is to look critically at these views and propose others. The chapter concludes with some clarifications of the book’s relation to I-languages, to grammatical levels and to linguistic details; and of the importance of its conclusions.Less
In Chomsky’s view, linguistics is about a psychological state, the speaker’s knowledge of language which constitutes her linguistic competence. This knowledge is said to underlie her linguistic intuitions. The rules (principles) of the language are thought to be “psychologically real” in that they are represented — the Representational Thesis (RT) — or otherwise embodied in the language faculty. This book’s plan is described, which is to look critically at these views and propose others. The chapter concludes with some clarifications of the book’s relation to I-languages, to grammatical levels and to linguistic details; and of the importance of its conclusions.
Michael Devitt
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199250967
- eISBN:
- 9780191603945
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250960.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter starts by arguing against the received view that the intuitive judgments of speakers are the main evidence for a grammar. Still, they are evidence and an explanation for this is ...
More
This chapter starts by arguing against the received view that the intuitive judgments of speakers are the main evidence for a grammar. Still, they are evidence and an explanation for this is required. The Chomskian explanation involves the Representational Thesis (RT): that intuitions are derived by a rational process from a representation of linguistic rules in the language faculty, a representation that constitutes the speaker’s linguistic competence. The chapter argues for a different view of intuitions in general, and hence of linguistic intuitions: they do not reflect information supplied by represented or even unrepresented rules in the language faculty. Rather, they are empirical central-processor responses to linguistic phenomena differing from other such responses only in being fairly immediate and unreflective.Less
This chapter starts by arguing against the received view that the intuitive judgments of speakers are the main evidence for a grammar. Still, they are evidence and an explanation for this is required. The Chomskian explanation involves the Representational Thesis (RT): that intuitions are derived by a rational process from a representation of linguistic rules in the language faculty, a representation that constitutes the speaker’s linguistic competence. The chapter argues for a different view of intuitions in general, and hence of linguistic intuitions: they do not reflect information supplied by represented or even unrepresented rules in the language faculty. Rather, they are empirical central-processor responses to linguistic phenomena differing from other such responses only in being fairly immediate and unreflective.
John Broome
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199243761
- eISBN:
- 9780191602900
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924376X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
People are often faced with decisions that involve weighing the lives of some people against the lives of others, or weighing lives against other goods. This book aims to develop a moral theory that ...
More
People are often faced with decisions that involve weighing the lives of some people against the lives of others, or weighing lives against other goods. This book aims to develop a moral theory that can help with making these practical decisions. It is a theory of value, which includes an account of how good it is to extend a person’s life, and also an account of how good it is to have new lives in the world — of the value of adding a new person to the world’s population. It is a theory about the aggregation of people’s wellbeing: of how the wellbeing that comes to a person at different times in her life comes together to determine the overall value of her life, and of how different people’s wellbeing comes together to determine the overall value of the world. The book pays particular attention to the common intuition that adding people to the population is ethically neutral, but eventually rejects it. The book’s conclusion is a version of utilitarianism. The method is formal, but the presentation is as informal as possible.Less
People are often faced with decisions that involve weighing the lives of some people against the lives of others, or weighing lives against other goods. This book aims to develop a moral theory that can help with making these practical decisions. It is a theory of value, which includes an account of how good it is to extend a person’s life, and also an account of how good it is to have new lives in the world — of the value of adding a new person to the world’s population. It is a theory about the aggregation of people’s wellbeing: of how the wellbeing that comes to a person at different times in her life comes together to determine the overall value of her life, and of how different people’s wellbeing comes together to determine the overall value of the world. The book pays particular attention to the common intuition that adding people to the population is ethically neutral, but eventually rejects it. The book’s conclusion is a version of utilitarianism. The method is formal, but the presentation is as informal as possible.
Peter Unger
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195108590
- eISBN:
- 9780199868261
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195108590.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
That our unexamined moral intuitions often lead us to commend conduct that is seriously wrong and to condemn conduct that is not wrong indicates the extent to which these intuitions clash with our ...
More
That our unexamined moral intuitions often lead us to commend conduct that is seriously wrong and to condemn conduct that is not wrong indicates the extent to which these intuitions clash with our Basic Moral Values. The view known as Liberationism, which holds that moral intuitions are often unreflective of basic values, contrasts with the more common view known as Preservationism, which maintains that our moral intuitions accord with our basic moral values. This book explores the inconsistencies in the Preservationist position by highlighting disparities in the responses that our intuitions generate for relevantly similar moral cases. These misleading responses are generated by psychological tendencies, such as projective separating and protophysical thinking, that distort the features of moral problems. In distorting our responses, the Preservationist position allows us to think erroneously that it is not difficult for well‐off people to lead a morally good life in a world in which serious suffering may easily be reduced. In fact, a moral life is extremely costly for well‐off people given how much we efficiently may do to alleviate the distant serious suffering of others.Less
That our unexamined moral intuitions often lead us to commend conduct that is seriously wrong and to condemn conduct that is not wrong indicates the extent to which these intuitions clash with our Basic Moral Values. The view known as Liberationism, which holds that moral intuitions are often unreflective of basic values, contrasts with the more common view known as Preservationism, which maintains that our moral intuitions accord with our basic moral values. This book explores the inconsistencies in the Preservationist position by highlighting disparities in the responses that our intuitions generate for relevantly similar moral cases. These misleading responses are generated by psychological tendencies, such as projective separating and protophysical thinking, that distort the features of moral problems. In distorting our responses, the Preservationist position allows us to think erroneously that it is not difficult for well‐off people to lead a morally good life in a world in which serious suffering may easily be reduced. In fact, a moral life is extremely costly for well‐off people given how much we efficiently may do to alleviate the distant serious suffering of others.
Daniel Dennett
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195171655
- eISBN:
- 9780199871339
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter further develops a line of argument Daniel Dennett presented in his 1991 book, Consciousness Explained, where he argued that we should reject the intuition that Mary gains knowledge when ...
More
This chapter further develops a line of argument Daniel Dennett presented in his 1991 book, Consciousness Explained, where he argued that we should reject the intuition that Mary gains knowledge when she leaves the room. In his view, this intuition derives from a failure to appreciate the implications of knowing all the physical facts. Dennet gives a more detailed account of his case. Specifically, he (1) criticizes attempts to defend the intuition; (2) devises variations on the Mary case to illustrate how a deduction from physical information of what it's like to see in color might actually proceed; and (3) defends his arguments against objections. He affirmatively answers the question: could a proper understanding of phenomenal concepts/knowledge show that there is or is not an epistemic gap? He argues that a proper understanding of phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge helps to show that there is no epistemic gap.Less
This chapter further develops a line of argument Daniel Dennett presented in his 1991 book, Consciousness Explained, where he argued that we should reject the intuition that Mary gains knowledge when she leaves the room. In his view, this intuition derives from a failure to appreciate the implications of knowing all the physical facts. Dennet gives a more detailed account of his case. Specifically, he (1) criticizes attempts to defend the intuition; (2) devises variations on the Mary case to illustrate how a deduction from physical information of what it's like to see in color might actually proceed; and (3) defends his arguments against objections. He affirmatively answers the question: could a proper understanding of phenomenal concepts/knowledge show that there is or is not an epistemic gap? He argues that a proper understanding of phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge helps to show that there is no epistemic gap.
Frank Jackson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195171655
- eISBN:
- 9780199871339
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter develops a representationalist view about perceptual experience and defends its application to the knowledge argument. This view is based partly on the idea that perceptual experience is ...
More
This chapter develops a representationalist view about perceptual experience and defends its application to the knowledge argument. This view is based partly on the idea that perceptual experience is diaphanous — in other words, that accessing the nature of the experience itself is nothing other than accessing the properties of its object. It is argued that although the diaphanousness thesis alone does not entail representationalism, the thesis supports an inference from a weaker to a stronger version of representationalism. On the weak version, perceptual experience is essentially representational. On the strong version, how an experience represents things as being exhausts its experiential nature. Strong representationalism undermines the claim that Mary learns new truths when she leaves the room.Less
This chapter develops a representationalist view about perceptual experience and defends its application to the knowledge argument. This view is based partly on the idea that perceptual experience is diaphanous — in other words, that accessing the nature of the experience itself is nothing other than accessing the properties of its object. It is argued that although the diaphanousness thesis alone does not entail representationalism, the thesis supports an inference from a weaker to a stronger version of representationalism. On the weak version, perceptual experience is essentially representational. On the strong version, how an experience represents things as being exhausts its experiential nature. Strong representationalism undermines the claim that Mary learns new truths when she leaves the room.
