David Phillips
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199778911
- eISBN:
- 9780199919093
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199778911.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics is one of the most important books in the history of moral philosophy. But it has not hitherto received the kind of sustained scholarly attention its stature ...
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Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics is one of the most important books in the history of moral philosophy. But it has not hitherto received the kind of sustained scholarly attention its stature merits. In this book the author aims to do something that has (surprisingly) not been done before: to interpret and evaluate the central argument of the Methods, in a way that brings out the important conceptual and historical connections between Sidgwick’s views and contemporary moral philosophy.Sidgwick distinguished three basic methods: utilitarianism, egoism, and dogmatic intuitionism. And he focused on two conflicts: between utilitarianism and dogmatic intuitionism and between utilitarianism and egoism. Sidgwick believed he could largely resolve the conflict between utilitarianism and dogmatic intuitionism, but could not resolve the conflict between utilitarianism and egoism. Phillips suggests that the best way to approach Sidgwick’s ideas is to start with his views on these two conflicts, and with the metaethical and epistemological ideas on which they depend. Phillips interprets and largely defends Sidgwick’s non-naturalist metaethics and moderate intuitionist moral epistemology. But he argues for a verdict on the two conflicts different from Sidgwick’s own. Phillips claims that Sidgwick is less successful than he thinks in resolving the conflict between utilitarianism and dogmatic intuitionism, and that Sidgwick’s treatment of the conflict between utilitarianism and egoism is more successful than he thinks in that it provides the model for a plausible view of practical reason.Phillips’s book will be of interest to two different groups of readers: to students seeking a brief introduction to Sidgwick’s most important ideas and a guidebook to the Methods, and to scholars in ethics and the history of ideas concerned with Sidgwick’s seminal contribution to moral philosophy.Less
Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics is one of the most important books in the history of moral philosophy. But it has not hitherto received the kind of sustained scholarly attention its stature merits. In this book the author aims to do something that has (surprisingly) not been done before: to interpret and evaluate the central argument of the Methods, in a way that brings out the important conceptual and historical connections between Sidgwick’s views and contemporary moral philosophy.Sidgwick distinguished three basic methods: utilitarianism, egoism, and dogmatic intuitionism. And he focused on two conflicts: between utilitarianism and dogmatic intuitionism and between utilitarianism and egoism. Sidgwick believed he could largely resolve the conflict between utilitarianism and dogmatic intuitionism, but could not resolve the conflict between utilitarianism and egoism. Phillips suggests that the best way to approach Sidgwick’s ideas is to start with his views on these two conflicts, and with the metaethical and epistemological ideas on which they depend. Phillips interprets and largely defends Sidgwick’s non-naturalist metaethics and moderate intuitionist moral epistemology. But he argues for a verdict on the two conflicts different from Sidgwick’s own. Phillips claims that Sidgwick is less successful than he thinks in resolving the conflict between utilitarianism and dogmatic intuitionism, and that Sidgwick’s treatment of the conflict between utilitarianism and egoism is more successful than he thinks in that it provides the model for a plausible view of practical reason.Phillips’s book will be of interest to two different groups of readers: to students seeking a brief introduction to Sidgwick’s most important ideas and a guidebook to the Methods, and to scholars in ethics and the history of ideas concerned with Sidgwick’s seminal contribution to moral philosophy.
David Ross
Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252657
- eISBN:
- 9780191598333
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252653.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The Right and the Good is a classic of 20th‐century philosophy by the great scholar Sir David Ross, which is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton–Lake, a ...
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The Right and the Good is a classic of 20th‐century philosophy by the great scholar Sir David Ross, which is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton–Lake, a leading expert on Ross. Ross's book was originally published in 1930, and is the pinnacle of ethical intuitionism, which was the dominant moral theory in British philosophy for much of the 19th and early 20th century. The central concern of the book is with rightness and goodness, and their relation to one another. Ross argues against notable rival ethical theories. The right act, he holds, cannot be derived from the moral value of the motive from which it is done; furthermore, rightness is not wholly determined by the value of the consequences of one's action, whether this value is some benefit for the agent, or some agent‐neutral good. Rather, the right act is determined by a plurality of self‐evident prima facie duties. Ross portrayed rightness and goodness as simple non‐natural properties. Philip Stratton provides a substantial introduction to the book, in which he discusses its central themes and clears up some common misunderstandings. A new bibliography and index are also included, along with editorial notes that aim to clarify certain points and indicate where Ross later changed his mind on particular issues. Intuitionism is now enjoying a considerable revival, and this new edition provides the context for a proper modern understanding of Ross's great work.Less
The Right and the Good is a classic of 20th‐century philosophy by the great scholar Sir David Ross, which is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton–Lake, a leading expert on Ross. Ross's book was originally published in 1930, and is the pinnacle of ethical intuitionism, which was the dominant moral theory in British philosophy for much of the 19th and early 20th century. The central concern of the book is with rightness and goodness, and their relation to one another. Ross argues against notable rival ethical theories. The right act, he holds, cannot be derived from the moral value of the motive from which it is done; furthermore, rightness is not wholly determined by the value of the consequences of one's action, whether this value is some benefit for the agent, or some agent‐neutral good. Rather, the right act is determined by a plurality of self‐evident prima facie duties. Ross portrayed rightness and goodness as simple non‐natural properties. Philip Stratton provides a substantial introduction to the book, in which he discusses its central themes and clears up some common misunderstandings. A new bibliography and index are also included, along with editorial notes that aim to clarify certain points and indicate where Ross later changed his mind on particular issues. Intuitionism is now enjoying a considerable revival, and this new edition provides the context for a proper modern understanding of Ross's great work.
Michael C. Rea
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199247608
- eISBN:
- 9780191601804
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247609.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Philosophical naturalism has dominated the Western academy for well over a century. However, there is an important sense in which naturalism's status as orthodoxy is without rational foundation. ...
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Philosophical naturalism has dominated the Western academy for well over a century. However, there is an important sense in which naturalism's status as orthodoxy is without rational foundation. Furthermore, the costs of embracing it are surprisingly high. The goal of this book is to defend these two claims, with special attention to the second. The first part of the book aims to provide a fair and historically informed characterization of naturalism. The second part argues for the striking thesis that naturalists are committed to rejecting realism about material objects, materialism, and perhaps realism about other minds. The book concludes with an examination of two alternative research programmes – intuitionism and supernaturalism – and argues that, under certain circumstances, intuitionism is self‐defeating.Less
Philosophical naturalism has dominated the Western academy for well over a century. However, there is an important sense in which naturalism's status as orthodoxy is without rational foundation. Furthermore, the costs of embracing it are surprisingly high. The goal of this book is to defend these two claims, with special attention to the second. The first part of the book aims to provide a fair and historically informed characterization of naturalism. The second part argues for the striking thesis that naturalists are committed to rejecting realism about material objects, materialism, and perhaps realism about other minds. The book concludes with an examination of two alternative research programmes – intuitionism and supernaturalism – and argues that, under certain circumstances, intuitionism is self‐defeating.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199282593
- eISBN:
- 9780191603587
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199282595.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter explores the challenge to the proof of Fitch’s results presented by intuitionism, and the prospects of this viewpoint in avoiding the paradox that results. It argues that adopting ...
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This chapter explores the challenge to the proof of Fitch’s results presented by intuitionism, and the prospects of this viewpoint in avoiding the paradox that results. It argues that adopting intuitionistic principles of reasoning will not help avoid the paradox. It merely changes what is paradoxical from a lost distinction between known truth and knowable truth, to a lost distinction between unknown truth and unknowable truth. Since paradox remains in both cases, the solution to the paradox must be found elsewhere.Less
This chapter explores the challenge to the proof of Fitch’s results presented by intuitionism, and the prospects of this viewpoint in avoiding the paradox that results. It argues that adopting intuitionistic principles of reasoning will not help avoid the paradox. It merely changes what is paradoxical from a lost distinction between known truth and knowable truth, to a lost distinction between unknown truth and unknowable truth. Since paradox remains in both cases, the solution to the paradox must be found elsewhere.
Roger Crisp
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199290338
- eISBN:
- 9780191710476
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290338.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Anyone who claims that there is some ultimate reason for action is likely to be asked two questions. First, how do you know? That is, what capacity gives you this special insight? And, second, what ...
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Anyone who claims that there is some ultimate reason for action is likely to be asked two questions. First, how do you know? That is, what capacity gives you this special insight? And, second, what justification do you have? The first may be called the epistemic question, and the second the justificatory question. Further, and possibly related, questions may concern metaphysics, semantics, or other matters. This chapter defends ethical intuitionism as the most plausible account of our knowledge of certain basic normative principles. It advocates a form of intuitionism that is relatively modest, the essential components of the idea being that human beings have a capacity for grasping certain a priori truths, that such truths include truths about normative reasons, and that a grasp of such a truth can in itself provide justification for accepting it, in some cases sufficient justification for knowledge.Less
Anyone who claims that there is some ultimate reason for action is likely to be asked two questions. First, how do you know? That is, what capacity gives you this special insight? And, second, what justification do you have? The first may be called the epistemic question, and the second the justificatory question. Further, and possibly related, questions may concern metaphysics, semantics, or other matters. This chapter defends ethical intuitionism as the most plausible account of our knowledge of certain basic normative principles. It advocates a form of intuitionism that is relatively modest, the essential components of the idea being that human beings have a capacity for grasping certain a priori truths, that such truths include truths about normative reasons, and that a grasp of such a truth can in itself provide justification for accepting it, in some cases sufficient justification for knowledge.
Joshua Gert
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199657544
- eISBN:
- 9780191742217
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657544.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Expressivism and non-reductive realism represent two very widely separated poles in contemporary discussion s of normativity. But the domain of the normative is both large and diverse. It would be ...
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Expressivism and non-reductive realism represent two very widely separated poles in contemporary discussion s of normativity. But the domain of the normative is both large and diverse. It would be extremely surprising if either expressivism or non-reductive realism managed to capture all — or even the most important — phenomena. The book defends a response-dependence account of the normative that accommodates the kind of variation in response that some non-reductive realists downplay or ignore, but that also allows for the sort of straightforward talk of normative properties, normative truth, and substantive normative disagreement that expressivists have had a hard time respecting. One distinctive feature of the book is its reliance, throughout, on an analogy between color properties and normative properties. This analogy suggests that the appropriate response to a given instance of a normative property may often depend significantly on the perspective one takes on that instance: for example, whether one views it as past or future. Another distinctive feature is its focus on the basic normative property of practical rationality, rather than on the notion of a normative reason or the notion of the good. This simple shift of focus allows for a more satisfying account of the link between reasons and motivation, and also helps explain why and how some reasons can justify far more than they can require.Less
Expressivism and non-reductive realism represent two very widely separated poles in contemporary discussion s of normativity. But the domain of the normative is both large and diverse. It would be extremely surprising if either expressivism or non-reductive realism managed to capture all — or even the most important — phenomena. The book defends a response-dependence account of the normative that accommodates the kind of variation in response that some non-reductive realists downplay or ignore, but that also allows for the sort of straightforward talk of normative properties, normative truth, and substantive normative disagreement that expressivists have had a hard time respecting. One distinctive feature of the book is its reliance, throughout, on an analogy between color properties and normative properties. This analogy suggests that the appropriate response to a given instance of a normative property may often depend significantly on the perspective one takes on that instance: for example, whether one views it as past or future. Another distinctive feature is its focus on the basic normative property of practical rationality, rather than on the notion of a normative reason or the notion of the good. This simple shift of focus allows for a more satisfying account of the link between reasons and motivation, and also helps explain why and how some reasons can justify far more than they can require.
R. M. Hare
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250326
- eISBN:
- 9780191597602
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250320.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book is divided into three parts: in Part I, R. M. Hare offers a justification for the use of philosophy of language in the treatment of moral questions, together with an overview of his moral ...
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This book is divided into three parts: in Part I, R. M. Hare offers a justification for the use of philosophy of language in the treatment of moral questions, together with an overview of his moral philosophy of ‘universal prescriptivism’. The second part, and the core of the book, consists of five chapters originally presented as a lecture series under the title ‘A Taxonomy of Ethical Theories’. Hare identifies descriptivism and non‐descriptivism as the two main positions in modern moral philosophy. The former he divides into Naturalism and Intuitionism, and the latter into Emotivism and Rationalism. Hare argues that all forms of descriptivism tend to lead to Relativism because the truth conditions of moral statements are culturally variant. Of the positions discussed, only Hare's own position, a form of Rationalism, which he calls Universal Prescriptivism, meets all of the requirements that an adequate ethical theory should meet. Part III consists of Hare's previously published essay ‘Could Kant have been a Utilitarian?’ (Utilitas 5, 1993). Here, Hare puts forward the controversial thesis that Kant's moral philosophy is, in its basic principles, compatible with utilitarianism.Less
This book is divided into three parts: in Part I, R. M. Hare offers a justification for the use of philosophy of language in the treatment of moral questions, together with an overview of his moral philosophy of ‘universal prescriptivism’. The second part, and the core of the book, consists of five chapters originally presented as a lecture series under the title ‘A Taxonomy of Ethical Theories’. Hare identifies descriptivism and non‐descriptivism as the two main positions in modern moral philosophy. The former he divides into Naturalism and Intuitionism, and the latter into Emotivism and Rationalism. Hare argues that all forms of descriptivism tend to lead to Relativism because the truth conditions of moral statements are culturally variant. Of the positions discussed, only Hare's own position, a form of Rationalism, which he calls Universal Prescriptivism, meets all of the requirements that an adequate ethical theory should meet. Part III consists of Hare's previously published essay ‘Could Kant have been a Utilitarian?’ (Utilitas 5, 1993). Here, Hare puts forward the controversial thesis that Kant's moral philosophy is, in its basic principles, compatible with utilitarianism.
Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199290659
- eISBN:
- 9780191603617
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199290652.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Morality is a practical matter that concerns choice and action, and a sound moral outlook should be capable of motivating someone to act virtuously. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that moral ...
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Morality is a practical matter that concerns choice and action, and a sound moral outlook should be capable of motivating someone to act virtuously. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that moral principles might play an important role in guiding action. This final chapter addresses this concern, and explains how moral principles can and should play an important role in guiding action. Moral principles can help us avoid the all too human failings of special pleading and rationalization. They can also help make certain features of situations more salient, and help structure thinking in ways more likely to lead to morally right action. Different philosophical models of principled guidance, contemporary empirical debates about the nature of moral cognition, and indeed of concept deployment more generally, are considered. It is argued that certain findings from cognitive science associated with so-called ‘prototype theory’ and ‘exemplar theory’ do not do much to undermine a robust role for moral principles in guiding the actions of a morally decent agent. Some empirical findings from ‘prospect theory’ about the effects of framing situations in one way rather than another are used to bolster the positive case for principled guidance.Less
Morality is a practical matter that concerns choice and action, and a sound moral outlook should be capable of motivating someone to act virtuously. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that moral principles might play an important role in guiding action. This final chapter addresses this concern, and explains how moral principles can and should play an important role in guiding action. Moral principles can help us avoid the all too human failings of special pleading and rationalization. They can also help make certain features of situations more salient, and help structure thinking in ways more likely to lead to morally right action. Different philosophical models of principled guidance, contemporary empirical debates about the nature of moral cognition, and indeed of concept deployment more generally, are considered. It is argued that certain findings from cognitive science associated with so-called ‘prototype theory’ and ‘exemplar theory’ do not do much to undermine a robust role for moral principles in guiding the actions of a morally decent agent. Some empirical findings from ‘prospect theory’ about the effects of framing situations in one way rather than another are used to bolster the positive case for principled guidance.
Mark Timmons (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199662951
- eISBN:
- 9780191745195
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199662951.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new essays that ...
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Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new essays that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of issues and positions in normative ethical theory, and represents a sampling of recent developments in this field. This second volume includes contributions by Robert Audi, Christian Coons, Julia Driver, William J. Fitzpatrick, Thomas Hurka, Esther Shubert, Daniel Jacobson, Elinor Mason, Michael Nelson, Luke Robinson, Jacob Ross, Andrew Sepielli, and Cynthia A. Stark. The topics discussed include: Kantian intuitionism, welfarism, the objective standard of good, intention, permissibility and double effect, moral dumbfounding and moral stupidity, coercion and integrity, practical reason and morality, atomism, subjective normativity and action guidance, and Rawlsian self-respect.Less
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new essays that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of issues and positions in normative ethical theory, and represents a sampling of recent developments in this field. This second volume includes contributions by Robert Audi, Christian Coons, Julia Driver, William J. Fitzpatrick, Thomas Hurka, Esther Shubert, Daniel Jacobson, Elinor Mason, Michael Nelson, Luke Robinson, Jacob Ross, Andrew Sepielli, and Cynthia A. Stark. The topics discussed include: Kantian intuitionism, welfarism, the objective standard of good, intention, permissibility and double effect, moral dumbfounding and moral stupidity, coercion and integrity, practical reason and morality, atomism, subjective normativity and action guidance, and Rawlsian self-respect.
Henry Sidgwick
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250234
- eISBN:
- 9780191598432
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250231.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Sidgwick argues that Calderwood's criticisms of his view on Intuitionism presented in Methods of Ethics derive from a misunderstanding of Sidgwick's project. Sidgwick did not set out to criticize, ...
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Sidgwick argues that Calderwood's criticisms of his view on Intuitionism presented in Methods of Ethics derive from a misunderstanding of Sidgwick's project. Sidgwick did not set out to criticize, from the outside, a particular school of thought, but rather to trace the phases and to estimate the scientific value of a specific method of reaching practical decisions. One phase in this process is intuitionism. According to Sidgwick, the only ultimately valid moral intuitions are those that provide the philosophical basis for utilitarianism.Less
Sidgwick argues that Calderwood's criticisms of his view on Intuitionism presented in Methods of Ethics derive from a misunderstanding of Sidgwick's project. Sidgwick did not set out to criticize, from the outside, a particular school of thought, but rather to trace the phases and to estimate the scientific value of a specific method of reaching practical decisions. One phase in this process is intuitionism. According to Sidgwick, the only ultimately valid moral intuitions are those that provide the philosophical basis for utilitarianism.
Hugh J. McCann
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195311952
- eISBN:
- 9780199871070
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses Audi's version of metaethical intuitionism, arguing that it faces significant objections. Without a basis for the theory's claims of self-evidence, it argues, moral intuitions ...
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This chapter discusses Audi's version of metaethical intuitionism, arguing that it faces significant objections. Without a basis for the theory's claims of self-evidence, it argues, moral intuitions can be charged with arbitrariness. Moreover, familiar problems concerning “queerness” and supervenience remain. This chapter proposes that moral intuitions are grounded in conative experiences of “felt obligation”. It then argues that his version of intuitionism preserves the virtues of Audi's approach—indeed sharing the spirit of Audi's theory—without succumbing to the skeptical problems.Less
This chapter discusses Audi's version of metaethical intuitionism, arguing that it faces significant objections. Without a basis for the theory's claims of self-evidence, it argues, moral intuitions can be charged with arbitrariness. Moreover, familiar problems concerning “queerness” and supervenience remain. This chapter proposes that moral intuitions are grounded in conative experiences of “felt obligation”. It then argues that his version of intuitionism preserves the virtues of Audi's approach—indeed sharing the spirit of Audi's theory—without succumbing to the skeptical problems.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195311952
- eISBN:
- 9780199871070
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter comprises Audi's responses to the critical chapters that comprise Part I, “Problems and Prospects for Intuitionist Ethics.” Audi defends his version of ethical intuitionism against the ...
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This chapter comprises Audi's responses to the critical chapters that comprise Part I, “Problems and Prospects for Intuitionist Ethics.” Audi defends his version of ethical intuitionism against the objections of Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong (Chapter 2), Roger Crisp (Chapter 3), and Hugh McCann (Chapter 4), and he defends his integration of Rossian pluralism with a Kantian unification of morality under the categorical imperative against the challenges raised by Bernard Gert (Chapter 5), Thomas Hurka (Chapter 6), and Candace Vogler (Chapter 7).Less
This chapter comprises Audi's responses to the critical chapters that comprise Part I, “Problems and Prospects for Intuitionist Ethics.” Audi defends his version of ethical intuitionism against the objections of Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong (Chapter 2), Roger Crisp (Chapter 3), and Hugh McCann (Chapter 4), and he defends his integration of Rossian pluralism with a Kantian unification of morality under the categorical imperative against the challenges raised by Bernard Gert (Chapter 5), Thomas Hurka (Chapter 6), and Candace Vogler (Chapter 7).
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199269914
- eISBN:
- 9780191710032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter claims that recent developments in psychology and brain science cast considerable doubt on moral intuitionism. In arguing for this claim, it first develops a set of six principles ...
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This chapter claims that recent developments in psychology and brain science cast considerable doubt on moral intuitionism. In arguing for this claim, it first develops a set of six principles concerning when non-moral beliefs require justifying beliefs to back them up. In short, whenever a belief is important, partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources, then that belief needs to be backed up by confirming beliefs, if the believer is to be epistemically justified in holding it. By appealing to recent empirical work, moral beliefs of all sorts fall under one or more of his principles, and thus are in need of support from other relevant beliefs. If so, then moral intuitionism is incorrect: no moral beliefs enjoy the status of being non-inferentially justified. This is his strong claim. More cautiously, the chapter claims that even if there may be some individuals who, in some contexts, have moral beliefs that do not require inferential support, still, for educated adults who are well aware of the various possible distorting factors affecting beliefs, no moral beliefs are non-inferentially justified. Even if moral judgments are not themselves claims that can be confirmed or disconfirmed entirely by empirical means (including the methods of science), it does not follow that developments in the sciences, including biology, psychology, sociology, anthropology, cognitive science, and brain science, are not relevant to whether a person's (or group's) moral beliefs are epistemically justified.Less
This chapter claims that recent developments in psychology and brain science cast considerable doubt on moral intuitionism. In arguing for this claim, it first develops a set of six principles concerning when non-moral beliefs require justifying beliefs to back them up. In short, whenever a belief is important, partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources, then that belief needs to be backed up by confirming beliefs, if the believer is to be epistemically justified in holding it. By appealing to recent empirical work, moral beliefs of all sorts fall under one or more of his principles, and thus are in need of support from other relevant beliefs. If so, then moral intuitionism is incorrect: no moral beliefs enjoy the status of being non-inferentially justified. This is his strong claim. More cautiously, the chapter claims that even if there may be some individuals who, in some contexts, have moral beliefs that do not require inferential support, still, for educated adults who are well aware of the various possible distorting factors affecting beliefs, no moral beliefs are non-inferentially justified. Even if moral judgments are not themselves claims that can be confirmed or disconfirmed entirely by empirical means (including the methods of science), it does not follow that developments in the sciences, including biology, psychology, sociology, anthropology, cognitive science, and brain science, are not relevant to whether a person's (or group's) moral beliefs are epistemically justified.
Erik Palmgren
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198566519
- eISBN:
- 9780191713927
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198566519.003.0010
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Logic / Computer Science / Mathematical Philosophy
Brouwer introduced his axioms for intuitionism to regain central results on continuity. Special axioms were avoided instead in Bishop's development of constructive analysis. Bishop in fact modified ...
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Brouwer introduced his axioms for intuitionism to regain central results on continuity. Special axioms were avoided instead in Bishop's development of constructive analysis. Bishop in fact modified the definition of continuous function on the real numbers to mean uniformly continuous on each finite and closed interval. Though a successful move in the context of metric spaces, this seems to lead to difficulties when considering general spaces, in particular as the composition of two continuous functions needs not to be continuous. Though little emphasized, the continuous functions of the category of locales or formal spaces agree with Bishop's definition of continuous function on real numbers. Proving this within the framework of (Bishop) constructive mathematics is the purpose of the present chapter. The upshot is that for formal spaces, it is not necessary to adopt special axioms to obtain a good category.Less
Brouwer introduced his axioms for intuitionism to regain central results on continuity. Special axioms were avoided instead in Bishop's development of constructive analysis. Bishop in fact modified the definition of continuous function on the real numbers to mean uniformly continuous on each finite and closed interval. Though a successful move in the context of metric spaces, this seems to lead to difficulties when considering general spaces, in particular as the composition of two continuous functions needs not to be continuous. Though little emphasized, the continuous functions of the category of locales or formal spaces agree with Bishop's definition of continuous function on real numbers. Proving this within the framework of (Bishop) constructive mathematics is the purpose of the present chapter. The upshot is that for formal spaces, it is not necessary to adopt special axioms to obtain a good category.
Jonathan Dancy
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199599325
- eISBN:
- 9780191741500
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter focuses on Bernard Williams's ‘What does Intuitionism Imply?’ (1988). It considers the justice of certain complaints that he makes about the position he associates with John McDowell. ...
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This chapter focuses on Bernard Williams's ‘What does Intuitionism Imply?’ (1988). It considers the justice of certain complaints that he makes about the position he associates with John McDowell. The chapter first considers, and reject, McDowell's appeal to the analogy with secondary qualities in his ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’ (1985). The chapter then considers and defends McDowell's reply to John Mackie's complaint that objective values do not pull their own weight; I try to show the justice of McDowell's reply in a way that detaches it from any reliance on the dispositional conception of value. Finally, the chapter turns to Williams's attempts to show that the objectivity of moral values cannot be sustained within the constraints of McDowell's approach, because of various explanatory failures. The chapters argues that everything that needs to be explained can be explained, and that we should prefer a sort of optimism to a Williams-style pessimism. The chapter ends by considering whether Williams is right to think of McDowell as an intuitionist.Less
This chapter focuses on Bernard Williams's ‘What does Intuitionism Imply?’ (1988). It considers the justice of certain complaints that he makes about the position he associates with John McDowell. The chapter first considers, and reject, McDowell's appeal to the analogy with secondary qualities in his ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’ (1985). The chapter then considers and defends McDowell's reply to John Mackie's complaint that objective values do not pull their own weight; I try to show the justice of McDowell's reply in a way that detaches it from any reliance on the dispositional conception of value. Finally, the chapter turns to Williams's attempts to show that the objectivity of moral values cannot be sustained within the constraints of McDowell's approach, because of various explanatory failures. The chapters argues that everything that needs to be explained can be explained, and that we should prefer a sort of optimism to a Williams-style pessimism. The chapter ends by considering whether Williams is right to think of McDowell as an intuitionist.
Charles Travis
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199230334
- eISBN:
- 9780191710605
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230334.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Truth matters to all those capable of thinking falsely (so of thinking things); but to philosophers in a special way. Philosophers have spoken volumes on the topic. One such example is Michael ...
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Truth matters to all those capable of thinking falsely (so of thinking things); but to philosophers in a special way. Philosophers have spoken volumes on the topic. One such example is Michael Dummett's early essay, ‘Truth’, where he defends two intuitions. The first is that no statement could be neither true nor false; or it could never be right to say so. The second is that it is not so of every statement that it is guaranteed to be either true or false. Each has its exponents. Few, though, defend both. If both are right, that may argue for a view dubbed sublunary intuitionism: in an important sense (though one yet to be clarified) the logic of ordinary discourse is intuitionist, not classical. This chapter argues that Dummett's first intuition is incorrect. His second intuition stands on a more radical, perhaps more simple-minded, reading than he gives it. But it is the tension between the two intuitions, if anything, that argues for sublunary intuitionism. Neither alone makes the case.Less
Truth matters to all those capable of thinking falsely (so of thinking things); but to philosophers in a special way. Philosophers have spoken volumes on the topic. One such example is Michael Dummett's early essay, ‘Truth’, where he defends two intuitions. The first is that no statement could be neither true nor false; or it could never be right to say so. The second is that it is not so of every statement that it is guaranteed to be either true or false. Each has its exponents. Few, though, defend both. If both are right, that may argue for a view dubbed sublunary intuitionism: in an important sense (though one yet to be clarified) the logic of ordinary discourse is intuitionist, not classical. This chapter argues that Dummett's first intuition is incorrect. His second intuition stands on a more radical, perhaps more simple-minded, reading than he gives it. But it is the tension between the two intuitions, if anything, that argues for sublunary intuitionism. Neither alone makes the case.
Kumaraswamy Velupillai
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198295273
- eISBN:
- 9780191596988
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198295278.003.0010
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics
In the concluding chapter, the themes broached in the first chapter are reconsidered in the light of the results and framework developed in the book as computable economics. In particular, the idea ...
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In the concluding chapter, the themes broached in the first chapter are reconsidered in the light of the results and framework developed in the book as computable economics. In particular, the idea of economics as problem solving and economic agents as problem solvers is taken up for a methodological discussion. More generally, the discussion in this chapter centres on the philosophical and epistemological implications of the kind of mathematical methodology used in the formalization of economic theory.Less
In the concluding chapter, the themes broached in the first chapter are reconsidered in the light of the results and framework developed in the book as computable economics. In particular, the idea of economics as problem solving and economic agents as problem solvers is taken up for a methodological discussion. More generally, the discussion in this chapter centres on the philosophical and epistemological implications of the kind of mathematical methodology used in the formalization of economic theory.
Ralph Wedgwood
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199251315
- eISBN:
- 9780191719127
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251315.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Part III of the book is devoted to epistemological issues. If there are objective normative truths, then how could we ever know them? How could we even have any rational or justified beliefs in ...
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Part III of the book is devoted to epistemological issues. If there are objective normative truths, then how could we ever know them? How could we even have any rational or justified beliefs in normative propositions? This chapter argues that the idea that the ‘intentional is normative’ supports a new solution to these epistemological problems: it allows us to give a new account of where a thinker's so-called ‘normative intuitions’ come from, and why (and under what conditions) it is rational for the thinker to trust them. It is argued that this account is preferable both to the rival versions of intuitionism about normative beliefs, and to those epistemological accounts that are incompatible with intuitionism.Less
Part III of the book is devoted to epistemological issues. If there are objective normative truths, then how could we ever know them? How could we even have any rational or justified beliefs in normative propositions? This chapter argues that the idea that the ‘intentional is normative’ supports a new solution to these epistemological problems: it allows us to give a new account of where a thinker's so-called ‘normative intuitions’ come from, and why (and under what conditions) it is rational for the thinker to trust them. It is argued that this account is preferable both to the rival versions of intuitionism about normative beliefs, and to those epistemological accounts that are incompatible with intuitionism.
J. Eric Oliver and Thomas J. Wood
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780226578477
- eISBN:
- 9780226578644
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226578644.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
An Intuitionist is defined via dozens of surveys about how, why, and when people are more likely to make the decisions they do. A set of core traits that differentiate where people reside on the ...
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An Intuitionist is defined via dozens of surveys about how, why, and when people are more likely to make the decisions they do. A set of core traits that differentiate where people reside on the Intuitionism scale is used, and a general demographic is revealed. Why these factors are important is also explored, with a look at education level, gender, personality, income, upbringing, religious affiliation, and of course, political leanings.Less
An Intuitionist is defined via dozens of surveys about how, why, and when people are more likely to make the decisions they do. A set of core traits that differentiate where people reside on the Intuitionism scale is used, and a general demographic is revealed. Why these factors are important is also explored, with a look at education level, gender, personality, income, upbringing, religious affiliation, and of course, political leanings.
John Skorupski
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199587636
- eISBN:
- 9780191595394
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587636.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter gives a normative account of what it means to say of a proposition, of a warrant, and of knowledge that it is a priori; it then argues that all synthetic a priori propositions are either ...
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This chapter gives a normative account of what it means to say of a proposition, of a warrant, and of knowledge that it is a priori; it then argues that all synthetic a priori propositions are either normative propositions or non‐normative offshoots of normative propositions.Less
This chapter gives a normative account of what it means to say of a proposition, of a warrant, and of knowledge that it is a priori; it then argues that all synthetic a priori propositions are either normative propositions or non‐normative offshoots of normative propositions.
