Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199744794
- eISBN:
- 9780199933396
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The topic of introspection stands at the interface between questions in epistemology about the nature of self-knowledge and questions in the philosophy of mind about the nature of consciousness. What ...
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The topic of introspection stands at the interface between questions in epistemology about the nature of self-knowledge and questions in the philosophy of mind about the nature of consciousness. What is the nature of introspection such that it provides us with a distinctive way of knowing about our own conscious mental states? And what is the nature of consciousness such that we can know about our own conscious mental states by introspection? How should we understand the relationship between consciousness and introspective self-knowledge? Should we explain consciousness in terms of introspective self-knowledge or vice versa? Until recently, questions in epistemology and the philosophy of mind were pursued largely in isolation from one another. This book aims to integrate these two lines of research by bringing together fourteen new chapters and one reprinted piece on the relationship between introspection, self-knowledge, and consciousness.Less
The topic of introspection stands at the interface between questions in epistemology about the nature of self-knowledge and questions in the philosophy of mind about the nature of consciousness. What is the nature of introspection such that it provides us with a distinctive way of knowing about our own conscious mental states? And what is the nature of consciousness such that we can know about our own conscious mental states by introspection? How should we understand the relationship between consciousness and introspective self-knowledge? Should we explain consciousness in terms of introspective self-knowledge or vice versa? Until recently, questions in epistemology and the philosophy of mind were pursued largely in isolation from one another. This book aims to integrate these two lines of research by bringing together fourteen new chapters and one reprinted piece on the relationship between introspection, self-knowledge, and consciousness.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195138924
- eISBN:
- 9780199786480
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138929.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
How people assign mental states to others and how they represent or conceptualize such states in the first place are topics of interest to philosophy of mind, developmental psychology, and cognitive ...
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How people assign mental states to others and how they represent or conceptualize such states in the first place are topics of interest to philosophy of mind, developmental psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. Three competing answers to the question of how people impute mental states to others have been offered: by rationalizing, by theorizing, or by simulating. Simulation theory says that mindreaders produce mental states in their own minds that resemble, or aim to resemble, those of their targets; these states are then imputed to, or projected onto, the targets. In low-level mindreading, such as reading emotions from faces, simulation is mediated by automatic mirror systems. More controlled processes of simulation, here called “enactment imagination”, are used in high-level mindreading. Just as visual and motor imagery are attempts to replicate acts of seeing and doing, mindreading is characteristically an attempt to replicate the mental processes of a target, followed by projection of the imagination-generated state onto the target. Projection errors are symptomatic of simulation, because one’s own genuine states readily intrude into the simulational process. A nuanced form of introspection is introduced to explain self-attribution and also to address the question of how mental concepts are represented. A distinctive cognitive code involving introspective representations figures prominently in our concepts of mental states. The book concludes with an overview of the pervasive effects on social life of simulation, imitation, and empathy, and charts their possible roles in moral experience and the fictive arts.Less
How people assign mental states to others and how they represent or conceptualize such states in the first place are topics of interest to philosophy of mind, developmental psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. Three competing answers to the question of how people impute mental states to others have been offered: by rationalizing, by theorizing, or by simulating. Simulation theory says that mindreaders produce mental states in their own minds that resemble, or aim to resemble, those of their targets; these states are then imputed to, or projected onto, the targets. In low-level mindreading, such as reading emotions from faces, simulation is mediated by automatic mirror systems. More controlled processes of simulation, here called “enactment imagination”, are used in high-level mindreading. Just as visual and motor imagery are attempts to replicate acts of seeing and doing, mindreading is characteristically an attempt to replicate the mental processes of a target, followed by projection of the imagination-generated state onto the target. Projection errors are symptomatic of simulation, because one’s own genuine states readily intrude into the simulational process. A nuanced form of introspection is introduced to explain self-attribution and also to address the question of how mental concepts are represented. A distinctive cognitive code involving introspective representations figures prominently in our concepts of mental states. The book concludes with an overview of the pervasive effects on social life of simulation, imitation, and empathy, and charts their possible roles in moral experience and the fictive arts.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195138795
- eISBN:
- 9780199833252
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138791.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Explores issues ranging from introspection to social epistemology. “Internalism Exposed” pinpoints problems in the defense of internalism as an approach to epistemic justification. “A Priori Warrant ...
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Explores issues ranging from introspection to social epistemology. “Internalism Exposed” pinpoints problems in the defense of internalism as an approach to epistemic justification. “A Priori Warrant and Naturalistic Epistemology” argues that naturalistic epistemology is compatible with a priori warrant, and shows how scientific research supports an innate faculty of number cognition that can generate arithmetic belief with a priori warrant. “The Unity of the Epistemic Virtues” examines the prospects for a unifying account of distinct epistemic values, such as justified belief and true belief. The next three papers consider intuitions and introspection from an epistemological perspective. One paper explains how intuitions can play the evidential role that philosophical practice assigns to it. Two papers argue that introspection plays an unavoidable but legitimate role in the science of consciousness despite being a “private” method. The final three papers deal with aspects of social epistemology. One asks how novices can justifiably choose among two or more competing experts. Another explores the possibility of an epidemiology of knowledge, of which memetics is a prominent example. The final paper provides a critical survey and guide to the diverse approaches to social epistemology.Less
Explores issues ranging from introspection to social epistemology. “Internalism Exposed” pinpoints problems in the defense of internalism as an approach to epistemic justification. “A Priori Warrant and Naturalistic Epistemology” argues that naturalistic epistemology is compatible with a priori warrant, and shows how scientific research supports an innate faculty of number cognition that can generate arithmetic belief with a priori warrant. “The Unity of the Epistemic Virtues” examines the prospects for a unifying account of distinct epistemic values, such as justified belief and true belief. The next three papers consider intuitions and introspection from an epistemological perspective. One paper explains how intuitions can play the evidential role that philosophical practice assigns to it. Two papers argue that introspection plays an unavoidable but legitimate role in the science of consciousness despite being a “private” method. The final three papers deal with aspects of social epistemology. One asks how novices can justifiably choose among two or more competing experts. Another explores the possibility of an epidemiology of knowledge, of which memetics is a prominent example. The final paper provides a critical survey and guide to the diverse approaches to social epistemology.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195138924
- eISBN:
- 9780199786480
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138929.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Most cognitive scientists and many philosophers of mind resist the traditional notion that the mind has a special method of monitoring or accessing its own current mental states. We review the ...
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Most cognitive scientists and many philosophers of mind resist the traditional notion that the mind has a special method of monitoring or accessing its own current mental states. We review the critiques of both philosophers (Wittgenstein, Burge, Shoemaker) and cognitive scientists (Gazzaniga, Nisbett and Wilson, Gopnik), based on confabulation or self/other parallelism, and find all to be wanting. We then examine the more congenial monitoring account of Nichols and Stich, but find it incapable of handling the problem of attitude-type identification. A nuanced special-method approach is presented that combines introspection (inner recognition) for self-attributing state-types and redeployment for self-attributing attitude contents. The question of what the input-properties are for introspection is addressed at length.Less
Most cognitive scientists and many philosophers of mind resist the traditional notion that the mind has a special method of monitoring or accessing its own current mental states. We review the critiques of both philosophers (Wittgenstein, Burge, Shoemaker) and cognitive scientists (Gazzaniga, Nisbett and Wilson, Gopnik), based on confabulation or self/other parallelism, and find all to be wanting. We then examine the more congenial monitoring account of Nichols and Stich, but find it incapable of handling the problem of attitude-type identification. A nuanced special-method approach is presented that combines introspection (inner recognition) for self-attributing state-types and redeployment for self-attributing attitude contents. The question of what the input-properties are for introspection is addressed at length.
Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199579938
- eISBN:
- 9780191731112
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The word ‘phenomenology’ as it occurs in the title of this book is a name for the subjective qualitative character of experience. It is widely agreed that there is such a thing as sensory ...
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The word ‘phenomenology’ as it occurs in the title of this book is a name for the subjective qualitative character of experience. It is widely agreed that there is such a thing as sensory phenomenology, and imagistic phenomenology. The central concern of the cognitive phenomenology debate is whether there is a distinctive ‘cognitive phenomenology’—that is, a kind of phenomenology that has cognitive or conceptual character in some sense that needs to be precisely determined. Most of the authors in this collection of essays are concerned with whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology, but a number of papers also consider whether cognitive phenomenology is part of conscious perception and conscious emotion. Three broad themes run through the volume. First, some authors focus on the question of how the notion of cognitive phenomenology ought to be understood. How should the notion of cognitive phenomenology be defined? Are there different kinds of cognitive phenomenology? A second theme concerns the existence of cognitive phenomenology. Some contributors defend the existence of a distinctive cognitive phenomenology, whereas others deny it. The arguments for and against the existence of cognitive phenomenology raise questions concerning the nature of first‐person knowledge of thought, the relationship between consciousness and intentionality, and the scope of the explanatory gap. A third theme concerns the implications of the cognitive phenomenology debate. What are the implications of the debate for accounts of our introspective access to conscious thought and for accounts of the very nature of conscious thought?Less
The word ‘phenomenology’ as it occurs in the title of this book is a name for the subjective qualitative character of experience. It is widely agreed that there is such a thing as sensory phenomenology, and imagistic phenomenology. The central concern of the cognitive phenomenology debate is whether there is a distinctive ‘cognitive phenomenology’—that is, a kind of phenomenology that has cognitive or conceptual character in some sense that needs to be precisely determined. Most of the authors in this collection of essays are concerned with whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology, but a number of papers also consider whether cognitive phenomenology is part of conscious perception and conscious emotion. Three broad themes run through the volume. First, some authors focus on the question of how the notion of cognitive phenomenology ought to be understood. How should the notion of cognitive phenomenology be defined? Are there different kinds of cognitive phenomenology? A second theme concerns the existence of cognitive phenomenology. Some contributors defend the existence of a distinctive cognitive phenomenology, whereas others deny it. The arguments for and against the existence of cognitive phenomenology raise questions concerning the nature of first‐person knowledge of thought, the relationship between consciousness and intentionality, and the scope of the explanatory gap. A third theme concerns the implications of the cognitive phenomenology debate. What are the implications of the debate for accounts of our introspective access to conscious thought and for accounts of the very nature of conscious thought?
Marcia Cavell
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199287086
- eISBN:
- 9780191603921
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199287082.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Self-knowledge is supposed to be transforming. Yet ordinarily, knowledge by itself has no effect on the object known. This chapter discusses the phenomenon of first-person authority; ‘the ocular ...
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Self-knowledge is supposed to be transforming. Yet ordinarily, knowledge by itself has no effect on the object known. This chapter discusses the phenomenon of first-person authority; ‘the ocular view’ of self-knowledge and an alternative account; and self-knowledge with regard to beliefs and to emotions. It argues that self-discovery often requires a dialectic between the first-person and the third-person points of view in relation to one’s self.Less
Self-knowledge is supposed to be transforming. Yet ordinarily, knowledge by itself has no effect on the object known. This chapter discusses the phenomenon of first-person authority; ‘the ocular view’ of self-knowledge and an alternative account; and self-knowledge with regard to beliefs and to emotions. It argues that self-discovery often requires a dialectic between the first-person and the third-person points of view in relation to one’s self.
Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199590728
- eISBN:
- 9780191725456
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Self-knowledge has always been a central topic of philosophical inquiry. It is hard to think of a major philosopher, from ancient times to the present, who refrained from pronouncing on the nature, ...
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Self-knowledge has always been a central topic of philosophical inquiry. It is hard to think of a major philosopher, from ancient times to the present, who refrained from pronouncing on the nature, the importance, or the limitations of one's knowing of oneself as oneself. What makes self-knowledge such a perplexing phenomenon? The chapters in this book seek to deepen our understanding of self-knowledge, to solve some of the genuine (and to resolve some of the spurious) problems that hold back philosophical progress on that front, and to assess the value of some classic moves in the debate over the epistemic status of self-ascriptions. Some of the chapters discuss features of self-knowledge that appear to account for its unique — and, in that sense, peculiar — status; some advance straight for solving crucial problems; and others take a step back to consider the terms in which we set the questions to which a philosophical theory of self-knowledge is to provide the answer. Through rigorous argumentation regarding the issues of reflection, introspection, deliberation, rationality, belief-formation, and epistemic warrant, the chapters illustrate how the specific problems that surround the topic of self-knowledge, instead of being approached as peripheral cases to which ready-made epistemological theories can be applied, may themselves illuminate some fundamental issues in the theory of knowledge.Less
Self-knowledge has always been a central topic of philosophical inquiry. It is hard to think of a major philosopher, from ancient times to the present, who refrained from pronouncing on the nature, the importance, or the limitations of one's knowing of oneself as oneself. What makes self-knowledge such a perplexing phenomenon? The chapters in this book seek to deepen our understanding of self-knowledge, to solve some of the genuine (and to resolve some of the spurious) problems that hold back philosophical progress on that front, and to assess the value of some classic moves in the debate over the epistemic status of self-ascriptions. Some of the chapters discuss features of self-knowledge that appear to account for its unique — and, in that sense, peculiar — status; some advance straight for solving crucial problems; and others take a step back to consider the terms in which we set the questions to which a philosophical theory of self-knowledge is to provide the answer. Through rigorous argumentation regarding the issues of reflection, introspection, deliberation, rationality, belief-formation, and epistemic warrant, the chapters illustrate how the specific problems that surround the topic of self-knowledge, instead of being approached as peripheral cases to which ready-made epistemological theories can be applied, may themselves illuminate some fundamental issues in the theory of knowledge.
Ernest Sosa
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199297023
- eISBN:
- 9780191711411
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297023.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter critically considers two traditional accounts of intuitive knowledge, and a virtue-based account is offered in their stead.
This chapter critically considers two traditional accounts of intuitive knowledge, and a virtue-based account is offered in their stead.
Pieter A. M. Seuren
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199559473
- eISBN:
- 9780191721137
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559473.003.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics
This chapter describes the ontological, cognitive, and methodological foundations of language studies, discussing in particular the relation between realism and formalism and advocating non‐hardware ...
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This chapter describes the ontological, cognitive, and methodological foundations of language studies, discussing in particular the relation between realism and formalism and advocating non‐hardware cognitive realism. It contains a critique of cognitivism, pragmatics, and functionalism, ending with an assessment of studies relating to the innateness hypothesis and language genesis.Less
This chapter describes the ontological, cognitive, and methodological foundations of language studies, discussing in particular the relation between realism and formalism and advocating non‐hardware cognitive realism. It contains a critique of cognitivism, pragmatics, and functionalism, ending with an assessment of studies relating to the innateness hypothesis and language genesis.
Peter Brooks
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691151588
- eISBN:
- 9781400839698
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691151588.003.0007
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
This chapter discusses the importance of the place of the knower in relation to the known, the narrating I to the narrated I, when they are one and “the same” person—whatever that oneness and ...
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This chapter discusses the importance of the place of the knower in relation to the known, the narrating I to the narrated I, when they are one and “the same” person—whatever that oneness and sameness may mean, which in fact turns out to be problematic. The strange workings of derealization are potentially helpful in understanding some of the writers who undertake to explore the enigma of identity in its peculiarly modern forms. Such writers include Jean-Jacques Rousseau, William Wordsworth, Marcel Proust, Virginia Woolf, Robert Musil, Italo Svevo, and Sigmund Freud. These writers all tend to come upon moments at which introspection, or inquest into the formation of the self, encounters a dissolution or estrangement of self that is somehow key to its understanding.Less
This chapter discusses the importance of the place of the knower in relation to the known, the narrating I to the narrated I, when they are one and “the same” person—whatever that oneness and sameness may mean, which in fact turns out to be problematic. The strange workings of derealization are potentially helpful in understanding some of the writers who undertake to explore the enigma of identity in its peculiarly modern forms. Such writers include Jean-Jacques Rousseau, William Wordsworth, Marcel Proust, Virginia Woolf, Robert Musil, Italo Svevo, and Sigmund Freud. These writers all tend to come upon moments at which introspection, or inquest into the formation of the self, encounters a dissolution or estrangement of self that is somehow key to its understanding.
Mark R. Leary
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195172423
- eISBN:
- 9780199786756
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195172423.003.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter examines the nature of self-awareness and the consequences of self-reflection for thought, behavior, and emotion. Attention is devoted to self-awareness in nonhuman animals (research ...
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This chapter examines the nature of self-awareness and the consequences of self-reflection for thought, behavior, and emotion. Attention is devoted to self-awareness in nonhuman animals (research suggests that other animals do not have the capacity to think about themselves as human beings do) and the question of when and why the human capacity for self-reflection evolved. The benefits of having a self (such as planning, introspection, and self-evaluation) are discussed before turning to the central theme of the book: that the same capacity for self-reflection that has led to the greatest human achievements also leads to the greatest human problems.Less
This chapter examines the nature of self-awareness and the consequences of self-reflection for thought, behavior, and emotion. Attention is devoted to self-awareness in nonhuman animals (research suggests that other animals do not have the capacity to think about themselves as human beings do) and the question of when and why the human capacity for self-reflection evolved. The benefits of having a self (such as planning, introspection, and self-evaluation) are discussed before turning to the central theme of the book: that the same capacity for self-reflection that has led to the greatest human achievements also leads to the greatest human problems.
Christopher Peacocke
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199239443
- eISBN:
- 9780191717000
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239443.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter explores the theory that the distinctive awareness that subjects have of their own mental actions is a form of action-awareness. Subjects' awareness of their own mental actions is a ...
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This chapter explores the theory that the distinctive awareness that subjects have of their own mental actions is a form of action-awareness. Subjects' awareness of their own mental actions is a species of the same genus that also includes the distinctive awareness of bodily actions. The chapter begins by articulating some distinctive features of bodily action-awareness and then characterizing the range of mental actions. It argues that all of these distinctive features of action-awareness in the bodily case are present also for mental actions. It considers some of the attractions and consequences of the Principal Hypothesis; to draw upon it in an account of our understanding of our own and others' mental actions, in a way that accords with the role of reference and identity in understanding discussed in earlier chapters of this book; to apply it in the characterization of some pathological states; and finally to consider some aspects of its significance for the nature of first-person thought and rationality.Less
This chapter explores the theory that the distinctive awareness that subjects have of their own mental actions is a form of action-awareness. Subjects' awareness of their own mental actions is a species of the same genus that also includes the distinctive awareness of bodily actions. The chapter begins by articulating some distinctive features of bodily action-awareness and then characterizing the range of mental actions. It argues that all of these distinctive features of action-awareness in the bodily case are present also for mental actions. It considers some of the attractions and consequences of the Principal Hypothesis; to draw upon it in an account of our understanding of our own and others' mental actions, in a way that accords with the role of reference and identity in understanding discussed in earlier chapters of this book; to apply it in the characterization of some pathological states; and finally to consider some aspects of its significance for the nature of first-person thought and rationality.
Susanna Siegel
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199231546
- eISBN:
- 9780191716126
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Since disjunctivists when talking about perception deny that hallucinations and veridical perceptions have a common fundamental nature, they need some other way to account for the fact that these ...
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Since disjunctivists when talking about perception deny that hallucinations and veridical perceptions have a common fundamental nature, they need some other way to account for the fact that these kinds of experiences can ‘seem the same’ from the inside. A natural response is to give a purely epistemic account of hallucination, according to which there is nothing more to hallucinations than their indiscriminability from veridical perceptions. This chapter argues that the epistemic conception of hallucination falters in its treatment of cognitively unsophisticated creatures, and that it cannot respect all the facts about what we can know on the basis of introspection.Less
Since disjunctivists when talking about perception deny that hallucinations and veridical perceptions have a common fundamental nature, they need some other way to account for the fact that these kinds of experiences can ‘seem the same’ from the inside. A natural response is to give a purely epistemic account of hallucination, according to which there is nothing more to hallucinations than their indiscriminability from veridical perceptions. This chapter argues that the epistemic conception of hallucination falters in its treatment of cognitively unsophisticated creatures, and that it cannot respect all the facts about what we can know on the basis of introspection.
Murray G. H. Pittock
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197263037
- eISBN:
- 9780191734007
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197263037.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, Cultural History
This lecture discusses Robert Burns, a poet who dwelt on the early phase of the poem ‘Resolution and Independence’. It examines the critical introspection that has tended to exclude Burns from an ...
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This lecture discusses Robert Burns, a poet who dwelt on the early phase of the poem ‘Resolution and Independence’. It examines the critical introspection that has tended to exclude Burns from an increasingly narrow definition of Romanticism since 1945. The lecture presents an argument that Burns' concerns are in many respects not those of the ‘peasant poet’ or a particularist Scottish writer, but in dialogue with the other major British Romantic poets. Finally, it demonstrates that Burns' self-consciousness, poetic flexibility, and playful use of category and genre demand a deeper understanding of the nature of British Romanticism and of the scope of his achievement within it.Less
This lecture discusses Robert Burns, a poet who dwelt on the early phase of the poem ‘Resolution and Independence’. It examines the critical introspection that has tended to exclude Burns from an increasingly narrow definition of Romanticism since 1945. The lecture presents an argument that Burns' concerns are in many respects not those of the ‘peasant poet’ or a particularist Scottish writer, but in dialogue with the other major British Romantic poets. Finally, it demonstrates that Burns' self-consciousness, poetic flexibility, and playful use of category and genre demand a deeper understanding of the nature of British Romanticism and of the scope of his achievement within it.
Joseph Mendola
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199534999
- eISBN:
- 9780191715969
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534999.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter provides a characterization of internalism and externalism about mental content, introduces standard motivations for both, and sketches the structure of the book. Standard motivations ...
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This chapter provides a characterization of internalism and externalism about mental content, introduces standard motivations for both, and sketches the structure of the book. Standard motivations for internalism include arguments from introspection and explanation. Standard motivations for externalism include intuitions about cases and more theoretical arguments entwined with externalist accounts of word-mediated thoughts and perceptual thoughts. And both externalists and internalist appeal to science. The goal of this book is to develop another internalist argument, by disposing of all standing externalist arguments and propounding an attractive internalism.Less
This chapter provides a characterization of internalism and externalism about mental content, introduces standard motivations for both, and sketches the structure of the book. Standard motivations for internalism include arguments from introspection and explanation. Standard motivations for externalism include intuitions about cases and more theoretical arguments entwined with externalist accounts of word-mediated thoughts and perceptual thoughts. And both externalists and internalist appeal to science. The goal of this book is to develop another internalist argument, by disposing of all standing externalist arguments and propounding an attractive internalism.
Joseph Mendola
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199534999
- eISBN:
- 9780191715969
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534999.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter develops a symmetry between one simple form of Wittgenstein's private language argument against internalism and standard internalist complaints rooted in explanation and introspection, ...
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This chapter develops a symmetry between one simple form of Wittgenstein's private language argument against internalism and standard internalist complaints rooted in explanation and introspection, for instance arguments of McKinsey and Boghossian. It argues that all of these negative arguments should be answered by internalists and externalists through the same strategy. It also develops a positive account of our introspective access to our thoughts, partly by contrast with Wright's work.Less
This chapter develops a symmetry between one simple form of Wittgenstein's private language argument against internalism and standard internalist complaints rooted in explanation and introspection, for instance arguments of McKinsey and Boghossian. It argues that all of these negative arguments should be answered by internalists and externalists through the same strategy. It also develops a positive account of our introspective access to our thoughts, partly by contrast with Wright's work.
Michael Davies
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199242405
- eISBN:
- 9780191602405
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242402.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Assesses Bunyan’s presentation of religious experience in his spiritual autobiography, Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners, and addresses psychological, medical, and psychoanalytic ...
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Assesses Bunyan’s presentation of religious experience in his spiritual autobiography, Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners, and addresses psychological, medical, and psychoanalytic interpretations of the text. Grace Abounding demonstrates the terrorizing strictures of the law, as well as freedom from them through grace, and many episodes in the account, often read as evidence of Bunyan’s psychological breakdown, are understood here as instructing the reader in covenant theology. Grace Abounding is not a text exemplifying Calvinist anxiety over predestination, as this conversion account warns against such introspection.Less
Assesses Bunyan’s presentation of religious experience in his spiritual autobiography, Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners, and addresses psychological, medical, and psychoanalytic interpretations of the text. Grace Abounding demonstrates the terrorizing strictures of the law, as well as freedom from them through grace, and many episodes in the account, often read as evidence of Bunyan’s psychological breakdown, are understood here as instructing the reader in covenant theology. Grace Abounding is not a text exemplifying Calvinist anxiety over predestination, as this conversion account warns against such introspection.
Katalin Farkas
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199230327
- eISBN:
- 9780191710629
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230327.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter shows that externalism is incompatible with the claim that all mental features are accessible in a privileged way. All and only phenomenal properties of conscious events give rise to ...
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This chapter shows that externalism is incompatible with the claim that all mental features are accessible in a privileged way. All and only phenomenal properties of conscious events give rise to perspectival facts, which are precisely the facts that are open to privileged access. Phenomenal properties are shared by subjects in Twin situations. According to externalists, mental features are determined by factors that go beyond phenomenal properties, and hence they do not register within the subject's point of view. Compared to internalism, externalism limits privileged accessibility. The chapter also criticises the account of self-knowledge based on the fact that some reflective thoughts are conceptually self-verifying, evaluates the argument based on the so-called ‘travelling cases’ for the incompatibility of externalism and self-knowledge, and discusses the relation between discrimination and introspective knowledge.Less
This chapter shows that externalism is incompatible with the claim that all mental features are accessible in a privileged way. All and only phenomenal properties of conscious events give rise to perspectival facts, which are precisely the facts that are open to privileged access. Phenomenal properties are shared by subjects in Twin situations. According to externalists, mental features are determined by factors that go beyond phenomenal properties, and hence they do not register within the subject's point of view. Compared to internalism, externalism limits privileged accessibility. The chapter also criticises the account of self-knowledge based on the fact that some reflective thoughts are conceptually self-verifying, evaluates the argument based on the so-called ‘travelling cases’ for the incompatibility of externalism and self-knowledge, and discusses the relation between discrimination and introspective knowledge.
Mitchell S. Green
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199283781
- eISBN:
- 9780191712548
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283781.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
This chapter elucidates the notion of self-expression by laying down twenty dicta about it. Among them are the claim that self-expression shows one's thought, feeling, or experience; that it is a ...
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This chapter elucidates the notion of self-expression by laying down twenty dicta about it. Among them are the claim that self-expression shows one's thought, feeling, or experience; that it is a signal, that it can be both voluntary and spontaneous, that it can occur unintentionally in a voluntary act, that it may but need not be overt, that it can occur in the course of a ‘saying in one's heart’, and that what is expressed must be the sort of thing that can be known by introspection. Self-expression and expressiveness are also distinguished. The chapter then offers a general gloss of self-expression intended as a working hypothesis in terms of which later chapters are framed.Less
This chapter elucidates the notion of self-expression by laying down twenty dicta about it. Among them are the claim that self-expression shows one's thought, feeling, or experience; that it is a signal, that it can be both voluntary and spontaneous, that it can occur unintentionally in a voluntary act, that it may but need not be overt, that it can occur in the course of a ‘saying in one's heart’, and that what is expressed must be the sort of thing that can be known by introspection. Self-expression and expressiveness are also distinguished. The chapter then offers a general gloss of self-expression intended as a working hypothesis in terms of which later chapters are framed.
Eric Schwitzgebel
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199744794
- eISBN:
- 9780199933396
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Introspection is not a single process but a plurality of processes. It’s a plurality both within and between cases: Most individual introspective judgments arise from a plurality of processes (that’s ...
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Introspection is not a single process but a plurality of processes. It’s a plurality both within and between cases: Most individual introspective judgments arise from a plurality of processes (that’s the within-case claim), and the collection of processes issuing in introspective judgments differs from case to case (that’s the between-case claim). Introspection is not the operation of a single cognitive mechanism or small collection of mechanisms. Introspective judgments arise from a shifting confluence of many processes, recruited opportunistically. Introspection is the dedication of central cognitive resources, or attention, to the task of arriving at a judgment about one’s current, or very recently past, conscious experience, using or attempting to use some capacities that are unique to the first-person case, with the aim or intention that one’s judgment reflect some relatively direct sensitivity to the target state. Cases discussed include visual experience, emotion, and auditory imagery.Less
Introspection is not a single process but a plurality of processes. It’s a plurality both within and between cases: Most individual introspective judgments arise from a plurality of processes (that’s the within-case claim), and the collection of processes issuing in introspective judgments differs from case to case (that’s the between-case claim). Introspection is not the operation of a single cognitive mechanism or small collection of mechanisms. Introspective judgments arise from a shifting confluence of many processes, recruited opportunistically. Introspection is the dedication of central cognitive resources, or attention, to the task of arriving at a judgment about one’s current, or very recently past, conscious experience, using or attempting to use some capacities that are unique to the first-person case, with the aim or intention that one’s judgment reflect some relatively direct sensitivity to the target state. Cases discussed include visual experience, emotion, and auditory imagery.
