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Ethics: and "The Nature of Moral Philosophy"

G. E. Moore

William H. Shaw (ed.)

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780199272013
eISBN:
9780191603181
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199272018.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

This book is a new edition of G.E. Moore’s Ethics, originally published in 1912. In it, Moore analyzes the utilitarian account of right and wrong in great detail, defending the doctrine that results ... More


Utilitarianism (concluded)

G. E. Moore

in Ethics: and "The Nature of Moral Philosophy"

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780199272013
eISBN:
9780191603181
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199272018.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

This chapter continues the previous chapter’s detailed analysis of the utilitarian account of right and wrong. Utilitarianism asserts not only that producing a maximum of pleasure is a characteristic ... More


Intrinsic Value

G. E. Moore

in Ethics: and "The Nature of Moral Philosophy"

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780199272013
eISBN:
9780191603181
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199272018.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

In this final chapter, Moore rebuts egoism and upholds the view that it is always our duty to perform that action, of the various ones open to us, the total consequences of which will have the ... More


Two Kinds of Intrinsic Goodness

Michael Slote

in From Morality to Virtue

Published in print:
1995
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195093926
eISBN:
9780199833689
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195093925.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Two different kinds of intrinsic goodness are often conflated. A state of affairs can be intrinsically good (e.g. the virtuous being happy), but certain things can be intrinsically good for a person, ... More


The Objectivity of Moral Judgements (concluded)

G. E. Moore

in Ethics: and "The Nature of Moral Philosophy"

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780199272013
eISBN:
9780191603181
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199272018.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

This chapter continues Moore’s critique of different attitudinal theories of ethics begun in the previous chapter. He discusses theories that view moral judgements as judgements about the will ... More


Value Monism in Epistemology

Michael R. DePaul

in Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195128925
eISBN:
9780199833764
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195128923.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Value monism is the view that truth is the only intrinsic epistemic good, and justification is valuable only as a means to true belief. Argues against this view. The two propositions – (1) truth is ... More


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