G. E. Moore
William H. Shaw (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272013
- eISBN:
- 9780191603181
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272018.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book is a new edition of G.E. Moore’s Ethics, originally published in 1912. In it, Moore analyzes the utilitarian account of right and wrong in great detail, defending the doctrine that results ...
More
This book is a new edition of G.E. Moore’s Ethics, originally published in 1912. In it, Moore analyzes the utilitarian account of right and wrong in great detail, defending the doctrine that results are the test of right and wrong while rejecting utilitarianism’s hedonistic value theory. The book argues at length against attitudinal accounts of right and wrong, which threaten to undermine the objectivity or moral judgements. It also has important things to say about intrinsic value, free will, the motives of actions, and many other topics. Although Moore’s 1903 Principia Ethica has overshadowed it, Ethics is a rich text that displays great philosophical skill and intellectual candour, and merits careful study in its own right. Moore himself always regarded the book favourably. Thirty years after its publication, he wrote, ‘I myself like [it] better than Principia Ethica, because it seems to me to be much clearer and far less full of confusions and invalid arguments’. This edition of Ethics includes Moore’s essay, ‘The Nature of Moral Philosophy’. It also contains an introduction by the editor, notes on the text, a brief chronology of Moore’s life, an index, and suggestions for further reading.Less
This book is a new edition of G.E. Moore’s Ethics, originally published in 1912. In it, Moore analyzes the utilitarian account of right and wrong in great detail, defending the doctrine that results are the test of right and wrong while rejecting utilitarianism’s hedonistic value theory. The book argues at length against attitudinal accounts of right and wrong, which threaten to undermine the objectivity or moral judgements. It also has important things to say about intrinsic value, free will, the motives of actions, and many other topics. Although Moore’s 1903 Principia Ethica has overshadowed it, Ethics is a rich text that displays great philosophical skill and intellectual candour, and merits careful study in its own right. Moore himself always regarded the book favourably. Thirty years after its publication, he wrote, ‘I myself like [it] better than Principia Ethica, because it seems to me to be much clearer and far less full of confusions and invalid arguments’. This edition of Ethics includes Moore’s essay, ‘The Nature of Moral Philosophy’. It also contains an introduction by the editor, notes on the text, a brief chronology of Moore’s life, an index, and suggestions for further reading.
G. E. Moore
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272013
- eISBN:
- 9780191603181
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272018.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter continues the previous chapter’s detailed analysis of the utilitarian account of right and wrong. Utilitarianism asserts not only that producing a maximum of pleasure is a characteristic ...
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This chapter continues the previous chapter’s detailed analysis of the utilitarian account of right and wrong. Utilitarianism asserts not only that producing a maximum of pleasure is a characteristic of all and only right actions, but also that right actions are right because they produce a maximum of pleasure. Moreover, this is true in all conceivable circumstances and in any conceivable universe. Moore also explains what it means for utilitarianism to judge something to be intrinsically better (or worse) than other things, and he distinguishes something as being ‘intrinsically good’ from its being ‘ultimately good’ or ‘good for its own sake’.Less
This chapter continues the previous chapter’s detailed analysis of the utilitarian account of right and wrong. Utilitarianism asserts not only that producing a maximum of pleasure is a characteristic of all and only right actions, but also that right actions are right because they produce a maximum of pleasure. Moreover, this is true in all conceivable circumstances and in any conceivable universe. Moore also explains what it means for utilitarianism to judge something to be intrinsically better (or worse) than other things, and he distinguishes something as being ‘intrinsically good’ from its being ‘ultimately good’ or ‘good for its own sake’.
G. E. Moore
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272013
- eISBN:
- 9780191603181
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272018.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
In this final chapter, Moore rebuts egoism and upholds the view that it is always our duty to perform that action, of the various ones open to us, the total consequences of which will have the ...
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In this final chapter, Moore rebuts egoism and upholds the view that it is always our duty to perform that action, of the various ones open to us, the total consequences of which will have the greatest intrinsic value. He criticizes the hedonistic doctrine that one whole is intrinsically better than another when, and only when, it contains more pleasure. He rejects not only the idea that intrinsic value is proportional to pleasure, but also that it is proportional to any other single factor. He concludes by distinguishing different senses in which a thing can be good or bad.Less
In this final chapter, Moore rebuts egoism and upholds the view that it is always our duty to perform that action, of the various ones open to us, the total consequences of which will have the greatest intrinsic value. He criticizes the hedonistic doctrine that one whole is intrinsically better than another when, and only when, it contains more pleasure. He rejects not only the idea that intrinsic value is proportional to pleasure, but also that it is proportional to any other single factor. He concludes by distinguishing different senses in which a thing can be good or bad.
Michael Slote
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195093926
- eISBN:
- 9780199833689
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195093925.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Two different kinds of intrinsic goodness are often conflated. A state of affairs can be intrinsically good (e.g. the virtuous being happy), but certain things can be intrinsically good for a person, ...
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Two different kinds of intrinsic goodness are often conflated. A state of affairs can be intrinsically good (e.g. the virtuous being happy), but certain things can be intrinsically good for a person, a constitutive element in his or her welfare. These notions do not come together, as Kant's example of the prosperous but evil individual manifestly indicates: intuitively, such a state of affairs is in itself intrinsically bad but is nonetheless intrinsically good for, i.e. beneficial to, the prosperous individual. Any virtue ethics needs to keep these concepts distinct.Less
Two different kinds of intrinsic goodness are often conflated. A state of affairs can be intrinsically good (e.g. the virtuous being happy), but certain things can be intrinsically good for a person, a constitutive element in his or her welfare. These notions do not come together, as Kant's example of the prosperous but evil individual manifestly indicates: intuitively, such a state of affairs is in itself intrinsically bad but is nonetheless intrinsically good for, i.e. beneficial to, the prosperous individual. Any virtue ethics needs to keep these concepts distinct.
G. E. Moore
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272013
- eISBN:
- 9780191603181
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272018.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter continues Moore’s critique of different attitudinal theories of ethics begun in the previous chapter. He discusses theories that view moral judgements as judgements about the will ...
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This chapter continues Moore’s critique of different attitudinal theories of ethics begun in the previous chapter. He discusses theories that view moral judgements as judgements about the will (rather than the feelings) of some being or beings, focusing on the theory that the wrongness of what is wrong consists simply in the fact that God forbids it. Moore then turns to theories that see mental attitudes as determining, not what is right and wrong, but rather what is good and bad.Less
This chapter continues Moore’s critique of different attitudinal theories of ethics begun in the previous chapter. He discusses theories that view moral judgements as judgements about the will (rather than the feelings) of some being or beings, focusing on the theory that the wrongness of what is wrong consists simply in the fact that God forbids it. Moore then turns to theories that see mental attitudes as determining, not what is right and wrong, but rather what is good and bad.
Michael R. DePaul
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195128925
- eISBN:
- 9780199833764
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195128923.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Value monism is the view that truth is the only intrinsic epistemic good, and justification is valuable only as a means to true belief. Argues against this view. The two propositions – (1) truth is ...
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Value monism is the view that truth is the only intrinsic epistemic good, and justification is valuable only as a means to true belief. Argues against this view. The two propositions – (1) truth is the only intrinsic epistemic good, and (2) knowledge is better than mere true belief – cannot, according to the writer, both be true. Since (2) is obviously true, we must reject (1), and embrace value pluralism, which asserts that in addition to truth, there are further intrinsic goods, such as knowledge and justification.Less
Value monism is the view that truth is the only intrinsic epistemic good, and justification is valuable only as a means to true belief. Argues against this view. The two propositions – (1) truth is the only intrinsic epistemic good, and (2) knowledge is better than mere true belief – cannot, according to the writer, both be true. Since (2) is obviously true, we must reject (1), and embrace value pluralism, which asserts that in addition to truth, there are further intrinsic goods, such as knowledge and justification.
