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This chapter discusses the nature of the derivation of powers and the theories of the ontology of powers. It explains that a power is derivative if the presence of this power in the object depends on the powers that its constituents have and the special relations the constituents have to each other. The chapter presents the consequences of derivation as simplification, explanatory strength, complexity, grounding, and intrinsicality. The chapter also examines the taxonomy of the theories regarding the ontology of powers. The theories are broken down into dualism of pure types, dual-sided theory, pan-disposition alarm, categoricalism, and neutral monism.

This chapter argues that Friedrich Nietzsche's proposal that the fundamental constituents of reality are both intrinsic and relational is a contentious metaphysical thesis. It analyses the philosophical cogency of the proposal and argues that intrinsicality and relationality are incongruous because relationality, unlike intrinsicality, is existentially committed. It explores Nietzsche's bundle theory of objects and the role of resistance in bringing powers into relations and suggests that Nietzsche believed that powers do not logically imply other powers on which they are existentially dependent.

Slot theory is the view that (i) there exist such entities as argument places, or ‘slots’, in universals, and that (ii) a universal u is n-adic if and only if there are exactly n slots in u. This chapter argues that those who take properties and relations to be abundant, fine-grained, non-set-theoretical entities face pressure to be slot theorists. It is noted that slots permit a natural account of the notion of adicy. The chapter then considers a series of ‘slot-free’ accounts of that notion and argues that each of them has significant drawbacks.

This chapter defends a modified version of the HOT theory referred to here as the wide intrinsicality view (WIV). In contrast to the HOT theory, The WIV states that although what makes mental states conscious is intrinsic to conscious states, an inner relational element is also present within the structure of such states. The chapter starts with an introduction to a seemingly false dilemma invoked by Rosenthal, followed by some initial rationale for favoring the WIV over his version of HOT theory. The three most serious objections to the standard HOT theory are addressed here, namely, the problem of misrepresentation, the problem of the rock, and the hard problem of consciousness. This chapter shows how the WIV can address these problems, specifically the problems of misrepresentation and of the rock. For the final problem, it is shown that either version of the HOT theory is a better solution.

This chapter provides a framework for understanding two ways in which reasons can vary across contexts, namely through the effects of (1) conditions which take the form of enablers and disablers, as well as (2) modifiers which take the form of intensifiers and attenuators. The chapter establishes that the distinction between those features of the context that condition or modify a reason and those that constitute the reason is metaphysically robust and can be drawn in a non-arbitrary and non-pragmatic manner, and that the former features cannot be included in the specification of the reason. Moreover, it will be shown that intrinsicality as well as restricted forms of non-trivial separability can be preserved, thereby establishing that the additive theory of weighing reasons can be rendered consistent with these forms of context-dependence.

When counterfactuals hold concerning entities with properties that stand in some kind of loose existential dependency relation, counterfactual dependence only indicates a causal relationship if part of their corresponding minimal supervenience bases satisfies the analysis of causation. The idea has application even if properties are understood in ways proponents of a powers ontology recommend. An analysis of intrinsic properties in this chapter appeals to three features—External Independence, Duplication Characterization, and Maximizing Recombination—each of which, by itself, doesn’t quite work to demarcate what we have in mind. This provides a second way of approaching the issue as well as assisting with later analysis of varieties of Humean supervenience.

The proposed analysis of causation is compatible with allowing that there are ways to distinguish the variety that falls under it. The same characteristics as those who take causation to involve substantial causal processes characterize kinds of causation without these characteristics themselves serve to characterize causation in general. This is an advantage because the theories that make an appeal to substantial processes in understanding causation face considerable difficulties. The attempt to tie causation to the presence of substantial causal processes between cause and effect fails to be justified by appeal to responsibility, or by its capacity to make sense of causal locality and the intrinsic character of causal processes. Some claim that a counterfactual theory closes off certain options with regard to the property understanding of Bell inequalities. This is not the case.