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This chapter brings together the findings of the three case studies and the statistical analysis, and offers a forward‐looking discussion of how to design political institutions in order to effectively manage intrastate conflict. It also discusses the political and logistical issues involved in implementing such a system, and discusses avenues for future research.

Why does decentralization reduce ethnic conflict and secessionism more in some countries than in others? This question constitutes the central focus of this book. After presenting the puzzle, the book defines political decentralization and lays out the debate between scholars, who argue that decentralization intensifies intrastate conflict, and policy‐makers, who argue that decentralization reduces it. The chapter previews the book's argument, which is that the effect of decentralization hinges on the electoral strength of regional parties. Subsequently, the book describes its methodological approach, consisting of three carefully selected cases studies — Czechoslovakia (1989–93), Spain (1976–present), and India (1947–present) — and a statistical analysis examining the effect on decentralization and regional parties on intrastate conflict, and decentralization, in turn, on regional parties.

This chapter elaborates on the argument regarding how the effect of decentralization on intrastate conflict hinges on regional parties. Brancati argues that the negative effects typically associated with decentralization are not an effect of decentralization directly, but that of regional parties. Specifically, it argues that regional parties create regional identities, advocate legislation that is harmful to other regions and regional minorities, and also mobilize groups to engage in ethnic conflict and secessionism and support extremist organizations that engage in these activities. The chapter also establishes in this chapter a number of conditions under which regional parties are likely to stimulate conflict and secessionism, and statewide parties are likely to reduce it. The chapter further argues that decentralization, in turn, increases the strength of regional parties depending on particular features of decentralization (i.e. the proportion of legislative seats a region possesses, the number of regional legislatures in a country, the upper house election procedures, the sequencing of national and regional elections). The chapter also offers a theoretical discussion in this chapter of the origins of decentralization and regional parties, arguing that neither is simply a product of the underlying ethnolinguistic, religious, and territorial differences in a country, but have an independent effect on these differences, and on conflict and secessionism.

This chapter examines how the mediation dilemma might play out more strongly in civil wars through a number of illustrative case studies. The case of Rwanda shows that greater vulnerability in intrastate conflicts, where former combatants must coexist, can make mediation particularly precarious in the long run. The Haiti case demonstrates that third parties have the potential to interfere with the mutual dependence between the governed and those governing that must exist in stable polities. The Oslo Middle East peace process shows that third parties can affect the contest for legitimacy that often occurs in civil wars and can create the incentives for spoilers to emerge. The Sri Lankan conflict reveals that the nature of insurgency can generate incentives to use mediation for insincere motives and derail any post-mediation peace. Finally, mediation in Aceh is a potential example of a case in which the bargaining environment and the mediator techniques were conducive to reaching both a short-and long-term peace.

Political economy analyses of intrastate conflicts have focused on the links between resource scarcities, distributional inequities, and political marginalization. As well, scholars agree that institutions are vital in the attenuation, mediation, and mitigation of intrastate conflicts. This chapter captures the major explanations for intrastate conflicts and the institutional prescriptions to manage them. These studies include the modernization theories of the 1960s, the weak state literature of the 1980s and 1990s, and the recent theorizing on natural resources and conflicts. These studies share key assumptions about the centrality of socio-economic inequities, weak governance structures, and the availability of opportunities for groups to contest their grievances. The conclusion proposes that although civil conflicts are ending in most parts of the world, multilateral approaches and initiatives remain critical in tackling new intrastate fissures and regionalized conflicts.

In this chapter, the book proposes four general categories that represent the barriers that lead states to choose indirect intervention: (1) the risk of escalation, (2) a lack of domestic support, (3) a lack of international support, and (4) a lack of capacity. Facing these restrictions, states must decide how much control they desire over the outcome when intervening indirectly. Further, the chapter suggests that proxy war is only one means of indirectly intervening in the affairs of another state and can be broken down into two general types: donated assistance and proxy war. Lastly, the chapter offers a new typology for proxy war (in it to win it, holding action, meddling, and feeding the chaos) and explains how the different types fit into a state’s policy to intervene in the affairs of another state.

Building on the conceptual framework offered by this book, this chapter develops a preliminary typology of wartime sexual violence that is based on the politico-economic conditions of war. This chapter uncovers specific patterns in the perpetration of sexual violence across different conflicts, which are directly related to the politico-economic determinants of the armed conflicts. While sociocultural context and individual motivations play an undeniable role, this typology focuses on the structural level to examine how the political economic determinants of war shape both the objective of the armed group and the forms and functions of sexual violence perpetrated by the group.

Creating a meaningful analysis of historical as well as current interpolity relations in Inner and East Asia requires using an entirely different lens than we are accustomed to. By suspending the political and legal baggage of modern concepts of statehood, sovereignty, and independence, we achieve a better-informed assessment of assertions made in support of claims to territory, authority, and related political projects in this part of the world today. By applying this approach, conflict-resolution practitioners will be aware of how states and non-state actors deploy historical narratives to construe the past so as to justify nationalist policies and ambitions in the present, thereby excluding alternative visions of the past and hindering their ability to imagine how relations within and between states might be more effectively ordered today. The chapter offers as examples the conflicting narratives concerning the South China Sea, Preah Vihear, Arunachal Pradesh, the Senkaku Islands, and the selection of the present Dalai Lama’s reincarnation. Unblocking these sovereignty conflicts requires a major pluralistic reinterpretation of the Asian past if we are to achieve a more open understanding of the present.