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This chapter reflects on the impact of the Human Rights Act (HRA) in its first 10 years on litigation and, in particular, on advocacy. It suggests that the impact has been important but not revolutionary: the HRA has fitted into the existing legal landscape and has not required radical changes to the rules on procedure and evidence. It examines four areas in which its impact can be felt: the nature of the evidence required in human rights cases; disclosure and candour in judicial review proceedings; the increased need for cross-examination of witnesses; and the role of third-party interveners because human rights cases tend to raise issues of importance to the wider public. Finally, it examines the increasing importance of international law in domestic cases, which can be attributed in part to the impact of the HRA.

This chapter describes a major transition from monopoly to market at EDF, the French state-owned electricity company that is today's the world's biggest electrical utility firm. It took ten years to persuade managers and unions to sit around a single table to develop a new system of industrial relations. The intervener's role was to help managers understand the effects of their policies towards workers and unions and to help with the negotiation of social agreements.

This concluding chapter discusses how intervener cultures interact with the broad range of factors that challenge and undermine the effectiveness of peace operations, including by giving rise to the perpetration of sexual misconduct against local communities. In light of this, it details the key insights this book has revealed about the nature and impacts of sexual misconduct by interveners in peace operations and suggests how the international community might better address this issue and its complex, interlinked implications in the future. The chapter also reflects on the major shortcomings of policy on sexual exploitation and abuse to date, including the individualization of sexual exploitation and abuse, which relegates responses primarily to conduct and discipline policies rather than addressing the broader and systemic issues at play. It then considers the extent to which recent policy shifts might avoid replicating past mistakes in terms of sexual exploitation and abuse policy. Ultimately, recognizing the mutually reinforcing ways in which sexual exploitation and abuse by interveners undermines peacekeeping and peacebuilding outcomes and developing an effective and robust response to such misconduct and other interlinked peacekeeping challenges based on that understanding is crucial to the pursuit of global peace, order, and justice.

This chapter traces the history of sexual exploitation and abuse in peace operations globally, including the various forms it takes (only some of which are criminal) and the range of international interveners who perpetrate it. Sexual exploitation and abuse first emerged as an issue in peace operations during the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1993, when the number of prostitutes in the country grew from six thousand before the United Nations arrived to more than twenty-five thousand in 1993. The data available on sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated by interveners suggests that the range of misconduct is diverse, encompassing opportunistic sexual abuse, transactional sex, networked sexual exploitation, and extremely violent or sadistic attacks. The chapter presents an account of how and why these behaviors occur in peace operations by investigating the local, international, normative, systemic, and structural factors that give rise to them. It also addresses the connections between sexual misconduct by interveners, conflict-related sexual violence perpetrated during wars, and the sexual harassment and abuse that is perpetrated by interveners against their colleagues in peace operations.

This chapter presents the case studies that underpin the analysis of the long-term impacts of sexual exploitation and abuse. It develops a detailed account of the context, nature, and scale of sexual misconduct during peace operations in Bosnia and Timor-Leste, drawing extensively on primary research in the two countries. The behaviors spanned all four types of misconduct and were perpetrated by a variety of uniformed and civilian interveners, including peacekeepers and non-UN personnel associated with the international community's presence in each country. They confirm many of the trends identified in the previous chapter about patterns of perpetration and contributing factors. However, this analysis also demonstrates that the ways in which local communities experience sexual exploitation and abuse is grounded in historical experience, cultural norms, and, in many ways, the particular forms of material deprivation and conflict-related sexual violence experienced, with significant variation between what was considered inappropriate behavior in the two countries.

This chapter investigates the micro- and mission-level impacts of sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated by interveners in peace operations on the international community's capacity to fulfill its goals related to security, stability, and peacebuilding in postconflict contexts. These impacts operate on three levels: the individual and community level, the structural level, and the operational level. One fairly obvious conclusion arising from this analysis is that, in perpetrating sexual exploitation and abuse, interveners commit human rights violations, consolidate structures and processes that facilitate further exploitation and abuse, and spark conflict with actors who object to such behaviors. Thus, these outcomes are not in line with general expectations of the impacts peacekeepers should have on local populations and host states. Sexual exploitation and abuse is a significant source of mistrust between local communities and the international intervention, particularly as it intersected with other behaviors that amplified and exploited the power imbalance between international interveners and local communities.

The information of the parties to the proceedings on the order accepting admissibility of the application for an intervention may be given by serving the order on the parties and the intervener pursuant to Rule 314.

This chapter contains an introductory account of the basic scope and meaning of the doctrine of negotiorum gestio. It should again be stressed that it is not here intended to describe the doctrine in all its details, or to give a full report of the ways in which an intervener might recover in the continental systems here discussed. Instead, the purpose of this chapter is merely to illustrate how a general principle allowing necessitous interveners to recover — negotiorum gestio — operates within a modern legal system. Thus, this chapter does not contain any discussion of, for example, the intervener's possible claims in contract or tort, nor of the specific provisions in the German civil code entitling the finder of lost goods to reimbursement of his expenses as well as a reward.

This chapter contains an introductory account of the position in English law. English Law in principle denies the intervener a claim, be it for reward or for mere reimbursement of his expenses. Yet, as with the rule of no liability for nonfeasance, it proves surprisingly difficult to find any authority for this supposed principle. While there seems to be no authority for the supposed principle of denying voluntary interveners a claim, English law does not appear to contain a general principle that does grant interveners a claim. And whilst most of the English doctrines discussed in this chapter merely allow claims for reimbursement of expenses and/or compensation of loss, the salvage cases form an obvious exception, as well as some cases in equity, where trustees were on occasion remunerated for services voluntarily rendered.

Throughout the centuries, the courts' attitude towards necessitous interveners has been ambiguous. There are numerous obiter dicta that oppose the granting of a claim to the intervener. Yet, there is an ever-growing list of cases in which the courts have granted a claim to the voluntary intervener. Regrettably, in granting such claims, the courts have resorted to a variety of doctrines. It is here suggested that the law ought to work towards a general principle allowing voluntary interveners to recover. The logical first step in this process is to investigate whether any of the existing doctrines can be extended so as to incorporate such a general principle. Some of these doctrines can be dismissed out of hand. The law of contract is the first amongst these. Of course, the implied contract theory could have been employed to develop a general principle.

It is seen that none of the existing doctrines possess the right tools for the development of a general principle that allow the intervener to recover. This chapter discusses the alternative to this, which is to develop a separate doctrine. In doing so, the doctrine to be developed must first of all succeed in removing the existing disincentives against voluntary intervention. To the potential intervener, the intervention must therefore at least appear cost-neutral. Furthermore, whether or not success should be required largely depends on the measure of recovery that is allowed to the intervener. Then to allow the intervening roof contractor full remuneration even where no success has been achieved, would be to grant him more rights than he would have had if he had had the opportunity to negotiate with the defendant. Most contracts for professional services, however, require the application of best endeavours, not results.

With regard to the service of decisions and orders, para 1 refers to Rules 270–275 which apply to service on all parties on the opposite side of the service, including interveners (Rules 313–317). Refer to the respective parts of the commentary. The date of service of decisions is relevant for the beginning of the time periods for lodging an appeal and the grounds of appeal (Rule 224).

This chapter explores the theoretical arguments against granting a remedy to the intervener. Here, one can distinguish the following main arguments against the imposition of a duty to reward or remunerate the good Samaritan or even to merely reimburse his expenses: granting a claim would lead to ‘ruinous litigation’, it would lead to ‘the overthrow of personal rights and civil freedom’, and it would do ‘violence to some of the kindest and best effusions of the heart’. This chapter discusses each of these arguments separately. In addition, it also investigates whether a change in the law might lead to abuse by meddlesome interveners looking to make a profit. Furthermore, if justice requires the introduction of a general right, the mere possibility of abuse should not be enough to reverse it. There are many existing doctrines that are open to abuse.

This chapter explores the theoretical arguments in favour of granting a remedy to the intervener in Continental Europe. One of the main arguments that have been used to justify the granting of a claim to the intervener has been that the law ought not to discourage interveners. Amongst English and American scholars, too, those who argue in favour of granting a remedy to the intervener usually invoke this policy argument. Under the present policy argument, it is assumed, potential good Samaritans are discouraged because their intervention might prove to be a costly affair if the beneficiary refuses to reimburse their expenses and compensate them for their losses. The solution, it is argued, is to introduce a right to be compensated for the loss incurred during the intervention — to ‘offset pre-legal countervailing disincentives’ — or even a right to a positive reward in order to actively encourage intervention.

This chapter explores why the Video Recordings Act (VRA) looks set to be a permanent feature on the statute book. A draft Video Recordings Bill was notified to the EC on 10 September 2009. The British Video Association urged its members to continue submitting DVDs as normal to the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC). The Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport played the role of ‘intervener’ with the result that the Obscene Publications Act is abolished. ‘Harm’ is defined in the context of media legislation. It is argued in this chapter that the VRA should simply be abolished hook, line and sinker. As far as film and video censorship in contemporary Britain is concerned, the message from the political class continues to ring out loud and clear: there is no alternative.

This chapter examines the growth and value of interventions in judicial proceedings. It argues the exponential growth in interventions is largely attributable not to the CPR, but the introduction of the Human Rights Act. The decision whether or not to allow an intervention, and then whether to give any weight to its content is wholly discretionary. Interventions are part of a wider trend to an increasingly inquisitorial jurisdiction, beyond the adversarial contest between the parties. Two reasons for the growth in interventions are courts’ willingness to take into account broader policy considerations in judicial review proceedings, and relatedly the willingness of the courts to hear international law and comparative law arguments and place weight on them. The Supreme Court, in particular, has encouraged interventions in recent years, and Baroness Hale has made clear in writing how useful she finds them. Although interveners are now subject to the risk of adverse costs orders under the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 for interventions deemed to be unhelpful, to date these provisions do not appear to have been applied, which suggests that that this part of the Government’s efforts to discourage interveners has been unsuccessful.

A petitioner is adversely affected by a final decision if that decision did not give him all that he had applied for. It is necessary that the decision is totally or partly less than requested by the claimant (→ Art 76(1) UPCA) or that the defendant has lost to a full extent or partly. There is no threshold value; therefore, an application for rehearing is also admissible in cases with a low economic value. It is of no importance whether the reasons given in the decision contain unfavourable and/or incorrect statements on legal questions or facts. Nor is it important whether the decision unfavourable to the applicant was based on procedural or material reasons.

This chapter examines the effects of regime change on relations between interveners and targets and on domestic conditions in the latter. It seeks to answer two principal questions: First, why does regime change, undertaken to improve relations between two states, so often go awry, failing to advance those relations and triggering further conflict—both inside the target of regime change and between the target and the intervener? Second, why do some regime change operations turn out better than others? The chapter focuses mainly on the universe of successful regime changes enacted by all countries in the world over an extended period of time. It compares instances of regime change to cases where it was absent, or where it was attempted but failed. The chapter establishes whether regime change actually causes domestic strife in targets and conflict between targets and interveners, or merely occurs where these outcomes were already more likely to happen.

This chapter lays out in detail the definition of foreign-imposed regime change. It distinguishes regime change from related concepts such as the imposition of regimes in new states emerging from colonialism (often referred to as imposed polities); military occupation; annexation; and state death. The chapter then details the three principal ways in which regime change is carried out: compellent threats demanding leader change; invasion; and overt or covert interventions in which external forces work with domestic factions located inside the target or in a nearby state. The chapter presents a list of cases of regime change that took place between 1816 and 2011, then determines the most frequent interveners and targets of regime change. It also investigates trends in regime change over time and across regions of the world and distinguishes among three types of regime change—leadership, institutional, restoration.