Search Results

This chapter investigates global trends from 1991 to 2008. In particular, it inquires whether the macro-level propositions identified in Chapter 1 have been borne out. Therefore, it considers whether the level of interstate conflict has declined, whether global defense spending has decreased, whether the threat of global terrorism has begun to supplant interstate warfare on the global security agenda, and whether regional and global multilateral security institutions have begun to supplant states as the primary security providers, as many globalization scholars have predicted. It is shown that global trends are not very consistent with the globalization-kills-the-national-security-state hypothesis. Moreover, to the extent that certain features of the contemporary international system are consistent with the globalization school's predictions, it remains unclear whether globalization is the sole cause (or even the primary cause), or whether something potentially less enduring — such as American hegemony, the defense/deterrence dominance of contemporary military technology, or a lull after the all-encompassing global clash that was the Cold War — may have been more instrumental.

Twenty years ago realists, emphasizing the influence of the international system and working in the humanistic tradition, dominated research on the causes of war. Today, liberal theories occupy center stage, and political scientists rely on statistical analyses of pairs of states through time. Epidemiological studies of over 12,000 dyads, 1885-2001, using a liberal-realist model of interstate conflict confirm the pacific benefits of democracy and economic interdependence. Development is also beneficial. Key elements of realism do receive statistical support; but democracy and trade are at least as influential as power, and they are more amenable to social engineering. Realism does not provide a path to world peace. The best hope is continued liberal reforms: the expansion and deepening of democracy and capitalism and the inclusion of more countries in the international economic system. Fortunately, globalization has advanced rapidly in recent decades, making for a generally optimistic prognosis.

Looking at examples of interstate asymmetric conflict, this chapter argues that regimes of minor powers fighting major powers might seem suicidal. This book was not the first piece of research to have been puzzled by such behaviour. However, in this introduction, the strengths and weaknesses of previous studies are highlighted. The aim of this book is to attempt to address some of these weaknesses by asking a similar question on more recent cases, namely, why or under what conditions have minor powers attempted to resist or challenge others they know to be significantly more powerful than they by force of arms in the post-Cold War period? That said, this chapter argues that problem-driven pragmatism allows us to take insights from multiple theories. Finally, this chapter discusses the data, findings, relevance, scope and the main audience that might be interested in reading this book. At the end of the chapter, the organisation of the book is provided.

This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the origin of the terms “conflict of laws” and “private international Law” and the different assumptions underlying them, and continues with a description of the three parts of conflicts law: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. It then describes the various categories of intra-national (horizontal and vertical) and international conflicts of laws and the methods used historically to solve them. It concludes with a comparison of the role of interstate and international borders in the occurrence and resolution of these conflicts, as well as a selected general bibliography of works in the subject area.

The chapter on peace and trade takes as its starting point a historical account of the relationship between trade and peace. Its focus is on the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) of the World Trade Organization, which is initially considered in the light of the general link between the WTO Agreement and the level of conflict and tensions between and within states. The chapter finds that in cases concerning interstate conflicts or tensions, the DSM is likely to reduce the conflicts and tensions, and benefit smaller, weaker states. Conversely, where cases involve internal conflicts or tensions, the DSM is more likely to increase such conflicts and tensions, and benefit bigger, more powerful states. These conclusions are based on a study of cases registered with the DSM, as well as general assumptions regarding the regulatory and institutional framework of the WTO and regarding states’ use of trade measures and the DSM.

Building on the conceptual framework offered by this book, this chapter develops a preliminary typology of wartime sexual violence that is based on the politico-economic conditions of war. This chapter uncovers specific patterns in the perpetration of sexual violence across different conflicts, which are directly related to the politico-economic determinants of the armed conflicts. While sociocultural context and individual motivations play an undeniable role, this typology focuses on the structural level to examine how the political economic determinants of war shape both the objective of the armed group and the forms and functions of sexual violence perpetrated by the group.

This chapter illustrates how the public health crises of the 1790s can illustrate the ambiguous nationhood of the early United States and the tension among the states as they attempted to situate themselves within both a national and a global context. Faced with the continuing borderless health threats, the Pennsylvanians—Philadelphians especially—were forced to think about the nature of their relationship with the world beyond the banks of the Delaware River. Philadelphia was after all the center of the quarantine debate that arose from the 1796 Smith Bill. That, in turn, reflected the ways in which interstate conflict over coordinating policy across jurisdictional lines also illuminates the ongoing argument over the place of consent and coercion in achieving consensus among individuals.

The international law of occupation—as it has developed since the nineteenth century—traditionally regulates the conduct and obligations of occupying forces. Very little is said about the obligations of an occupied State, or a ‘victim’ State. This chapter focuses on a limited practice of the European Court of Human Rights in developing some principles in this respect. The main emphasis is put on the landmark judgment Ilascu v Moldova and Russia, in which, for the first time, the Court has found that a State, which lost effective control over a part of its territory and was unable to exercise its jurisdiction there, still had some positive obligations deriving from its de jure jurisdiction. It is argued that the Court’s approach represented a new development in international law, which traditionally considered human rights obligations to be primarily triggered by an effective territorial control. It is further discussed that it might be quite difficult to reconcile positive obligations towards people remaining in occupied territories with a State’s obligation to refrain from supporting separatist regimes. Substitution of effective control for the concept of ‘positive obligations’ necessitates a very delicate assessment of different political, diplomatic, judicial, and other measures, which requires a high degree of sensitivity on the part of the international court. The scope of the positive obligations of an injured State vis-à-vis the positive obligations of an occupying State needs to be elucidated further.