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This book analyzes the history of the interpretation of the book of Job by medieval Jewish exegetes. The scholarship on medieval Jewish thought has focused largely on the systematic philosophical aspects of this literature. The author, however, is concerned with exegesis qua exegesis. He offers a close examination of commentaries on Job written by six major thinkers: Saadiah Gaon (882-942, Egypt and Babylon), Moses Maimonides (1138-1204, Spain and Egypt), Samuel ibn Tibbon (1160-1230, Provence), Zerahiah Hen (13th Century, Barcelona and Rome), Levi Gersonides (1288-1344, Provence), and Simeon ben Zeham Duran (1361-1444, Majorca and Algiers). Saadiah and Maimonides wrote in Arabic, the other four in Hebrew. The author looks at the relationship between the commentaries and their antecedent sources as well as their relationship to the broader context of medieval Jewish thought. He also provides an overview of the questions the commentators confronted about the historicity, national origin, and “Jewishness” of the text. He argues that the commentaries on Job are linked in a coherent and evolving tradition of interpretation and he identifies various views of providence as the central concern of them all.

This book is a compendium of writings from the last ten years by one of the leading figures in aesthetics, Jerrold Levinson. It contains twenty-four essays and is divided into seven parts. The first is about issues relating to art in general, not specific to one art form. The second is about philosophical problems specific to music. The third part focuses on pictorial art, and the fourth on interpretation, in particular, the interpretation of literature. The remaining parts of the book discuss aesthetic properties, issues in historical aesthetics, humor, and intrinsic value.

This book, which is the first in a series providing authoritative texts of key non-canonical gospel writings, comprises a critical edition, with full translations, of all the extant manuscripts of the Gospel of Mary. In addition, an extended Introduction discusses the key issues involved in the interpretation of the text, as well as locating it in its proper historical context, while a Commentary explicates points of detail. The gospel has been important in many recent discussions of non-canonical gospels, of early Christian Gnosticism, and of discussions of the figure of Mary Magdalene. This book should provoke future discussions of this important early Christian text.

During the Enlightenment, scholars guided by a new vision of a post-theological age did not simply investigate the Bible, they remade it. In place of the familiar scriptural Bibles that belonged to Christian and Jewish communities, they created a new form: the academic Bible. This book examines the creation of the academic Bible. Beginning with the fragmentation of biblical interpretation in the centuries after the Reformation, it shows how the weakening of scriptural authority in the Western churches altered the role of biblical interpretation. In contexts shaped by skepticism and religious strife, interpreters increasingly operated on the Bible as a text to be managed by critical tools. These developments prepared the way for scholars to formalize an approach to biblical study shaped by classical philology and oriented toward the statist vision of the new universities and their sponsors. Focusing on a renowned German scholar of the period, Johann David Michaelis (1717–1791) of Göttingen, this book explores the ways that critics reconceived the role of the Bible. The founders of modern biblical criticism preserved the cultural authority of the Bible, yet they did so by pushing scriptural Bibles and religious reading to the margins of academic discourse. This book offers a new account of the origins of biblical studies, illuminating the relation of the Bible to churchly readers, theological exegesis, and academic criticism. It explains why, in an age of religious resurgence, modern biblical criticism may no longer be in a position to serve as the Bible’s disciplinary gatekeeper.

Hilary of Poitiers (c300–368), who was instrumental in shaping the development of pro-Nicene theology in the West, combined two separate works, a treatise on faith (De Fide) and a treatise against the “Arians” (Adversus Arianos), to create De Trinitate; his chief theological contribution to the 4th-century Trinitarian debates. Scholars have long recognized the presence of these two treatises in Hilary's De Trinitate but have been unable to settle the questions of when and why Hilary did this. This book addresses these questions concerning the structure and chronology of De Trinitate by situating Hilary's treatise in its historical and theological context and offering a close reading of the text. It is argued that De Fide was written in 356 following Hilary's condemnation at the synod of Béziers and prior to receiving a decision on his exile from the Emperor. When Hilary arrived in exile, he wrote a second work, Adversus Arianos. Following the synod of Sirmium in 357 and his collaboration with Basil of Ancyra in early 358, Hilary recast his efforts and began to write De Trinitate. He decided to incorporate his two earlier works, De Fide and Adversus Arianos, into this project. Toward that end, he returned to his earlier works and drastically revised their content by adding new prefaces and new theological and exegetical material to reflect his mature pro-Nicene theology. These revisions and textual alterations have never before been acknowledged in the scholarship on De Trinitate.

Scholarship on Plato's dialogues persistently divides its focus between the dramatic or literary and the philosophical or argumentative dimensions of the texts. But this hermeneutic division of labor is naïve, for Plato's arguments are embedded in dramatic dialogues and developed through complex, largely informal exchanges between literary characters. Consequently, it is questionable how readers can even attribute arguments and theses to the author himself. The answer to this question lies in transcending the scholarly divide and integrating the literary and philosophical dimensions of the texts. This is the task of Trials of Reason.

The study focuses on a set of fourteen so-called early dialogues, beginning with a methodological framework that explains how to integrate the argumentation and the drama in these texts. Unlike most canonical philosophical works, the early dialogues do not merely express the results of the practice of philosophy. Rather, they dramatize philosophy as a kind of motivation, the desire for knowledge of goodness, and as a discursive practice, motivated by this desire and ideally governed by reason. And they dramatize the trials to which desire and reason are subject, that is, the difficulties of realizing philosophy as a form of motivation, a practice, and an epistemic achievement. In short, Trials of Reason argues that Plato's early dialogues are as much works of metaphilosophy as philosophy itself.

The artworld is a complicated place. It contains acts of artistic creation, interpretation, evaluation, preservation, misunderstanding, and condemnation. The goal of this book is to turn a critical reflective eye upon various aspects of the artworld, and to articulate some of the problems, principles, and norms implicit in the actual practices of artistic creation, interpretation, evaluation, and commodification. Aesthetic theory is treated as a descriptive, rather than normative, enterprise: one that relates to artworld realities as a semantic theory relates to the fragments of natural language it seeks to describe. Sustained efforts are made to illuminate emotional expression, correct interpretation, and objectivity in the context of artworld practice; the relevance of jazz to aesthetic theory; the goals of ontology (artworld and otherwise); the relation(s) between art and language; and the relation(s) between artistic/critical practice and aesthetic theory.

This book is about the representation of Moses and the Exodus narrative in three North American texts: Moses in Red by Lincoln Steffens; Moses, Man of the Mountain (1926), by Zora Neale Hurston (1939), and Cecil B. DeMille's film, The Ten Commandments (1956). It does not seek to judge the merits of these works, but rather to ask why and how they recast the biblical narrative as they did, and how their images of Moses were received. The study holds in tension the roles of producers and consumers, valuing both as interpreters and creators of the Moses story.

Drawing on insights from cultural studies the books and the film are located in the “religious” contexts of their day (e.g., in relation to changing attitudes to biblical interpretation and authority, and to popular movements within American religion) and in broader political frameworks (e.g., in relation to conflicts like the Cold War, or vis‐a‐vis ethnic or gender issues). In examining Steffens's, Hurston's and DeMille's Moses images, this book lays bare the dynamics involved in the afterlife of a figure who remains central to the identity of American civilization. It also argues that the scope of biblical studies should develop to embrace more fully, the critical study of popular culture and the ways in which “ordinary people” think about the Bible.

This book presents a series of chapters devoted to two of the most fundamental topics in the philosophy of art: the distinctive character of artworks and what is involved in understanding them as art. In Part I, a wide range of questions about the nature and definition of art are considered. Can art be defined, and if so, which definitions are the most plausible? Do we make and consume art because there are evolutionary advantages to doing so? Has art completed the mission that guided its earlier historical development, and if so, what is to become of it now? Should architecture be classified as an art form? Part II turns to the interpretation and appreciation of art. What is the target and purpose of the critic's interpretation? Is interpretation primarily directed at uncovering artists' intended meanings? Can apparently contradictory interpretations of a given piece both be true? Are interpretative evaluations entailed by descriptions of a work's aesthetic and artistic characteristics? In addition to providing answers to these and other questions in aesthetics, there is consideration of the nature and content of metaphor, and the relation between the expressive qualities of a work of art and the emotions of its creator.

This book explores certain fundamental metaphysical aspects of works of art, giving focus to a distinction between works and the materials that underlie or constitute them. This constitutive material might be physical or abstract. For each work there is an ‘object’ (i.e., the materials of its composition) associated with it and a central claim in the book is that the work is never simply identical with the ‘object’ that constitutes it. Issues about the creation of works, their distinct kinds of properties (including aesthetic properties), their amenability to interpretation, their style, the conditions under which they can go out of existence, and their relation to perceptually indistinguishable doubles (including forgeries and parodies) are raised and debated. A core theme is that works like paintings, music, literature, sculpture, architecture, films, photographs, multimedia installations, and many more besides, have fundamental features in common, as cultural artefacts, in spite of enormous surface differences. It is their nature as distinct kinds of things, grounded in distinct ontological categories, that is the subject of this enquiry. Although much of the discussion is abstract, based in analytical metaphysics, there are many specific applications, including a study of Jean-Paul Sartre's novel La Nausée and recent conceptual art. Some surprising conclusions are derived about the identity and survival conditions of works, and about the difference, often, between what a work seems to be and what it really is.

This book looks at what enters into ethical judgment and choice. Interpretation of a case and of what the options are is always a factor, as is a sense of the possible values at stake. Intuitions also enter in, but often are unreliable. For a long time it seemed only fair that oldest sons inherited, and it struck few people as unfair that women were not allowed to attend universities. A moral judgment is putatively part of a moral order in a society that any reasonable person would accept. But what counts as “reasonable” is generally contestable. The unreliability of intuitions leads naturally to ethical theory. Kantian, contractualist, and consequentialist theories all have some important truth in them, but not the whole truth. Contractualism lacks the resources required for a fully determinate account of what counts as “reasonable.” Broad general rules are important to Kant and are at the center of everyday morality. But can Kantian ethics explain why they have to have this central role? Our evolving social contract now contains elements (e.g., the rejection of racism and sexism) that once would have seemed counter-intuitive to most people. But could consequentialists have predicted with entire confidence the consequences of social changes that we now think were desirable? The last part of this book contains a double argument. One is that ethical theory is employed by humans in a state of semi-ignorance of relevant factors, grasping at likely truths and evolved intuitions. The other is that consequentialist considerations have a major role at the fundamental level, but much more in justification or criticism than in ethical discovery.

This book focuses on the potential for conflict between overlapping constitutional and EU fundamental rights. When constitutional and EU rights overlap and the respective interpretations diverge, state courts are asked to follow the standard of protection defined by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The ECJ's claim to normative authority needs to be justified. This book advocates a theory of supranational judicial authority grounded in the ideal of dialogue. At the outset, it is argued that traditional approaches to constitutional conflicts based upon supremacy should be overcome. A pluralist framework for structuring the interaction between legal systems in the EU not only offers a better account of reality, but it should be welcomed normatively as well. In this context, the ideal of dialogue will contribute to a better understanding and theorizing of the interaction between national and supranational courts interpreting fundamental rights. Despite multiple and varied references to dialogue in the literature, mostly from a descriptive standpoint, there has been no thorough and rigorous account establishing its legitimating potential regarding ECJ adjudication of fundamental rights norms. This book offers a theoretical account of how the legitimacy of ECJ's authority in adjudicating fundamental rights might be grounded in the ideal of dialogue. The arguments underpinning the legitimating potential of dialogue and the prerequisites for judicial dialogue are explored. Thereafter, the implications of dialogue for the mode of judicial reasoning in interpreting fundamental rights are analyzed. Such a theory of supranational judicial authority would serve as a normative model to assess the activity of the ECJ and to improve current institutional practices.

While affirming the profound importance of political analysis, this book is critical of prevalent doctrines. Specifically, it examines and criticizes several influential post-structuralist positions, advocating logical analysis and empirical enquiry, guided by Kantian ethics, in their stead. In Chapter 1, the book seeks to define in practical and empirical terms the nature and domain of political interpretation. In the second and third chapters, after introducing ideological critique as a particularly important form of political interpretation, the book criticizes some prominent, post-structural alternatives to the position it is advocating. In the fourth chapter, the book develops a psychological analysis of ideology and the critique of ideology. And finally, in Chapter 5, it turns to the structure of the university, examining some of the ways in which it now contributes to the dissemination of oppressive ideologies, as well as how it might be restructured so as to inhibit such dissemination, and even to foster the sort of critical thinking which is (along the lines indicated in Chapter 4) antithetical to such ideologies.

This book constitutes a defence of musical formalism against those who would put literary interpretations on the absolute music canon. In Part I, the historical origins of both the literary interpretation of absolute music and musical formalism are laid out. In Part II, specific attempts to put literary interpretations on various works of the absolute music canon are examined and criticized. Finally, in Part III, the question is raised as to what the human significance of absolute music is, if it does not lie in its representational or narrative content. The answer is that, as yet, philosophy has no answer, and that the question should be considered an important one for philosophers of art to consider, and to try to answer without appeal to representational or narrative content.