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This develops an argument applicable primarily to reform in established democracies, but potentially offering insight into choices in new democracies as well: that there are certain electoral systems that may be seen as extreme on one (or both) of two dimensions—interparty and intraparty. The interparty dimension refers to the degree to which, on the one hand, a single party forms a majority government on well under a majority of votes, or, on the other hand, coalitions are formed among several parties; the intraparty dimension refers to a continuum of electoral systems from those in which legislators depend exclusively on their own personal votes to those in which votes are given exclusively to parties such that legislators have no direct ties to voters. Suggests that electoral systems that are extreme on one or both of these dimensions are inherently prone to reformist pressures, and also shows that much of the appeal of mixed‐member systems derives from how they appear to balance the extremes on each of these dimensions: the trade‐off on the interparty dimension, which is between majoritarian and proportional forms of representation; and the trade‐off on the intraparty dimension, which is between ‘strong candidates’ and ‘strong parties’. Brief studies are presented of five cases of reform from extreme electoral systems to mixed‐member systems: New Zealand (formerly a pluralitarian system); Italy and Israel (formerly hyper‐representative systems); Japan (formerly a hyper‐personalistic system); and Venezuela (formerly a hyper‐centralized system). The ideas presented in the chapter form the basis for the set of key questions presented to the authors of the country chapters in Part II of the book.

Reviews the experiences of several existing mixed‐member electoral systems in an effort to assess the likely prospects for the continued spread of this mode of electoral reform. There are three sections. The first, ‘Inherent and Contingent Factors in Electoral Reform’, looks at extreme electoral systems and systemic failure, act‐contingent explanations of pressures for reform, and outcome‐contingent explanations of political compromise leading to reform. The second section, ‘The Best of Both Worlds’, looks at the interparty and intraparty dimensions of mixed‐member electoral systems, and offers an assessment of these systems. The third section briefly assesses the prospects for continued spread of the mixed‐member idea.

An analysis of the factors and the processes that led to the adoption of a mixed‐member electoral system in Israel. The first section analyzes the characteristics of the Israeli pre‐reform extreme electoral (hyper‐representative) system according to the two dimensions (intraparty and interparty) suggested by Shugart in Ch. 2; it also presents a brief discussion of reform initiatives, intended to provide solutions to some of the electoral system pathologies, and explains their failure. The second section discusses the developments in the intraparty dimension—the parties’ tendencies from the 1970s on to adopt more and more inclusive selectorates for candidate selection (this was reform outside the constitutional and legislative framework). The final section discusses the developments in the interparty dimension—patching a majoritarian feature onto a proportional system; this is an analysis of the politics of reform—the factors and the processes that led to the adoption of direct election of the prime minister, and includes five elements: long‐term developments that served as background factors; events that served as catalysts during the struggle for and against reform; a description of the political actors who took part in this struggle; the characteristics of the mixed system that make it more fit for promotion and its use by the reformers to overcome the primary advantage of the institutional status quo; and, lastly, the four stages of the reform process. An appendix lists major events and dates.

The Russian mixed‐member majoritarian (MMM) system introduced by executive decree in 1993 and passed into law in 1995 did not produce the outcomes expected by its designers, nor have electoral system effects in Russia followed expectations in the electoral systems literature. Russia has been rather exceptional in the degree of fractionalization allowed under its MMM system, and there has been a great disparity in electoral support for parties in the list and nominal tiers of the system, and a proliferation of independent candidates with no partisan affiliation in the single‐seat districts (SSD). These unexpected outcomes might lead one to consider the MMM system to be a failure, but this chapter argues that the intraparty effects of the system, namely, the incentives promoting the formation of national parties with strong grassroots organization, make the current MMM system ideal for Russia. The purpose of the chapter is to lay out the effects of Russia's MMM system and offer some explanations for its unexpected outcomes. There are five sections: the first provides a brief description of the system; the second looks at the interparty dimension; the third expands on the interparty dimension by describing the emerging party system in Russia, examining the effects of the MMM system on the number of electoral parties, and looking at the impact the MMM system has had on the success of particular parties; the fourth section examines the intraparty dimension, and shows how the proportional representation party‐list tier has promoted the formation of parties as the central mechanism for nomination and election to public office while SSD elections in the nominal tier have encouraged party‐building at the local level; the final section offers some conclusions and implications of the Russian case for the study of electoral systems.

The inaugural mixed‐member proportional (MMP) elections were held in Venezuela in 1993. According to the MMP electoral rules in Venezuela, approximately half of the Chamber of Deputies is elected from single‐seat districts in the nominal tier of the system, and half is elected from closed party lists in the list tier. Analyzes how electoral incentives associated with the two tiers affect campaigns, elections, legislative entrepreneurship, and representation, and considers political behaviour and attitudes to be responses both to the institutional incentives associated with electoral rules and party structures, and to the actions of politically active citizens and interest organizations. The chapter has three sections: the first discusses the effects of MMP on the interparty dimension, examining proportionality and the effective number of parties, and analyzing party strategies for joining pre‐election coalitions in the nominal and list tier elections; the second and third sections look at the intraparty dimension, analyzing distinctions between the incentives and behaviour of members elected in each tier. The second section analyzes legislative entrepreneurship in the Chamber of Deputies before and after the adoption of the MMP system; the third section (Legislators, Parties and Representation) shows that legislators elected in the nominal and list tiers view campaigns and legislative representation differently, but that the adoption of MMP rules has not altered the strong relationships between established interest organizations and representatives in the Congress.

Bolivia's mixed‐member proportional (MMP) electoral system was only established in 1994 and was applied for the first time in the elections of June 1997, so it is not yet possible to make a definitive assessment of its impact on the country's political system. The chapter therefore discusses the specific immediate effects that implementation of the system has had. The first section focuses on the effects on the representation of parties and the structure of the party system (interparty and intraparty dimensions) and on the relations between single‐seat district (SSD) deputies and constituents, and the second section focuses on governance. The overall finding is that the MMP system has had no far‐reaching consequences on the government system, but has had some noteworthy consequences for the party system. Some political leaders in both governing and opposition parties are not, however, satisfied with either the degree of personalization of Bolivian politics or the role of SSD deputies, and have highlighted the need for further electoral reforms; this issue is discussed in the third section.