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This chapter establishes the theoretical framework. It develops the idea of legitimacy as a constitutive element of international society. However, international society is not autonomous, but has been exposed to normative influence from world society. This poses complex new questions about power and consensus where the two societies intersect. The concept of world society is traced, particularly through its English-School variant, and located in the work of Hedley Bull and John Vincent. Rather than the common idea that world society might be coming to displace international society, the suggestion is that the two societies have become complementary: key international society actors have formed coalitions with sectors of global civil society, while world society remains dependent on state actors for regulation and enforcement of norms.

This chapter locates the discussion in the context of the theoretical literature on international norms, particularly that by Martha Finnemore and Katherine Sikkink. Much of this literature is interested in norm cycles, and the means by which norms come to be disseminated internationally. Building on this work, the chapter argues that the idea of dissemination does not quite capture what in fact have been a series of strategic negotiations between international and world society, often coming during the major peace settlements at the end of wars. Historically, this has often also arisen out of a coalition of interest between powerful state actors, and civil society groups. It is suggested that the framework of negotiation between international and world society allows us to understand this process in a particular way. It also demonstrates how the absorption of norms from world society into international society has complicated the latter's practices of consensus. It opens up major new issues about how consensus is to be developed within world society about changing principles of international legitimacy. These issues are explored in the context of the WTO and G7/8, and illustrated by the Ottawa Convention on Landmines and the formation of the International Criminal Court.

As part of the ending of the Cold War, a summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe agreed the Charter of Paris in 1990. Amongst other things, it expressed a commitment to democracy ‘as the only system of government of our nations’. If international society is considered to be pluralistic, this was a puzzling development: it was making an international principle of legitimacy out of a form of internal government. The chapter attempts to explain this development in terms of the role of world society, in the context of the dramatic events of the end of the Cold War. It shows that the commitment to democracy served obvious state purposes, but also responded to a wider social constituency of expectations. This case was pressed by a transnational network acting in support of democratic principles, and which organized parallel summits to shadow the CSCE process. This also responded to developments in international law where some theorists, such as Thomas Franck, claimed to have identified an emerging democratic entitlement.

Perhaps the least discussed aspect of the 1919 settlement is its provisions on social justice, and yet an entire section of the Versailles Treaty and an article of the League Covenant were devoted to the international regulation of labour, which resulted in establishment of the International Labour Organization. These developments reflected the activities of the trade union movement, and particularly its Congresses during the war, as well as heightened sensitivity to labour in the context of both the war and the outbreak of the Russian revolution. It is clear that inclusion of a section on labour was sponsored by all of the Big Three powers for various political and instrumental reasons. What was radically new about the structure of the ILO was that it allowed membership from state representatives, but also from business and labour, thereby recognizing world society membership in an otherwise international society forum. The decisive argument was that social justice was properly the business of international society because it was fundamental to achieving international peace.

The draft proposals for the United Nations Charter that emerged from Dumbarton Oaks allowed only for one brief mention of human rights. The final version agreed at San Francisco gave human rights a much higher profile. Why did this change take place? There is a substantial body of literature that accounts for it exclusively in terms of the activities of the US Consultants (representatives of NGOs), attached to the US Delegation. However, the role of Latin American states, as well as of the Soviet Union, needs to be remembered. The chapter draws attention to the problems surrounding the heroic role of the US consultants. It traces the evolution of thinking about human rights during the war years, culminating in the attendance of some 1,200 representatives of NGOs at the San Francisco conference. There is no doubt, therefore, that state officials were conscious of wide public expectations on the human rights front. Since popular support for the UN would be vital to its future effectiveness, respect for human rights can be seen as a kind of ‘social wage’ in return. This gave the individual a new standing in international society and international law.

This is the exceptional case in that the proposal to include a racial equality clause in the League Covenant was rejected. On the other hand, this is another case where the norm was supported by a leading state (Japan), in conjunction with a wider world society movement. The drafting history casts doubts on Japanese motives for pressing the proposal, but the failure reflects the relative weakness of Japan as a normative sponsor. While opposition to the clause certainly came from Britain, in response to pressure from parts of the empire, President Wilson's own position was ambiguous, and he certainly was not prepared to risk the Treaty of Versailles (and the League Covenant) to include it. There was a widespread pressure to hold a Pan-African Congress at Paris to coincide with the settlement. However, the Japanese delegate Baron Makino expressed a number of interesting normative arguments in support of the clause, appealing to the blurring of the distinction between international and world society brought about by the principle of collective security.

Starts by outlining the three broad ways that there are of thinking about the contribution of the English School of International Relations and international society approach to the study of contemporary international relations. The first way is to follow Barry Buzan in arguing that the English School is an ‘underexploited resource’ and that ‘the time is ripe to develop and apply its historicist, and methodologically pluralist approach’ to the subject; the second, at the other end of the spectrum, calls for the School's closure, or indeed, argues that it no longer exists because it has been too much distorted by contemporary proponents who have eschewed some of its foundational ideas – such as the centrality of states, and the importance of power politics; the third perspective is somewhere between these two, and has arisen as a result of the increased dialogue between English School ideas and other theoretical perspectives – most notably realism and constructivism, which call for the further refinement of English School thinking to give it a theory that is capable of identifying the motors for change and lines of causation in world politics. The primary purpose of this book is to assess these three positions and question the utility of the English School and international society approach to world politics, and to contribute to the development of English School thinking by opening up avenues for theoretical dialogue with other perspectives and suggesting new lines of theoretically informed empirical analysis. Two further sections of the introduction look at international relations theory after the cold war, and discuss the central question of the relationship between the English School and the concept of international society. The final section summarizes the ground covered in each chapter of the book.

This chapter examines how criminal justice helps to construct society by reaffirming common values at the moment they meet with opposition. It also introduces the English School approach to the study of international society and it describes how it provides a useful framework for analysing the issues raised by the International Criminal Court. The chapter clarifies the use of the pluralist and solidarist labels at the heart of the English School research agenda, summarises the main arguments of the book and sets out the chapter outline.

Considers the relationship between culture and international society, a question that subtly permeates the work of the English School of International Relations. Begins by examining ideas among the first wave of English School authors about the role of culture in the formation of international society. Next, it considers assumptions about the relationship between culture and international society to be found among contemporary English School authors. The key issues addressed here include the role that culture plays in establishing order and stability in international society, the role that key institutions of international society play in managing cultural diversity (cultural pluralism), and the relationship between culture and perceptions of equity and justice within international society. Then seeks to draw together discussion of these three cultural issue areas to reflect on their implications for the functioning and cohesion of contemporary international society.

In contrast to Hidemi Suganami in the first chapter, the author argues that the English School of International Relations has made, and can continue to make, an important contribution to the study of world history. In particular, he suggests that the three traditions of world politics – international system, international society, and world society – provide a useful way of thinking about the many different types of international societies and systems that have permeated world history. Adopts a world historical focus on the more familiar distinction drawn by the founding fathers of the English School between the political structures that define an international system and the social structures that define an international society, the aim being to demonstrate that a range of different international societies and systems have, across the course of world history, given way to a single worldwide international society/system. Begins by examining the debate about the validity of distinguishing between international systems and societies, and then looks at the interaction between international systems and societies in the premodern world. Goes on to outline the establishment of the European international system/society and its contact with other international systems/societies, and concludes by assessing the utility of adopting a world historical perspective and drawing a pluralistic distinction between international systems and societies.

Attempts to draw together the ideas presented in the book and to question the continuing relevance of the approach of the English School of International Relations to international relations. Argues that although the School has made a significant contribution to the discipline, more work needs to be done if it is to maintain its relevance. In particular, the School needs to address the relationship between international society and world society in more detail, identify and explore the many structures that underpin international society, rethink the pluralism–solidarism debate, and shed more light on the drivers and dynamics of change in world politics.

This chapter explores the constitutional framework of international relations, which is primarily a societas of states. It considers the place of international organisations, non-governmental organisations, transnational networks, and human rights in such a society. It examines the distinction between an international system and an international society, the prudential and procedural association, and the role of political ideals in international law.

The final two chapters in Part One investigate the evolving research agenda of the English School of International Relations and its contribution to contemporary international relations. In this chapter, the author explores what may be described as the ‘new agenda’ in English School thinking about world politics. He begins by briefly tracing the long history of the concept of international society, noting how it has become synonymous with the English School despite the fact that other paradigms have also made use of the term. He moves on to reiterate one of the central claims of the first part of this book: that the English School and the concept of international society have been propelled to the forefront of contemporary debates about world politics by important sociological and normative developments in mainstream international relations in North America. He then identifies four core and as yet unsolved ‘puzzles’ that will frame the English School's new agenda as it continues to develop; these are the relationship between agency and structure, the boundaries between international society and world society, the moral basis of international society, and the tension between forces of society and hierarchy in contemporary world politics.

Starts by asking where women are in international society. While observing the absence of women from theories of international society, it argues that women are nonetheless present as actors in diplomatic encounters between and among states, and that gender relations have been an integral part of the evolution and expansion of international society. then proceeds to account for the conceptual exclusion of gender in the approaches of the English School of International Relations to international society. It reveals the gender bias behind two core assumptions of international society: i.e. that states are the major actors and that domestic politics are irrelevant in the workings of this interstate society. Ends by considering the future viability of the international society concept given its neglect of gender, arguing that, as a concept, international society risks irrelevance unless it can be revised to account fully for contemporary developments that significantly affect international norms and interstate behaviour.

Deals with arguably the most pointed omission from the thinking of the English School of International Relations – international political economy (IPE) – a failure has had serious and negative consequences for how the understanding of international society has developed, and has also had the consequence that the English School has so far not exploited its considerable potential to act as the theoretical framework through which globalization can be analyzed. The author holds that nothing stands in the way of bringing IPE into the international society tradition, and that much is to be gained by doing so. In the first section of the chapter, he begins his account by identifying and then accounting for this omission, arguing that it is both unnecessary and unjustified; he places the economic sector within English School thinking, looks at what has been said about it, and examines why it has been neglected. In the second section, the consequences of the neglect of the economic sector are explored for the debate about pluralism and solidarism. In the third section, regions and institutions are examined as ways of bringing IPE and the English School together, and in the final section, it is argued that this combination holds the key to a more effective study of globalization.

In this final chapter, The author asks whether the shift from a multipolar to unipolar society of states has led to normative change in international society, using the norm prohibiting the use of force as a case study, and arguing that although material changes in international society do have an impact, the norms that underpin international society are not infinitely malleable and constrain even powerful actors like the USA. He begins his chapter with a discussion of the relationship between power and norms, which reinforces the linkages between English School of International Relations and constructivist approaches identified in Ch. 4 by Reus‐Smit. The author dismisses the realist and materialist arguments that norms play, at most, a peripheral role in international life, by arguing that even powerful states prefer to act in accordance with international rules. In relation to the use of force, he argues that it is very difficult to find a case since 1945 where a state has not sought to justify its use of force with reference to the rules governing that discussion. After charting the evolution of norms pertaining to the use of force and the globalization of international society, he turns to the post‐September 11 era, arguing that although the USA continues to follow the rules to a large extent, its attempt to act as a ‘normative innovator’ by claiming an exceptional right to self‐defence poses a grave danger to both the UN and the system of law that underpins the society of states.

This chapter follows on from the previous by exploring how the pluralist – solidarist distinction at the heart of English School inquiry manifests itself in the question of whether states have a right and duty to extradite or prosecute individuals charged with crimes that offend humanity. By focusing on the Pinochet case before the House of Lords and the Arrest Warrant or Yerodia case before the International Court of Justice it demonstrates how the pluralist concern for order within and between states has restrained the solidarist enthusiasm for universal jurisdiction. The chapter includes a section on the politics of international criminal justice. This advances the argument that the US prefers to limit the decision to prosecute to states because its position of relative power means that it can more or less guarantee its interests and protect its personnel from international criminal accountability. This is illustrated by focusing on the US response to Belgian legislation that enabled its national courts to exercise universal jurisdiction.