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Domestic and international policy‐making on protection of the ozone layer are examined from 1980 to 1987. Tracks the 1982 resumption of international negotiations to protect the ozone layer after two further unsuccessful attempts. Follows the progression of these negotiations, and their interactions with domestic policy and corporate strategy, over five years: three years of stagnation leading to the 1985 Vienna Convention, followed by two years of rapid progress culminating in the 1987 Montreal Protocol — the first international agreement on concrete measures to reduce human contribution to ozone depletion.

Economic and cultural globalization seem to have ushered in an awkward and potentially unstable period of transition for the world. Even if one supposes that free trade and unrestricted capital mobility can eventually result in global factor price equalization and international equality, the transition may take decades if not centuries. At stake are questions of how to distribute the costs incurred, and the benefits to be derived, by cooperative action to create global public goods or minimize global public bads. Questions of equity are also implicated in the origin of the global problems themselves. International negotiations are influenced by unequal economic and bargaining strengths and the diverse stages of development at which nations find themselves.

The basic argument of this chapter is that equity and distributional criteria must be at the core of a global public goods framework for international cooperation. There are several reasons behind this. First, equity and justice promote cooperative behavior, itself needed for the provision of public goods. Second, when the system is perceived to be fair and equitable, nations will participate in it willingly. Third, global equity is itself a public good that, without cooperation or coercion (i.e., in a decentralized setting), may be undersupplied. The undersupply may be because, e.g., there is no private market through which nations or individuals may meet their need to give.

Thus, the first section of this chapter sets the stage by outlining the continuing role of inequality among nations in shaping the world. The second section considers the potential instrumental value of social cohesion in public goods supply (equity for public goods). After that, the chapter considers how distributional factors affect the demand and supply of public goods. Then, it pursues the proposition (originally from Thurow, 1971) that the distribution of income is itself a public good. The final section offers conclusions. The rest of the chapter illustrates the value of equity for the production of public goods, in the distribution of public goods, and as a public good itself.

This chapter examines the ways in which trade and the operation of multinationals have influenced the operation of national production systems, and how this has changed between the period of ‘classic multinationalization’ and the period called ‘globalization’. It discusses the relevance of different theories of international business and trade (product cycle, new trade theory, eclectic theory, global commodity chains, geography and knowledge creation, and globalization of innovation) for understanding the relation between technology and changing international division of labour. A background of the changes in international trade negotiations (World Trade Organization) is discussed and a framework for policy is provided, which has important implications for innovation.

This chapter explores the role of civil society in climate change politics, and argues that the literature on this topic has not fully accounted for the failure of civil society to influence mitigation action. It highlights three main deficits. First, despite the diversification of actors involved in the negotiations, resources and links to power still rest overwhelmingly in the hands of professionalized non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that take a more reformist and market-based approach. Second, civil society has failed to take a coordinated and viable strategy for building strength in domestic contexts to realize influence at key hinge moments in the international negotiations. And third, civil society has primarily devoted its attention at the international level to the UN climate processes, while often neglecting less accessible but highly relevant international governance frameworks, including international trade regimes, financial institutions, and scientific bodies.

China’s energy challenges are shaping the way its leadership is approaching climate mitigation at the domestic level, which in turn is shaping its positioning in international climate negotiations. An increase in the scientific and technical understanding of its own energy and emissions situation—an understanding promoted in part by increased international engagement—has permitted China’s policy makers to legislate with more confidence domestically. Low carbon development is now positioned at the core of China’s overarching national five-year economic plans with carbon management programs existing alongside a low carbon development strategy. These significant domestic changes have permitted an equally striking shift in China’s approach to global environmental diplomacy, particularly in the context of the international climate change negotiations.

This chapter focuses on the international negotiations on climate change under way since UNCED in 1992. Several governments began their consideration of reduced emissions of greenhouse gases in the 1980s; the world began in a formal way to address the issue in 1992. In that year, with the IPCC's first report in hand, delegates to UNCED in Rio decided that the scientific indications of possible harm were definite enough for countries to begin action under international treaties to limit the possibility of a damaging climate change. The chapter describes the history and content of the negotiations, including the Rio and Berlin meetings and the Kyoto Protocol. It discusses the difficult equity issues involved, continued resistance to the negotiations, the economic models on which much of this resistance is based, and some of the reasons why it is considered that the resistance was misplaced.

Climate change poses a serious challenge to the ability of international law to construct equitable global responses to shared problems. Emissions of greenhouse gases come disproportionately from industrialized countries. Some countries, again predominantly in the industrialized world, are better placed than others to pioneer the technologies, processes, and behavioural changes that will be necessary to mitigate their emissions. Furthermore, in international climate negotiations, the same countries are often the least able to make their voices heard, or to assess the implications of any proposed outcome in light of their own interests. A sustainable development law perspective in the area of climate change focuses on how climate change law is developed and implemented, with a focus on the needs of smaller economies, especially least-developed countries and new actors, including civil society and corporate citizens.

This book has investigated the influence of international bureaucracies in world politics. Drawing on the core findings of the Managers of Global Change (MANUS) research project, it has demonstrated that bureaucracies have a significant autonomous influence as actors in global environmental policy which at times exceeds expectations. Through nine case studies, the book has suggested that bureaucracies act as knowledge brokers, negotiation facilitators, and capacity builders in international politics. In addition to influencing global agendas, bureaucracies shape international negotiation processes and make international cooperation work by assisting in national implementation. This chapter shows how the autonomous influence of international bureaucracies in world politics varies considerably in both degree and type, and offers an explanatory model to account for this variation.

This chapter discusses the aspect of the diplomatic base of India's nuclear behaviour. It notes that Indian diplomacy holds high the importance of peace diplomacy, socio-economic development, and international negotiations. It then lists the primary fault lines between India and the West, before focusing on the challenge posed by post-war US disarmament strategy on Indian security. Next, this chapter considers India's interest in nuclear affairs and its early interest in the development of its own nuclear power capability. It also studies Nehru's thoughts on nuclear matters, the premise of the disarmament and nuclear policy of India, and India's atomic energy arrangements with Canada and the US. The Indian reactions after President Eisenhower summarized the ‘Atoms for Peace’ plan are also considered.

This chapter assesses the economic incentives of different countries to cooperate on international climate negotiations, particularly on greenhouse gas emission control. It first examines the indications that the noncooperative coalition theory provides for the analysis of climate negotiations. It then presents the FEEM-RICE model, a well-known integrated assessment tool for the study of climate change. This model is used to analyze the equilibrium coalition structure that could emerge out of climate negotiations.

The chapter focuses on the climate policy of China. Chinese climate policies are linked to its economic policy, particularly its energy policy. The three main determinants that are decisive for China’s climate change policy include economy, energy, and perceived vulnerability. It studies the role and influence of the main institutions involved in China’s climate-change policy. The role of China in international negotiations is examined, and the implementation of direct climate policies through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) by China is discussed. The chapter concludes by presenting a future perspective on China’s climate policy.

Although the European Union (EU) is often neglected in the great powers literature owing to its lack of military and security clout, we argue that the EU should nevertheless be considered a great power in global environmental politics (GEP). We develop this argument by highlighting the multiple nature and sources of power at the EU’s disposal, its ability to project power, and its recognition as a great power in GEP. By examining two distinctive cases of GEP—climate change and chemicals governance—we show that the EU relies on different sources of power and deploys its power in different ways in GEP, but that in both cases it can indeed be considered a great power. However, the EU’s negative power (responsibility) is diminishing as it becomes more successful in resolving environmental issues, which demonstrates the paradox of the EU’s role in GEP generally. Therefore, the EU relies increasingly on its positive power and its ability to persuade, incentivize, and assist others in its role as a green great power.

Many food security experts believe that considering food security as a broader security problem will better incentivize governments to tackle global hunger, thus making it a more tractable and solvable problem. Food insecurity can impact international security by weakening states, stoking regional insecurity, and by potentially causing violent conflict between states. However, this does not imply that governments will act differently to promote global food security. To prevent food insecurity from endangering international security, rules, institutions, and policies must be developed to help soften the impacts of shortages, create equitable and predictable responses to scarcity, and ensure that resource competition does not endanger the international system. In short, what is needed is what is lacking: an international effort to build global food security by addressing vexing issues concerning energy, climate, trade, and overall agricultural production.

This chapter reconsiders the global emissions budget using the conception of natural resource justice defended previously. Noting that this is to adopt a method of partial integrationism, it is shown that the two principles can at least be applied not only to the problem of sharing the emissions budget, but also the prior matter of setting it. Applying the principle of collective self-determination to these problems is found to be more difficult, because it grounds many conflicting claims. This difficulty is addressed by formulating guidelines for adjudicating between self-determination claims. It is concluded that the emissions budget should be set within the parameters of enabling basic needs satisfaction for current and future individuals and protecting collectives from climate impacts that threaten the legitimate exercise of self-determination through territorial displacement. If this allows for more than subsistence emissions, fair international negotiations will be required to distribute any such secondary emissions entitlements.

Article 20 EC Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which he is a national is not represented, be entitled to protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, on the same conditions as the nationals of that State. Member States shall adopt the necessary provisions and start the international negotiations required to secure this protection.