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This chapter sketches the theoretical terrain to be reviewed in the remainder of the book in order to trace what has been happening to international legitimacy since the end of the Cold War. The post-Cold War revival of legitimacy and the elements of contemporary legitimacy are discussed.

This chapter revisits the recurrent matter of rightful membership as it now manifests itself in contemporary conditions. It argues that recent tendencies in international society's development of that aspect of international legitimacy that deals with rightful membership point towards two starkly different conclusions. On the one hand, they invite the judgement that more so than at any earlier historical period, the two dimensions of legitimacy — the domestic and the international — have been brought into intimate relationship with each other. On the other hand, such a conception has brought to the fore the tension between international society's own commitment to a certain form of state, as appropriate for membership, and the seemingly divergent basis of its own pragmatic and pluralistic activities.

This chapter analyzes the relationship between legitimacy and its cognate norms; namely, those of legality, morality, and constitutionality. It criticizes propositions to the effect that a choice can be made between legitimacy, on the one hand, and particular norms, on the other. It does so for several reasons. First, legitimacy possesses no independent normative content of its own that would make such a choice meaningful. Second, the notion of legitimacy is always mediated through a composite of other norms, and cannot be ranged against them individually. Third, the tensions that arise are amongst those discrete norms themselves, rather than between each individually and legitimacy.

This chapter explores the issue of consensus, and what this means for contemporary society. Topics discussed include the nature of consensus, the kind of consensus important in international society, the 1991 Gulf War, Kosovo in 1999, and the 2003 Iraq War. It is argued that consensus is clearly important for legitimacy, but its decisiveness depends on whether consensus is valuable in its own right, or, more fundamentally, because it is thought to indicate a correspondence with the other norms of international society.

This chapter develops the idea that legitimacy is intimately related to power, and considers the extent to which contemporary problems affecting international legitimacy simply reflect the current distribution of power. It considers the specific debate about US hegemony in the contemporary world situation. It argues that the problem for legitimacy in contemporary international society does indeed reside in disequilibrium, but not in any straightforward sense. It is not simply a matter of international society coming to terms with the lack of a balance of power. Nor, for that matter, is it the case of international society having to adjust to the preferences and vagaries of US policy, as they variably reflect these underlying power conditions. The contemporary idea of legitimacy attaches itself to a notion of acceptable leadership in conditions of hegemony. That is to say that it must be a leadership that is acceptable both to international society at large, and also to the predominant state called upon to play that role.

On 1 Nov 1994, the UN Trusteeship Council voted to suspend operations after Palau, the last remaining trust territory, attained independence. The sovereign state has emerged out of decolonization as the supreme form of political organization in post‐colonial international society—an international society in which dominions, colonies, principalities, free cities, and, of course, mandates and trust territories have all but vanished. However, the ostensible failure of this post‐colonial project—the fact that the promise of peace and prosperity held out by independent statehood is too often betrayed by appalling violence and absolute poverty—has reinvigorated interest in trusteeship as a way of responding to problems of international disorder and injustice. The purpose of this chapter is threefold: first, it examines the principal dilemma of decolonization that has resulted in a renewed interest in trusteeship; second, it considers this renewed interest in trusteeship in the context of international involvement in administering Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and, until recently, East Timor; third, it reflects upon the normative implications that a resurrected practice of trusteeship carries for a society of states that is premised on the juridical equality of all its members. The five sections of the chapter are: The False Promise of post‐Colonial Independence; Innovation and Convention—the case for trusteeship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and East Timor; The New International Legitimacy—the resurrection of trusteeship; A Universal Society of States?; and Answering the Call of Humanity.

Smooha argues that Jews have settled in Palestine – Land of Israel in sufficient strength to establish a strong independent state in part of the area (pre‐1967 Israel), although their attempt to incorporate the rest (the West Bank and Gaza) by settlement has failed. As a result, partition has become the most feasible way to resolve the Jewish–Palestinian conflict. In Ireland, by contrast, the position of British settlers (Protestants) is said to be much weaker than their Jewish counterparts. The Protestants are weak demographically, lack international legitimacy, are not supported by Britain, and are faced with a confident Irish nationalism. As a consequence, the historical trend points to Britain's withdrawal and an end to the partition of Ireland as the most likely form of conflict resolution.

Chapter 1 investigates the early practice of state recognition. It reveals that prior to 1815 international legitimacy centered on the notion of state rights, which, given that most states were hereditary monarchies, was taken to imply dynastic rights. There was a general consensus that new states could be formed only with the consent of their legitimate parent sovereign. The ability to take effective control of a territory could not by itself establish legitimate titles to territory.

Multilateral liberalists are another group critical of President Bush's foreign policy. They contend that liberal democratic institutions play a primary role in mitigating rivalry and fostering legitimacy, and that the unilateral use of force abroad, even for humanitarian concerns, must be kept to a minimum. Like realists, multilateral liberalists differ in their views on a number of issues but, unlike realists, they tend to overestimate the influence of soft power, the effectiveness of international institutions and the likelihood of stable, liberal democracies generating a consensus on the need to undertake strong, effective action against major threats. While the US should never ignore the views of other nations, alliances, and international organizations such as the UN and NATO, it is not in the country's interest to make unanimity among them a categorical imperative in its decision to use force and in crafting foreign policy.

This paper argues that many sovereign debt restructurings as agreed between defaulting states and their multilateral, bilateral, or private creditors constitute exercises of international public authority. Their authoritative character results from their effects on the citizens of the defaulting state, especially through adjustment programs. They also affect taxpayers in lending states as well as private creditors. Their public and international character derives from their legal basis in hard or soft public international law. As a consequence of their qualification as exercises of international public authority, sovereign debt restructurings need to be framed by public law in order to ensure their legitimacy. This paper shows how legal scholarship might promote the development of such a public law framework. The paper then proposes a set of legal principles for sovereign debt restructurings. Some of them might already exist de lege lata, while others should be understood as proposals de lege ferenda. Legal scholarship is especially useful for developing procedural requirements, while substantive issues require a political decision, with the exception of the need to respect fundamental human rights. Most importantly, however, the qualification of sovereign debt restructurings as exercises of public authority requires domestic and international courts and tribunals to defer to them and to stay enforcement as long as such restructurings are being negotiated or implemented. A general principle of law to that effect seems to be emerging. In deciding about a stay, domestic and international courts and tribunals might control the legitimacy of sovereign debt restructurings.

This chapter outlines a theoretical argument of social reputation in explaining the states' commitment and compliance with “responsible” arms export controls. Generally, the argument holds that states support popular norms and policies in order to reap social benefits, such as positive self-image and increased international legitimacy. The argument proceeds in two parts. One is concerned with states seeking to signal that they possess the qualities of good international citizens, supporting peace and human rights. The other introduces the argument's domestic facet, claiming that the states' governments faced with arm trade scandal or the threat of it are more likely to seek improvements to their export practice, which is to conform more closely to policies and controls. The chapter finally provides alternative explanations premised on how states' interests—national security, economic gain, and defense boost—are conceived in conjunction to their commitment to meet international controls.

This chapter argues that globalization affects popular perceptions of electoral fairness and quality because it is responsible for putting pressure on states to hold credible elections, as states do not wish to jeopardize their domestic and international legitimacy. The analysis that is presented here extends previous work on the role of electoral institutions in shaping popular evaluations of electoral processes by exploring the impact of a state’s international position on confidence in electoral conduct. Using data from Module 1 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), the chapter finds that globalization has a positive effect on individual‐level perceptions of electoral fairness.

This chapter illustrates how Israel’s foreign policy was predicated on the assumption that Arab hostility was a permanent feature in the region and that the Arab states had no genuine interest in reaching a political settlement. Assuming an environment of continuous conflict, Israeli foreign policy was thus the product of a ‘worst-case scenario’ outlook whereby peace negotiations were often overshadowed by security considerations. On the international stage, this meant that foreign policy was primarily aimed at securing international legitimacy and establishing a positive image abroad through effective public diplomacy at a time when Israel’s military operations caused much consternation internationally. Secret diplomacy, therefore, became a cornerstone of Israel’s foreign policy, either for the purpose of developing relations with countries which publicly did not recognise the Jewish state, or as a tool to secure Israel’s national interests in the periphery.