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This chapter examines the actors engaged in constructing international law as a set of rules. It argues that states remain at the heart of global governance by exercising jurisdictional power in a partitioned and relatively coordinated way within a global state-centred system in which non-state actors constantly shape states' behaviour. The whole of such interaction denotes what is called the ‘international community’. The chapter first explores the meaning of global governance, public and private authority, and international community. Then, it discusses states and a variety of non-state players. Finally, it explores the concept of international legal personality, concluding that it is often used as a tool for manipulation to favour one or another ‘deserving’ player.

Chapter 2 identifies and explains the four theoretical conceptions of international legal personality, which will be tested against historical and existing norms of positive international law in Chapters 3–8. With particular focus on the role attributed to the individual as the ultimate subject of international law, the examination will concentrate on selected scholars’ conclusions on the criteria for, and the consequences of acquiring, international legal personality. Moreover, it will address the way in which proponents of the various conceptions perceive the relationship between the international legal order and national legal order(s) and the role of the concept of international legal personality in that regard. Given that a primary aim of the book is to ascertain the position of the individual as a matter of international lex lata, particular attention is given to the two main conceptions of international legal personality, which both claim to be positivist.

This chapter presents and explains the evaluative framework that the study employs when analysing armed groups and legal personality. In doing so, the chapter provides a short historical account of the manner in which international legal personality has been understood and theorized and explains how the evaluative framework will be utilized in the subsequent chapters.

One of the most important contributions of the international legal doctrine along the last six decades has been the rescue of the individual as subject of the law of nations. Such contribution is of historical significance. The individual's presence and participation has been growing in the international legal order. The international legal personality of individuals has been asserted before organs of international supervision of his rights, and his international legal capacity has consolidated before international legal tribunals (e.g., European and Inter-American Courts) of human rights. The individuals’ legal subjectivity is beyond question in contemporary international law.

This chapter provides a historical account of the manner in which the legal personality of armed groups was conceived and treated prior to the drafting of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Conducting a detailed review of the law of belligerency and the legal framework of insurgency, the chapter demonstrates the different ways in which armed groups could acquire obligations under international law under these frameworks. During the course of this examination, the chapter pays particular attention to the relevance of territory, special agreements, State consent, and the armed group’s functionality. It concludes by analysing its findings against the evaluative framework set out in Chapter 3.

This purpose of this chapter is to determine what the framework of international humanitarian law demonstrates about the material and theoretical circumstances that are required in order for armed groups to acquire international legal personality under international humanitarian law. To fulfil this aim, the chapter analyses the threshold of international humanitarian law and explores its relevance to the acquisition of legal personality by armed groups. The chapter ends by analysing the threshold test against the evaluative framework in Chapter 3, drawing conclusions about the role that State consent plays in the acquisition of international legal personality by armed groups under international humanitarian law.

This chapter clarifies key concepts of the book. It explains the heuristic function of an analytical category, and the utility of employing religious actors as an analytical device. It then defines the analytical category of religious actors as one that covers states and non-state entities which assume the role of interpreters of religion, and in doing so claim a ‘special’ or religious legitimacy that relies primarily on tradition or affect, as opposed to rational-legal features. These definitional contours are further refined by examining the interactions of religious actors in international fora in relation to two topics: sexuality and reproduction, and ‘defamation of religions’. Finally, the chapter discusses the framework of acquisition of rights and obligations in international law: it contrasts the ‘subjects doctrine’ to the ‘capacity approach’, whereby the latter enables the extraction of right and obligations of non-state actors from treaty law and jurisprudence.

This chapter examines the interlocking concerns of biblical tragedy and the early modern law of nations through Hugo Grotius’ Sophompaneas (1635; trans., 1652), a learned dramatization of Genesis 39–50 that deserves to be better known, and Milton’s much-debated Samson Agonistes (1671). It contributes to scholarship on Samson Agonistes by examining Samson’s role in law of nations discourse and shows how Grotius used tragedy and scripture to underpin his own international jurisprudence. Reading Samson Agonistes with Grotius’ biblical tragedy helps us not only to see Hebrew scripture’s influence on emerging global norms but also how biblical tragedy develops into two competing orders: a flat, unmediated politics of human rights and the highly allegorized mimetic structure of international legal personality.

This chapter considers how international law has shaped and continues to shape Middle East and North Africa (MENA) states by examining the inter-related factors of international legal personality, self-determination claims and the adjudication of boundary disputes. It focuses on three case studies in the colonial and postcolonial periods: the mandate states; the case of Western Sahara's (failed) self-determination bid; and some of the small states of the Gulf. The chapter takes issue with traditional narratives of rupture and instead points to continuities. In particular, it focuses on the inter-war period of the mandate system to highlight the inseparable relationship between formal and informal empire and its enduring legacies across the Arab world. It argues that international law has played an important role in delimiting and limiting the possibilities of post-colonial statehood in the MENA region. Thus, it is only in understanding international law in the colonial and mandatory eras that we can make sense of the present.

This chapter examines the foreign judicial precedents for the development of Argentine judicial tendencies that consolidated the application of general common standards for the immunities of international organizations. It describes relevant Argentine precedents, which have been organized based on the major allegations concerning the possibility of implied waiver of immunities; due protection of individual rights; allegations of an act as iure imperii or iure gestionis; issues of international legal personality and the applicable law; the control of arbitral tribunals through domestic courts; and, finally, international legal personality and implied immunities.

This final chapter of Part II of the book draws together the conclusions of the previous two chapters to develop conclusions about the circumstances in which armed groups can acquire legal personality under human rights law. Examining these conclusions, the chapter argues that there is a need for a threshold test to be met before international human rights law can be applied. It argues that this threshold test should include an ‘organization’ component and an ‘international’ requirement. Drawing upon the conclusions in Chapter 2 on the normative value of human rights law versus international humanitarian law, the chapter ends by considering how an armed group’s control of territory may be relevant to such a threshold test.

The general introduction sets the scene for the legal issues addressed in this book by presenting their relevance in most recent conflicts and other situations of violence, including in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Ukraine, the Central African Republic, and Kenya. It also introduces the legal framework the book sets out to examine, notably international humanitarian law, human rights law, and international criminal law. The introductory chapter further presents the book’s methodology, introduces its structure, and explains key terms and concepts. These include, in particular, the terms ‘non-state armed group’, ‘international legal personality’, and ‘degree of organization’, which are especially relevant throughout the book.

The chapter considers in what circumstances international organizations have international legal personality and what results from such personality. It also considers whether international legal personality gives rise to rights and obligations and which ones. Central to this analysis, the chapter studies whether an international organization may have human rights and international humanitarian law obligations and whether these derive from its international legal personality, its constituent agreement, as a result of the functions of the organization, or some combination thereof. The chapter concludes that international organizations have obligations to comply with peremptory norms and accepted general principles of international law (which include elements of human rights and international law) that apply to all subjects under international law. There are also additional obligations which apply in particular contexts, and are aligned with organizations’ purposes and their capacities to act and react in any given situation.

The “Roman Question” arose with the capture of Rome by the Italian Army on 20 September 1870, marking the dissolution of the Papal State and its annexation to the Kingdom of Italy. It was subsequently settled with the signing of a Treaty between the Holy See and the Kingdom of Italy on 11 February 1929, creating the Vatican City State. This chapter, while considering the historical background of the “Roman Question”, will examine it exclusively from the perspective of international law. Particular attention will be devoted to the debate on the international legal personality of the Holy See within the European context from 1870 to the early 1930s. The theories proposed by contemporary scholars can be regarded as a point of departure for discussions regarding the Holy See’s international legal personality and its union with the Vatican City State from the point of view of international law.

Chapter 9 reiterates and reflects on the overall conclusions of the previous chapters: (1) that positive international law has consistently supported Kelsen’s ‘a posteriori’ conception of international legal personality; (2) that, consequently, the international legal personality of any entity is solely a matter of (presumption-free) interpretation of international norms; and (3) that we must abandon both the widespread presumption against direct individual rights and obligations (in accordance with the ‘modified States-only’ conception of international legal personality) and the use of the orthodox ‘States-only’ conception of international legal personality as means to distinguish between international law and national law.

Chapter 2 places Caribbean regional integration in its context, briefly surveying the geographic and economic features of the region. It examines the history of West Indian regional integration, from before the Second World War to the present. It highlights the formative impact of the West Indies Federation and of subsequent, unsuccessful, attempts at political integration. It traces the shift toward economic, functional forms of integration, and examines the evolution of the constituent instruments of both CARICOM and the OECS. It offers a brief introduction to the different forms of economic integration, locating both regional organizations in their broader global context. It presents a basic introduction both to the law of treaty interpretation and to some of the rules and principles of international institutional law, including autointerpretation, international legal personality, implied powers, and the doctrine of ultra vires.

One of the asymmetries faced by military missions in areas of limited statehood are diverging legal obligations of state and non-state actors, in particular in relation to human rights duties. From a perspective of states bound by human rights treaties, there is a certain danger that armed groups opposing them might abuse the obligations incumbent upon state actors. Against this perception, the potential application of human rights law to armed groups is not only relevant as a tool for protecting civilians but also from a reciprocity perspective in view of the fluidity of armed conflicts and with a view to convergence of standards. The chapter assesses how international law and international legal practice in relation to armed groups have evolved over the past decade. It takes stock of recent developments and analyses the degree to which human rights obligations apply to armed groups.

The book’s general conclusion summarizes the different thresholds of organization, power, or capacity required from armed groups as identified in the book’s three parts. It presents them in two concise and innovative tables. In a second step, the conclusion compares the different thresholds in order to identify similarities and differences. Comparing how the different fields of law have addressed armed groups over the past years and decades, and which challenges different fields have faced, the general conclusion also makes suggestions on how international law should further develop in order to better address the very different natures and capacities of armed groups. Moreover, it discusses how the conclusions drawn in this book might be relevant in the analysis of possible legal obligations of other non-state actors.