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Internal Reasons and Contractualist Impartiality

Alan Thomas

in Value and Context: The Nature of Moral and Political Knowledge

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780198250173
eISBN:
9780191604072
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198250177.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter examines a proposal concerning the nature of practical reasons: that all such reasons are internal reasons. It is the first obstacle that was placed in the way of the Wittgensteinian ... More


A Puzzle about Internal Reasons

Michael Smith

in Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199599325
eISBN:
9780191741500
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

According to Bernard Williams, all reasons for action are what he calls ‘internal reasons’, where an agent has an internal reason to act in some way just in case she would be motivated to act in that ... More


A Great and Rare Art

John Kekes

in Enjoyment: The Moral Significance of Styles of Life

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199546923
eISBN:
9780191720109
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546923.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

The enjoyment of one's life depends on the favorable personal evaluation of its style composed of one's attitude, manner, and dominant activities. Enjoyable lives that meet these conditions may still ... More


Rational Explanation: Belief, Feeling, and Will

John Skorupski

in The Domain of Reasons

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199587636
eISBN:
9780191595394
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587636.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The aim of Chapter 10 is to describe the form of ‘rational explanations’, i.e. explanations in terms of recognised warrant, and to show that exactly the same form of rational explanation applies to ... More


Against Modern Dualism about the Good

Talbot Brewer

in The Retrieval of Ethics

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2009
ISBN:
9780199557882
eISBN:
9780191720918
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557882.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

It is very nearly a fixed point within contemporary analytic philosophy that practical rationality calls for the efficient pursuit of that which is good for oneself. By contrast, it is a hotly ... More


Motivating and Justifying Reasons

Dean Moyar

in Hegel's Conscience

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780195391992
eISBN:
9780199894659
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391992.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, General

Chapter 2 takes up the problem of motivating and justifying reasons. The central problem here is how to think of the relation of the reasons that agents do in fact act upon to the reasons that ... More


From Prudence to Morality

James Griffin

in Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance

Published in print:
1988
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198248439
eISBN:
9780191597558
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198248431.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Morality must be rooted in the natural sources of human action. What are they? For instance, how are morality and self‐interest related? How are morality and personal aims related (a question to ... More


Prudence, Procrastination, and Rationality

Olav Gjelsvik

in The Thief of Time: Philosophical Essays on Procrastination

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780195376685
eISBN:
9780199776306
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195376685.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter defends an aspect of the standard view that procrastination is doing things later in time than you should and does so by accounting for normative aspects of time discounting and ... More


Freedom, Normative Judgments, and Reason

Ishtiyaque Haji

in Reason’s Debt to Freedom: Normative Appraisals, Reasons, and Free Will

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199899203
eISBN:
9780199949885
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899203.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

The principal issues to be discussed in the book are summarized in Chapter 1, such as alternative possibilities, objective reasons, free will, moral responsibility, moral sentiments. A ... More


The Resurrection of Jesus and Roman Catholic Fundamental Theology

Francis Schüssler Fiorenza

in The Resurrection: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Resurrection of Jesus

Published in print:
1998
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198269854
eISBN:
9780191600517
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198269854.003.0009
Subject:
Religion, Theology

Francis Schüssler Fiorenza develops a fundamental theological approach to Jesus’ resurrection that takes seriously the contemporary critique of foundationalism. He first discusses two different ... More


The Idiot

Mark Rowlands

in Can Animals Be Moral?

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199842001
eISBN:
9780199979844
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199842001.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

The concept of control, identified in the arguments of Aristotle and Kant, is rendered more precise in this chapter. The central dialectical figure of Myshkin is introduced. Myshkin is an individual ... More


Bernard Williams on Truth's Values

John Finnis

in Reason in Action: Collected Essays Volume I

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199580057
eISBN:
9780191729379
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580057.003.0006
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law

This chapter is the first part of a 2008 essay whose other parts are collected as Chapter 7 in Volume II of this text and Chapter 8 in Volume V. Here Williams's project in the last book he published, ... More


Reasons

Bryan R. Weaver and Kevin Scharp

in Semantics for Reasons

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
August 2019
ISBN:
9780198832621
eISBN:
9780191871184
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198832621.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

Chapter 1 clarifies, organizes, and in some case corrects the extensive literature on the different kinds of reasons. We focus in particular on (i) contributory, conclusive, and sufficient reasons, ... More


Analytical Naturalism and Subjectivism

Samuel Scheffler

in On What Matters: Volume Two

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199572816
eISBN:
9780191809873
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572816.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter provides a philosophical discussion of Analytical Naturalism and Subjectivism. It first considers several types of metaethical view, namely: Semi-Cognitivism, Cognitivism, Nihilism, ... More


Internal Reasons and the Heart’s Desire

Timothy Chappell

in Knowing What To Do: Imagination, Virtue, and Platonism in Ethics

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
May 2014
ISBN:
9780199684854
eISBN:
9780191765148
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684854.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Pace Mackie, there is nothing necessarily ‘queer’ about the idea of intrinsically motivating or justifying reasons. Williams’ internal reasons thesis, even if true, does not exclude anything like as ... More


Must We Conform?

John Kekes

in Hard Questions: Facing the Problems of Life

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
February 2019
ISBN:
9780190919986
eISBN:
9780190920012
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190919986.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter compares Melville’s Bartleby and the Venetian atheist savant, Sarpi. Bartleby lived a miserable life in nineteenth-century New York City. His inner resources were meager, and quiet ... More


Proleptic Reasons

Agnes Callard

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics: 11

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
September 2016
ISBN:
9780198784647
eISBN:
9780191828775
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198784647.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Sometimes we engage in a pursuit before we can fully access its value. When we embark upon, for example, the project of coming to appreciate classical music, we make a foray into a new domain of ... More


Subjectivist Reasons

Derek Parfit

in On What Matters: Volume Three

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
December 2017
ISBN:
9780198778608
eISBN:
9780191853487
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198778608.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter examines some arguments made in favour of subjectivism. It considers the claim that, if we were fully procedurally rational, we would want to avoid future agony because such agony would ... More


Morality, Blame, and Internal Reasons

Derek Parfit

in On What Matters: Volume Three

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
December 2017
ISBN:
9780198778608
eISBN:
9780191853487
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198778608.003.0016
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter presents two claims. The first is that no fact could give us a reason if we could not possibly be aware of this fact, or our awareness of this fact could not possibly motivate us. Next ... More


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