Mitchell S. Green
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199283781
- eISBN:
- 9780191712548
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283781.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
This chapter develops the third major form of showing employed in this book: showing how an experience, emotion, or mood feels. One way in which we do this is by using items of experience that are ...
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This chapter develops the third major form of showing employed in this book: showing how an experience, emotion, or mood feels. One way in which we do this is by using items of experience that are ‘congruent’ in some appropriate way with the experience or affect we are aiming to express, and, building on the work of L. Marks, this notion of congruence is motivated and developed. It is then argued that showing how an experience, emotion, or mood feels makes empathy possible for those with the capacity for empathy. The notion of empathy in play here is defended against alternative conceptions such as those of B. Gaut, A. Neill, and U. Frith. The perspective developed thus far is then related to artistic expression. Some leading theories of artistic expression are considered, including those of P. Kivy, J. Levinson, S. Davies, D. Matravers, R. Stecker, and B. Vermazen. An alternative conception, the Expression as Showing Theory, is developed and shown to be superior to these alternatives. The chapter concludes with an account of how certain works of art can be expressive by virtue of their mode of representation.Less
This chapter develops the third major form of showing employed in this book: showing how an experience, emotion, or mood feels. One way in which we do this is by using items of experience that are ‘congruent’ in some appropriate way with the experience or affect we are aiming to express, and, building on the work of L. Marks, this notion of congruence is motivated and developed. It is then argued that showing how an experience, emotion, or mood feels makes empathy possible for those with the capacity for empathy. The notion of empathy in play here is defended against alternative conceptions such as those of B. Gaut, A. Neill, and U. Frith. The perspective developed thus far is then related to artistic expression. Some leading theories of artistic expression are considered, including those of P. Kivy, J. Levinson, S. Davies, D. Matravers, R. Stecker, and B. Vermazen. An alternative conception, the Expression as Showing Theory, is developed and shown to be superior to these alternatives. The chapter concludes with an account of how certain works of art can be expressive by virtue of their mode of representation.
