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The chapter highlights the increasing relevance of boundary-crossing problems and thus of institutional choices in the intergovernmental arena of federal and multilevel systems. It distinguishes intergovernmental relations along three dimensions: exchanges, patterns, and structures. Focusing on dominant patterns, and structures as reflected in the nature of intergovernmental arrangements, the study compares the 'corridor of adaptation' across several federal systems. These corridors are rooted in intragovernmental dynamics and indicate the leeway of constitutive governments to create strong intergovernmental institutions. On this basis, the chapter distinguishes between four interaction modes associated with a particular institutional infrastructure: unilateral adaptation, ad hoc coordination, co-decision (regular joint decision-making) and supragovernmentalism (the formal creation of collective authority). Finally, the chapter defines and operationalizes the two dependent variables institutionalization of intergovernmental arrangements and their mutual integration.

Chapter 2 first examines how the relationship between nation-building and social policy emerged in Canadian society during and immediately following the Second World War. It then demonstrates how the transformation of Québécois nationalism during the 1960s generated a positive connection between sub-state nationalism and progressive social policy, and how this new connection affected the enactment and implementation of social policy in Canada. Next, it explores the contemporary links between nationalist mobilization in Quebec and the issue of social policy reform in the context of retrenchment and, more recently, federal budget surpluses. Finally, it looks at the impact of the Québécois nationalism–social policy nexus on the structures of Canadian federalism.

This chapter argues that patterns of horizontal self-coordination across lower-level governments in federal systems are driven by willingness as much as capacity. Depending on the internal dynamics of lower-level governments (which drive their ‘outside relations’), strategic considerations systematically feed into collective attempts to solve shared policy problems that cross jurisdictional boundaries. The mismatch between the willingness and the capacity of governments to engage in collective problem-solving (i.e. the tension between political manoeuvring and functional needs) generates a range of paradoxes inherent in intergovernmental self-coordination. Just to mention one: Since intergovernmental institutions are a product of self-coordination, strong voluntary institutions are more likely to be created in less competitive settings by governments that are less constrained by the anticipated outcome of the next election, thus, in settings where they are needed the least. These arguments are substantiated by material from a study of intergovernmental relations in Canada, Switzerland and the US.

This chapter on intergovernmental relations makes the case that an area often thought of as a lawyers' hobby rather than a major political variable is indeed key to the development of social citizenship on the practical and the rhetorical levels. Practically, governments cannot develop distinctive social citizenship if it requires policies they cannot make. Theoretically, debates about social policy channel and change social citizenship thinking and models of social citizenship. Governments themselves are major participants in the debates through which understandings of citizenship evolve, and the forums they meet in, the kinds of issues they debate, and the extent to which they shape each other's policies matter. The influence is reciprocal; citizenship, or concepts of fairness, provide much of the fuel for the fires that are increasingly whipped up around financial formulae or representation.

This chapter addresses UK central government and devolution over the whole period, focusing on how the centre articulated Britishness and approached the issues of law making and parliament, intergovernmental relations, and territorial finance in the light of devolution. The chapter places a principal focus on how the Blair governments developed the central state in the light of devolution. It explores the role of territorial pressures and constraints in thinking about adaptation at the centre; the availability of political resources in shaping approaches to reform; choices over the use of those resources; and the policy process adopted in making those choices. In so doing the chapter considers to what extent the evidence supports the proposition that following Bulpitt, the Blair governments sought to fashion an approach also to the development of the central state in the light of devolution that maintained a centre autonomy model of centre–periphery relations. The implication is that they sought this goal both to assist the successful embedding of devolution in ways amenable to the state as a whole, as well as maintaining effective UK government across all its priorities, not simply territorial management. The chapter draws on the published work of Trench, which was based on extensive interviews in Whitehall in the early 2000s, and reconsiders it within the book's framework of analysis.

Understanding policy analysis within State and Territory governments in Australia presents quite a challenge. State governments are part of a federation in which the Commonwealth government is fiscally dominant and has greatly expanded its policy ambition and reach over the past century. As a result, many areas of government activity, previously the sole preserve of State governments have become concurrent areas of policy formulation and implementation. Determining the precise role of States individually or collectively in such shared policy areas is inherently difficult. This chapter begins by looking at similarities and differences in State-level policy analysis compared to the federal level. It then looks at commonalities and differences between the States themselves, before drawing some conclusions on the policy patterns, decisions and styles across subnational government.

This chapter explores the system of intergovernmental relations and tries to determine if it functions as a vehicle for powersharing in state European Union (EU) decisions. It takes a look at the adaptations within Spain and the effectiveness of the channels for Basque participation in state decisions on EU matters. It also examines the Basque involvement in state intergovernmental and parliamentary bodies, and then discusses the importance of informal links between political parties ruling in multiple territorial arenas.

Policy bureaucrats have been the main providers of public policy advice in modern Australia. But this central role has been seriously challenged by the rise of alternative (non-government) sources of policy analysis and advice. This chapter examines the policy advice capacities within government; the key processes at national level for policy development in Australia, including inter-governmental forums; competitive sources of policy advice; and the likely future requirements for addressing complex policy issues in an era of uncertainty and fiscal constraint. Within public sector agencies, the policy function comprises analytical, administrative and relational roles, which in practice are closely connected. The new economic, social and environmental problems facing government now require policy and governance innovations. These challenges have stretched the policy capacity of managers and leaders to design, implement and evaluate new approaches and to manage new risks.

This chapter shows that, whereas urban preservation in Paris had long been a privilege of the state, the municipal government has begun to claim more autonomy over its urban territory and attempted to incorporate urban preservation into a larger frame of urban development. Hence, urban preservation in Paris is gradually transformed from the monopoly of the state to a joint venture between the city and the state.

The federal systems of Canada and the United States (U.S.) are difficult to define both individually and in comparative terms. They are similar in some ways yet very different in others. They have employed different strategies to deal with issues, diverse populations, and political structures. At the same time, both have relied on their constitutions to respond to change. Their strategies have moved between conflict and collaboration to attempt to support principles of democracy at different points in their historical development. Federalisms are highly variable; each is sui generis. Few if any generalizations about them are very robust. If this is true, then we have two quite different models to describe and explain. The task, then, is to understand how and in what ways they are similar and ask what common factors might explain why; and to understand the differences, and explain them.

This chapter presents the main theoretical framework of the book. After defining the concept of political fragmentation, the chapter identifies three major types of political fragmentation (i.e., functional, territorial, and intergovernmental) and specifies the effects of each type on the policy process.

This chapter examines patterns of policymaking and intergovernmental conflict during the first year of the Trump Administration. There is remarkable continuity with the activity discussed in the body of the book. As reflected in staffing decisions, ideas, and official activity, the Trump Administration’s domestic agenda clearly extends the basic commitments of the state conservatives discussed in this book. Partisan and intergovernmental disagreements likewise remain highly concentrated in the same areas of policy. In challenging the activity of the Trump Administration, liberal state officeholders have been quick to make use of much of the repertoire of administrative and legal behaviors developed by conservatives in recent years. The chapter therefore argues that the pattern of conservative state opposition to the Obama Administration was not an isolated episode, but an emerging norm in American politics and government: the United States is likely entering an era of more conflictual intergovernmental relations. Owing to the underlying administrative law doctrines, as well as the Trump Administration’s efforts to limit the scope of the administrative and welfare state, the likely result is a rearranged federalism in which state governments are more powerful and active than they have been for generations.

This chapter deals with multilevel government as one of the significant themes of Paul Craig’s work. Its focus is multilevel government within the state, defined to include a range of forms of significantly devolved government, of which federation is one. The chapter responds to the apparent paradox that while multilevel government is now widely regarded as a desirable feature of a system of government, for many good reasons that include its potential to deepen democracy, multilevel systems tend to become increasingly centralised over time, detracting from the advantages they offer. The chapter suggests that a partial explanation lies in prevailing conceptions of constitutionalism, almost all of which were developed by reference to the assumptions of a unitary state. It argues instead for a concept of constitutionalism adapted to the objectives and circumstances of multilevel government, in a compound form that might be described as multilevel constitutionalism. Multilevel constitutionalism would not dictate the degree of devolution but it would support its adoption and operation once in place. Implementation of multilevel constitutionalism in turn demands cultural change on the part of the principal actors, to give it practical effect. The chapter explores what this might require of political elites in pursuing intergovernmental arrangements, and of courts, interpreting and applying the governing constitution. It concludes with still tentative suggestions about the extent to which a suitably modified version of multilevel constitutionalism could apply above the level of the state, to regional and international arrangements.

Public health studies issues and policies implemented and often governed by local-level public health departments. Yet public health policy research emphasizes state and federal relations. Obscuring the role of local politics and in designing and implementing public health policies inaccurately portrays the functioning of public health systems and may lead to incomplete assumptions about the effects of health politics on public health. Homelessness is no exception, with a long history of expanded governing authority for communities and local governments. To understand homeless policy governance, we must draw from theories of urban politics and intergovernmental relations that have been developed to explain social policy. Chapter 2 develops the main theoretical argument of the book: limited coordination between policy interests governing homeless policy and trends of decentralization in homeless policy governance contribute to fewer publicly funded policy alternatives for solutions to chronic homelessness and increases the policy alternatives for private actors.

This chapter investigates whether Europeanisation has been a catalyst for change in the pattern of governance in Ireland. It presents a theoretical framework for understanding the effects of Europeanisation on Ireland and relates the various conceptualisations of Europeanisation to the Irish case. This chapter contends that while Europeanisation has influenced changes in Irish policy-making and implementation, the impact of Europeanisation was mediated by domestic forces. It also analyses the way in which key variables such as intergovernmental relations, political parties and cultural values have been affected to differing degrees by Europeanisation.