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Knowledge and Practical Interests

Jason Stanley

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
May 2006
ISBN:
9780199288038
eISBN:
9780191603679
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199288038.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The thesis of this book is that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e., by how much is at stake for that person at ... More


Interest‐Relative Invariantism versus Contextualism

Jason Stanley

in Knowledge and Practical Interests

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
May 2006
ISBN:
9780199288038
eISBN:
9780191603679
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199288038.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter is devoted to a thorough-going comparison of Interest-Relativism Invariantism and contextualism. It argues that the contextualist is committed to a worse error-theory than the advocate ... More


Interest‐Relative Invariantism

Jason Stanley

in Knowledge and Practical Interests

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
May 2006
ISBN:
9780199288038
eISBN:
9780191603679
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199288038.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter explains and develops a version of Interest-Relative Invariantism about knowledge, according to which whether or not someone knows that p at a certain time depends in part on what is at ... More


Contextualism, Interest‐Relativism, and Philosophical Paradox

Jason Stanley

in Knowledge and Practical Interests

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
May 2006
ISBN:
9780199288038
eISBN:
9780191603679
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199288038.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter discusses contextualist and interest-relative accounts of the sorites paradox and the Liar Paradox. It concludes that a pure interest-relative account is completely untenable for such ... More


Interest‐Relative Invariantism versus Relativism

Jason Stanley

in Knowledge and Practical Interests

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
May 2006
ISBN:
9780199288038
eISBN:
9780191603679
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199288038.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Relativism about knowledge-attributions is the thesis that knowledge attributions express propositions the truth of which is relative to a judge. On this view, a knowledge attribution may express a ... More


The Variability of Know(s)-that Judgments

Jody Azzouni

in Attributing Knowledge: What It Means to Know Something

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
October 2020
ISBN:
9780197508817
eISBN:
9780197508848
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The usage evidence—various scenarios that realistically depict where and when we attribute knowledge to ourselves and others—shows that all the alternatives (epistemic contextualism, ... More


Skepticism

Sarah Moss

in Probabilistic Knowledge

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
March 2018
ISBN:
9780198792154
eISBN:
9780191861260
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198792154.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

Accepting probabilistic knowledge gives rise to a difficult puzzle: how can Smith know that it is at least .6 likely that Jones smokes, when he is happy to admit that there is a significant chance ... More


Knowledge and action

Sarah Moss

in Probabilistic Knowledge

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
March 2018
ISBN:
9780198792154
eISBN:
9780191861260
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198792154.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter develops and defends two probabilistic knowledge norms of action. The first is a knowledge norm for reasons, namely that you may treat a probabilistic content as a reason for action if ... More


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