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The Rationality Theory

Alvin I. Goldman

in Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780195138924
eISBN:
9780199786480
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195138929.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Daniel Dennett’s “intentional stance” theory is a leading specimen of the rationality theory, though Dennett vacillates in offering stronger and weaker variants. In the strong formulations, the ... More


 Knowing Spirits

John Russell Roberts

in A Metaphysics for the Mob: The Philosophy of George Berkeley

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
May 2007
ISBN:
9780195313932
eISBN:
9780199871926
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195313932.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

This chapter explores the ramifications that the attribution to Berkeley of a use theory of meaning has for the interpretation of the divine language thesis, the relationship between individual ... More


The Instrumentalist Approach

William Lyons

in Approaches to Intentionality

Published in print:
1997
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198752226
eISBN:
9780191695087
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198752226.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language

This chapter discusses the rise of ‘scientific philosophy’, which would expose the logical and conceptual bases of natural sciences. The author traces it back to the 19th-century philosopher Auguste ... More


Animal Agency

Helen Steward

in A Metaphysics for Freedom

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199552054
eISBN:
9780191738838
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552054.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter considers animal agency. Using the work of developmental psychologists, it is argued that agency is a highly robust and distinctive concept that ought to be accorded a central role in ... More


The Nature of Non-Experiential Intentionality: An Interpretivist Theory

Uriah Kriegel

in The Sources of Intentionality

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199742974
eISBN:
9780199914449
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199742974.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

Developing a philosophical account of experiential intentionality requires answering the following question: For any item x and property F, what would make it the case that F figures in the ... More


Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content

Uriah Kriegel

in Cognitive Phenomenology

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199579938
eISBN:
9780191731112
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Since the seventies, it has been customary to assume that intentionality is independent of consciousness. Recently, a number of philosophers have rejected this assumption, claiming that ... More


Embodied Stances: Realism Without Literalism

Rebecca Kukla

in The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
February 2018
ISBN:
9780199367511
eISBN:
9780199367535
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199367511.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

This chapter argues that Dennettian stances, including the intentional stance, should be understood as collections of embodied strategies for coping with objects and coordinating with others. A ... More


The Inherently Normative Nature of Action Explanations

G. F. Schueler

in Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199250370
eISBN:
9780191598364
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199250375.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, General

There is a crucial difference between explaining actions on the basis of the agent's actual or possible practical deliberation (the deliberative model) and explaining them on the basis of some ... More


Intentionality and Experience: Terminological Preliminaries

Galen Strawson

in Real Materialism: and Other Essays

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
September 2008
ISBN:
9780199267422
eISBN:
9780191708343
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter glosses ‘naturalism’, ‘physicalism’, ‘intentionality’, ‘aboutness’, ‘mental’, ‘content’, ‘mental content’, ‘representational content’, and so on in ways that may seem unorthodox but ... More


Intentionality and Experience: Terminological Preliminaries

Galen Strawson

in Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199272457
eISBN:
9780191709951
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272457.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter glosses the terms ‘naturalism’, ‘physicalism’, ‘intentionality’, ‘aboutness’, ‘mental’, ‘content’, ‘mental content’, ‘representational content’, and so on, in ways that may seem ... More


Seeming to Seem

David Rosenthal

in The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
February 2018
ISBN:
9780199367511
eISBN:
9780199367535
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199367511.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

Dennett’s account of consciousness starts from third-person considerations. I argue this is wise, since beginning with first-person access precludes accommodating the third-person access we have to ... More


The Conditions of Agency

Christian List and Philip Pettit

in Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199591565
eISBN:
9780191725494
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591565.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter introduces the conditions a system must meet to count as an agent. At a basic level, a system is an agent if it acts so as to satisfy its desires in accordance with its beliefs, where ... More


Missteps on the Road Toward Macrocognition

Bryce Huebner

in Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199926275
eISBN:
9780199347193
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199926275.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

This chapter discusses two cases where the informational architecture of a distributed system yields robust patterns of collective behavior, but where we have no good reason to posit a unified ... More


Dennett on Breaking the Spell

Lynne Rudder Baker

in The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
February 2018
ISBN:
9780199367511
eISBN:
9780199367535
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199367511.003.0021
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

Dennett’s has recently attempted to break the “spell” that prevents people from submitting their religious beliefs and practices to scientific investigation. But what spell is being broken? Religion ... More


Probability Designs

Karin Kukkonen

in Probability Designs: Literature and Predictive Processing

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
December 2019
ISBN:
9780190050955
eISBN:
9780190050986
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190050955.003.0003
Subject:
Literature, Criticism/Theory

The chapter discusses the assumptions behind the notion of ‘design’ in greater detail. It draws on arguments around intentionality, manuscript genetics, and the extended mind. Design is understood as ... More


One Step Closer on the Road Toward Macrocognition

Bryce Huebner

in Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199926275
eISBN:
9780199347193
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199926275.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

This chapter discusses the organizational and architectural constraints on collective mentality. It is argued that collective mentality is unlikely to be realized by an organizational structure that ... More


The Habit Stance

Michael Brownstein

in The Implicit Mind: Cognitive Architecture, the Self, and Ethics

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
April 2018
ISBN:
9780190633721
eISBN:
9780190633752
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190633721.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

While it is clear that implicit attitudes are malleable, there is much to learn about the most effective techniques for changing them. This chapter examines three general approaches that increasingly ... More


The Technical View

Carrie Figdor

in Pieces of Mind: The Proper Domain of Psychological Predicates

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780198809524
eISBN:
9780191846861
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198809524.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

Chapter 7 completes the discussion of alternatives to Literalism. It presents the view that the terms are used literally in the unexpected domains, but with distinct reference. The view has two main ... More


The Many Roles of the Intentional Stance

Tadeusz Zawidzki

in The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
February 2018
ISBN:
9780199367511
eISBN:
9780199367535
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199367511.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

Can the intentional stance play all of the roles Dennett claims that it must play? There is reason for skepticism about the suitability of the intentional stance as an analysis of mature, ... More


Memory and the Intentional Stance

Felipe De Brigard

in The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
February 2018
ISBN:
9780199367511
eISBN:
9780199367535
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199367511.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

Despite Dennett’s vast scholarship, he seemed to only have directly addressed the topic of memory in a relatively unknown coauthored article published in a somewhat obscure volume. The current ... More


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