David B. Wong
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195305395
- eISBN:
- 9780199786657
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195305396.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter addresses the question how deeply moral reasons relate to human motivation through discussing the debate over internalism and externalism in ethics. Internalists on moral reasons hold ...
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This chapter addresses the question how deeply moral reasons relate to human motivation through discussing the debate over internalism and externalism in ethics. Internalists on moral reasons hold that an agent’s having a reason to act requires that it be based in some motive that she already has, while externalists deny the necessary relation. The position defended here is externalist about reasons, but it specifies an intelligible relation between external reasons and the possibility of agents acting on them. Recognition of a moral reason to help another, for example, can become embedded during moral learning in the intentional objects of prior motivational propensities to respond to the suffering of others. Because they become embedded in and function to channel pre-existing motivations, reasons are external to any particular individual’s pre-existing motivations, but they must be internal to the general motivational capabilities of human nature.Less
This chapter addresses the question how deeply moral reasons relate to human motivation through discussing the debate over internalism and externalism in ethics. Internalists on moral reasons hold that an agent’s having a reason to act requires that it be based in some motive that she already has, while externalists deny the necessary relation. The position defended here is externalist about reasons, but it specifies an intelligible relation between external reasons and the possibility of agents acting on them. Recognition of a moral reason to help another, for example, can become embedded during moral learning in the intentional objects of prior motivational propensities to respond to the suffering of others. Because they become embedded in and function to channel pre-existing motivations, reasons are external to any particular individual’s pre-existing motivations, but they must be internal to the general motivational capabilities of human nature.
Colin McGinn
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199267606
- eISBN:
- 9780191601798
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926760X.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
A sketch is given of the view that there are non-existent intentional objects: such things as Pegasus and Zeus, which do not exist but which can be the subject of thought, which can be referred to, ...
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A sketch is given of the view that there are non-existent intentional objects: such things as Pegasus and Zeus, which do not exist but which can be the subject of thought, which can be referred to, and to which true predicates can be applied. It is claimed that non-existent objects are the foundation of all intentionality: whenever there is intentionality towards an existent object, there is concurrent intentionality towards a non-existent one. The consequences of this view for perception and reference are considered. The question of reference to non-physical objects – abstract or mental entities – is raised and it is argued that this does not involve an accompanying reference to a non-existent intentional object, as is the case with reference to the physical.Less
A sketch is given of the view that there are non-existent intentional objects: such things as Pegasus and Zeus, which do not exist but which can be the subject of thought, which can be referred to, and to which true predicates can be applied. It is claimed that non-existent objects are the foundation of all intentionality: whenever there is intentionality towards an existent object, there is concurrent intentionality towards a non-existent one. The consequences of this view for perception and reference are considered. The question of reference to non-physical objects – abstract or mental entities – is raised and it is argued that this does not involve an accompanying reference to a non-existent intentional object, as is the case with reference to the physical.
Johannes L. Brandl
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199272457
- eISBN:
- 9780191709951
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272457.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter argues that the immanence theory of intentionality that Brentano put forward is not so unreasonable as its many critics have taken it to be. This chapter provides a charitable reading of ...
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This chapter argues that the immanence theory of intentionality that Brentano put forward is not so unreasonable as its many critics have taken it to be. This chapter provides a charitable reading of Brentano's formulation of this theory, then reconsiders Brentano's own reasons for rejecting it in his later writings. A version of this theory is proposed that takes real entities, namely mental information bearers, to be the immanent objects to which subjects are related in experience. The merit of this proposal is that it offers a naturalistic explanation of the subjectivity of experience in terms of the special vehicles of representation used in producing our experiences.Less
This chapter argues that the immanence theory of intentionality that Brentano put forward is not so unreasonable as its many critics have taken it to be. This chapter provides a charitable reading of Brentano's formulation of this theory, then reconsiders Brentano's own reasons for rejecting it in his later writings. A version of this theory is proposed that takes real entities, namely mental information bearers, to be the immanent objects to which subjects are related in experience. The merit of this proposal is that it offers a naturalistic explanation of the subjectivity of experience in terms of the special vehicles of representation used in producing our experiences.
Graham Priest
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199262540
- eISBN:
- 9780191602672
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199262543.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Chapter 3 provides a semantics for intentional predicates. The semantics proceeds in terms of objects which may or may not exist. An appendix discusses accounts of intentionality in Medieval Logic.
Chapter 3 provides a semantics for intentional predicates. The semantics proceeds in terms of objects which may or may not exist. An appendix discusses accounts of intentionality in Medieval Logic.
Robert C. Solomon
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195145496
- eISBN:
- 9780199833726
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195145496.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The idea that emotions have “objects” is interpreted. In place of atomistic analysis in terms of components, I offer a holistic account of emotion.
The idea that emotions have “objects” is interpreted. In place of atomistic analysis in terms of components, I offer a holistic account of emotion.
David M. Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199590612
- eISBN:
- 9780191723391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The notion of a truthmaker is introduced, and the importance of the notion for metaphysics is stressed. Russell was a pioneer. All truth is a matter of correspondence of a proposition to reality, so ...
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The notion of a truthmaker is introduced, and the importance of the notion for metaphysics is stressed. Russell was a pioneer. All truth is a matter of correspondence of a proposition to reality, so truthmaker Maximalism should be accepted. It need not be a one—one correspondence. ‘What are your truthmakers?’ is superior to Quine's question ‘What do you quantify over?’ Minimalist theories of truth, descending from Frank Ramsey, are rejected. Minimal truthmakers, however, are not rejected except in the case of infinities. The relation of truths to their truthmakers is an internal one, depending solely on the terms involved, truth and truthmaker. Truthbearers, that is truths, are true propositions, but propositions are no more than what is believed, supposes that, entertains that, etc., what philosophers call ‘intentional objects’. They can include impossibilities. There is no realm of propositions. The important Entailment Principle says that if a proposition entails some further proposition, then a truthmaker for the premise is also truthmaker for the conclusion. This casts significant light on the nature of valid argument.Less
The notion of a truthmaker is introduced, and the importance of the notion for metaphysics is stressed. Russell was a pioneer. All truth is a matter of correspondence of a proposition to reality, so truthmaker Maximalism should be accepted. It need not be a one—one correspondence. ‘What are your truthmakers?’ is superior to Quine's question ‘What do you quantify over?’ Minimalist theories of truth, descending from Frank Ramsey, are rejected. Minimal truthmakers, however, are not rejected except in the case of infinities. The relation of truths to their truthmakers is an internal one, depending solely on the terms involved, truth and truthmaker. Truthbearers, that is truths, are true propositions, but propositions are no more than what is believed, supposes that, entertains that, etc., what philosophers call ‘intentional objects’. They can include impossibilities. There is no realm of propositions. The important Entailment Principle says that if a proposition entails some further proposition, then a truthmaker for the premise is also truthmaker for the conclusion. This casts significant light on the nature of valid argument.
Ryan Nichols
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199276912
- eISBN:
- 9780191707759
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276912.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter focuses on the relationship between Reidian sensation and perception. It considers whether sensations are intentional objects of other mental states and, if so, what type of mental ...
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This chapter focuses on the relationship between Reidian sensation and perception. It considers whether sensations are intentional objects of other mental states and, if so, what type of mental states takes them as objects. It argues that Reidian sensations are qualitative feelings and not perceived intermediaries. Indeed, sensations, strictly speaking, are not even necessary for perceptual events. Though this confirms some fears about Reid's theory — that he has in a sense omitted sensations from his theory of perception — it is argued that he does this intentionally. This conclusion is justified by examining Reid's provocative comments to the effect that our capacity to experience sensations evolved or was created for the purpose of enhancing our survival, and not for the purpose of assisting us in getting information about the mind-independent world.Less
This chapter focuses on the relationship between Reidian sensation and perception. It considers whether sensations are intentional objects of other mental states and, if so, what type of mental states takes them as objects. It argues that Reidian sensations are qualitative feelings and not perceived intermediaries. Indeed, sensations, strictly speaking, are not even necessary for perceptual events. Though this confirms some fears about Reid's theory — that he has in a sense omitted sensations from his theory of perception — it is argued that he does this intentionally. This conclusion is justified by examining Reid's provocative comments to the effect that our capacity to experience sensations evolved or was created for the purpose of enhancing our survival, and not for the purpose of assisting us in getting information about the mind-independent world.
A. N. Prior
- Published in print:
- 1971
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198243540
- eISBN:
- 9780191680694
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243540.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Language
From objects of thought in the sense of ‘what we think’, this chapter now turns to objects of thought in the more natural sense of what we think of or about. It discusses ‘thinking of’ as a genuine ...
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From objects of thought in the sense of ‘what we think’, this chapter now turns to objects of thought in the more natural sense of what we think of or about. It discusses ‘thinking of’ as a genuine relation; Reid on the possible unreality and generality of objects of thought; Brentano, Meinong, and Findlay on objects of thought; and Miss Anscombe on intentional objects.Less
From objects of thought in the sense of ‘what we think’, this chapter now turns to objects of thought in the more natural sense of what we think of or about. It discusses ‘thinking of’ as a genuine relation; Reid on the possible unreality and generality of objects of thought; Brentano, Meinong, and Findlay on objects of thought; and Miss Anscombe on intentional objects.
Tim Crane
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199682744
- eISBN:
- 9780191762970
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682744.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter explains the basic elements of the theory of intentionality which will be used to solve the problem of non-existence. Intentionality is the direction of the mind upon an (existing or ...
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This chapter explains the basic elements of the theory of intentionality which will be used to solve the problem of non-existence. Intentionality is the direction of the mind upon an (existing or non-existing) object. Every intentional state involves an intentional mode (or attitude) and an intentional content (the way its object is represented). Not all intentional states are propositional attitudes: some are relations to existing objects, while others are non-relational but object-directed.Less
This chapter explains the basic elements of the theory of intentionality which will be used to solve the problem of non-existence. Intentionality is the direction of the mind upon an (existing or non-existing) object. Every intentional state involves an intentional mode (or attitude) and an intentional content (the way its object is represented). Not all intentional states are propositional attitudes: some are relations to existing objects, while others are non-relational but object-directed.
Robert C. Solomon
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195145496
- eISBN:
- 9780199833726
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195145496.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The idea that emotions have “objects” is scrutinized. I reject the idea that emotions can be separated into components – the emotion itself and the object of the emotion. I also discuss David Hume 's ...
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The idea that emotions have “objects” is scrutinized. I reject the idea that emotions can be separated into components – the emotion itself and the object of the emotion. I also discuss David Hume 's attempt to capture intentionality in his account of pride.Less
The idea that emotions have “objects” is scrutinized. I reject the idea that emotions can be separated into components – the emotion itself and the object of the emotion. I also discuss David Hume 's attempt to capture intentionality in his account of pride.
Frederick Kroon
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199764297
- eISBN:
- 9780199932191
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter attempts to adjudicate the disagreement between familiar realist ways of understanding intentionality and the anti-realist way favored by phenomenal intentionalists. It begins this task ...
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This chapter attempts to adjudicate the disagreement between familiar realist ways of understanding intentionality and the anti-realist way favored by phenomenal intentionalists. It begins this task by presenting what seems a particularly strong reason for thinking that phenomenal intentionalists have underestimated the need for intentional objects in an account of the intentional content of sensory experience. After arguing that we should nonetheless question the intentional realist's account of this intentional content, the chapter offers a compromise fictionalist approach that fits the spirit of the phenomenal intentionalist framework while retaining the benefits of the intentional realist's way of invoking intentional objects.Less
This chapter attempts to adjudicate the disagreement between familiar realist ways of understanding intentionality and the anti-realist way favored by phenomenal intentionalists. It begins this task by presenting what seems a particularly strong reason for thinking that phenomenal intentionalists have underestimated the need for intentional objects in an account of the intentional content of sensory experience. After arguing that we should nonetheless question the intentional realist's account of this intentional content, the chapter offers a compromise fictionalist approach that fits the spirit of the phenomenal intentionalist framework while retaining the benefits of the intentional realist's way of invoking intentional objects.
Mark Sainsbury
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198803348
- eISBN:
- 9780191841538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198803348.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
Intentionality is a property of mental states: their being directed on things, or about things. Intensionality is a semantic property, marked by such features as failure of truth preservation when ...
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Intentionality is a property of mental states: their being directed on things, or about things. Intensionality is a semantic property, marked by such features as failure of truth preservation when one referring expression is replaced by another with the same reference. Attributions of intentional states are intensional. This first chapter sets out the basic distinctions, describes some puzzles about intensionality (for example, how it is possible to think about unicorns when there are none to think about), and sketches the path to be taken in the rest of the book.Less
Intentionality is a property of mental states: their being directed on things, or about things. Intensionality is a semantic property, marked by such features as failure of truth preservation when one referring expression is replaced by another with the same reference. Attributions of intentional states are intensional. This first chapter sets out the basic distinctions, describes some puzzles about intensionality (for example, how it is possible to think about unicorns when there are none to think about), and sketches the path to be taken in the rest of the book.
D. C. Greetham
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198119937
- eISBN:
- 9780191671265
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198119937.003.0005
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
This chapter begins by the author's use of the story ‘Poem is Whitman's. Is the Voice?’ in presenting the argument that who is speaking matters because intention is, or is not, a valid concern for ...
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This chapter begins by the author's use of the story ‘Poem is Whitman's. Is the Voice?’ in presenting the argument that who is speaking matters because intention is, or is not, a valid concern for textual criticism, dependent in part on whether there in an author, a voice, whose presence can be inferred from the text. The chapter further discusses that the term voice, even when used in grammatical terminology, is a metaphor inferring by analogy the intent of the subject from the structure of the predicate. It then presents the problem confronted by the textual and literary critic – the artefactual status of the object or ‘whatness’ – and makes a distinction between ‘motives’ and ‘intentions’. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the different views on intention in text espoused by various theorists, the criticisms and problems faced by each, and the argument that Edmund Husserl's definition of consciousness as a movement toward an ‘intentional object’ could provide valuable insight into the rationale and procedure for intentionalist editing.Less
This chapter begins by the author's use of the story ‘Poem is Whitman's. Is the Voice?’ in presenting the argument that who is speaking matters because intention is, or is not, a valid concern for textual criticism, dependent in part on whether there in an author, a voice, whose presence can be inferred from the text. The chapter further discusses that the term voice, even when used in grammatical terminology, is a metaphor inferring by analogy the intent of the subject from the structure of the predicate. It then presents the problem confronted by the textual and literary critic – the artefactual status of the object or ‘whatness’ – and makes a distinction between ‘motives’ and ‘intentions’. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the different views on intention in text espoused by various theorists, the criticisms and problems faced by each, and the argument that Edmund Husserl's definition of consciousness as a movement toward an ‘intentional object’ could provide valuable insight into the rationale and procedure for intentionalist editing.
Dagfinn Føllesdal
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195139167
- eISBN:
- 9780199833214
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019513916X.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Husserl’s notion of the intentional object may be compared and contrasted with Bolzano’s and Frege’s views on the reference of linguistic expressions, especially since Bolzano was a main influence on ...
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Husserl’s notion of the intentional object may be compared and contrasted with Bolzano’s and Frege’s views on the reference of linguistic expressions, especially since Bolzano was a main influence on the development of Husserl’s views. Føllesdal responds to David Bell’s criticisms of Føllesdal’s earlier readings of Husserl on reference, directedness, and the notion of a determinable object x. He argues that Husserl’s treatment of indexicals and reference is in some ways more insightful than the treatments of either Bolzano or Frege. To preempt the charge that Husserl’s philosophy forwards a naïve, overly mentalistic model of the mind and its expressive capacities, Føllesdal mentions that Husserl developed a thought experiment nearly identical to the well-known Twin Earth scenario later framed by Hilary Putnam to criticize internalist, mentalistic theories of meaning. Føllesdal argues that Husserl was ahead of his time in trying to account for the semantics of indexical and demonstrative terms, partly under the influence of Brentano. This study shows that the opposition between so-called continental and so-called analytic philosophy is not historically as well-grounded as many have supposed.Less
Husserl’s notion of the intentional object may be compared and contrasted with Bolzano’s and Frege’s views on the reference of linguistic expressions, especially since Bolzano was a main influence on the development of Husserl’s views. Føllesdal responds to David Bell’s criticisms of Føllesdal’s earlier readings of Husserl on reference, directedness, and the notion of a determinable object x. He argues that Husserl’s treatment of indexicals and reference is in some ways more insightful than the treatments of either Bolzano or Frege. To preempt the charge that Husserl’s philosophy forwards a naïve, overly mentalistic model of the mind and its expressive capacities, Føllesdal mentions that Husserl developed a thought experiment nearly identical to the well-known Twin Earth scenario later framed by Hilary Putnam to criticize internalist, mentalistic theories of meaning. Føllesdal argues that Husserl was ahead of his time in trying to account for the semantics of indexical and demonstrative terms, partly under the influence of Brentano. This study shows that the opposition between so-called continental and so-called analytic philosophy is not historically as well-grounded as many have supposed.
David Premack and Ann James Premack
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198524021
- eISBN:
- 9780191689093
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524021.003.0007
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter presents a domain-specific theory of human social competence according to which humans interpret self-propelled objects that pursue goals as having intentions. These intentional objects ...
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This chapter presents a domain-specific theory of human social competence according to which humans interpret self-propelled objects that pursue goals as having intentions. These intentional objects engage in interactions to which value is attributed; they reciprocate value, join groups, and take possessions. The theory explains these interactions in terms of the following mental states: perception, desire, and belief.Less
This chapter presents a domain-specific theory of human social competence according to which humans interpret self-propelled objects that pursue goals as having intentions. These intentional objects engage in interactions to which value is attributed; they reciprocate value, join groups, and take possessions. The theory explains these interactions in terms of the following mental states: perception, desire, and belief.
Roger Scruton
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198167273
- eISBN:
- 9780191598371
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019816727X.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
Confronts certain puzzles raised about the nature and identity of the musical work, and dismisses these puzzles as unreal: either they concern the musical work itself, in which case they are puzzles ...
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Confronts certain puzzles raised about the nature and identity of the musical work, and dismisses these puzzles as unreal: either they concern the musical work itself, in which case they are puzzles about the metaphysical status of an intentional object, and therefore susceptible to an arbitrary solution, or they concern the sounds in which the work is heard, in which case they are simply special cases of the problems concerning the nature and identity of events.Less
Confronts certain puzzles raised about the nature and identity of the musical work, and dismisses these puzzles as unreal: either they concern the musical work itself, in which case they are puzzles about the metaphysical status of an intentional object, and therefore susceptible to an arbitrary solution, or they concern the sounds in which the work is heard, in which case they are simply special cases of the problems concerning the nature and identity of events.
J. L. Mackie
- Published in print:
- 1976
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198750369
- eISBN:
- 9780191597947
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198750366.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Mackie outlines Locke's representationalist theory. He analyses the relation between representationalism and the picture theory of ideas. The theory's relation to the veil of perception doctrine is ...
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Mackie outlines Locke's representationalist theory. He analyses the relation between representationalism and the picture theory of ideas. The theory's relation to the veil of perception doctrine is also critically examined. Mackie criticizes the verificationist theory of meaning and instead argues that ideas should be understood as intentional objects. Mackie introduces and defends a version of realism, which he calls ‘common‐sense realism’.Less
Mackie outlines Locke's representationalist theory. He analyses the relation between representationalism and the picture theory of ideas. The theory's relation to the veil of perception doctrine is also critically examined. Mackie criticizes the verificationist theory of meaning and instead argues that ideas should be understood as intentional objects. Mackie introduces and defends a version of realism, which he calls ‘common‐sense realism’.
Mark Textor
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780199685479
- eISBN:
- 9780191765636
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780199685479.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
In Psychologie, Brentano introduced a new mark of mental phenomena: all and only mental phenomena are intentional. No physical state or property is intentional. Under the label ‘Brentano’s Thesis’ ...
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In Psychologie, Brentano introduced a new mark of mental phenomena: all and only mental phenomena are intentional. No physical state or property is intentional. Under the label ‘Brentano’s Thesis’ this mark of the mental has guided philosophical research both by phenomenologists and by analytic philosophers of mind. This chapter reconstructs the view of intentionality that underlies Brentano’s Thesis and finds it under-explained. Brentano clearly struggled to convey to his readers what he took to be the common feature of the mental. The chapter goes on to assess attempts to explain intentionality in independently intelligible terms by such philosophers as Chisholm, Crane, and Molnar, and finds them all wanting.Less
In Psychologie, Brentano introduced a new mark of mental phenomena: all and only mental phenomena are intentional. No physical state or property is intentional. Under the label ‘Brentano’s Thesis’ this mark of the mental has guided philosophical research both by phenomenologists and by analytic philosophers of mind. This chapter reconstructs the view of intentionality that underlies Brentano’s Thesis and finds it under-explained. Brentano clearly struggled to convey to his readers what he took to be the common feature of the mental. The chapter goes on to assess attempts to explain intentionality in independently intelligible terms by such philosophers as Chisholm, Crane, and Molnar, and finds them all wanting.
Wolfgang Künne
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199241316
- eISBN:
- 9780191597831
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199241317.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
I argue that neither sentences nor sentential utterances nor token‐sentences, but propositions, conceived of as (possible) contents of certain speech acts and of certain mental acts and states, are ...
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I argue that neither sentences nor sentential utterances nor token‐sentences, but propositions, conceived of as (possible) contents of certain speech acts and of certain mental acts and states, are the primary truth‐value bearers. Following Husserl, I make a point of taking the proposition that p to be the content, rather than the (intentional) object, of a thinker's V‐ing that p, and of assigning the latter role to states of affairs. Temporalists (such as the Stoics, Prior, and Kaplan) claim that truth is an unstable property of certain sayables and thinkables, whereas eternalists (like Bolzano, Frege, and Russell) deny this. After distinguishing different kinds of eternalism and of temporalism and locating Lukasiewicz's position on my map, I argue that we need the concept of indexically expressed propositions with stable truth‐values. Finally, I concede that the notion of sayables and thinkables with shifting truth‐values also serves some important explanatory purposes.Less
I argue that neither sentences nor sentential utterances nor token‐sentences, but propositions, conceived of as (possible) contents of certain speech acts and of certain mental acts and states, are the primary truth‐value bearers. Following Husserl, I make a point of taking the proposition that p to be the content, rather than the (intentional) object, of a thinker's V‐ing that p, and of assigning the latter role to states of affairs. Temporalists (such as the Stoics, Prior, and Kaplan) claim that truth is an unstable property of certain sayables and thinkables, whereas eternalists (like Bolzano, Frege, and Russell) deny this. After distinguishing different kinds of eternalism and of temporalism and locating Lukasiewicz's position on my map, I argue that we need the concept of indexically expressed propositions with stable truth‐values. Finally, I concede that the notion of sayables and thinkables with shifting truth‐values also serves some important explanatory purposes.
Tim Crane
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199682744
- eISBN:
- 9780191762970
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682744.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book addresses the ancient question of how it is possible to think about what does not exist. It is argued that the representation of the non-existent is a pervasive feature of our thought about ...
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This book addresses the ancient question of how it is possible to think about what does not exist. It is argued that the representation of the non-existent is a pervasive feature of our thought about the world, and that we will not adequately understand thought’s representational power (‘intentionality’) unless we have understood the representation of the non-existent. Intentionality is conceived in terms of the direction of the mind upon an object of thought, or an intentional object. Intentional objects are what we think about. Some intentional objects exist and some do not. Non-existence poses a problem because there seem to be truths about non-existent intentional objects, but truths are answerable to reality, and reality contains only what exists. The proposed solution is to accept that there are some genuine truths about non-existent intentional objects, but to hold that they must be reductively explained in terms of truths about what does exist.Less
This book addresses the ancient question of how it is possible to think about what does not exist. It is argued that the representation of the non-existent is a pervasive feature of our thought about the world, and that we will not adequately understand thought’s representational power (‘intentionality’) unless we have understood the representation of the non-existent. Intentionality is conceived in terms of the direction of the mind upon an object of thought, or an intentional object. Intentional objects are what we think about. Some intentional objects exist and some do not. Non-existence poses a problem because there seem to be truths about non-existent intentional objects, but truths are answerable to reality, and reality contains only what exists. The proposed solution is to accept that there are some genuine truths about non-existent intentional objects, but to hold that they must be reductively explained in terms of truths about what does exist.
