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Conclusion: Constructing Content

Carolyn Price

in Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780199242009
eISBN:
9780191696992
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199242009.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

This concluding chapter sums up the key findings of this study about intentional content. The findings suggests that there are not intentional norms in nature because there are no biological norms in ... More


Representing Thoughts

Christopher Peacocke

in Truly Understood

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199239443
eISBN:
9780191717000
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239443.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The ability to think about Thoughts was presupposed in the discussions of self-ascription and in the discussion of other-ascriptions of actions, judgements, and other events and states with ... More


Learning and Wanting

Carolyn Price

in Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780199242009
eISBN:
9780191696992
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199242009.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

This chapter considers two ways in which it is possible to advance beyond the minimal intentional systems described in the previous chapters. It analyses who the learning process generates ... More


Self‐Knowledge and Intentional Content

Christopher Peacocke

in Being Known

Published in print:
1999
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198238607
eISBN:
9780191598197
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198238606.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A conscious occurrent propositional attitude contributes to the content of consciousness by occupying attention, rather than by being its object. Externally individuated concepts contribute to the ... More


Introduction: Nature and Function

Carolyn Price

in Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780199242009
eISBN:
9780191696992
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199242009.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

This introductory chapter explains the objective of this book, which is to offer a theory of intentional content and to provide an account of what it is meant when people say that a person is musing ... More


Against Materialism

Laurence BonJour

in The Waning of Materialism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199556182
eISBN:
9780191721014
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter argues that there are no compelling arguments in favor of, and very powerful, seemingly unanswerable objections to, materialism in the philosophy of mind. The arguments for materialism ... More


States, Contents, and the Source of Entitlement

Christopher Peacocke

in The Realm of Reason

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
April 2004
ISBN:
9780199270729
eISBN:
9780191600944
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199270724.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

States and defends the second principle of rationalism, The Rationalist Dependence Thesis, which holds that the rational truth‐conduciveness of any given transition to which a thinker is entitled is ... More


Mental Action and Self‐Awareness (II): Epistemology

Christopher Peacocke

in Mental Actions

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199225989
eISBN:
9780191710339
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199225989.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

We know of our own mental actions by taking our conscious, belief-independent events of apparent action awareness at face value. This is not a perceptual model of the self-ascription of attitudes, ... More


For Someone's Sake

Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen

in Personal Value

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199603787
eISBN:
9780191729294
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603787.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The proposed analysis in this work, stresses that the defining feature of personal value, is not found exclusively in its normative element. Chapter 5 presents, and begins discussion of, the equally ... More


The Structure of Intentionality

Tim Crane

in The Objects of Thought

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199682744
eISBN:
9780191762970
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682744.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter explains the basic elements of the theory of intentionality which will be used to solve the problem of non-existence. Intentionality is the direction of the mind upon an (existing or ... More


Inside and Outside Language: Stroud's Nonreductionism about Meaning

Hannah Ginsborg

in The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Reflections on the Thought of Barry Stroud

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780195381658
eISBN:
9780199918317
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381658.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, General, History of Philosophy

I argue that Stroud's nonreductionism about meaning is insufficiently motivated. First, given that he rejects the assumption that grasp of an expression's meaning guides or instructs us in its use, ... More


The World of Qualia

Matjaž Potrč

in The Case for Qualia

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262232661
eISBN:
9780262286497
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262232661.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, General

The discussion in this chapter is limited to the experiential world. Although the relation of qualia to the physical world remains unclear, it is argued here that qualia may well be whatever helps to ... More


Representationalism

Gerald Vision

in Re-Emergence: Locating Conscious Properties in a Material World

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262015844
eISBN:
9780262298599
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262015844.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter is concerned with “Representationalism” and its companion term “representationism” that both, essentially, state that conscious, particularly phenomenal, properties are features of their ... More


The Character of Experience

Paul Gilbert and Kathleen Lennon

in The World, the Flesh and the Subject: Continental Themes in Philosophy of Mind and Body

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
March 2012
ISBN:
9780748614981
eISBN:
9780748652495
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Edinburgh University Press
DOI:
10.3366/edinburgh/9780748614981.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Sensory perceptions and bodily sensations are paradigms of mental states that have a subjective character: there is something it is like to be in them which seems recalcitrant to explanation in terms ... More


Introduction: Cognition, Content, and Knowledge Revisited

Robert Hanna

in Cognition, Content, and the A Priori: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind and Knowledge

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
November 2015
ISBN:
9780198716297
eISBN:
9780191785009
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716297.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

According to a classical view in the philosophy of mind, both human and non-human minded animals inherently or innately possess a capacity to produce mental representations of objects (whether those ... More


A Defense of Qualia in the Strong Sense

Barry Maund

in The Case for Qualia

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262232661
eISBN:
9780262286497
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262232661.003.0015
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This chapter argues that the existence of such a thing as the phenomenal-qualitative character to experiences—and with it, the existence of qualia—is a noncontroversial issue, especially if taken in ... More


Metaphysics and the Theory of Content

Christopher Peacocke

in The Primacy of Metaphysics

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
July 2019
ISBN:
9780198835578
eISBN:
9780191873751
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198835578.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Is the metaphysics of a domain prior in the order of philosophical explanation to a theory of intentional contents and meanings about that domain? Or is the opposite true? There is a general argument ... More


Quality and Content: Essays on Consciousness, Representation, and Modality

Joseph Levine

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
April 2018
ISBN:
9780198800088
eISBN:
9780191839863
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198800088.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The papers presented in this volume cover topics, such as the “phenomenal concept strategy,” to defend materialism from anti-materialist intuitions, the doctrine of representationalism about ... More


From the Looks of Things: The Explanatory Failure of Representationalism

Diana Raffman

in The Case for Qualia

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262232661
eISBN:
9780262286497
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262232661.003.0019
Subject:
Philosophy, General

In this chapter it is argued that although the representationalist has told a credible materialist story of how a perceptual experience gets and carries its intentional content, he has not yet ... More


Narrow Content Meets Fat Syntax

Stephen Stich

in Collected Papers, Volume 1: Mind and Language, 1972–2010

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199734108
eISBN:
9780190267513
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199734108.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter begins with a quick overview of Fodor's account of narrow content. It provides a sketch of how Fodor proposes to construct the notion and sets out a pair of reasons for doubting that ... More


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