Asifa Hussain and William Miller
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199280711
- eISBN:
- 9780191604102
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199280711.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, UK Politics
Two-thirds of Pakistanis and two-fifths of English report being subjected to ‘intentional insults’, although most claim that their abusers were not really ‘typical Scots’. Integration may reduce the ...
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Two-thirds of Pakistanis and two-fifths of English report being subjected to ‘intentional insults’, although most claim that their abusers were not really ‘typical Scots’. Integration may reduce the harassment of English immigrants, but the more Pakistanis integrate, the more they suffered. Those who were born in Scotland, spoke English at home, or worked outside the home or the family business experienced more harassment and abuse. For ethnic Pakistanis, more contact meant more harassment, and perhaps greater sensitivity to it. General perceptions of conflict between minorities and majority of Scots were strongly linked to personal experience, with frequency having more impact than severity; even irritating ethnic jokes created a perception of conflict if they were frequent. The impact of personal experience on general perceptions of conflict with majority Scots was as strong amongst English immigrants as they were amongst ethnic Pakistanis.Less
Two-thirds of Pakistanis and two-fifths of English report being subjected to ‘intentional insults’, although most claim that their abusers were not really ‘typical Scots’. Integration may reduce the harassment of English immigrants, but the more Pakistanis integrate, the more they suffered. Those who were born in Scotland, spoke English at home, or worked outside the home or the family business experienced more harassment and abuse. For ethnic Pakistanis, more contact meant more harassment, and perhaps greater sensitivity to it. General perceptions of conflict between minorities and majority of Scots were strongly linked to personal experience, with frequency having more impact than severity; even irritating ethnic jokes created a perception of conflict if they were frequent. The impact of personal experience on general perceptions of conflict with majority Scots was as strong amongst English immigrants as they were amongst ethnic Pakistanis.
Gerhard Dannemann
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199533114
- eISBN:
- 9780191705526
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199533114.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Comparative Law, Law of Obligations
This book provides a description of the German law of unjustified enrichment. It explains how German law generally allows restitution for transfers made without legal ground (rather than on the basis ...
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This book provides a description of the German law of unjustified enrichment. It explains how German law generally allows restitution for transfers made without legal ground (rather than on the basis of individual unjust factors), an approach which the late Peter Birks proposed for English law to adopt, and which the House of Lords was careful not to rule out for the future in Deutsche Morgan Grenfell v Inland Revenue. Part I explains the workings of German unjustified enrichment law within the particular context of German contract, tort, and property law. It shows how the German general unjust enrichment clause is controlled by limiting its scope to intentional transfers, and complemented by specific grounds of unjust enrichment. This part also explains defences against and measure of enrichment claims. Part II places German law in the comparative context of three different fundamental approaches towards unjustified enrichment, shows some unexpected similarities between English and German law, and discusses whether English law could and should adopt the German approach. The book gives equal prominence to structural issues and legal doctrine on the one hand, and practical application of the law on the other. It provides leading German cases and relevant statutory provisions in English translation.Less
This book provides a description of the German law of unjustified enrichment. It explains how German law generally allows restitution for transfers made without legal ground (rather than on the basis of individual unjust factors), an approach which the late Peter Birks proposed for English law to adopt, and which the House of Lords was careful not to rule out for the future in Deutsche Morgan Grenfell v Inland Revenue. Part I explains the workings of German unjustified enrichment law within the particular context of German contract, tort, and property law. It shows how the German general unjust enrichment clause is controlled by limiting its scope to intentional transfers, and complemented by specific grounds of unjust enrichment. This part also explains defences against and measure of enrichment claims. Part II places German law in the comparative context of three different fundamental approaches towards unjustified enrichment, shows some unexpected similarities between English and German law, and discusses whether English law could and should adopt the German approach. The book gives equal prominence to structural issues and legal doctrine on the one hand, and practical application of the law on the other. It provides leading German cases and relevant statutory provisions in English translation.
Ralph Wedgwood
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199251315
- eISBN:
- 9780191719127
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251315.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book presents a complete theory about the nature of normative thought, that is, the sort of thought that is concerned with what ought to be the case, or what we ought to do or think. This theory ...
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This book presents a complete theory about the nature of normative thought, that is, the sort of thought that is concerned with what ought to be the case, or what we ought to do or think. This theory implies a kind of metanormative realism, according to which normative truths or facts are genuinely part of reality. At the same time, the theory aims to provide a substantive account of the nature of these normative facts, and a substantive explanation of how it is possible for us to know these facts and to refer to them in language or thought. In providing these explanations, the theory relies on a version of the idea (which has been much discussed in recent work in the philosophy of mind) of the normativity of the intentional. This is the idea that there is no way to explain the nature of the various sorts of mental states that have intentionality or representational content (such as beliefs, judgments, desires, decisions, and so on) without stating normative facts. This idea provides the basis for a systematic theory that deals with the following three areas: the semantics of normative statements (which investigates the meaning of statements about what ought to be); the metaphysics of normative facts (about the nature of the facts stated by these statements); and the epistemology of normative belief (about what justifies us in holding beliefs that these statements express).Less
This book presents a complete theory about the nature of normative thought, that is, the sort of thought that is concerned with what ought to be the case, or what we ought to do or think. This theory implies a kind of metanormative realism, according to which normative truths or facts are genuinely part of reality. At the same time, the theory aims to provide a substantive account of the nature of these normative facts, and a substantive explanation of how it is possible for us to know these facts and to refer to them in language or thought. In providing these explanations, the theory relies on a version of the idea (which has been much discussed in recent work in the philosophy of mind) of the normativity of the intentional. This is the idea that there is no way to explain the nature of the various sorts of mental states that have intentionality or representational content (such as beliefs, judgments, desires, decisions, and so on) without stating normative facts. This idea provides the basis for a systematic theory that deals with the following three areas: the semantics of normative statements (which investigates the meaning of statements about what ought to be); the metaphysics of normative facts (about the nature of the facts stated by these statements); and the epistemology of normative belief (about what justifies us in holding beliefs that these statements express).
Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, and Adrian Haddock
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199586264
- eISBN:
- 9780191723360
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
The three parts of the book comprise three distinct investigations under a common theme: enquiry into inter-relationships between issues about the nature of knowledge and issues about the value of ...
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The three parts of the book comprise three distinct investigations under a common theme: enquiry into inter-relationships between issues about the nature of knowledge and issues about the value of knowledge. The first investigation provides an analysis of problems concerning the value of knowledge and a critical examination of responses to these by virtue epistemologists. The book finds virtue-theoretic accounts wanting and argues that there is a cognitive state — understanding — which is similar to, but different from knowledge, and which has final value. In the second investigation the book presents accounts of perceptual knowledge, knowledge from indicator phenomena, and knowledge from testimony, in each of which recognitional abilities feature prominently. Consideration of these abilities, the book claims, enables us to reach a better understanding of knowledge and its value. The third investigation focuses on the relationship between perceptual knowledge and knowledge of our own intentional actions. The book argues for an account of knowledge and justification to which a certain kind of second-order knowledge is central and applies this both to perceptual knowledge, and knowledge of our own intentional actions, with a view to explaining ways in which knowledge is of value.Less
The three parts of the book comprise three distinct investigations under a common theme: enquiry into inter-relationships between issues about the nature of knowledge and issues about the value of knowledge. The first investigation provides an analysis of problems concerning the value of knowledge and a critical examination of responses to these by virtue epistemologists. The book finds virtue-theoretic accounts wanting and argues that there is a cognitive state — understanding — which is similar to, but different from knowledge, and which has final value. In the second investigation the book presents accounts of perceptual knowledge, knowledge from indicator phenomena, and knowledge from testimony, in each of which recognitional abilities feature prominently. Consideration of these abilities, the book claims, enables us to reach a better understanding of knowledge and its value. The third investigation focuses on the relationship between perceptual knowledge and knowledge of our own intentional actions. The book argues for an account of knowledge and justification to which a certain kind of second-order knowledge is central and applies this both to perceptual knowledge, and knowledge of our own intentional actions, with a view to explaining ways in which knowledge is of value.
David Archard and David Benatar (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199590704
- eISBN:
- 9780191595547
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590704.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The book offers new and original chapters on the ethics of procreation and parenthood. The introduction provides an overview of the current debates in this area. In his chapter, Tim Bayne evaluates ...
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The book offers new and original chapters on the ethics of procreation and parenthood. The introduction provides an overview of the current debates in this area. In his chapter, Tim Bayne evaluates current thinking about the ethics of bringing people into existence. David Benatar argues that the right of reproductive freedom, although important, must be limited. Michael Parker responds to the argument for ‘procreative beneficence’—the view that procreators are duty‐bound to produce children with the best possible quality of life. He argues that we need only aim at producing children that have ‘a reasonable chance of a good life’. Colin Macleod considers the extent to which the existence of parental prerogatives conflicts with the demands of justice. David Archard argues that the causal theory of parenthood is consistent with the view that those who did not cause the child to exist may still take on the responsibilities of acting as parents. Elizabeth Brake defends a version of the intentional account of parental duties, arguing that these duties can only arise from voluntary acceptance of the socially constituted parental role.Less
The book offers new and original chapters on the ethics of procreation and parenthood. The introduction provides an overview of the current debates in this area. In his chapter, Tim Bayne evaluates current thinking about the ethics of bringing people into existence. David Benatar argues that the right of reproductive freedom, although important, must be limited. Michael Parker responds to the argument for ‘procreative beneficence’—the view that procreators are duty‐bound to produce children with the best possible quality of life. He argues that we need only aim at producing children that have ‘a reasonable chance of a good life’. Colin Macleod considers the extent to which the existence of parental prerogatives conflicts with the demands of justice. David Archard argues that the causal theory of parenthood is consistent with the view that those who did not cause the child to exist may still take on the responsibilities of acting as parents. Elizabeth Brake defends a version of the intentional account of parental duties, arguing that these duties can only arise from voluntary acceptance of the socially constituted parental role.
Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195382440
- eISBN:
- 9780199870158
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195382440.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of “good” or the notion of “desire” have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional ...
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Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of “good” or the notion of “desire” have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of ‘desire’ and ‘good’, how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the “Guise of the Good” thesis — the view that desire (or perhaps intention, or intentional action) always aims at the good — has received renewed attention in the last twenty years. Can one have desire for things that the desirer does not perceive to be good in any, or form intentions to act in way that one does not deem to be good? Does the notion of good play any essential role in an account of deliberation or practical reason? Moreover, philosophers also disagree about the relevant notion of good. Is it a purely formal notion, or does it involve a substantive conception of the good? Is the primary notion, the notion of the good for a particular agent, or the notion of good simpliciter? Does the relevant notion of good make essential appeal to human nature, or would it in principle extend to all rational beings? While these questions are central in contemporary work in ethics, practical reason, and philosophy of action, they are not new; similar issues were discussed in the ancient period. The book aims to bring together “systematic” and more historically-oriented work on these issues.Less
Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of “good” or the notion of “desire” have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of ‘desire’ and ‘good’, how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the “Guise of the Good” thesis — the view that desire (or perhaps intention, or intentional action) always aims at the good — has received renewed attention in the last twenty years. Can one have desire for things that the desirer does not perceive to be good in any, or form intentions to act in way that one does not deem to be good? Does the notion of good play any essential role in an account of deliberation or practical reason? Moreover, philosophers also disagree about the relevant notion of good. Is it a purely formal notion, or does it involve a substantive conception of the good? Is the primary notion, the notion of the good for a particular agent, or the notion of good simpliciter? Does the relevant notion of good make essential appeal to human nature, or would it in principle extend to all rational beings? While these questions are central in contemporary work in ethics, practical reason, and philosophy of action, they are not new; similar issues were discussed in the ancient period. The book aims to bring together “systematic” and more historically-oriented work on these issues.
David M. Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199590612
- eISBN:
- 9780191723391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The notion of a truthmaker is introduced, and the importance of the notion for metaphysics is stressed. Russell was a pioneer. All truth is a matter of correspondence of a proposition to reality, so ...
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The notion of a truthmaker is introduced, and the importance of the notion for metaphysics is stressed. Russell was a pioneer. All truth is a matter of correspondence of a proposition to reality, so truthmaker Maximalism should be accepted. It need not be a one—one correspondence. ‘What are your truthmakers?’ is superior to Quine's question ‘What do you quantify over?’ Minimalist theories of truth, descending from Frank Ramsey, are rejected. Minimal truthmakers, however, are not rejected except in the case of infinities. The relation of truths to their truthmakers is an internal one, depending solely on the terms involved, truth and truthmaker. Truthbearers, that is truths, are true propositions, but propositions are no more than what is believed, supposes that, entertains that, etc., what philosophers call ‘intentional objects’. They can include impossibilities. There is no realm of propositions. The important Entailment Principle says that if a proposition entails some further proposition, then a truthmaker for the premise is also truthmaker for the conclusion. This casts significant light on the nature of valid argument.Less
The notion of a truthmaker is introduced, and the importance of the notion for metaphysics is stressed. Russell was a pioneer. All truth is a matter of correspondence of a proposition to reality, so truthmaker Maximalism should be accepted. It need not be a one—one correspondence. ‘What are your truthmakers?’ is superior to Quine's question ‘What do you quantify over?’ Minimalist theories of truth, descending from Frank Ramsey, are rejected. Minimal truthmakers, however, are not rejected except in the case of infinities. The relation of truths to their truthmakers is an internal one, depending solely on the terms involved, truth and truthmaker. Truthbearers, that is truths, are true propositions, but propositions are no more than what is believed, supposes that, entertains that, etc., what philosophers call ‘intentional objects’. They can include impossibilities. There is no realm of propositions. The important Entailment Principle says that if a proposition entails some further proposition, then a truthmaker for the premise is also truthmaker for the conclusion. This casts significant light on the nature of valid argument.
Tom W. N. Parker
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198184430
- eISBN:
- 9780191674259
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198184430.003.0008
- Subject:
- Literature, Poetry, 16th-century and Renaissance Literature
This conclusion concludes that the frequency in the reiterations of particular sets of numbers within the sonnet sequences of the Sidney circle is an enough conviction that intentional patterning did ...
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This conclusion concludes that the frequency in the reiterations of particular sets of numbers within the sonnet sequences of the Sidney circle is an enough conviction that intentional patterning did existed. The Renaissance was a period governed by appreciation of harmony and aesthetic considerations, hence sonnet sequence within a harmonic pattern were deeply appreciated. In the works of Fulke Greville, Robert Sidney and Phillip Sidney, the recurrence of the same set of numbers in the formal arrangements of the sonnet sequences implied the purpose and implication of harmonic sequences — intentional patterning and formal sonnet sequences were indications of the technicalities that sought to belie the perceived shallowness of sonnets and poetry. While fastidious attention is directed to the superficial and surface features of poems, the formal sonnet sequences allows if not forces a reader to look beyond the superficiality of poetry to the sweat and blood invested by the poets to the algorithms and sequences of their craft.Less
This conclusion concludes that the frequency in the reiterations of particular sets of numbers within the sonnet sequences of the Sidney circle is an enough conviction that intentional patterning did existed. The Renaissance was a period governed by appreciation of harmony and aesthetic considerations, hence sonnet sequence within a harmonic pattern were deeply appreciated. In the works of Fulke Greville, Robert Sidney and Phillip Sidney, the recurrence of the same set of numbers in the formal arrangements of the sonnet sequences implied the purpose and implication of harmonic sequences — intentional patterning and formal sonnet sequences were indications of the technicalities that sought to belie the perceived shallowness of sonnets and poetry. While fastidious attention is directed to the superficial and surface features of poems, the formal sonnet sequences allows if not forces a reader to look beyond the superficiality of poetry to the sweat and blood invested by the poets to the algorithms and sequences of their craft.
Carolyn Price
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199242009
- eISBN:
- 9780191696992
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199242009.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
This concluding chapter sums up the key findings of this study about intentional content. The findings suggests that there are not intentional norms in nature because there are no biological norms in ...
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This concluding chapter sums up the key findings of this study about intentional content. The findings suggests that there are not intentional norms in nature because there are no biological norms in nature and that claims about function and content are claims about objective causal relations between natural items. The results also indicate that determinacy objection against a teleological approach to intentional explanation can be answered using the proposed account of the theory of functions.Less
This concluding chapter sums up the key findings of this study about intentional content. The findings suggests that there are not intentional norms in nature because there are no biological norms in nature and that claims about function and content are claims about objective causal relations between natural items. The results also indicate that determinacy objection against a teleological approach to intentional explanation can be answered using the proposed account of the theory of functions.
Jerry A. Fodor
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199548774
- eISBN:
- 9780191721106
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548774.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
This book presents a new development of the famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. The book defends ...
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This book presents a new development of the famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. The book defends and extends the groundbreaking idea that thinking is couched in a symbolic system realized in the brain. This idea is central to the representational theory of mind which has been established as a key reference point in modern philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. The foundation stone of our present cognitive science is Turing's suggestion that cognitive processes are not associations but computations; and computation requires a language of thought. This book offers a more cogent presentation and a fuller explication of a distinctive account of the mind, with various intriguing new features. The central role of compositionality in the representational theory of mind is revealed: most of what we know about concepts follows from the compositionality of thoughts. The book shows the necessity of a referentialist account of the content of intentional states, and of an atomistic account of the individuation of concepts. Not least among the new developments is the book's identification and persecution of pragmatism as the leading source of error in the study of the mind today.Less
This book presents a new development of the famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. The book defends and extends the groundbreaking idea that thinking is couched in a symbolic system realized in the brain. This idea is central to the representational theory of mind which has been established as a key reference point in modern philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. The foundation stone of our present cognitive science is Turing's suggestion that cognitive processes are not associations but computations; and computation requires a language of thought. This book offers a more cogent presentation and a fuller explication of a distinctive account of the mind, with various intriguing new features. The central role of compositionality in the representational theory of mind is revealed: most of what we know about concepts follows from the compositionality of thoughts. The book shows the necessity of a referentialist account of the content of intentional states, and of an atomistic account of the individuation of concepts. Not least among the new developments is the book's identification and persecution of pragmatism as the leading source of error in the study of the mind today.
Rowland Stout
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240631
- eISBN:
- 9780191680212
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240631.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This book argues that intentional actions are unique among natural phenomena in that they happen because they should happen. This is not to say that they happen because they ought to morally, ...
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This book argues that intentional actions are unique among natural phenomena in that they happen because they should happen. This is not to say that they happen because they ought to morally, although perhaps they sometimes do. It is to say that there are ways of evaluating actions as rational or irrational, as justified or unjustified; and it is because they are rational or justified, according to such a way of evaluating things, that they happen. This is a highly controversial thesis; it amounts to saying that value has a causal role to play in nature. It goes against the orthodox view that evaluations are only projected on to the world by people; they are not part of the fabric of nature and so cannot themselves make anything happen.Less
This book argues that intentional actions are unique among natural phenomena in that they happen because they should happen. This is not to say that they happen because they ought to morally, although perhaps they sometimes do. It is to say that there are ways of evaluating actions as rational or irrational, as justified or unjustified; and it is because they are rational or justified, according to such a way of evaluating things, that they happen. This is a highly controversial thesis; it amounts to saying that value has a causal role to play in nature. It goes against the orthodox view that evaluations are only projected on to the world by people; they are not part of the fabric of nature and so cannot themselves make anything happen.
Stephen P. Stich
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195126662
- eISBN:
- 9780199868322
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195126661.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Eliminativism (or eliminative materialism) has been an important and provocative view in the philosophy of mind since the 1970s. Eliminativism claims that the mental states alluded to in our ordinary ...
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Eliminativism (or eliminative materialism) has been an important and provocative view in the philosophy of mind since the 1970s. Eliminativism claims that the mental states alluded to in our ordinary talk about the mind – particularly intentional states like beliefs, desires, and thoughts – are the posits of a badly mistaken “folk” theory, and thus, like phlogiston, witches and other posits of badly mistaken theories, they do not exist. This volume is a collection of essays that systematically examine the arguments for eliminativism. Ch. 2 illustrates the way in which connectionist models of belief and memory might be used to support the claim that folk psychology is a radically mistaken theory. Ch. 4 argues against the claim that simulation theory undermines the debate between eliminativists and their opponents. Chs. 3 and 5 argue that the case for the premises of the eliminativist argument is problematic in ways that have not been noted in previous discussions. The long title essay (Ch. 1) argues that, even if the premises are true, they do not support the eliminativist conclusion without the addition of some additional premise, and none of the additional premises that might fill the gap, are defensible. Though many writers rely on the theory of reference to fill the gap between premises and conclusion, it is argued that appeals to the theory of reference cannot do the ontological work required by the eliminativist argument.Less
Eliminativism (or eliminative materialism) has been an important and provocative view in the philosophy of mind since the 1970s. Eliminativism claims that the mental states alluded to in our ordinary talk about the mind – particularly intentional states like beliefs, desires, and thoughts – are the posits of a badly mistaken “folk” theory, and thus, like phlogiston, witches and other posits of badly mistaken theories, they do not exist. This volume is a collection of essays that systematically examine the arguments for eliminativism. Ch. 2 illustrates the way in which connectionist models of belief and memory might be used to support the claim that folk psychology is a radically mistaken theory. Ch. 4 argues against the claim that simulation theory undermines the debate between eliminativists and their opponents. Chs. 3 and 5 argue that the case for the premises of the eliminativist argument is problematic in ways that have not been noted in previous discussions. The long title essay (Ch. 1) argues that, even if the premises are true, they do not support the eliminativist conclusion without the addition of some additional premise, and none of the additional premises that might fill the gap, are defensible. Though many writers rely on the theory of reference to fill the gap between premises and conclusion, it is argued that appeals to the theory of reference cannot do the ontological work required by the eliminativist argument.
David B. Wong
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195305395
- eISBN:
- 9780199786657
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195305396.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter addresses the question how deeply moral reasons relate to human motivation through discussing the debate over internalism and externalism in ethics. Internalists on moral reasons hold ...
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This chapter addresses the question how deeply moral reasons relate to human motivation through discussing the debate over internalism and externalism in ethics. Internalists on moral reasons hold that an agent’s having a reason to act requires that it be based in some motive that she already has, while externalists deny the necessary relation. The position defended here is externalist about reasons, but it specifies an intelligible relation between external reasons and the possibility of agents acting on them. Recognition of a moral reason to help another, for example, can become embedded during moral learning in the intentional objects of prior motivational propensities to respond to the suffering of others. Because they become embedded in and function to channel pre-existing motivations, reasons are external to any particular individual’s pre-existing motivations, but they must be internal to the general motivational capabilities of human nature.Less
This chapter addresses the question how deeply moral reasons relate to human motivation through discussing the debate over internalism and externalism in ethics. Internalists on moral reasons hold that an agent’s having a reason to act requires that it be based in some motive that she already has, while externalists deny the necessary relation. The position defended here is externalist about reasons, but it specifies an intelligible relation between external reasons and the possibility of agents acting on them. Recognition of a moral reason to help another, for example, can become embedded during moral learning in the intentional objects of prior motivational propensities to respond to the suffering of others. Because they become embedded in and function to channel pre-existing motivations, reasons are external to any particular individual’s pre-existing motivations, but they must be internal to the general motivational capabilities of human nature.
Jerrold Levinson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199206179
- eISBN:
- 9780191709982
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206179.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This essay aims to do just two things. One is to underline the necessity of a historical dimension in any acceptable account of arthood. Two is to sketch answers to certain objections that have been ...
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This essay aims to do just two things. One is to underline the necessity of a historical dimension in any acceptable account of arthood. Two is to sketch answers to certain objections that have been recently raised for an intentional-historical account of art, most of which offer a challenge to its insistence on an ineliminable historical element in any such account. In the course of underlining the historical character of the concept of art, it is shown that certain non-historical considerations appealed to by some theorists, for instance, institutional or functional ones, which appear to weigh importantly in some cases of arthood, in fact have an underlying or reinforcing rationale of a history-involving sort.Less
This essay aims to do just two things. One is to underline the necessity of a historical dimension in any acceptable account of arthood. Two is to sketch answers to certain objections that have been recently raised for an intentional-historical account of art, most of which offer a challenge to its insistence on an ineliminable historical element in any such account. In the course of underlining the historical character of the concept of art, it is shown that certain non-historical considerations appealed to by some theorists, for instance, institutional or functional ones, which appear to weigh importantly in some cases of arthood, in fact have an underlying or reinforcing rationale of a history-involving sort.
Jerrold Levinson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199206179
- eISBN:
- 9780191709982
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206179.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This second essay is concerned with the intentional-historical account of art, focusing on the nature of the artifactuality of artworks presupposed by the account. It develops ideas on the ...
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This second essay is concerned with the intentional-historical account of art, focusing on the nature of the artifactuality of artworks presupposed by the account. It develops ideas on the artifactuality of artworks in counterpoint with recent contributions on the subject by Paul Bloom and Amie Thomasson. Against Bloom — who seeks to extend the intentional-historical account to all artifacts — it defends the claim that artworks remain a distinctive sort of artifact in possessing, perhaps alone of all artifact kinds, only intentional-historical necessary conditions. Against Thomasson — who maintains that artifact-making necessarily involves a substantive conception of what is being made — it defends the claim that the conception of artwork necessarily involved in art-making, although not without content, is about as insubstantive as an object concept can be.Less
This second essay is concerned with the intentional-historical account of art, focusing on the nature of the artifactuality of artworks presupposed by the account. It develops ideas on the artifactuality of artworks in counterpoint with recent contributions on the subject by Paul Bloom and Amie Thomasson. Against Bloom — who seeks to extend the intentional-historical account to all artifacts — it defends the claim that artworks remain a distinctive sort of artifact in possessing, perhaps alone of all artifact kinds, only intentional-historical necessary conditions. Against Thomasson — who maintains that artifact-making necessarily involves a substantive conception of what is being made — it defends the claim that the conception of artwork necessarily involved in art-making, although not without content, is about as insubstantive as an object concept can be.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195138924
- eISBN:
- 9780199786480
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138929.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Daniel Dennett’s “intentional stance” theory is a leading specimen of the rationality theory, though Dennett vacillates in offering stronger and weaker variants. In the strong formulations, the ...
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Daniel Dennett’s “intentional stance” theory is a leading specimen of the rationality theory, though Dennett vacillates in offering stronger and weaker variants. In the strong formulations, the theory is quite implausible; in its weak formulations, its content is too thin to have predictive implications. It also suffers from an inability to handle attributions over the entire range of mental states, including sensations like thirst, hunger, or itchiness. Finally, it offers no satisfactory story of how mental concepts are understood. An ostensibly related theory, the “teleological stance” theory, doesn’t really claim to explain mental state attribution.Less
Daniel Dennett’s “intentional stance” theory is a leading specimen of the rationality theory, though Dennett vacillates in offering stronger and weaker variants. In the strong formulations, the theory is quite implausible; in its weak formulations, its content is too thin to have predictive implications. It also suffers from an inability to handle attributions over the entire range of mental states, including sensations like thirst, hunger, or itchiness. Finally, it offers no satisfactory story of how mental concepts are understood. An ostensibly related theory, the “teleological stance” theory, doesn’t really claim to explain mental state attribution.
Colin McGinn
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199856145
- eISBN:
- 9780199919567
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199856145.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
What kind of subject is philosophy? This book takes up this perennial question, defending the view that philosophy consists of conceptual analysis, construed broadly. Conceptual analysis is ...
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What kind of subject is philosophy? This book takes up this perennial question, defending the view that philosophy consists of conceptual analysis, construed broadly. Conceptual analysis is understood to involve the search for de re essences, but the book takes up various challenges to this meta-philosophy: that some concepts are merely family resemblance concepts with no definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (“game”, “language”); that it is impossible to provide sufficient conditions for some philosophically important concepts without circularity (“knowledge”, “intentional action”); that there exists an unsolved paradox of analysis; that there is no well-defined analytic-synthetic distinction; that names have no definition; and that conceptual analysis is not properly naturalistic. Ultimately, the text finds none of these objections convincing: analysis emerges as both possible and fruitful. At the same time, it rejects the idea of the “linguistic turn”, arguing that analysis is not directed to language as such, but at reality. Going on to distinguish several types of analysis, with an emphasis on classical decompositional analysis, this book shows different philosophical traditions to be engaged in conceptual analysis when properly understood. Philosophical activity has the kind of value possessed by play, the text claims, which differs from the kind of value possessed by scientific activity. The book concludes with an analytic discussion of the prospects for traditional ontology and the nature of instantiation.Less
What kind of subject is philosophy? This book takes up this perennial question, defending the view that philosophy consists of conceptual analysis, construed broadly. Conceptual analysis is understood to involve the search for de re essences, but the book takes up various challenges to this meta-philosophy: that some concepts are merely family resemblance concepts with no definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (“game”, “language”); that it is impossible to provide sufficient conditions for some philosophically important concepts without circularity (“knowledge”, “intentional action”); that there exists an unsolved paradox of analysis; that there is no well-defined analytic-synthetic distinction; that names have no definition; and that conceptual analysis is not properly naturalistic. Ultimately, the text finds none of these objections convincing: analysis emerges as both possible and fruitful. At the same time, it rejects the idea of the “linguistic turn”, arguing that analysis is not directed to language as such, but at reality. Going on to distinguish several types of analysis, with an emphasis on classical decompositional analysis, this book shows different philosophical traditions to be engaged in conceptual analysis when properly understood. Philosophical activity has the kind of value possessed by play, the text claims, which differs from the kind of value possessed by scientific activity. The book concludes with an analytic discussion of the prospects for traditional ontology and the nature of instantiation.
Alan Millar
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199254408
- eISBN:
- 9780191719721
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199254408.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter argues that while rationalizing explanations are genuine explanations, the explanatory insight they supply is limited. This is a limitation of the power of available explanations. The ...
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This chapter argues that while rationalizing explanations are genuine explanations, the explanatory insight they supply is limited. This is a limitation of the power of available explanations. The position is contrasted with that of enthusiasts for the explanatory power of intentional psychology, notably Jerry Fodor, and sceptics about such explanatory power, notably Paul Churchland. Fodor’s approach is contrasted with one according to which familiarity with relevant practices, in the sense previously explained, has a central role in both the explanation and prediction of what people think and do. In this connection, particular attention is paid to practices implicated by roles in institutions. It is further argued that not only are available rationalizing explanations limited in scope, but that there are limits to the availability of rationalizing explanations even with the domain in which commonsense sense thinking aspires to explanations.Less
This chapter argues that while rationalizing explanations are genuine explanations, the explanatory insight they supply is limited. This is a limitation of the power of available explanations. The position is contrasted with that of enthusiasts for the explanatory power of intentional psychology, notably Jerry Fodor, and sceptics about such explanatory power, notably Paul Churchland. Fodor’s approach is contrasted with one according to which familiarity with relevant practices, in the sense previously explained, has a central role in both the explanation and prediction of what people think and do. In this connection, particular attention is paid to practices implicated by roles in institutions. It is further argued that not only are available rationalizing explanations limited in scope, but that there are limits to the availability of rationalizing explanations even with the domain in which commonsense sense thinking aspires to explanations.
Joseph Raz
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693818
- eISBN:
- 9780191731907
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693818.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
What are our duties or rights? What should we do? What are we responsible for? How do we determine the answers to these questions? This book examines and explains the philosophical issues underlying ...
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What are our duties or rights? What should we do? What are we responsible for? How do we determine the answers to these questions? This book examines and explains the philosophical issues underlying these everyday questions. It explains the nature of normativity, namely of the fact that, and belief and feelings that one should do something, that there are reasons for certain actions, or for having certain beliefs or emotions, and various basic features of reasoning about what to do. It then considers when we are responsible for our actions and omissions and offers a novel account of responsibility.Less
What are our duties or rights? What should we do? What are we responsible for? How do we determine the answers to these questions? This book examines and explains the philosophical issues underlying these everyday questions. It explains the nature of normativity, namely of the fact that, and belief and feelings that one should do something, that there are reasons for certain actions, or for having certain beliefs or emotions, and various basic features of reasoning about what to do. It then considers when we are responsible for our actions and omissions and offers a novel account of responsibility.
Sarah Gerson and Amanda Woodward
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195331059
- eISBN:
- 9780199864072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331059.003.0015
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Developmental Psychology
This chapter considers the potential origins of the ability to discern others' intentions in acting. It focuses on a category of experience that has long been hypothesized to contribute to ...
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This chapter considers the potential origins of the ability to discern others' intentions in acting. It focuses on a category of experience that has long been hypothesized to contribute to intentional understanding: namely, first-person agentive experience. Theoretically, it seems reasonable that one's own experience as an agent could provide useful information for understanding other agents. A true test of this general hypothesis requires (1) measuring infants' analysis of observed action structure and (2) relating this measure to variations in infants' own actions. The chapter turns first to recent studies that have done just this, and in so doing provided initial evidence that this general proposal is on the right track. It then turns to the much harder question of why self-produced experience might have an effect on the development of action understanding. This question will leads to the consideration of recent work on mirror systems, the limits of mirror systems, and the role of analogy in conceptual development.Less
This chapter considers the potential origins of the ability to discern others' intentions in acting. It focuses on a category of experience that has long been hypothesized to contribute to intentional understanding: namely, first-person agentive experience. Theoretically, it seems reasonable that one's own experience as an agent could provide useful information for understanding other agents. A true test of this general hypothesis requires (1) measuring infants' analysis of observed action structure and (2) relating this measure to variations in infants' own actions. The chapter turns first to recent studies that have done just this, and in so doing provided initial evidence that this general proposal is on the right track. It then turns to the much harder question of why self-produced experience might have an effect on the development of action understanding. This question will leads to the consideration of recent work on mirror systems, the limits of mirror systems, and the role of analogy in conceptual development.
