Richard Swinburne (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780197264898
- eISBN:
- 9780191754074
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264898.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Do humans have a free choice of which actions to perform? Three recent developments of modern science can help us to answer this question. First, new investigative tools have enabled us to study the ...
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Do humans have a free choice of which actions to perform? Three recent developments of modern science can help us to answer this question. First, new investigative tools have enabled us to study the processes in our brains which accompanying our decisions. The pioneer work of Benjamin Libet has led many neuroscientists to hold the view that our conscious intentions do not cause our bodily movements but merely accompany them. Then, Quantum Theory suggests that not all physical events are fully determined by their causes, and so opens the possibility that not all brain events may be fully determined by their causes, and so maybe — if neuroscience does not rule this out — there is a role for intentions after all. Finally, a theorem of mathematics, Gödel's theory, has been interpreted to suggest that the initial conditions and laws of development of a mathematician's brain could not fully determine which mathematical conjectures he sees to be true. The extent to which human behaviour is determined by brain events may well depend on whether conscious events, such as intentions, are themselves merely brain events, or whether they are separate events which interact with brain events (perhaps in the radical form that intentions are events in our soul, and not in our body). This book considers what kind of free will we need in order to be morally responsible for our actions or be held guilty in a court of law. Is it sufficient merely that our actions are uncaused by brain events?Less
Do humans have a free choice of which actions to perform? Three recent developments of modern science can help us to answer this question. First, new investigative tools have enabled us to study the processes in our brains which accompanying our decisions. The pioneer work of Benjamin Libet has led many neuroscientists to hold the view that our conscious intentions do not cause our bodily movements but merely accompany them. Then, Quantum Theory suggests that not all physical events are fully determined by their causes, and so opens the possibility that not all brain events may be fully determined by their causes, and so maybe — if neuroscience does not rule this out — there is a role for intentions after all. Finally, a theorem of mathematics, Gödel's theory, has been interpreted to suggest that the initial conditions and laws of development of a mathematician's brain could not fully determine which mathematical conjectures he sees to be true. The extent to which human behaviour is determined by brain events may well depend on whether conscious events, such as intentions, are themselves merely brain events, or whether they are separate events which interact with brain events (perhaps in the radical form that intentions are events in our soul, and not in our body). This book considers what kind of free will we need in order to be morally responsible for our actions or be held guilty in a court of law. Is it sufficient merely that our actions are uncaused by brain events?
Gregory Currie
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199282609
- eISBN:
- 9780191712432
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282609.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Mind
Narratives are artefacts of a special kind: they are devices which function to tell stories, and do so by conveying the storytelling intentions of their makers. But, narrative itself is too inclusive ...
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Narratives are artefacts of a special kind: they are devices which function to tell stories, and do so by conveying the storytelling intentions of their makers. But, narrative itself is too inclusive a category for much more to be said about it than this; we should focus attention instead on the vaguely defined but interesting category of things rich in narrative structure. Such devices offer significant possibilities, not merely for the representation of stories, but for the expression of point of view; they have also played an important role in the evolution of reliable channels of information, an issue pursued in three chapter appendices. This book argues that much of the pleasure of narrative depends on early developing tendencies in human beings to imitation and to joint attention, and imitation turns out to be the key to understanding such important literary techniques as free indirect discourse and character‐focused narration. The book also examines irony in narrative, with an emphasis on the idea of the expression of ironic points of view; a case study of this phenomenon is offered. Finally, the book examines the idea of Character, as evidenced in robust, situation‐independent ways of acting and thinking, and its important role in many narratives. It is asked whether scepticism about the notion of Character should have us reassess the dramatic and literary tradition which places such emphasis on Character.Less
Narratives are artefacts of a special kind: they are devices which function to tell stories, and do so by conveying the storytelling intentions of their makers. But, narrative itself is too inclusive a category for much more to be said about it than this; we should focus attention instead on the vaguely defined but interesting category of things rich in narrative structure. Such devices offer significant possibilities, not merely for the representation of stories, but for the expression of point of view; they have also played an important role in the evolution of reliable channels of information, an issue pursued in three chapter appendices. This book argues that much of the pleasure of narrative depends on early developing tendencies in human beings to imitation and to joint attention, and imitation turns out to be the key to understanding such important literary techniques as free indirect discourse and character‐focused narration. The book also examines irony in narrative, with an emphasis on the idea of the expression of ironic points of view; a case study of this phenomenon is offered. Finally, the book examines the idea of Character, as evidenced in robust, situation‐independent ways of acting and thinking, and its important role in many narratives. It is asked whether scepticism about the notion of Character should have us reassess the dramatic and literary tradition which places such emphasis on Character.
Roger Teichmann
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199299331
- eISBN:
- 9780191715068
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299331.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
One of the most important philosophers of recent times, Elizabeth Anscombe wrote books and articles on a wide range of topics, including the ground-breaking monograph Intention. This book studies ...
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One of the most important philosophers of recent times, Elizabeth Anscombe wrote books and articles on a wide range of topics, including the ground-breaking monograph Intention. This book studies Anscombe's philosophical oeuvre. It presents Anscombe's main ideas, bringing out their interconnections, elaborating and discussing their implications, pointing out objections and difficulties, and aims to give a unified overview of her philosophy. Many of Anscombe's arguments are relevant to contemporary debates, and on a number of topics, what Anscombe has to say constitutes a powerful alternative to dominant or popular views. Among the writings discussed are Intention, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, ‘Rules, Rights and Promises’, ‘On Brute Facts’, ‘The First Person’, ‘The Intentionality of Sensation’, ‘Causality and Determination’, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, ‘The Question of Linguistic Idealism’, and a number of other pieces, including some that are little known or hard to obtain. A complete bibliography of Anscombe's writings is also included. Ranging from the philosophy of action, through ethics, to philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and the philosophy of logic and language, this book is a study of one of the most significant bodies of work in modern philosophy, spanning more than fifty years, and one which is as pertinent today as ever.Less
One of the most important philosophers of recent times, Elizabeth Anscombe wrote books and articles on a wide range of topics, including the ground-breaking monograph Intention. This book studies Anscombe's philosophical oeuvre. It presents Anscombe's main ideas, bringing out their interconnections, elaborating and discussing their implications, pointing out objections and difficulties, and aims to give a unified overview of her philosophy. Many of Anscombe's arguments are relevant to contemporary debates, and on a number of topics, what Anscombe has to say constitutes a powerful alternative to dominant or popular views. Among the writings discussed are Intention, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, ‘Rules, Rights and Promises’, ‘On Brute Facts’, ‘The First Person’, ‘The Intentionality of Sensation’, ‘Causality and Determination’, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, ‘The Question of Linguistic Idealism’, and a number of other pieces, including some that are little known or hard to obtain. A complete bibliography of Anscombe's writings is also included. Ranging from the philosophy of action, through ethics, to philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and the philosophy of logic and language, this book is a study of one of the most significant bodies of work in modern philosophy, spanning more than fifty years, and one which is as pertinent today as ever.
Emma Borg
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199588374
- eISBN:
- 9780191741487
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588374.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind
This book examines some recent answers to the questions of how and where to draw the divide between semantics (roughly, features of the literal meaning of linguistic items) and pragmatics (roughly, ...
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This book examines some recent answers to the questions of how and where to draw the divide between semantics (roughly, features of the literal meaning of linguistic items) and pragmatics (roughly, features emerging from the context within which such items are being used). In particular, the book defends what is commonly known as ‘minimal semantics’ (aka ‘semantic invariantism’ or ‘insensitive semantics’). Minimal semantics, as the name suggests, offers a pretty minimal account of the inter-relation between semantics and pragmatics. Specifically, it holds that while context can affect literal semantic content in the case of genuine (i.e. lexically or syntactically marked) context-sensitive items (e.g. indexicals, demonstratives, tense markers), this is the extent of pragmatic influence within the semantic realm. Minimalism, then, prohibits what are here called ‘free pragmatic effects’: putative effects on semantic content which are not required by any lexico‐syntactic item in a sentence. The book opens with an exploration of the current positions in this debate, introducing the main approaches of minimalism, indexicalism, contextualism, relativism, and occasionalism and offers some initial reasons for being concerned about many of the positions opposing minimalism. The main arguments against minimalism are then explored, looking at the argument that minimal contents are explanatorily irrelevant, the argument that at least some sentences fail to express minimal contents, and the argument that the kinds of word meanings which minimalism requires are either impossible or explanatorily inadequate. The ultimate conclusion of the book is that none of these arguments are compelling and that minimalism in fact provides an attractive and plausible account of the literal meanings of natural language sentences.Less
This book examines some recent answers to the questions of how and where to draw the divide between semantics (roughly, features of the literal meaning of linguistic items) and pragmatics (roughly, features emerging from the context within which such items are being used). In particular, the book defends what is commonly known as ‘minimal semantics’ (aka ‘semantic invariantism’ or ‘insensitive semantics’). Minimal semantics, as the name suggests, offers a pretty minimal account of the inter-relation between semantics and pragmatics. Specifically, it holds that while context can affect literal semantic content in the case of genuine (i.e. lexically or syntactically marked) context-sensitive items (e.g. indexicals, demonstratives, tense markers), this is the extent of pragmatic influence within the semantic realm. Minimalism, then, prohibits what are here called ‘free pragmatic effects’: putative effects on semantic content which are not required by any lexico‐syntactic item in a sentence. The book opens with an exploration of the current positions in this debate, introducing the main approaches of minimalism, indexicalism, contextualism, relativism, and occasionalism and offers some initial reasons for being concerned about many of the positions opposing minimalism. The main arguments against minimalism are then explored, looking at the argument that minimal contents are explanatorily irrelevant, the argument that at least some sentences fail to express minimal contents, and the argument that the kinds of word meanings which minimalism requires are either impossible or explanatorily inadequate. The ultimate conclusion of the book is that none of these arguments are compelling and that minimalism in fact provides an attractive and plausible account of the literal meanings of natural language sentences.
Richard Holton
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199214570
- eISBN:
- 9780191706547
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214570.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book provides a unified account of the will, pulling together a diverse range of phenomena that have typically been treated separately: intention, resolution, choice, weakness and strength of ...
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This book provides a unified account of the will, pulling together a diverse range of phenomena that have typically been treated separately: intention, resolution, choice, weakness and strength of will, temptation, addiction, and freedom of the will. Drawing on recent psychological research, it is argued that rather than being the pinnacle of rationality, these components work to compensate for our inability to make and maintain sound judgments. Choice is the capacity to form intentions even in the absence of judgment of which action is best. Weakness of will is the failure to maintain resolutions in the face of temptation, where temptation typically involves a shift in judgment as to what is best, or, in cases of addiction, a disconnection between what is judged best and what is desired. Strength of will is the corresponding ability to maintain a resolution in the face of temptation, an ability that requires the employment of a particular faculty or skill. Finally, the experience of freedom of the will is traced to the experiences of forming intentions, and of maintaining resolutions, both of which require effortful activity from the agent.Less
This book provides a unified account of the will, pulling together a diverse range of phenomena that have typically been treated separately: intention, resolution, choice, weakness and strength of will, temptation, addiction, and freedom of the will. Drawing on recent psychological research, it is argued that rather than being the pinnacle of rationality, these components work to compensate for our inability to make and maintain sound judgments. Choice is the capacity to form intentions even in the absence of judgment of which action is best. Weakness of will is the failure to maintain resolutions in the face of temptation, where temptation typically involves a shift in judgment as to what is best, or, in cases of addiction, a disconnection between what is judged best and what is desired. Strength of will is the corresponding ability to maintain a resolution in the face of temptation, an ability that requires the employment of a particular faculty or skill. Finally, the experience of freedom of the will is traced to the experiences of forming intentions, and of maintaining resolutions, both of which require effortful activity from the agent.
Roy F. Baumeister, Alfred R. Mele, and Kathleen D. Vohs (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195389760
- eISBN:
- 9780199863341
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389760.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This volume is aimed at readers who wish to move beyond debates about the existence of free will and the efficacy of consciousness and closer to appreciating how free will and consciousness might ...
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This volume is aimed at readers who wish to move beyond debates about the existence of free will and the efficacy of consciousness and closer to appreciating how free will and consciousness might operate. It draws from philosophy and psychology, the two fields that have grappled most fundamentally with these issues. In this wide-ranging volume, the contributors explore issues such as how free will is connected to rational choice, planning, and self-control; roles for consciousness in decision making; the nature and power of conscious deciding; connections among free will, consciousness, and quantum mechanics; why free will and consciousness might have evolved; how consciousness develops in individuals; the experience of free will; effects on behavior of the belief that free will is an illusion; and connections between free will and moral responsibility in lay thinking. Collectively, these state-of-the-art chapters by accomplished psychologists and philosophers provide a glimpse into the future of research on free will and consciousness.Less
This volume is aimed at readers who wish to move beyond debates about the existence of free will and the efficacy of consciousness and closer to appreciating how free will and consciousness might operate. It draws from philosophy and psychology, the two fields that have grappled most fundamentally with these issues. In this wide-ranging volume, the contributors explore issues such as how free will is connected to rational choice, planning, and self-control; roles for consciousness in decision making; the nature and power of conscious deciding; connections among free will, consciousness, and quantum mechanics; why free will and consciousness might have evolved; how consciousness develops in individuals; the experience of free will; effects on behavior of the belief that free will is an illusion; and connections between free will and moral responsibility in lay thinking. Collectively, these state-of-the-art chapters by accomplished psychologists and philosophers provide a glimpse into the future of research on free will and consciousness.
Sergio Tenenbaum
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195382440
- eISBN:
- 9780199870158
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195382440.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
In the introduction, Tenenbaum provides a general overview about the main debates that arise from investigation of the relation between desire (and practical reason) and the good, and briefly ...
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In the introduction, Tenenbaum provides a general overview about the main debates that arise from investigation of the relation between desire (and practical reason) and the good, and briefly explains the contribution that the individual chapters make to these debates, as well as how these chapters hang together.Less
In the introduction, Tenenbaum provides a general overview about the main debates that arise from investigation of the relation between desire (and practical reason) and the good, and briefly explains the contribution that the individual chapters make to these debates, as well as how these chapters hang together.
Alfred R Mele
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195384260
- eISBN:
- 9780199869909
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195384260.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This book has both a negative aim and a positive aim. The negative aim is to show that some recent influential scientific claims about free will, consciousness, and action‐production are not ...
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This book has both a negative aim and a positive aim. The negative aim is to show that some recent influential scientific claims about free will, consciousness, and action‐production are not warranted by the data. These claims (by Benjamin Libet, Daniel Wegner, and others) include the following: your brain routinely decides what you will do before you become conscious of its decision; there is only a 100‐millisecond window of opportunity for free will, and all you can freely do in that window is veto conscious intentions that you were about to execute; intentions and their physical correlates play no role in producing corresponding actions; and free will is an illusion. The positive aim is to show that there is powerful empirical support for the thesis that there are effective conscious decisions and intentions to act.Less
This book has both a negative aim and a positive aim. The negative aim is to show that some recent influential scientific claims about free will, consciousness, and action‐production are not warranted by the data. These claims (by Benjamin Libet, Daniel Wegner, and others) include the following: your brain routinely decides what you will do before you become conscious of its decision; there is only a 100‐millisecond window of opportunity for free will, and all you can freely do in that window is veto conscious intentions that you were about to execute; intentions and their physical correlates play no role in producing corresponding actions; and free will is an illusion. The positive aim is to show that there is powerful empirical support for the thesis that there are effective conscious decisions and intentions to act.
Paul Weirich
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195388381
- eISBN:
- 9780199866700
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195388381.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
A committee's passing a resolution may be rational or irrational. Groups of people perform acts that are evaluable for rationality. This observation raises two philosophical questions: What makes a ...
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A committee's passing a resolution may be rational or irrational. Groups of people perform acts that are evaluable for rationality. This observation raises two philosophical questions: What makes a collective act evaluable for rationality? What principles of rationality govern collective acts? Collective rationality extends principles of evaluation from individuals to groups. However, because groups of people lack minds, their acts' evaluability does not require collective preferences, beliefs, or intentions. The evaluability of a group's act originates in the freedom of the group's members and their control over acts constituting the group's act. Common principles of collective rationality, such as efficiency, require grounding in general principles of rationality. Game theory demonstrates the origin of principles of collective rationality from principles governing all agents.Less
A committee's passing a resolution may be rational or irrational. Groups of people perform acts that are evaluable for rationality. This observation raises two philosophical questions: What makes a collective act evaluable for rationality? What principles of rationality govern collective acts? Collective rationality extends principles of evaluation from individuals to groups. However, because groups of people lack minds, their acts' evaluability does not require collective preferences, beliefs, or intentions. The evaluability of a group's act originates in the freedom of the group's members and their control over acts constituting the group's act. Common principles of collective rationality, such as efficiency, require grounding in general principles of rationality. Game theory demonstrates the origin of principles of collective rationality from principles governing all agents.
Donald Davidson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780198237570
- eISBN:
- 9780191602610
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019823757X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book features a collection of essays by Donald Davidson that explore the relations between language and the world, speaker intention and linguistic meaning, language and mind, mind and body, ...
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This book features a collection of essays by Donald Davidson that explore the relations between language and the world, speaker intention and linguistic meaning, language and mind, mind and body, mind and world, and mind and other minds. Davidson’s underlying thesis is that we are acquainted directly with the world, that thought emerges through interpersonal communication in a shared material world, and that language depends on communication. He also finds interconnections between his views and those of major philosophers of the past.Less
This book features a collection of essays by Donald Davidson that explore the relations between language and the world, speaker intention and linguistic meaning, language and mind, mind and body, mind and world, and mind and other minds. Davidson’s underlying thesis is that we are acquainted directly with the world, that thought emerges through interpersonal communication in a shared material world, and that language depends on communication. He also finds interconnections between his views and those of major philosophers of the past.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199896134
- eISBN:
- 9780199949533
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199896134.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim ...
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People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim of this book is to explain why that happens. The first main item of business is to clarify the nature of backsliding – of actions that display some weakness of will. To this end, Mele uses traditional philosophical techniques dating back to Plato and Aristotle (whose work on weakness of will or “akrasia” he discusses) and some new studies in the emerging field of experimental philosophy. He then attacks the thesis that backsliding is an illusion because people never freely act contrary to what they judge best. Mele argues that it is extremely plausible that if people ever act freely, they sometimes backslide. The biggest challenge posed by backsliding is to explain why it happens. At the book’s heart is the development of a theoretical and empirical framework that sheds light both on backsliding and on exercises of self-control that prevent it. Here, Mele draws on work in social and developmental psychology and in psychiatry to motivate a view of human behavior in which both backsliding and overcoming the temptation to backslide are explicable. He argues that backsliding is no illusion and our theories about the springs of action, the power of evaluative judgments, human agency, human rationality, practical reasoning, and motivation should accommodate backsliding.Less
People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim of this book is to explain why that happens. The first main item of business is to clarify the nature of backsliding – of actions that display some weakness of will. To this end, Mele uses traditional philosophical techniques dating back to Plato and Aristotle (whose work on weakness of will or “akrasia” he discusses) and some new studies in the emerging field of experimental philosophy. He then attacks the thesis that backsliding is an illusion because people never freely act contrary to what they judge best. Mele argues that it is extremely plausible that if people ever act freely, they sometimes backslide. The biggest challenge posed by backsliding is to explain why it happens. At the book’s heart is the development of a theoretical and empirical framework that sheds light both on backsliding and on exercises of self-control that prevent it. Here, Mele draws on work in social and developmental psychology and in psychiatry to motivate a view of human behavior in which both backsliding and overcoming the temptation to backslide are explicable. He argues that backsliding is no illusion and our theories about the springs of action, the power of evaluative judgments, human agency, human rationality, practical reasoning, and motivation should accommodate backsliding.
Gideon Yaffe
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199268559
- eISBN:
- 9780191601415
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926855X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Manifest Activity examines Thomas Reid's efforts to provide answers to a host of traditional philosophical questions concerning the nature of the will, the powers of human beings, motivation, and the ...
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Manifest Activity examines Thomas Reid's efforts to provide answers to a host of traditional philosophical questions concerning the nature of the will, the powers of human beings, motivation, and the relation between human action and natural change. The concept of ‘active power’ stands at the centre of Reid's philosophy of action. He holds that actions are all and only the events of which some creature is the ‘efficient cause’, and he thinks a creature is the efficient cause of an event just in case it has the power to bring that event about and exerts it. Reid's conception both of human actions and changes in nature is deeply teleological. He holds that to exert a power is to direct an event towards an end, and he holds that all changes, whether actions or events in nature, flow from the exertion of power. The book explains the details of this view, Reid's reasons for holding it, and its implications to our understanding of action, agency, and our relation to the natural world.Less
Manifest Activity examines Thomas Reid's efforts to provide answers to a host of traditional philosophical questions concerning the nature of the will, the powers of human beings, motivation, and the relation between human action and natural change. The concept of ‘active power’ stands at the centre of Reid's philosophy of action. He holds that actions are all and only the events of which some creature is the ‘efficient cause’, and he thinks a creature is the efficient cause of an event just in case it has the power to bring that event about and exerts it. Reid's conception both of human actions and changes in nature is deeply teleological. He holds that to exert a power is to direct an event towards an end, and he holds that all changes, whether actions or events in nature, flow from the exertion of power. The book explains the details of this view, Reid's reasons for holding it, and its implications to our understanding of action, agency, and our relation to the natural world.
H.L.A. Hart
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199534777
- eISBN:
- 9780191720703
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534777.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
This classic collection of essays, first published in 1968, has had an enduring impact on academic and public debates about criminal responsibility and criminal punishment. Forty years on, its ...
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This classic collection of essays, first published in 1968, has had an enduring impact on academic and public debates about criminal responsibility and criminal punishment. Forty years on, its arguments are as powerful as ever. H. L. A. Hart offers an alternative to retributive thinking about criminal punishment that nevertheless preserves the central distinction between guilt and innocence. He also provides an account of criminal responsibility that links the distinction between guilt and innocence closely to the ideal of the rule of law, and thereby attempts to by-pass unnerving debates about free will and determinism. Always engaged with live issues of law and public policy, Hart makes difficult philosophical puzzles accessible and immediate to a wide range of readers. For this new edition, otherwise a reproduction of the original, John Gardner adds an introduction, which provides a critical engagement with the book's main arguments, and explains the continuing importance of Hart's ideas in spite of the intervening revival of retributive thinking in both academic and policy circles. Unavailable for ten years, the new edition of Punishment and Responsibility makes available again the central text in the field for a new generation of academics, students and professionals engaged in criminal justice and penal policy.Less
This classic collection of essays, first published in 1968, has had an enduring impact on academic and public debates about criminal responsibility and criminal punishment. Forty years on, its arguments are as powerful as ever. H. L. A. Hart offers an alternative to retributive thinking about criminal punishment that nevertheless preserves the central distinction between guilt and innocence. He also provides an account of criminal responsibility that links the distinction between guilt and innocence closely to the ideal of the rule of law, and thereby attempts to by-pass unnerving debates about free will and determinism. Always engaged with live issues of law and public policy, Hart makes difficult philosophical puzzles accessible and immediate to a wide range of readers. For this new edition, otherwise a reproduction of the original, John Gardner adds an introduction, which provides a critical engagement with the book's main arguments, and explains the continuing importance of Hart's ideas in spite of the intervening revival of retributive thinking in both academic and policy circles. Unavailable for ten years, the new edition of Punishment and Responsibility makes available again the central text in the field for a new generation of academics, students and professionals engaged in criminal justice and penal policy.
Raimo Tuomela
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195313390
- eISBN:
- 9780199870929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195313390.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The creation and conceptual nature of full-blown we-mode we-intentions and joint intentions is discussed in this chapter. Intending jointly as a group (= in the we-mode) is taken to entail the ...
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The creation and conceptual nature of full-blown we-mode we-intentions and joint intentions is discussed in this chapter. Intending jointly as a group (= in the we-mode) is taken to entail the individual participants' shared we-intentions in the we-mode. A detailed account of we-intentions is given, and an alleged circularity problem concerning the circularity of accounting for joint intentions in terms of we-intentions is dissolved. It is also argued that we-mode joint intentions—and we-mode attitudes and actions in general—are irreducible to their I-mode counterparts. This is largely because of the group-reason requirement that the we-mode involves.Less
The creation and conceptual nature of full-blown we-mode we-intentions and joint intentions is discussed in this chapter. Intending jointly as a group (= in the we-mode) is taken to entail the individual participants' shared we-intentions in the we-mode. A detailed account of we-intentions is given, and an alleged circularity problem concerning the circularity of accounting for joint intentions in terms of we-intentions is dissolved. It is also argued that we-mode joint intentions—and we-mode attitudes and actions in general—are irreducible to their I-mode counterparts. This is largely because of the group-reason requirement that the we-mode involves.
Rowland Stout
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240631
- eISBN:
- 9780191680212
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240631.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
Philosophers have usually argued that the right way to explain people's actions is in terms of their beliefs and intentions rather than in terms of objective facts. This book takes the opposite line. ...
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Philosophers have usually argued that the right way to explain people's actions is in terms of their beliefs and intentions rather than in terms of objective facts. This book takes the opposite line. Appeal to teleology is widely regarded with suspicion, but he argues that there are things in nature, namely actions, which can be teleologically explained: they happen because they serve some end. Moreover, this teleological explanation is externalist: it cites facts about the world, not beliefs and intentions which only represent the world. Such externalism about the explanation of action is a natural partner to externalism about knowledge and about reference, but has hardly ever been considered seriously before. One dramatic consequence of such a position is that it opens up the possibility of a behaviourist account of beliefs and intentions.Less
Philosophers have usually argued that the right way to explain people's actions is in terms of their beliefs and intentions rather than in terms of objective facts. This book takes the opposite line. Appeal to teleology is widely regarded with suspicion, but he argues that there are things in nature, namely actions, which can be teleologically explained: they happen because they serve some end. Moreover, this teleological explanation is externalist: it cites facts about the world, not beliefs and intentions which only represent the world. Such externalism about the explanation of action is a natural partner to externalism about knowledge and about reference, but has hardly ever been considered seriously before. One dramatic consequence of such a position is that it opens up the possibility of a behaviourist account of beliefs and intentions.
A. D. (Bud) Craig
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691156767
- eISBN:
- 9781400852727
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691156767.001.0001
- Subject:
- Biology, Neurobiology
This book brings together startling evidence from neuroscience, psychology, and psychiatry to present revolutionary new insights into how our brains enable us to experience the range of sensations ...
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This book brings together startling evidence from neuroscience, psychology, and psychiatry to present revolutionary new insights into how our brains enable us to experience the range of sensations and mental states known as feelings. Drawing on own cutting-edge research, the author has identified an area deep inside the mammalian brain—the insular cortex—as the place where interoception, or the processing of bodily stimuli, generates feelings. The book shows how this crucial pathway for interoceptive awareness gives rise in humans to the feeling of being alive, vivid perceptual feelings, and a subjective image of the sentient self across time. The book explains how feelings represent activity patterns in our brains that signify emotions, intentions, and thoughts, and how integration of these patterns is driven by the unique energy needs of the hominid brain. It describes the essential role of feelings and the insular cortex in such diverse realms as music, fluid intelligence, and bivalent emotions, and relates these ideas to the philosophy of William James and even to feelings in dogs. The book is also a compelling insider's account of scientific discovery, one that takes readers behind the scenes as the astonishing answer to this neurological puzzle is pursued and pieced together from seemingly unrelated fields of scientific inquiry. This book will fundamentally alter the way that neuroscientists and psychologists categorize sensations and understand the origins and significance of human feelings.Less
This book brings together startling evidence from neuroscience, psychology, and psychiatry to present revolutionary new insights into how our brains enable us to experience the range of sensations and mental states known as feelings. Drawing on own cutting-edge research, the author has identified an area deep inside the mammalian brain—the insular cortex—as the place where interoception, or the processing of bodily stimuli, generates feelings. The book shows how this crucial pathway for interoceptive awareness gives rise in humans to the feeling of being alive, vivid perceptual feelings, and a subjective image of the sentient self across time. The book explains how feelings represent activity patterns in our brains that signify emotions, intentions, and thoughts, and how integration of these patterns is driven by the unique energy needs of the hominid brain. It describes the essential role of feelings and the insular cortex in such diverse realms as music, fluid intelligence, and bivalent emotions, and relates these ideas to the philosophy of William James and even to feelings in dogs. The book is also a compelling insider's account of scientific discovery, one that takes readers behind the scenes as the astonishing answer to this neurological puzzle is pursued and pieced together from seemingly unrelated fields of scientific inquiry. This book will fundamentally alter the way that neuroscientists and psychologists categorize sensations and understand the origins and significance of human feelings.
Sharan Jagpal
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195371055
- eISBN:
- 9780199870745
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195371055.003.0008
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Marketing
This chapter shows how the firm can choose new product designs and pricing strategies when primary data (i.e., intentions studies, conjoint experiments, auctions, simulated test markets, and test ...
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This chapter shows how the firm can choose new product designs and pricing strategies when primary data (i.e., intentions studies, conjoint experiments, auctions, simulated test markets, and test markets) are available. It shows how the firm can use the MCT methodology to quantify the effects of competitive reaction and measure cannibalization and market-growth effects when it introduces new products into the market. In particular, it shows how the firm can filter out response error in the data from conjoint and intentions studies to obtain unbiased demand and market share estimates for new products.Less
This chapter shows how the firm can choose new product designs and pricing strategies when primary data (i.e., intentions studies, conjoint experiments, auctions, simulated test markets, and test markets) are available. It shows how the firm can use the MCT methodology to quantify the effects of competitive reaction and measure cannibalization and market-growth effects when it introduces new products into the market. In particular, it shows how the firm can filter out response error in the data from conjoint and intentions studies to obtain unbiased demand and market share estimates for new products.
T. A. Cavanaugh
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272198
- eISBN:
- 9780191604157
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272190.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter presents the history of DER, considering Aquinas’s originating account and closely tracing the development of double effect through subsequent moralists up to the 19th century Jesuit ...
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This chapter presents the history of DER, considering Aquinas’s originating account and closely tracing the development of double effect through subsequent moralists up to the 19th century Jesuit J.P. Gury, who proposed the standard modern version. Over the six centuries separating Aquinas and Gury, ethicists expanded the number of cases considered by DER and further articulated its grounds in action theory, arriving at double-effect criteria as generally applicable to relevant cases. These criteria, their import, order, relation to one another, necessity, and sufficiency are analyzed, and revisions are proposed.Less
This chapter presents the history of DER, considering Aquinas’s originating account and closely tracing the development of double effect through subsequent moralists up to the 19th century Jesuit J.P. Gury, who proposed the standard modern version. Over the six centuries separating Aquinas and Gury, ethicists expanded the number of cases considered by DER and further articulated its grounds in action theory, arriving at double-effect criteria as generally applicable to relevant cases. These criteria, their import, order, relation to one another, necessity, and sufficiency are analyzed, and revisions are proposed.
T. A. Cavanaugh
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272198
- eISBN:
- 9780191604157
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272190.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter analyzes the intended/foreseen (i/f) distinction: how to name it, how to make it, and how to apply it to the classic cases of euthanasia/terminal sedation, craniotomy/hysterectomy, and ...
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This chapter analyzes the intended/foreseen (i/f) distinction: how to name it, how to make it, and how to apply it to the classic cases of euthanasia/terminal sedation, craniotomy/hysterectomy, and terror bombing/tactical bombing. Addressing the problem of closeness Foot moots, inadequate responses to this problem are considered such as paring one’s intentions, the counter-factual test, and conceptual necessity. The chapter presents an account of the i/f distinction based on the resources found in Aquinas, Anscombe, and Bratman who indicate how intention characteristically differs from foresight insofar as the former is while the latter is not a plan of action formed in deliberation embodying practical knowledge.Less
This chapter analyzes the intended/foreseen (i/f) distinction: how to name it, how to make it, and how to apply it to the classic cases of euthanasia/terminal sedation, craniotomy/hysterectomy, and terror bombing/tactical bombing. Addressing the problem of closeness Foot moots, inadequate responses to this problem are considered such as paring one’s intentions, the counter-factual test, and conceptual necessity. The chapter presents an account of the i/f distinction based on the resources found in Aquinas, Anscombe, and Bratman who indicate how intention characteristically differs from foresight insofar as the former is while the latter is not a plan of action formed in deliberation embodying practical knowledge.
Margaret Gilbert
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274956
- eISBN:
- 9780191603976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274959.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Joint commitments are compared and contrasted with personal decisions and intentions: all are in some sense commitments of the will. They provide one with sufficient reason for action, independently ...
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Joint commitments are compared and contrasted with personal decisions and intentions: all are in some sense commitments of the will. They provide one with sufficient reason for action, independently of one’s inclinations and self-interest. Aspects of joint commitment discussed include their formation, basic and non-basic cases, and ways of being freed from them. An argument is presented for the obligating nature of joint commitments. The directed obligation argued for is not context-sensitive and is therefore, in a sense, ‘absolute’.Less
Joint commitments are compared and contrasted with personal decisions and intentions: all are in some sense commitments of the will. They provide one with sufficient reason for action, independently of one’s inclinations and self-interest. Aspects of joint commitment discussed include their formation, basic and non-basic cases, and ways of being freed from them. An argument is presented for the obligating nature of joint commitments. The directed obligation argued for is not context-sensitive and is therefore, in a sense, ‘absolute’.
