Milo Jones and Philippe Silberzahn
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780804785808
- eISBN:
- 9780804787154
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804785808.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter presents an overview of the CIA's analysis of al-Qa'ida and Usama bin Ladin prior to September 11. It documents the scale of the CIA's failure to provide warning of bin Ladin's ...
More
This chapter presents an overview of the CIA's analysis of al-Qa'ida and Usama bin Ladin prior to September 11. It documents the scale of the CIA's failure to provide warning of bin Ladin's intentions and capabilities prior to the attacks. It describes how the CIA's culture and identity shaped the Agency's view of al-Qa'ida during each stage of the intelligence cycle prior to 9/11, and contrasts these mainstream Agency views with those of a Cassandra, Michael Scheuer. It describes how Scheuer, as head of the CIA's bin Ladin Unit, Alec Station, tried to provide strategic warning within the Agency, but was discounted and then demoted for his efforts. It documents how the Agency's homogeneity of personnel, scientism, preference for secrets and drive for consensus led to a fundamental misunderstanding of the threat posed by al-Qa'ida, and thus created the proximate conditions for an intelligence failure to occur.Less
This chapter presents an overview of the CIA's analysis of al-Qa'ida and Usama bin Ladin prior to September 11. It documents the scale of the CIA's failure to provide warning of bin Ladin's intentions and capabilities prior to the attacks. It describes how the CIA's culture and identity shaped the Agency's view of al-Qa'ida during each stage of the intelligence cycle prior to 9/11, and contrasts these mainstream Agency views with those of a Cassandra, Michael Scheuer. It describes how Scheuer, as head of the CIA's bin Ladin Unit, Alec Station, tried to provide strategic warning within the Agency, but was discounted and then demoted for his efforts. It documents how the Agency's homogeneity of personnel, scientism, preference for secrets and drive for consensus led to a fundamental misunderstanding of the threat posed by al-Qa'ida, and thus created the proximate conditions for an intelligence failure to occur.
Milo Jones and Philippe Silberzahn
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780804785808
- eISBN:
- 9780804787154
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804785808.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
The CIA was created in 1947 in large part to prevent another Pearl Harbor. On at least four dramatic occasions, the Agency failed at this task: prior to in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the ...
More
The CIA was created in 1947 in large part to prevent another Pearl Harbor. On at least four dramatic occasions, the Agency failed at this task: prior to in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Iranian revolution of 1978, the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. There has been no shortage of studies to understand how such failures happened. Until now, however, none of the explanations proffered has been fully satisfying, and sometimes competing explanations have been mutually incompatible. In contrast, this book proposes a unified, coherent and rigorous theory of intelligence failure built on culture and identity. Crucially, the book takes a systematic look at Cassandras - people who offered strategic warning, but were ignored, to show that surprises could be anticipated. As the first post-positivist study of intelligence failure, the book views intelligence analysis as permeated by social facts, and thus firmly in the grip of the identity and culture of the intelligence producer, the CIA. As a consequence, it can present novel model of surprise that focuses on the internal make-up the CIA, including the identities of analysts, the corporate identity of Langley as a whole, and the Agency's organizational culture. It suggests that by examining the key features of the Agency's identity and culture, we can arrive at a holistic, unified understanding of the intelligence failures that resulted in dramatic strategic surprises.Less
The CIA was created in 1947 in large part to prevent another Pearl Harbor. On at least four dramatic occasions, the Agency failed at this task: prior to in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Iranian revolution of 1978, the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. There has been no shortage of studies to understand how such failures happened. Until now, however, none of the explanations proffered has been fully satisfying, and sometimes competing explanations have been mutually incompatible. In contrast, this book proposes a unified, coherent and rigorous theory of intelligence failure built on culture and identity. Crucially, the book takes a systematic look at Cassandras - people who offered strategic warning, but were ignored, to show that surprises could be anticipated. As the first post-positivist study of intelligence failure, the book views intelligence analysis as permeated by social facts, and thus firmly in the grip of the identity and culture of the intelligence producer, the CIA. As a consequence, it can present novel model of surprise that focuses on the internal make-up the CIA, including the identities of analysts, the corporate identity of Langley as a whole, and the Agency's organizational culture. It suggests that by examining the key features of the Agency's identity and culture, we can arrive at a holistic, unified understanding of the intelligence failures that resulted in dramatic strategic surprises.
Milo Jones and Philippe Silberzahn
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780804785808
- eISBN:
- 9780804787154
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804785808.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter presents an overview of the CIA's internal culture and collective identity, and of the social mechanisms that created and maintained them between 1947 and 2001. First, it documents four ...
More
This chapter presents an overview of the CIA's internal culture and collective identity, and of the social mechanisms that created and maintained them between 1947 and 2001. First, it documents four persistent features of the CIA's identity and culture that later chapters use to understand intelligence failure: homogeneity of personnel, scientism, a preference for secret rather than openly available information, and a drive for consensus over other analytic values. In later chapters, these features are revisited during each phase of the intelligence cycle to help understand how they create the conditions for intelligence failure. Next, the chapter details the four key mechanisms that gave rise to these features of the CIA and explain their persistence: the self-selection of personnel, the active selection of personnel, the socialization of analysts, and the mirror-imaging not only of the Agency's targets, but also the CIA's intelligence community partners and intelligence consumers.Less
This chapter presents an overview of the CIA's internal culture and collective identity, and of the social mechanisms that created and maintained them between 1947 and 2001. First, it documents four persistent features of the CIA's identity and culture that later chapters use to understand intelligence failure: homogeneity of personnel, scientism, a preference for secret rather than openly available information, and a drive for consensus over other analytic values. In later chapters, these features are revisited during each phase of the intelligence cycle to help understand how they create the conditions for intelligence failure. Next, the chapter details the four key mechanisms that gave rise to these features of the CIA and explain their persistence: the self-selection of personnel, the active selection of personnel, the socialization of analysts, and the mirror-imaging not only of the Agency's targets, but also the CIA's intelligence community partners and intelligence consumers.
Milo Jones and Philippe Silberzahn
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780804785808
- eISBN:
- 9780804787154
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804785808.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter presents an overview of the CIA's analysis of the USSR prior to 1991. It begins by documenting the scope of the intelligence failure concerning the USSR's demise, especially contrasting ...
More
This chapter presents an overview of the CIA's analysis of the USSR prior to 1991. It begins by documenting the scope of the intelligence failure concerning the USSR's demise, especially contrasting the CIA's quantitative estimates of the USSR's economy with what was subsequently discovered. It describes how the CIA's culture and identity shaped the Agency's view of the USSR during each stage of the intelligence cycle prior to the Soviet collapse, and contrasts Agency views of the USSR's economic and social situation with those of Cassandras. These people, working with open-source information outside the Agency, formed what was later revealed as more accurate views of the USSR over the same period. It does not fault the CIA for a failure to predict the USSR's collapse, but it does document how the Agency's culture and identity led to a misunderstanding of its weaknesses, creating the conditions for an intelligence failure.Less
This chapter presents an overview of the CIA's analysis of the USSR prior to 1991. It begins by documenting the scope of the intelligence failure concerning the USSR's demise, especially contrasting the CIA's quantitative estimates of the USSR's economy with what was subsequently discovered. It describes how the CIA's culture and identity shaped the Agency's view of the USSR during each stage of the intelligence cycle prior to the Soviet collapse, and contrasts Agency views of the USSR's economic and social situation with those of Cassandras. These people, working with open-source information outside the Agency, formed what was later revealed as more accurate views of the USSR over the same period. It does not fault the CIA for a failure to predict the USSR's collapse, but it does document how the Agency's culture and identity led to a misunderstanding of its weaknesses, creating the conditions for an intelligence failure.
David P. Oakley
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780813176703
- eISBN:
- 9780813176727
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813176703.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
Desert Storm generated significant support for defense reform. This momentum was due in part to the timing of the war and the celebrity status General Schwarzkopf enjoyed following the US victory. ...
More
Desert Storm generated significant support for defense reform. This momentum was due in part to the timing of the war and the celebrity status General Schwarzkopf enjoyed following the US victory. With the end of the Cold War on the horizon and domestic pressure building to embrace the “peace dividend,” the conditions were set for policy makers and national security organizations to be more receptive to change. Schwarzkopf’s popularity ensured that any critiques he made were taken seriously and their legitimacy little questioned. Despite Schwarzkopf’s complaints being misplaced and later partially recanted, his words were embraced by policy makers and were influential in building the momentum for change. In this regard, Schwarzkopf can be both criticized for his uninformed criticism of the Intelligence Community and credited for the change his comments helped generate.Less
Desert Storm generated significant support for defense reform. This momentum was due in part to the timing of the war and the celebrity status General Schwarzkopf enjoyed following the US victory. With the end of the Cold War on the horizon and domestic pressure building to embrace the “peace dividend,” the conditions were set for policy makers and national security organizations to be more receptive to change. Schwarzkopf’s popularity ensured that any critiques he made were taken seriously and their legitimacy little questioned. Despite Schwarzkopf’s complaints being misplaced and later partially recanted, his words were embraced by policy makers and were influential in building the momentum for change. In this regard, Schwarzkopf can be both criticized for his uninformed criticism of the Intelligence Community and credited for the change his comments helped generate.
David P. Oakley
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780813176703
- eISBN:
- 9780813176727
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813176703.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
By taking the first steps to weaken the powerful military services and establishing a unified DoD, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 increased the DoD’s influence in US foreign policy while also ...
More
By taking the first steps to weaken the powerful military services and establishing a unified DoD, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 increased the DoD’s influence in US foreign policy while also creating policy and structure that enabled and required future DoD/CIA collaboration. The failures in the field that motivated defense reform were the same failures that initiated discussions on intelligence support to military operations. Reviews of Operation Urgent Fury and the Beirut barracks bombing criticized the lack of intelligence support to commanders. In this regard, the defense reform enacted by Congress through Goldwater-Nichols was the initial phase of broader national security reforms. Although intelligence reform was initially not embraced to the same degree as defense reform, policy makers, motivated by perceived “intelligence failures,” looked to restructure intelligence for a post–Cold War environment.Less
By taking the first steps to weaken the powerful military services and establishing a unified DoD, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 increased the DoD’s influence in US foreign policy while also creating policy and structure that enabled and required future DoD/CIA collaboration. The failures in the field that motivated defense reform were the same failures that initiated discussions on intelligence support to military operations. Reviews of Operation Urgent Fury and the Beirut barracks bombing criticized the lack of intelligence support to commanders. In this regard, the defense reform enacted by Congress through Goldwater-Nichols was the initial phase of broader national security reforms. Although intelligence reform was initially not embraced to the same degree as defense reform, policy makers, motivated by perceived “intelligence failures,” looked to restructure intelligence for a post–Cold War environment.
Milo Jones and Philippe Silberzahn
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780804785808
- eISBN:
- 9780804787154
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804785808.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter presents an overview of the CIA's analysis of events in Iran that led to the Islamic revolution in 1978–79. It first documents the scale and scope of the intelligence failure concerning ...
More
This chapter presents an overview of the CIA's analysis of events in Iran that led to the Islamic revolution in 1978–79. It first documents the scale and scope of the intelligence failure concerning Iran, and then describes how the CIA's internal culture and collective identity distorted its views of Iran prior to and during these events. It contrasts Agency views of the situation in Iran with those of Cassandras, people outside the Agency who anticipated the possibility of a revolution. It documents how the Agency's homogeneity of personnel, scientism, its preference for secrets and its drive for consensus led to a fundamental misunderstanding of the situation there, and thereby created the proximate conditions for an intelligence failure.Less
This chapter presents an overview of the CIA's analysis of events in Iran that led to the Islamic revolution in 1978–79. It first documents the scale and scope of the intelligence failure concerning Iran, and then describes how the CIA's internal culture and collective identity distorted its views of Iran prior to and during these events. It contrasts Agency views of the situation in Iran with those of Cassandras, people outside the Agency who anticipated the possibility of a revolution. It documents how the Agency's homogeneity of personnel, scientism, its preference for secrets and its drive for consensus led to a fundamental misunderstanding of the situation there, and thereby created the proximate conditions for an intelligence failure.
Jeffrey A. Friedman
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- April 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190938024
- eISBN:
- 9780190938055
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190938024.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter explores the politics of assessing uncertainty in international affairs, particularly the notion that clear probability assessments expose foreign policy analysts to excessive criticism. ...
More
This chapter explores the politics of assessing uncertainty in international affairs, particularly the notion that clear probability assessments expose foreign policy analysts to excessive criticism. Although this idea is widespread among scholars and practitioners of international relations, there is just as much reason to believe that the opposite is true. If foreign policy discourse is truly as polarized as the conventional wisdom suggests, then leaving key judgments vague could actually increase blame exposure by giving critics the opportunity to make ambiguous statements seem more mistaken than they really are. The chapter supports this claim by combing experimental evidence in a historical review of perceived intelligence failures such as the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Yom Kippur War, and assessments of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs.Less
This chapter explores the politics of assessing uncertainty in international affairs, particularly the notion that clear probability assessments expose foreign policy analysts to excessive criticism. Although this idea is widespread among scholars and practitioners of international relations, there is just as much reason to believe that the opposite is true. If foreign policy discourse is truly as polarized as the conventional wisdom suggests, then leaving key judgments vague could actually increase blame exposure by giving critics the opportunity to make ambiguous statements seem more mistaken than they really are. The chapter supports this claim by combing experimental evidence in a historical review of perceived intelligence failures such as the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Yom Kippur War, and assessments of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs.
Rose McDermott and Uri Bar-Joseph
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- March 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780199341733
- eISBN:
- 9780190677008
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199341733.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics, Political Theory
This book examines the factors contributing to failure and success in responding to strategic surprise, and as such it differs from previous studies that looked only at cases of failure. Given that ...
More
This book examines the factors contributing to failure and success in responding to strategic surprise, and as such it differs from previous studies that looked only at cases of failure. Given that surprise attacks that started wars have almost always succeeded, we analyze the psychological mechanisms by which leaders learn from their mistakes, especially in the way available intelligence is used. In order to undertake this analysis in a systematic way, it investigates three pairs of major military attacks: “Barbarossa,” the June 1941 German invasion of the USSR (failure), and the battle for Moscow between October 1941 and January 1942 (success); the June 1950 North Korean invasion of South Korea (failure), and the Chinese intervention in the war five months later (failure); and the Arab attack on Israel on Yom Kippur 1973 (failure), and the second Egyptian offensive in the war six days later (success). It challenges the central thesis in the field, which asserts that the fiascos are the product of structural obstacles to proper information processing. Instead, it delineates the critical role of individual psychopathologies, particularly narcissism, paranoia, and lack of openness to new information, in precipitating failure in order to show that the key explanation for some of the most significant cases of warning failure is not unintentional action but motivated biases in key intelligence and military officers or policymakers that null the more alarmistic views of others around them. In addition, it identifies the learning process that central decision-makers engage as key to subsequent success.Less
This book examines the factors contributing to failure and success in responding to strategic surprise, and as such it differs from previous studies that looked only at cases of failure. Given that surprise attacks that started wars have almost always succeeded, we analyze the psychological mechanisms by which leaders learn from their mistakes, especially in the way available intelligence is used. In order to undertake this analysis in a systematic way, it investigates three pairs of major military attacks: “Barbarossa,” the June 1941 German invasion of the USSR (failure), and the battle for Moscow between October 1941 and January 1942 (success); the June 1950 North Korean invasion of South Korea (failure), and the Chinese intervention in the war five months later (failure); and the Arab attack on Israel on Yom Kippur 1973 (failure), and the second Egyptian offensive in the war six days later (success). It challenges the central thesis in the field, which asserts that the fiascos are the product of structural obstacles to proper information processing. Instead, it delineates the critical role of individual psychopathologies, particularly narcissism, paranoia, and lack of openness to new information, in precipitating failure in order to show that the key explanation for some of the most significant cases of warning failure is not unintentional action but motivated biases in key intelligence and military officers or policymakers that null the more alarmistic views of others around them. In addition, it identifies the learning process that central decision-makers engage as key to subsequent success.
A.G. Noorani
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- October 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195678291
- eISBN:
- 9780199080588
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195678291.003.0085
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
The government appointed a four-member committee on 24 July 1999 'to review the events leading upto the Pakistani aggression in the Kargil district. … and to recommend such measures as are considered ...
More
The government appointed a four-member committee on 24 July 1999 'to review the events leading upto the Pakistani aggression in the Kargil district. … and to recommend such measures as are considered necessary to safeguard national security'. The article contends that the terms of reference were quite vague. Contradictory statements by leaders including the defence minister further raised doubts about the inquiry and its scope. Democratic accountability demands a thorough probe, covering not just initial intelligence failure but also the responses of leaders of the government and the army.Less
The government appointed a four-member committee on 24 July 1999 'to review the events leading upto the Pakistani aggression in the Kargil district. … and to recommend such measures as are considered necessary to safeguard national security'. The article contends that the terms of reference were quite vague. Contradictory statements by leaders including the defence minister further raised doubts about the inquiry and its scope. Democratic accountability demands a thorough probe, covering not just initial intelligence failure but also the responses of leaders of the government and the army.
Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- March 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780199341733
- eISBN:
- 9780190677008
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199341733.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics, Political Theory
Beginning with a theoretical overview of surprise attacks, we discuss their important role in military strategy and success. We describe our case selection strategy, using criteria based on attacks ...
More
Beginning with a theoretical overview of surprise attacks, we discuss their important role in military strategy and success. We describe our case selection strategy, using criteria based on attacks that started a war, and subsequent events taken in response to those attacks. We discuss Roberta Wohlstetter’s pioneering and influential study of Pearl Harbor and describe the uniqueness of this case and why her argument about signal-to-noise ratio may be less relevant for other cases of intelligence failure. More often, high quality decision-making is impaired by specific obstacles in the psychological characteristics of leaders and the environments and organizations they structure.Less
Beginning with a theoretical overview of surprise attacks, we discuss their important role in military strategy and success. We describe our case selection strategy, using criteria based on attacks that started a war, and subsequent events taken in response to those attacks. We discuss Roberta Wohlstetter’s pioneering and influential study of Pearl Harbor and describe the uniqueness of this case and why her argument about signal-to-noise ratio may be less relevant for other cases of intelligence failure. More often, high quality decision-making is impaired by specific obstacles in the psychological characteristics of leaders and the environments and organizations they structure.
