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This chapter moves the empirical focus of the book from the conditional impact of human security INGOs on “freedom from want” service provision to the conditional impact of human security INGOs on advocacy related to the “freedom from fear.” Focusing specifically on human rights advocacy INGOs, as the subcategory of human security INGOs that concentrate mainly on outcomes related to the “freedom from fear,” this chapter explores whether, when, and where INGOs will have an influence on a variety of human rights outcomes. The hypotheses are based on the advocacy INGO game-theoretic model presented in Chapter 3. Using novel measures of human rights INGO activities, the empirical results provide much support for the framework. Advocacy INGOs can be powerful actors for human rights but their impact can vary by issue, state level characteristics, and international support.

This chapter examines the relationship between parody and an author’s moral rights. It first traces the evolution of the concept of moral rights as a means of providing protection not only of the authors’ personal interests but also the public interest before discussing the reasons why moral rights might conflict with parodies. It considers two competing theories underlying the protection of authorial interests—the ‘monist’ theory and the ‘dualist’ theory—and their implications for the parody exception. It also explains how jurisdictions differ in the nature and scope of protection afforded to moral rights, noting that the parody exception in ‘copyright’ law does not extend to moral rights. The chapter goes on to explore the author’s paternity and integrity rights as well as their right against false attribution. It shows that, in the case of parodies, an overlap exists between the regimes applied to moral and economic rights.

This chapter aims to identify two ‘conceptual’ features of property rights and then consider how these features align with the right to bodily integrity. Property rights enable the rights-holder to exclude others from an object or resource, which thereby preserves an open-ended set of activities with regards to the object or resource. Property rights also enable preferences and choices that can exist independently of the particular rights-holder. The right to bodily integrity is akin to property rights insofar as the right is also an exclusive right, but differs from property rights as the right to bodily integrity enables preferences and choices that cannot exist independently of the rights-holder. The extent to which the right to bodily integrity differs from property rights in this regard depends on the (first-person or third-person) perspective of the body.

This chapter aims to identify the particular structure of rights and duties that ought to apply to the use and storage of bodily material. This requires an assessment of whether the rights that arise in items of bodily material are conceptually consistent with property rights. It is argued here that a right in bodily material that is in-itself is conceptually consistent with property rights and therefore such rights ought to obtain the legal structure of property rights. However, rights in bodily material that is for-itself or for-others are exclusive but non-contingent rights. In addition, insofar as these items of bodily material are self-ascribed, such rights are ambiguous. Rights in bodily material that is for-itself or for-others therefore ought to adopt a structure that is akin to the common law right to privacy. Hence, the law ought to develop a dualist approach to the legal status of bodily material.

This chapter presents a brief overview of the official human rights policy of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and examines China's record on personal integrity rights and civil and political rights. It puts China under the notorious level-4 ranking on the Political Terror Scale (PTS) based on both Amnesty International and Stated Department reports. It also gives China a low score on civil and political rights. Furthermore, it explains China's stand on freedom of thought, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, pornography, and freedom of assembly. It concludes that China clearly falls far short on civil and political rights when judged against countries in its income class.

This chapter aims to identify the ‘structural’ (or ‘doctrinal’) features of property law, compare these features with other branches of law, and consider how these features have been applied to the use and storage of bodily material. Since property rights are exclusive rights, property rights are exercisable against an open-set of persons, actionable per se, and impose duties of non-interference. This set of features can explain why there is pressure on the common law to recognize property rights in bodily material: to pull the entitlements in bodily material behind an ‘exclusionary boundary’. Additionally, since property rights are also rights that can exist independently of the particular rights-holder, they impose corrective remedial duties and are transferable. This set of features can begin to explain why there are limits to the appropriate application of property law: not all rights regarding an object or resource can exist independently of the rights-holder.

The right to destroy is an inherent component of the right to property. It has traditionally been called the jus abutendi: the right to consume, transform, and abuse. Today major legal systems implicitly recognize that an owner is entitled to consume or transform the thing that is the object of property rights, and the same theme is evident in international law. Yet the extension of this right to include irrational destruction is controversial because it permits wasting valuable resources. International law is beginning to craft exceptions to the right to destroy in certain situations. For example, the creator’s right of integrity can be used to prevent the mutilation or destruction of art or other artistic works. International law may also be moving toward a norm that bars owners from intentionally destroying cultural heritage property. Finally, the emerging principle of sustainable land use would restrict owners’ rights to abuse their lands.

This chapter introduces the modelling strategy used throughout the remaining empirical chapters of the book and in doing so presents a “proof-of-concept” for the IGO-based diffusion hypothesis. It shows that states’ levels of physical integrity rights tend to become more similar to each other (whether for better or worse) as a result of their shared membership in IGOs. It also engages in a detailed analysis of one particular country case, Bahrain, to illustrate these larger trends.

A central premise and promise of human rights law is that the protection of human rights leads to greater peace for societies. Yet, in empirical conflict research, rights violations have largely not been seen as a relevant conflict risk factor. It is also unclear why and how violations possibly lead to a higher risk of violent civil conflicts. This chapter explains theoretically how human rights violations potentially increase the risk of such conflicts. It argues that human rights abuses serve as both conflict facilitators and conflict multipliers, and demonstrates empirically that violations of basic economic and social rights and physical integrity rights increase the risk of civil war, while the effects of other civil and political rights are minor. The main implication of these results is that human rights policies and the enforcement of human rights law are well worth pursuing in order to reduce conflict risk.

This chapter lays out the measure of peace developed by Erik Melander. As he sees it, peace concerns the conduct of politics with respect for physical integrity rights, using consensual decision making, on the basis of strong equality values. He draws on the work of Carl von Clausewitz for his insights, following Clausewitz’s trinity of dimensions of war but finding parallels in an evaluation of quality peace. To measure the concept, he employs the three dimensions to develop a map of quality peace in countries in the period from 1981 to 2008. Using data from a variety of sources, including CIRI data, his mapping leads to seven insights into the state of quality peace over the long term and around the world. The chapter concludes with discussion of further implications and considerations of the mappings’ limitations, encouraging further study.

This chapter aims to gain further insight into the underlying mechanisms of IGO-based diffusion by examining the role played by state and IGO-level characteristics. In doing so it tests whether more powerful states tend to have more influence over the human rights policies of their fellow IGO members, and, at the same time, whether these more powerful states are more resistant to the influences of their fellow IGO members. It also asks whether the diffusion effect is restricted to IGOs with a human rights mandate. It finds that while there is some evidence to suggest that more powerful states exert greater influence over their IGO partners, these same states actually turn out to be more receptive to the influences of others. It argues that, overall, these results are most consistent with an “acculturation" (socialization) mechanism.