Craig T. Borowiak
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199778256
- eISBN:
- 9780199919086
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199778256.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter directly addresses democratic accountability’s place within global governance debates. Focusing on the writings of liberal cosmopolitan democrat David Held and more skeptical perspective ...
More
This chapter directly addresses democratic accountability’s place within global governance debates. Focusing on the writings of liberal cosmopolitan democrat David Held and more skeptical perspective of Robert Keohane, the chapter argues that contemporary approaches to democratic accountability in world politics over-emphasize control and order and neglect the place of disorderly, insurgent, and innovative practices taking place outside of formal institutions, often within civil society. Drawing from radical and agonistic traditions of democracy, the chapter introduces reflexive questions about the accountability of accountability frameworks themselves. It also argues for a postsovereignty politics in which democratic accountability is regarded as incompatible with all claims to final authority, regardless of whether that authority is the state, “the people,” or cosmopolitan public law. From this critical accountability approach, the key questions for globalizing democratic accountability are not only whether new accountability regimes can be built, but also whether we can develop reflexive and receptive ways to identify, disrupt, and address the accountability failures of those very regimes.Less
This chapter directly addresses democratic accountability’s place within global governance debates. Focusing on the writings of liberal cosmopolitan democrat David Held and more skeptical perspective of Robert Keohane, the chapter argues that contemporary approaches to democratic accountability in world politics over-emphasize control and order and neglect the place of disorderly, insurgent, and innovative practices taking place outside of formal institutions, often within civil society. Drawing from radical and agonistic traditions of democracy, the chapter introduces reflexive questions about the accountability of accountability frameworks themselves. It also argues for a postsovereignty politics in which democratic accountability is regarded as incompatible with all claims to final authority, regardless of whether that authority is the state, “the people,” or cosmopolitan public law. From this critical accountability approach, the key questions for globalizing democratic accountability are not only whether new accountability regimes can be built, but also whether we can develop reflexive and receptive ways to identify, disrupt, and address the accountability failures of those very regimes.
Claire Metelits
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780814795774
- eISBN:
- 9780814759554
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- NYU Press
- DOI:
- 10.18574/nyu/9780814795774.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
Once considered nationalists, many insurgent groups are now labeled as terrorists and thought to endanger not just their own people, but the world. As the unprecedented trends in political violence ...
More
Once considered nationalists, many insurgent groups are now labeled as terrorists and thought to endanger not just their own people, but the world. As the unprecedented trends in political violence among insurgents have taken shape, and as hundreds of thousands of civilians continue to be displaced, brutalized, and killed, this book provides startling insights that help to explain the nature of insurgent behavior. It draws from over one hundred interviews with insurgent soldiers, commanders, government officials, scholars, and civilians in Sudan, Kenya, Colombia, Turkey, and Iraq, offering a new understanding of insurgent group behavior and providing compelling and intimate portraits of the Sudan People's Liberation Army, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, and Kurdistan Workers' Party. The engaging narratives that emerge from the on-the-ground fieldwork provide incredibly valuable and accurate first-hand documentation of the tactics of some of the world's most notorious insurgent groups. The book offers the reader a timely and intimate understanding of these movements, and explains the changing behavior of insurgent groups toward the civilians they claim to represent.Less
Once considered nationalists, many insurgent groups are now labeled as terrorists and thought to endanger not just their own people, but the world. As the unprecedented trends in political violence among insurgents have taken shape, and as hundreds of thousands of civilians continue to be displaced, brutalized, and killed, this book provides startling insights that help to explain the nature of insurgent behavior. It draws from over one hundred interviews with insurgent soldiers, commanders, government officials, scholars, and civilians in Sudan, Kenya, Colombia, Turkey, and Iraq, offering a new understanding of insurgent group behavior and providing compelling and intimate portraits of the Sudan People's Liberation Army, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, and Kurdistan Workers' Party. The engaging narratives that emerge from the on-the-ground fieldwork provide incredibly valuable and accurate first-hand documentation of the tactics of some of the world's most notorious insurgent groups. The book offers the reader a timely and intimate understanding of these movements, and explains the changing behavior of insurgent groups toward the civilians they claim to represent.
Anthony James Joes
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813124377
- eISBN:
- 9780813134833
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813124377.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, Military History
Guerrilla insurgencies continue to rage across the globe, fueled by ethnic and religious conflict and the easy availability of weapons. At the same time, urban population centers in both ...
More
Guerrilla insurgencies continue to rage across the globe, fueled by ethnic and religious conflict and the easy availability of weapons. At the same time, urban population centers in both industrialized and developing nations attract ever-increasing numbers of people, outstripping rural growth rates worldwide. As a consequence of this population shift from the countryside to the cities, guerrilla conflict in urban areas, similar to the violent response to U.S. occupation in Iraq, will become more frequent. This book traces the diverse origins of urban conflicts and identifies similarities and differences in the methods of counterinsurgent forces. In this wide-ranging and richly detailed comparative analysis, this book examines eight key examples of urban guerrilla conflict spanning half a century and four continents: Warsaw in 1944, Budapest in 1956, Algiers in 1957, Montevideo and São Paulo in the 1960s, Saigon in 1968, Northern Ireland from 1970 to 1998, and Grozny from 1994 to 1996. The book demonstrates that urban insurgents violate certain fundamental principles of guerrilla warfare as set forth by renowned military strategists such as Carl von Clausewitz and Mao Tse-tung. Urban guerrillas operate in finite areas, leaving themselves vulnerable to encirclement and ultimate defeat. They also tend to abandon the goal of establishing a secure base or a cross-border sanctuary, making precarious combat even riskier. Typically, urban guerrillas do not solely target soldiers and police; they often attack civilians in an effort to frighten and disorient the local population and discredit the regime. Thus urban guerrilla warfare becomes difficult to distinguish from simple terrorism. The book argues persuasively against committing U.S. troops in urban counterinsurgencies, but also offers cogent recommendations for the successful conduct of such operations where they must be undertaken.Less
Guerrilla insurgencies continue to rage across the globe, fueled by ethnic and religious conflict and the easy availability of weapons. At the same time, urban population centers in both industrialized and developing nations attract ever-increasing numbers of people, outstripping rural growth rates worldwide. As a consequence of this population shift from the countryside to the cities, guerrilla conflict in urban areas, similar to the violent response to U.S. occupation in Iraq, will become more frequent. This book traces the diverse origins of urban conflicts and identifies similarities and differences in the methods of counterinsurgent forces. In this wide-ranging and richly detailed comparative analysis, this book examines eight key examples of urban guerrilla conflict spanning half a century and four continents: Warsaw in 1944, Budapest in 1956, Algiers in 1957, Montevideo and São Paulo in the 1960s, Saigon in 1968, Northern Ireland from 1970 to 1998, and Grozny from 1994 to 1996. The book demonstrates that urban insurgents violate certain fundamental principles of guerrilla warfare as set forth by renowned military strategists such as Carl von Clausewitz and Mao Tse-tung. Urban guerrillas operate in finite areas, leaving themselves vulnerable to encirclement and ultimate defeat. They also tend to abandon the goal of establishing a secure base or a cross-border sanctuary, making precarious combat even riskier. Typically, urban guerrillas do not solely target soldiers and police; they often attack civilians in an effort to frighten and disorient the local population and discredit the regime. Thus urban guerrilla warfare becomes difficult to distinguish from simple terrorism. The book argues persuasively against committing U.S. troops in urban counterinsurgencies, but also offers cogent recommendations for the successful conduct of such operations where they must be undertaken.
Gail Kligman and Katherine Verdery
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691149721
- eISBN:
- 9781400840434
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691149721.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
This chapter presents some of the language the Party created to carry out its mission—including categories that named classes, types of “enemies” and political insurgents, acceptable vs. suspect ...
More
This chapter presents some of the language the Party created to carry out its mission—including categories that named classes, types of “enemies” and political insurgents, acceptable vs. suspect religions, and ethnonational groups—as well as some of the techniques employed: various forms of propaganda, modeling by example, denunciation and unmasking, and petition writing. Through teaching peasants to denounce and unmask enemies and to communicate with the benevolent paternalist Party in its own terms, these techniques inculcated new rules for producing truth and for understanding the world. There were, of course, other forms of reaction to the pedagogies of collectivization, which have been emphasized in earlier chapters: violent uprisings, attacks on cadres, overt acts of sabotage, and so on.Less
This chapter presents some of the language the Party created to carry out its mission—including categories that named classes, types of “enemies” and political insurgents, acceptable vs. suspect religions, and ethnonational groups—as well as some of the techniques employed: various forms of propaganda, modeling by example, denunciation and unmasking, and petition writing. Through teaching peasants to denounce and unmask enemies and to communicate with the benevolent paternalist Party in its own terms, these techniques inculcated new rules for producing truth and for understanding the world. There were, of course, other forms of reaction to the pedagogies of collectivization, which have been emphasized in earlier chapters: violent uprisings, attacks on cadres, overt acts of sabotage, and so on.
Aysegul Aydin and Cem Emrence
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801453540
- eISBN:
- 9780801456206
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801453540.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
How do insurgents and governments select their targets? Which ideological discourses and organizational policies do they adopt to win civilian loyalties and control territory? This book suggests that ...
More
How do insurgents and governments select their targets? Which ideological discourses and organizational policies do they adopt to win civilian loyalties and control territory? This book suggests that both insurgents and governments adopt a wide variety of coercive strategies in war environments. The book integrates Turkish–Ottoman history with social science theory and unveils long-term policies that continue to inform the distribution of violence in Anatolia. It shows the astonishing similarity in combatants' practices over time and their resulting inability to consolidate Kurdish people and territory around their respective political agendas. The Kurdish insurgency in Turkey is one of the longest-running civil wars in the Middle East. This book demonstrates how violence in this conflict has varied geographically. Identifying distinct zones of violence, the book shows why Kurds and Kurdish territories have followed different political trajectories, guaranteeing continued strife between Kurdish insurgents and the Turkish state in an area where armed groups organized along ethnic lines have battled the central state since Ottoman times. The book presents the first empirical analysis of Kurdish insurgency, relying on original data. It argues that both state agents and insurgents are locked into particular tactics in their conduct of civil war and that the inability of combatants to switch from violence to civic politics leads to a long-running stalemate. Such rigidity blocks negotiations and prevents battlefield victories from being translated into political solutions and lasting agreements.Less
How do insurgents and governments select their targets? Which ideological discourses and organizational policies do they adopt to win civilian loyalties and control territory? This book suggests that both insurgents and governments adopt a wide variety of coercive strategies in war environments. The book integrates Turkish–Ottoman history with social science theory and unveils long-term policies that continue to inform the distribution of violence in Anatolia. It shows the astonishing similarity in combatants' practices over time and their resulting inability to consolidate Kurdish people and territory around their respective political agendas. The Kurdish insurgency in Turkey is one of the longest-running civil wars in the Middle East. This book demonstrates how violence in this conflict has varied geographically. Identifying distinct zones of violence, the book shows why Kurds and Kurdish territories have followed different political trajectories, guaranteeing continued strife between Kurdish insurgents and the Turkish state in an area where armed groups organized along ethnic lines have battled the central state since Ottoman times. The book presents the first empirical analysis of Kurdish insurgency, relying on original data. It argues that both state agents and insurgents are locked into particular tactics in their conduct of civil war and that the inability of combatants to switch from violence to civic politics leads to a long-running stalemate. Such rigidity blocks negotiations and prevents battlefield victories from being translated into political solutions and lasting agreements.
Ron E. Hassner
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195342048
- eISBN:
- 9780199852017
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195342048.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter examines the key problems that counterinsurgency operations pose in sacred places. It first delineates the concept of a “sacred space” and explains the key features that grant such ...
More
This chapter examines the key problems that counterinsurgency operations pose in sacred places. It first delineates the concept of a “sacred space” and explains the key features that grant such spaces a sacral quality. It then examines how insurgent groups can usefully occupy and exploit sacred places. It argues that insurgents can mingle with pilgrims and worshippers and can also use the sacredness of shrines, mosques, and temples as sanctuaries from counterinsurgent forces who may be understandably loath to offend local religious sensibilities by using force against such locales. The chapter outlines possible strategies and potential pitfalls for security forces when they are seeking to flush out insurgents who have taken refuge in sacred arenas. Finally, it looks at some of the lessons derived from the Israeli siege of the Church of Nativity in Bethlehem, where several Palestinian militants retreated in 2002.Less
This chapter examines the key problems that counterinsurgency operations pose in sacred places. It first delineates the concept of a “sacred space” and explains the key features that grant such spaces a sacral quality. It then examines how insurgent groups can usefully occupy and exploit sacred places. It argues that insurgents can mingle with pilgrims and worshippers and can also use the sacredness of shrines, mosques, and temples as sanctuaries from counterinsurgent forces who may be understandably loath to offend local religious sensibilities by using force against such locales. The chapter outlines possible strategies and potential pitfalls for security forces when they are seeking to flush out insurgents who have taken refuge in sacred arenas. Finally, it looks at some of the lessons derived from the Israeli siege of the Church of Nativity in Bethlehem, where several Palestinian militants retreated in 2002.
C. Christine Fair
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195342048
- eISBN:
- 9780199852017
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195342048.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter examines two important operations waged by Indian security forces to counter Sikh insurgents operating in India's northern state of Punjab, from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. The ...
More
This chapter examines two important operations waged by Indian security forces to counter Sikh insurgents operating in India's northern state of Punjab, from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. The first operation was a military as well as a public-relations debacle. The Indian Army had inadequate and flawed intelligence about the strength and capabilities of the insurgents who had entered and occupied the Golden Temple, and they failed to forge a viable public-relations strategy and ultimately used excessive force to prevail. Fortunately, the Indian state was capable of learning from its initial errors. When Sikh militants again attempted to use the temple as a sanctuary, the Indian security forces launched a second assault, which involved a prolonged siege, but one marked by careful attention to the sentiments of religious authorities and by a deft public-relations strategy. The two contrasting episodes underscore how the same regime, under different circumstances, can cope with and respond to the requirements of a counterinsurgency operation in a sacred site.Less
This chapter examines two important operations waged by Indian security forces to counter Sikh insurgents operating in India's northern state of Punjab, from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. The first operation was a military as well as a public-relations debacle. The Indian Army had inadequate and flawed intelligence about the strength and capabilities of the insurgents who had entered and occupied the Golden Temple, and they failed to forge a viable public-relations strategy and ultimately used excessive force to prevail. Fortunately, the Indian state was capable of learning from its initial errors. When Sikh militants again attempted to use the temple as a sanctuary, the Indian security forces launched a second assault, which involved a prolonged siege, but one marked by careful attention to the sentiments of religious authorities and by a deft public-relations strategy. The two contrasting episodes underscore how the same regime, under different circumstances, can cope with and respond to the requirements of a counterinsurgency operation in a sacred site.
Manjeet S. Pardesi
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195342048
- eISBN:
- 9780199852017
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195342048.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter discusses the July 2007 Pakistan military operation against the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. It begins by briefly describing the role of Islam in ...
More
This chapter discusses the July 2007 Pakistan military operation against the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. It begins by briefly describing the role of Islam in contemporary Pakistan, focusing on the rise of Islamist militant groups, especially those affiliated with the Deobandi school of thought and the nexus between the Establishment and the Islamists in Pakistan. The chapter then discusses the growing Islamization of the Pakistani state and society, within which the occupation of the Red Mosque by armed insurgents took place; and the conduct of Operation Sunrise and the recapture of the mosque complex by Pakistani security forces. It is argued that while Operation Sunrise was a success in military terms, its political consequences have contributed to Pakistan's ever-deepening instability and to Islamist militancy in the tribal belt and beyond. Prospects are slim that Islamabad has the will or capability to address the structural context within which the events at the Red Mosque transpired.Less
This chapter discusses the July 2007 Pakistan military operation against the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. It begins by briefly describing the role of Islam in contemporary Pakistan, focusing on the rise of Islamist militant groups, especially those affiliated with the Deobandi school of thought and the nexus between the Establishment and the Islamists in Pakistan. The chapter then discusses the growing Islamization of the Pakistani state and society, within which the occupation of the Red Mosque by armed insurgents took place; and the conduct of Operation Sunrise and the recapture of the mosque complex by Pakistani security forces. It is argued that while Operation Sunrise was a success in military terms, its political consequences have contributed to Pakistan's ever-deepening instability and to Islamist militancy in the tribal belt and beyond. Prospects are slim that Islamabad has the will or capability to address the structural context within which the events at the Red Mosque transpired.
David Siddhartha Patel
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195342048
- eISBN:
- 9780199852017
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195342048.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter focuses upon two uprisings in 2004 in Najaf, one of the holiest cities in Shi'ite Islam and home to the revered Imam Ali shrine. In the first uprising, in April 2004, U.S. army forces ...
More
This chapter focuses upon two uprisings in 2004 in Najaf, one of the holiest cities in Shi'ite Islam and home to the revered Imam Ali shrine. In the first uprising, in April 2004, U.S. army forces immediately attacked insurgents elsewhere in Iraq but deferred significant offensive operations against those in Najaf by four weeks. During those operations, they did not pursue insurgents into Najaf's Old City or the shrine. The second uprising occurred in August in 2004 and was put down by U.S. Marines. In contrast, the Marines immediately attacked insurgents throughout Najaf, reducing their exclusion zone around the shrine and around abandoned no-fire zones. The chapter asks why, despite similar risks, did U.S. forces aggressively pursue insurgents in Najaf's sacred spaces in August but not in April? It argues that the most important variable explaining the two different outcomes was the nature of the government at the time of the operations. In April, Iraq was governed by Paul Bremer, III, who was the administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). In contrast, by August the CPA had been dissolved and “power” was transferred to an appointed Iraqi Interim Government with Iyad Allawi as the prime minister. Allawi's government vociferously supported decisive action against insurgents in Najaf in August. The support of this nominally sovereign Iraqi government may explain the later U.S. willingness to assault Najaf's sacred sites. Earlier in the year, U.S. planners were unwilling to do so because they were uncertain about how Iraq's Shi'ites would respond.Less
This chapter focuses upon two uprisings in 2004 in Najaf, one of the holiest cities in Shi'ite Islam and home to the revered Imam Ali shrine. In the first uprising, in April 2004, U.S. army forces immediately attacked insurgents elsewhere in Iraq but deferred significant offensive operations against those in Najaf by four weeks. During those operations, they did not pursue insurgents into Najaf's Old City or the shrine. The second uprising occurred in August in 2004 and was put down by U.S. Marines. In contrast, the Marines immediately attacked insurgents throughout Najaf, reducing their exclusion zone around the shrine and around abandoned no-fire zones. The chapter asks why, despite similar risks, did U.S. forces aggressively pursue insurgents in Najaf's sacred spaces in August but not in April? It argues that the most important variable explaining the two different outcomes was the nature of the government at the time of the operations. In April, Iraq was governed by Paul Bremer, III, who was the administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). In contrast, by August the CPA had been dissolved and “power” was transferred to an appointed Iraqi Interim Government with Iyad Allawi as the prime minister. Allawi's government vociferously supported decisive action against insurgents in Najaf in August. The support of this nominally sovereign Iraqi government may explain the later U.S. willingness to assault Najaf's sacred sites. Earlier in the year, U.S. planners were unwilling to do so because they were uncertain about how Iraq's Shi'ites would respond.
Joseph Chinyong Liow
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195342048
- eISBN:
- 9780199852017
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195342048.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter focuses on the Thai military's complete mishandling of a counterinsurgency operation at the Krue Se Mosque in southern Thailand. It argues that the military violated some of the most ...
More
This chapter focuses on the Thai military's complete mishandling of a counterinsurgency operation at the Krue Se Mosque in southern Thailand. It argues that the military violated some of the most basic principles of counterinsurgency operations and demonstrated a profound lack of both tactical and strategic awareness. Specifically, their security forces had lacked adequate intelligence on the insurgents operating in the region where the mosque was located, there were problems in the chain of command, and there was no clear blueprint for the operation barring the use of force. Not surprisingly, this operation ended in considerable bloodshed at a mosque that was fraught with a history and myth of local resistance. As a consequence of this botched operation, the insurgency received a substantial boost because the harshness of the military's tactics alienated much of the local population.Less
This chapter focuses on the Thai military's complete mishandling of a counterinsurgency operation at the Krue Se Mosque in southern Thailand. It argues that the military violated some of the most basic principles of counterinsurgency operations and demonstrated a profound lack of both tactical and strategic awareness. Specifically, their security forces had lacked adequate intelligence on the insurgents operating in the region where the mosque was located, there were problems in the chain of command, and there was no clear blueprint for the operation barring the use of force. Not surprisingly, this operation ended in considerable bloodshed at a mosque that was fraught with a history and myth of local resistance. As a consequence of this botched operation, the insurgency received a substantial boost because the harshness of the military's tactics alienated much of the local population.
Nora Bensahel
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195342048
- eISBN:
- 9780199852017
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195342048.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter concludes the book with an instructive analysis across the various case studies. It draws out a number of operational lessons to be learned from the cases, including an assessment of the ...
More
This chapter concludes the book with an instructive analysis across the various case studies. It draws out a number of operational lessons to be learned from the cases, including an assessment of the degree of sacredness of a site, the level of support that insurgents enjoy within the local population, and the relative strengths of direct and indirect strategies. It argues that counterinsurgency operations rarely succeed or fail solely because of the sacredness of the site on which they take place. Rather, counterinsurgency is inherently difficult, and the presented cases demonstrate the numerous other factors that affect success, including differences in terrain and geography, tactical choices, the legitimacy of the national government, and the training and capabilities of both the insurgents and the counterinsurgency forces. However, the cases in this volume demonstrate that counterinsurgency in sacred spaces presents a number of special concerns that operational planners must address to ensure success.Less
This chapter concludes the book with an instructive analysis across the various case studies. It draws out a number of operational lessons to be learned from the cases, including an assessment of the degree of sacredness of a site, the level of support that insurgents enjoy within the local population, and the relative strengths of direct and indirect strategies. It argues that counterinsurgency operations rarely succeed or fail solely because of the sacredness of the site on which they take place. Rather, counterinsurgency is inherently difficult, and the presented cases demonstrate the numerous other factors that affect success, including differences in terrain and geography, tactical choices, the legitimacy of the national government, and the training and capabilities of both the insurgents and the counterinsurgency forces. However, the cases in this volume demonstrate that counterinsurgency in sacred spaces presents a number of special concerns that operational planners must address to ensure success.
Anthony James Joes
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813126142
- eISBN:
- 9780813135588
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813126142.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The Afghan war was the longest military conflict in Soviet history. The Soviet armed forces suffered their clearest reversal since the fall of Nazi Berlin, the first time in modern history that a ...
More
The Afghan war was the longest military conflict in Soviet history. The Soviet armed forces suffered their clearest reversal since the fall of Nazi Berlin, the first time in modern history that a Russian army had been decisively checked by insurgents. The war provided the arena for the CIA's biggest ever clandestine operation. The Afghan insurgents received material help from an exceedingly heterogeneous group of states. Afghanistan was able to establish and maintain what independence it possessed, in part because it provided a convenient buffer between the two contending empires. The Soviets in the end withdrew their troops from Afghanistan but that turned out to be the first of such withdrawals.Less
The Afghan war was the longest military conflict in Soviet history. The Soviet armed forces suffered their clearest reversal since the fall of Nazi Berlin, the first time in modern history that a Russian army had been decisively checked by insurgents. The war provided the arena for the CIA's biggest ever clandestine operation. The Afghan insurgents received material help from an exceedingly heterogeneous group of states. Afghanistan was able to establish and maintain what independence it possessed, in part because it provided a convenient buffer between the two contending empires. The Soviets in the end withdrew their troops from Afghanistan but that turned out to be the first of such withdrawals.
Mark de Rond
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9781501705489
- eISBN:
- 9781501707940
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501705489.003.0010
- Subject:
- Anthropology, Medical Anthropology
The author talks about the day he was invited to join one of the doctors on a flight to Kandahar to witness the handover of three Afghan casualties to the local health care system. He first discusses ...
More
The author talks about the day he was invited to join one of the doctors on a flight to Kandahar to witness the handover of three Afghan casualties to the local health care system. He first discusses the so-called “humpback day” for one of the doctors, or the day that marked the midpoint of his six-week tour. Doctors arrived and departed unaccompanied, whereas nurses came and left en masse to give way to a brand-new cohort in a formal handover ceremony before their twenty-four-hour decompression in Cyprus. Camaraderie has always been a strong feature of military life and especially in the theater of war. The author then turns to the day's casualties, who were to be dropped off at Kandahar Military Regional Hospital, called Camp Hero. He also narrates his flight back to Camp Bastion together with other passengers that included three insurgents, bound and blindfolded.Less
The author talks about the day he was invited to join one of the doctors on a flight to Kandahar to witness the handover of three Afghan casualties to the local health care system. He first discusses the so-called “humpback day” for one of the doctors, or the day that marked the midpoint of his six-week tour. Doctors arrived and departed unaccompanied, whereas nurses came and left en masse to give way to a brand-new cohort in a formal handover ceremony before their twenty-four-hour decompression in Cyprus. Camaraderie has always been a strong feature of military life and especially in the theater of war. The author then turns to the day's casualties, who were to be dropped off at Kandahar Military Regional Hospital, called Camp Hero. He also narrates his flight back to Camp Bastion together with other passengers that included three insurgents, bound and blindfolded.
Mark Kukis
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231156929
- eISBN:
- 9780231527569
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231156929.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, Middle East History
Featuring the testimony of close to seventy Iraqis from all walks of life, this book builds a chronological history unmatched for its insight and revelations. Here is a history of the war in Iraq as ...
More
Featuring the testimony of close to seventy Iraqis from all walks of life, this book builds a chronological history unmatched for its insight and revelations. Here is a history of the war in Iraq as told entirely by Iraqis living through the United States invasion and occupation. Beginning in 2003, this narrative includes the experiential accounts of civilians, politicians, former dissidents, insurgents, and militiamen. Iraqis offering firsthand stories range from onetime Prime Minister Ayad Allawi to resistance fighters speaking on the condition of anonymity. Divided into five parts, these interviews recount the 2003 invasion; Iraq's gradual slide into chaos from 2004 to 2005; the start of a new order in 2006; the rise of open sectarian violence over the next two years; and the effort since 2008 to reconstruct a society from relative calm. Each section includes interviews grouped into themes, with brief epilogues for the participants. Not since Studs Terkel's The Good War has a book captured so acutely the human consequences of a conflict we are still struggling to understand. This book makes utterly vivid the meaning and legacy of the Iraq war.Less
Featuring the testimony of close to seventy Iraqis from all walks of life, this book builds a chronological history unmatched for its insight and revelations. Here is a history of the war in Iraq as told entirely by Iraqis living through the United States invasion and occupation. Beginning in 2003, this narrative includes the experiential accounts of civilians, politicians, former dissidents, insurgents, and militiamen. Iraqis offering firsthand stories range from onetime Prime Minister Ayad Allawi to resistance fighters speaking on the condition of anonymity. Divided into five parts, these interviews recount the 2003 invasion; Iraq's gradual slide into chaos from 2004 to 2005; the start of a new order in 2006; the rise of open sectarian violence over the next two years; and the effort since 2008 to reconstruct a society from relative calm. Each section includes interviews grouped into themes, with brief epilogues for the participants. Not since Studs Terkel's The Good War has a book captured so acutely the human consequences of a conflict we are still struggling to understand. This book makes utterly vivid the meaning and legacy of the Iraq war.
James W. Pardew
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780813174358
- eISBN:
- 9780813174587
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813174358.003.0027
- Subject:
- History, Political History
Touch-and-go diplomacy by senior European officials fails to halt the momentum toward a civil war in Macedonia after Albanian insurgents use force to demand increased rights and power for their ...
More
Touch-and-go diplomacy by senior European officials fails to halt the momentum toward a civil war in Macedonia after Albanian insurgents use force to demand increased rights and power for their people. With limited capacity to deal with an insurgency, the Macedonians can have a war or a unified nation, not both. President Bush and Secretary of State Powell designate Pardew as the US envoy to work with EU envoy Francois Leotard of France to assist President Trajkovski in finding a peaceful solution to the looming war in Macedonia.
Less
Touch-and-go diplomacy by senior European officials fails to halt the momentum toward a civil war in Macedonia after Albanian insurgents use force to demand increased rights and power for their people. With limited capacity to deal with an insurgency, the Macedonians can have a war or a unified nation, not both. President Bush and Secretary of State Powell designate Pardew as the US envoy to work with EU envoy Francois Leotard of France to assist President Trajkovski in finding a peaceful solution to the looming war in Macedonia.
Mark Kukis
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231156929
- eISBN:
- 9780231527569
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231156929.003.0022
- Subject:
- History, Middle East History
In this chapter, Ra'ad Jamal Habib recounts his experience during the Iraq war. Before the war, Ra'ad Jamal Habib was a long-haul bus driver doing routes all over Iraq from Baghdad, where he has ...
More
In this chapter, Ra'ad Jamal Habib recounts his experience during the Iraq war. Before the war, Ra'ad Jamal Habib was a long-haul bus driver doing routes all over Iraq from Baghdad, where he has lived all his life. He continued working as a driver for hired cars running convoys between Baghdad and Damascus after the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime. In August of 2007, U.S. forces arrested him at his home in northern Baghdad as part of a campaign to thin the ranks of Shi'ite militias and Sunni insurgents. He was detained at Camp Bucca, a U.S. military detention facility that was then the largest in the world. The average stay for an Iraqi in Camp Bucca was one year. Ra'ad Jamal Habib was imprisoned from August 7, 2007, to September 25, 2008, according to U.S. military documents handed to him as part of his release papers.Less
In this chapter, Ra'ad Jamal Habib recounts his experience during the Iraq war. Before the war, Ra'ad Jamal Habib was a long-haul bus driver doing routes all over Iraq from Baghdad, where he has lived all his life. He continued working as a driver for hired cars running convoys between Baghdad and Damascus after the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime. In August of 2007, U.S. forces arrested him at his home in northern Baghdad as part of a campaign to thin the ranks of Shi'ite militias and Sunni insurgents. He was detained at Camp Bucca, a U.S. military detention facility that was then the largest in the world. The average stay for an Iraqi in Camp Bucca was one year. Ra'ad Jamal Habib was imprisoned from August 7, 2007, to September 25, 2008, according to U.S. military documents handed to him as part of his release papers.
Mark Kukis
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231156929
- eISBN:
- 9780231527569
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231156929.003.0023
- Subject:
- History, Middle East History
In this chapter, Ali Fahed Mahmood recounts his experience during the Iraq war. Ali Fahed Mahmood recalls how the sectarian war between Shi'ites and Sunnis turned Mansour, a mixed area where he ...
More
In this chapter, Ali Fahed Mahmood recounts his experience during the Iraq war. Ali Fahed Mahmood recalls how the sectarian war between Shi'ites and Sunnis turned Mansour, a mixed area where he lived, into a disaster zone. Shortly after the U.S. invasion, he joined a volunteer guard force established by the Americans to protect public buildings, and when the sectarian violence erupted he was in charge of security for forty guards keeping watch over sixteen schools. The threats started from both sides in the area as things got bad in 2004. Shi'ite militiamen with the Mahdi Army would paste warnings on the houses of Sunnis, telling them to leave. Sunni insurgents would post lists of names of people said to be working with the Americans, people who were to be killed. Ali Fahed Mahmood's name appeared on one of those lists, because he is a Shi'ite. Someone threw a threat letter into his yard, and later a grenade broke all the windows in his house. Ali Fahed Mahmood was still patrolling schools in his neighborhood as of January 2009.Less
In this chapter, Ali Fahed Mahmood recounts his experience during the Iraq war. Ali Fahed Mahmood recalls how the sectarian war between Shi'ites and Sunnis turned Mansour, a mixed area where he lived, into a disaster zone. Shortly after the U.S. invasion, he joined a volunteer guard force established by the Americans to protect public buildings, and when the sectarian violence erupted he was in charge of security for forty guards keeping watch over sixteen schools. The threats started from both sides in the area as things got bad in 2004. Shi'ite militiamen with the Mahdi Army would paste warnings on the houses of Sunnis, telling them to leave. Sunni insurgents would post lists of names of people said to be working with the Americans, people who were to be killed. Ali Fahed Mahmood's name appeared on one of those lists, because he is a Shi'ite. Someone threw a threat letter into his yard, and later a grenade broke all the windows in his house. Ali Fahed Mahmood was still patrolling schools in his neighborhood as of January 2009.
Alex Loftus
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- August 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780816665716
- eISBN:
- 9781452946849
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Minnesota Press
- DOI:
- 10.5749/minnesota/9780816665716.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
This book develops a conversation between Marxist theories of everyday life and recent work in urban political ecology, arguing for a philosophy of praxis in relation to the politics of urban ...
More
This book develops a conversation between Marxist theories of everyday life and recent work in urban political ecology, arguing for a philosophy of praxis in relation to the politics of urban environments. Grounding its theoretical debate in empirical studies of struggles to obtain water in the informal settlements of Durban, South Africa, as well as in the creative acts of insurgent art activists in London, the book builds on the work of key Marxist thinkers to redefine “environmental politics.” A Marxist philosophy of praxis—that world-changing ideas emerge from the acts of everyday people—undergirds the book. Our daily reality, states the book, is woven out of the entanglements of social and natural relations, and as such a kind of environmental politics is automatically incorporated into our lives. Nevertheless, one effect of the public recognition of global environmental change, asserts Loftus, has been a resurgence of dualistic understandings of the world: for example, that nature is inflicting revenge on arrogant human societies. The book reformulates—with the assistance of such philosophers as Georg Lukács, Antonio Gramsci, Henri Lefebvre, and others—a politics of the environment in which everyday subjectivity is at the heart of a revolutionary politics.Less
This book develops a conversation between Marxist theories of everyday life and recent work in urban political ecology, arguing for a philosophy of praxis in relation to the politics of urban environments. Grounding its theoretical debate in empirical studies of struggles to obtain water in the informal settlements of Durban, South Africa, as well as in the creative acts of insurgent art activists in London, the book builds on the work of key Marxist thinkers to redefine “environmental politics.” A Marxist philosophy of praxis—that world-changing ideas emerge from the acts of everyday people—undergirds the book. Our daily reality, states the book, is woven out of the entanglements of social and natural relations, and as such a kind of environmental politics is automatically incorporated into our lives. Nevertheless, one effect of the public recognition of global environmental change, asserts Loftus, has been a resurgence of dualistic understandings of the world: for example, that nature is inflicting revenge on arrogant human societies. The book reformulates—with the assistance of such philosophers as Georg Lukács, Antonio Gramsci, Henri Lefebvre, and others—a politics of the environment in which everyday subjectivity is at the heart of a revolutionary politics.
Patrick H. Hase
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9789622098992
- eISBN:
- 9789882207592
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Hong Kong University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5790/hongkong/9789622098992.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, Asian History
This chapter provides a discussion on the road to War during July 1898–March 1899. It starts by addressing the New Territories in 1899. The New Territories were mostly very mountainous, especially in ...
More
This chapter provides a discussion on the road to War during July 1898–March 1899. It starts by addressing the New Territories in 1899. The New Territories were mostly very mountainous, especially in the centre and east, with little flat land except in patches along the stream-courses or seashore. The New Territories in 1899 had no roads capable of taking any sort of wheeled vehicle, but only footpaths, mostly narrow and unpaved, or paved only with rough boulders. Where the paths went over the hills they often became interminable flights of ill-paved steps. The Six-Day War was the last flourish of the old society of the New Territories, the last time the old great Punti clans and villages were able to dominate local politics and society. After the coming of the British, these ancient Punti clans had to accept equality with their old tenants and allies. The agitations against the Lease of the New Territories to Britain are discussed. In addition, the preparations for War during March-April 1899 are highlighted. The chapter then outlines the factors driving the insurgents into armed opposition.Less
This chapter provides a discussion on the road to War during July 1898–March 1899. It starts by addressing the New Territories in 1899. The New Territories were mostly very mountainous, especially in the centre and east, with little flat land except in patches along the stream-courses or seashore. The New Territories in 1899 had no roads capable of taking any sort of wheeled vehicle, but only footpaths, mostly narrow and unpaved, or paved only with rough boulders. Where the paths went over the hills they often became interminable flights of ill-paved steps. The Six-Day War was the last flourish of the old society of the New Territories, the last time the old great Punti clans and villages were able to dominate local politics and society. After the coming of the British, these ancient Punti clans had to accept equality with their old tenants and allies. The agitations against the Lease of the New Territories to Britain are discussed. In addition, the preparations for War during March-April 1899 are highlighted. The chapter then outlines the factors driving the insurgents into armed opposition.
Patrick H. Hase
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9789622098992
- eISBN:
- 9789882207592
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Hong Kong University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5790/hongkong/9789622098992.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, Asian History
James Stewart Lockhart said that with regard to the Battle of Mui Shue Hang: “It is impossible to ascertain whether there were any casualties”. It is entirely probable that the Ping Shan people and ...
More
James Stewart Lockhart said that with regard to the Battle of Mui Shue Hang: “It is impossible to ascertain whether there were any casualties”. It is entirely probable that the Ping Shan people and Tang Shing-sz are correct, and that the list inscribed in the Tat Tak Kung Soh in 1938 is of the dead from the Ping Shan Brigade in the Six-Day War, the dead from the fighting with Ha Tsuen having been separately enshrined and commemorated, in a shrine that has not survived to the present day. It is also stated that the losses to the insurgents were serious, constituting an “utter rout”, and a “disastrous defeat”, with “many dead and many wounded”, which is much closer to the truth than the bland statements of “slight loss” in the British official Reports in the official collections. The chapter then reviews Sir Henry Blake's policies towards the insurgents. The takeover of Weihaiwei by the British can usefully be looked at in clarifying what Blake meant by calling for a minimal-force pacification in the New Territories, with military action being limited to bringing troops under attack to safety. It further addresses Lockhart's views of the insurgents.Less
James Stewart Lockhart said that with regard to the Battle of Mui Shue Hang: “It is impossible to ascertain whether there were any casualties”. It is entirely probable that the Ping Shan people and Tang Shing-sz are correct, and that the list inscribed in the Tat Tak Kung Soh in 1938 is of the dead from the Ping Shan Brigade in the Six-Day War, the dead from the fighting with Ha Tsuen having been separately enshrined and commemorated, in a shrine that has not survived to the present day. It is also stated that the losses to the insurgents were serious, constituting an “utter rout”, and a “disastrous defeat”, with “many dead and many wounded”, which is much closer to the truth than the bland statements of “slight loss” in the British official Reports in the official collections. The chapter then reviews Sir Henry Blake's policies towards the insurgents. The takeover of Weihaiwei by the British can usefully be looked at in clarifying what Blake meant by calling for a minimal-force pacification in the New Territories, with military action being limited to bringing troops under attack to safety. It further addresses Lockhart's views of the insurgents.
